



“The Destruction of the European Jews”



Raul Hilberg's Failure to Prove National-Socialist “Killing Centers”

His Misrepresented Sources and Flawed Methods



CARLO MATTOGNO



BUNGLED: “THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS”

Carlo Mattogno

BUNGLED: “THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS”

**Raul Hilberg’s Failure to Prove
National-Socialist “Killing Centers”**

**His Misrepresented Sources
and Flawed Methods**



**Academic Research
Media Review
Education Group Ltd
January 2024**

HOLOCAUST HANDBOOKS, Volume 3:

Carlo Mattogno:

Bungled: "The Destruction of the European Jews":

Raul Hilberg's Failure to Prove National-Socialist "Killing Centers."

His Misrepresented Sources and Flawed Methods

Translated by Carlos Porter and Germar Rudolf

Published and distributed by:

Academic Research Media Review Education Group Ltd

86-90 Paul Street, London, EC2A 4NE, United Kingdom

Published under a license granted by Castlehill Publishing LLC

January 2024

ISBN: 978-1-911733-54-6

ISSN 1529-7748

www.HolocaustHandbooks.com

© 2018, 2021 Carlo Mattogno

Set in Times New Roman

Table of Contents

	Page
Introduction	7
1. Origins and Significance of the "Final Solution"	10
1.1. The "Code Language"	10
1.2. National-Socialist Emigration-Evacuation Policy for Jews.....	11
1.3. Destruction or Emigration?	21
1.4. Hitler's "Prophecy" of January 30, 1939.....	22
1.5. National-Socialist Emigration/Evacuation Policies According to Hilberg	26
1.6. The " <i>Führerbefehl</i> "	33
1.7. The Final Objective of Jewish Emigration	36
1.8. The Wannsee Conference	38
1.9. Goebbels and the Alleged Extermination of the Jews	49
2. The Deportations	57
2.1. Hilberg and the Einsatzgruppen.....	57
2.1.1. The Extermination Order	57
2.1.2. The Two Sweeps	62
2.1.3. The Origins of the "Gas Vans"	63
2.1.4. The Ghettoes.....	65
2.1.5. The Death Toll.....	67
2.1.6. "Action 1005".....	69
2.2. The Purpose of the Deportations	70
2.3. The Deportations to the "Killing Centers"	78
2.3.1. France	78
2.3.2. Serbia.....	87
2.3.3. Croatia	93
2.3.4. Slovakia	94
2.3.5. Hungary	103
3. The "Killing Centers"	108
3.1. Chelmno	108
3.2. Belzec, Sobibór, Treblinka	110
3.3. Lublin-Majdanek	120
3.4. Auschwitz	123
3.5. Höss and the Origins of the "Gas Chambers".....	128
3.6. The Birkenau Crematoria	131
3.7. Zyklon B	134
3.8. Euthanasia and the "Killing Centers".....	148
3.9. The Camp Administration	151
3.9.1. Sadism and Corruption	151
3.9.2. Inmate Living Conditions	155
3.9.3. The Activity of the SS Courts.....	166
3.9.4. The Inmates' Labor Deployment.....	171
3.9.5. Medical Experiments	178
3.9.6. "Concealment" and Propaganda	182
3.9.7. The "Extermination Operations"	191

3.9.8. Open-Air Cremations 200

3.10. Hans Frank and the “Killing Centers” 202

3.11. The Order to “Stop Gassings” 206

3.12. The Death Toll in Poland 209

4. Hilberg’s Testimony at the 1985 Zündel Trial.....215

4.1. Summary of the Testimony 215

4.2. The Alleged Hitler Extermination Order..... 218

4.3. Hilberg’s Method 225

5. Hilberg on the *Führer* Order during the 1980s.....230

5.1. The Paris Conference 230

5.1.1. Intentionalists and Functionalists 230

5.1.2. The Extermination Order 236

5.1.3. Hilberg’s Contribution 242

5.2. The Stuttgart Conference 243

5.2.1. The Problems Discussed 243

5.2.2. Hilberg’s Contribution 250

5.3. Hilberg’s Article in *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp* 254

5.4. The 2003 Edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*..... 256

Conclusion263

Appendix.....267

The Opponents 267

Archive Abbreviations 270

Bibliography..... 271

Index of Names 283

Introduction

*The Destruction of the European Jews*¹ by Raul Hilberg is considered one of the most-important works of orthodox Holocaust historiography, "arguably the single most-important book about the Holocaust," in Michael Berenbaum's opinion (Gutman/Berenbaum, p. 78). Thanks to its massive number of references, the work meticulously documents the National-Socialist persecution of the European Jews. As for their alleged "destruction," the documentation often proves highly deficient. This has been stressed by revisionist researchers such as Jürgen Graf (1999/2015), as well as by orthodox scholars such as Belgian historian Gie van den Berghe, among other things the author of a critique of "negationism" (2001). In an article devoted to Hilberg's work, van den Berghe notes that, due to the lack of documentary sources, Hilberg was compelled to rely on testimonies regarding the alleged extermination camps, commenting (van den Berghe 1990, pp. 121f.):

"But many sources on extermination camps were destroyed, and on some aspects there have never been any nazi sources [...]. Hilberg had to turn to eye-witnesses. Because he has always avoided using the sources created by them, he had no relevant criteria to separate chaff from wheat, and he cannot interpret and analyze these more subjective sources more or less correctly.

From Hilberg's choice of ego-documents it becomes clear that he has been led by rather irrelevant criteria, e.g. the profession of the eyewitnesses (with Hilberg almost only doctors and university graduates), and the availability of the reports. As far as ego-documents are concerned, he almost only uses what was available in English.

In this chapter on the killing centers, the otherwise very accurate and conscientious Hilberg uses the ego-material in a remarkably inaccurate and uncritical way. Of the many thousand eyewitness reports on the nazi camps he has only used about ten. He considers events sufficiently proved if one eyewitness mentioned them. He generalizes on the basis of one eyewitness report and even omits the conditional tense here. He is astonishingly ill informed about the consulted eyewitnesses and their writings. He also makes a number of capital errors. He bases himself on declarations and constructions of victims to reconstruct the motives of their persecutors. He relies on a few psychoanalytically

¹ The first edition appeared in Chicago in 1961; a "revised and definitive edition" appeared in 1985, with yet another revised, but this time definitely definitive edition following in 2003. In this study, I quote from the 2003 edition, referring to the page numbers only.

inspired interpretations by the survivor E.A. Cohen in Het Duitse concentratiekamp (The German Concentration Camp) (Amsterdam, 1952), a book that was almost immediately translated into English. Later, Cohen expressed his doubts about these interpretations, but the book in which he did this (De negentien treinen naar Sobibor, The Nineteen Trains to Sobibor, Amsterdam – Brussels, 1979) was not consulted by Hilberg, probably because it was not translated into English.

Unfortunately this unjudicious [sic] use of ego-documents makes the chapter on extermination camps less convincing than the rest of the book."

If we consider that this chapter represents the apex and the *raison d'être* of Hilberg's book, of which the more-than-900 preceding pages constitute merely an introduction and a prelude, van den Berghe's critical observations already inflict a serious blow to the credibility of the entire book. This, by the way, can already be glimpsed from the fact that – as noted by J. Graf – the chapter on the "killing centers," is a rather skimpy part of the work, consisting of 138 pages (pp. 921-1058) out of a total of 1388, while the author devotes only 18 pages to the core problems of the "Killing Operations"! (pp. 1027-1044)

But the problem is much broader than that mooted by the Belgian historian, because there is also a need to examine the fundamental question of the reliability and reciprocal consistency of these testimonies, as well as that of Hilberg's interpretation of the documents, which is just as important.

What I intend in this study is essentially a verification of its sources and its historiographic method.

Since Hilberg's work in general, particularly with regard to the matters of concern to us here, consists of an enormous multitude of often-insignificant details, from which he draws first of all the great preponderance of his sources as well as his evidentiary pretensions, I, too, shall be constrained to descend repeatedly into detail. In my analysis, I shall, insofar as possible, follow Hilberg's expository trajectory; in some cases, however, I will choose to deal with similar matters in a different context.

On January 15-18, 1985, Hilberg testified as an historical expert on the Holocaust during the First Zündel Trial.² The stenographic record of the proceedings (District Court), upon which my remarks will be based, were published in 2020 (Rudolf 2020a). Over the course of the cross-examination by defense attorney Douglas Christie, many topics relating to the first edition of his work were discussed. Hilberg's responses were often revealing, particularly regarding his methods. For this reason, I shall insert those most-significant in the following discussion. On the other hand, I shall deal in Chapter IV with the most-important problems discussed by Hilberg during that trial.

² Ernst Zündel was tried in Canada on a charge of "spreading false news" for distributing a brochure by Richard Harwood (1974). The trial was held in Toronto from January 7 to March 25, 1985.

It is important to keep in mind that, at the time, Hilberg had already completed the “definitive” second edition of his book, the publication of which he anticipated (as indeed occurred) in a few months.³

The Zündel Trial was held at the end of a period of intense debate by orthodox Holocaust historiography relating to one of its fundamental historical themes: the alleged Jewish extermination order. In 1982, an international conference was held in Paris, France; in 1984, another no-less-important conference was held at Stuttgart, Germany. Hilberg had participated in both. In Chapter V, I reprise my account of these two conferences as first published in 1991 (Mattogno 1991, pp. 23-63) – with all due revisions and amendments – to highlight the historiographical “climate” in which Hilberg made his statements, and to gain a better understanding of their significance and their value.

³ District Court, p. 636/Rudolf 2020a, p. 118.

1. Origins and Significance of the “Final Solution”

1.1. The “Code Language”

At the beginning of Chapter Seven (“Mobile Killing Operations”), Hilberg writes:

“When the bureaucracy had completed all those measures that comprised the definition of the Jews, the expropriation of their property and their concentration in ghettos, it had reached a dividing line. Any further step would put an end to Jewish existence in Nazi Europe. In German correspondence the crossing of this threshold was referred to as ‘the final solution of the Jewish Question’ [die Endlösung der Judenfrage]. The word ‘final’ harbored two connotations. In a narrow sense it signified that the aim of the destruction process had now been clarified. If the concentration stage had been a transition to an unspecified goal, the new ‘solution’ removed all uncertainties and answered all questions. The aim was finalized – it was to be death. But the phrase ‘final solution’ also had a deeper, more significant meaning. In Himmler’s words, the Jewish problem would never have to be solved again. Definitions, expropriations, and concentrations can be undone. Killings are irreversible. Hence they gave the destruction process its quality of historical finality.” (pp. 275f.)

One would expect that this interpretation of the German term *Endlösung* would be based on German documents, all-the-more-so since Hilberg cites hundreds of them in great profusion. On the contrary, however, not only is he uncorroborated by any document in this regard, but practically all the documents in which the term “*Endlösung*” appears resoundingly refute his interpretations. In fact, such interpretations are nothing more than another specific case of the “coded language” first alleged by the Polish investigating judge Jan Sehn shortly after World War II (see Mattogno 2016, pp. 9f.) and adopted by the Nuremberg inquisitors in order systematically to distort innocuous documents for the purpose of creating fictitious “evidence” of the alleged extermination of the Jews, since the confiscated German archives seem curiously silent on the subject. Hilberg diligently catalogs the terms of this alleged “code language” (p. 338); the presence of any of these terms in any German document becomes for him “proof” of the extermination of the Jews.

In reality, adopting this false explanatory criterion, Hilberg systematically distorts the meaning of the documents concerned. This is particularly obvious in the documentation regarding German emigration-evacuation policy for Jews

as outlined by Hilberg in his Chapter Eight. But before checking the sources cited by Hilberg, we need a framework providing the historical-documentary context.

1.2. National-Socialist Emigration-Evacuation Policy for Jews

Shortly after Hitler's rise to power, the Reich government entered into the so-called Haavara Agreement with the Jewish Agency for Palestine, a capital-transfer agreement (haavara) for German Jews emigrating to Palestine. The basis of the agreement was created with "Circular Decree No. 54/33 by the Reich Ministry of Economics of August 28, 1933 to all German foreign-exchange control offices" (Vogel, p. 107). According to statistics of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 52,463 Jews emigrated from Germany to Palestine from 1933 to 1942 on the basis of this agreement.⁴

Until the outbreak of the war – and during the war, as long as circumstances permitted – emigration to all countries willing to admit the Jews was the principal purpose of National Socialist policy, as confirmed by the report of the German Foreign Office titled "The Jewish Question as a Factor in Foreign Affairs in 1938" (*Die Judenfrage als Faktor der Außenpolitik im Jahre 1938*) dated January 25, 1939. The first four points of the document read as follows:⁵

1. *The German policy on the Jews as a prerequisite and consequence of the foreign-policy decisions of 1938*
2. *Aim of German policy on the Jews: emigration*
3. *Means, ways and ends of Jewish emigration*
4. *The emigrated Jew as the best propaganda for the German policy on the Jews.*

Then, "the necessity for a radical solution of the Jewish question" was recognized, which basically consisted in the following:

"The ultimate goal of German Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living in Reich territory."

The day before, 24 January, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring had issued a decree establishing the Reich Center for Jewish Emigration (*Reichszentrale für jüdische Auswanderung*), the administration of which was entrusted to Reinhardt Heydrich. Göring first of all summarized concisely the principle that inspired National-Socialist policy (NG-2586-A):

"The emigration of Jews from Germany must be encouraged by all means."

Precisely with a view to what he instituted, the above-mentioned "*Reichszentrale*," which was responsible for "taking all the measures for the preparation

⁴ Vogel, p. 109; the topic is discussed on pp. 35-58, with reference to Documents 1-18, pp. 107-153.

⁵ Auswärtiges Amt 1953, pp. 780f.; cfr. PS-2258.

of an intensified emigration of the Jews," to provide for the preferential emigration of poor Jews, and finally to facilitate bureaucratic practices for single individuals.

On November 25, 1939, Erhard Wetzel and G. Hecht, who occupied official positions in the field of racial policy, wrote a memorandum titled "The Issue of treating the population of the former Polish territory from the point of view of racial politics," which constituted a first draft of the future "General Plan East." Among other things, the draft set forth a plan for Jewish resettlement in the occupied Polish territories, formulated as follows:⁶

"The remaining Polish territory which, at the moment, has a population of 12.7 million, would thus reach 19.3 million.^[7] In addition, there would be another 800,000 Jews from the Reich (Altreich area, Austria, Sudetenlands, and Protectorate). Finally, another 530,000 Jews from the former Polish territories now integrated into the Reich would have to be transferred as well."

The destination of these deportations was no doubt the General Government, which had been officially created on 12 October. The plan was a follow-up to the directives issued by Heydrich to all the Einsatzgruppen leaders on the "Jewish question in the occupied territories" by express letter dated 21 September 1939 (PS-3363), including the Nisko Plan (October 1939), which called for the creation of a Jewish reservation in eastern Poland, was a failed attempt at implementation, perhaps on the initiative of SS *Sturmbannführer* Adolf Eichmann's (see Goshen; see also Mattogno 2018, pp. 31f.). The idea of Jewish emigration was not abandoned, however (PS-660, p. 35):

"In order to make the Jew fit for emigration, it would be advisable, if need be, to provide him with a better educational training."

In a memorandum written in May 1940, Himmler wrote (1957, p. 197):

"I hope to see the term 'Jew' extinguished completely through the possibility of large-scale emigration of all Jews to Africa or some other colony"

On June 24, 1940, Heydrich, who headed the RSHA (*Reichssicherheitshauptamt*, Reich Security Main Office), requested the Minister for Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop to keep him informed of any possible ministerial meetings relating to the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question" (*Endlösung der Judenfrage*), justifying his request as follows (T-173):

"Dear Party Comrade Ribbentrop!

In 1939, the General Field Marshal [Göring], in his capacity as administrator of the Four-Year-Plan, entrusted me with the implementation of the Jewish emigration from the territory of the Reich. Subsequently, it was possible, even during the war and in spite of considerable difficulties, to carry on the Jewish emigration successfully.

⁶ "Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung des ehemaligen polnischen Gebietes nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkte." PS-660, p. 25.

⁷ Following the planned evacuation of 6,636,000 Poles residing in the Polish territories annexed by Germany.

Since 1st January 1939, when my office took over this task, more than 200,000 Jews have so far emigrated from the Reich area. However, the whole problem – we are dealing with some 3¼ million Jews in the areas presently under German sovereignty – can no longer be solved by emigration. Thus, a final solution on a territorial basis will impose itself.” (Emphases in original)

As a follow-up to this letter, the minister for foreign affairs wrote the so-called “Madagascar Project.” On July 3, 1940, Franz Rademacher, head of the Jewish section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote a report titled “The Jewish Question in the Peace Treaty,” which opened with the following declaration:

“The impending victory gives Germany the possibility and, I think, makes it our duty, to resolve the Jewish question in Europe. The most desirable solution is: All Jews out of Europe.”

The plan was approved by Ribbentrop and transmitted to the RSHA, which was responsible for implementing the technical preparations for the evacuation of the Jews to the island of Madagascar, and supervising the evacuated Jews (NG-2586-J). It was precisely this which comprised the “territorial Final Solution” to the Jewish Question advocated by Heydrich.

On August 30, Rademacher wrote a note “Madagaskar Projekt,” the “financing” paragraph of which opens with the following words (NG-2586-D):

“The implementation of the proposed final solution will require considerable resources.”

The “Final Solution” of the Jewish Question therefore simply referred to the transfer of the European Jews to Madagascar.

In October of 1940, Alfred Rosenberg wrote an article titled “Jews on Madagascar” (“*Juden auf Madagaskar*”), in which he reminded his readers that as early as the anti-Jewish congress at Budapest in 1927, “[...] the question of a future removal of the Jews from Europe [was] discussed, and here, for the first time, the proposal was made to promote Madagascar as the intended home-
stead of the Jews.” Rosenberg himself endorsed this idea and expressed his wish for the “Jewish high finance” in Britain and the USA to help with the creation of a “Jewish reservation” in Madagascar, which he considered “a world-wide problem.”⁸

According to the testimony of Moritz von Schirmeister, a former official at the German ministry of propaganda, even Joseph Goebbels spoke publicly of the Madagascar Plan several times (IMT, Vol. 17, p. 250), while Ribbentrop recalled the Führer’s intention to deport the European Jews to North Africa or Madagascar (IMT, Vol. 10, p. 398).

The deportation of the European Jews to Madagascar was not a fictitious plan, but a real and concrete project. In parallel with that plan, the authorities

⁸ CDJC, CXLVI-51, pp. 4, 7, 9.

of the Reich continued to promote the emigration of the Jews, particularly from Germany, by all means.

Zionist circles of Palestine fully supported this German policy. On January 11, 1941, one of their representatives sent a letter to the German Embassy in Ankara containing three attachments, including "a proposal from the National Military Organization of Palestine on the solution of the Jewish question in Europe," which stated:

"Germany's leading National Socialist statesmen have in comments and speeches more than once emphasized that a New Order in Europe requires a radical solution of the Jewish question through evacuation ('Jew-free Europe').

The evacuation of the Jewish masses from Europe is a prerequisite for solving the Jewish question, which is possible only by resettling these masses in the homeland of the Jewish people, Palestine, and by establishing the Jewish State in its historic boundaries.

To solve the Jewish problem in this way and once and for all to liberate the Jewish people is the aim of the political activity and the ongoing struggle of the Israeli freedom movement, the National Military Organization in Palestine (Irgun Zevai Leumi)."

In this context, Irgun even offered "to actively take part in the war on Germany's side."⁹

On May 20, 1941, Heydrich prohibited the emigration of Jews from France and Belgium "in consideration of the doubtlessly approaching final solution of the Jewish question," that is, in view of the implementation of the Madagascar Project, which was considered imminent.¹⁰ First of all, Heydrich basically reaffirmed the principle that inspired National-Socialist policy towards the Jews:

"In accordance with an instruction emanating from the Reich Marshall of the Greater German Reich [Göring], the emigration of Jews from the Reich territory including the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is to be implemented actively, even under the present state of war, within the conditions prevailing and taking into account the directives for the emigration of the Jews."

Heydrich then clearly explained the reasons for the prohibition (*ibid.*):

"As the Jews on the territory of the Reich, for example, have only a limited choice of departure [routes], mainly via Spain and Portugal, an emigration of Jews from France and Belgium would further reduce these possibilities."

Two months later, on July 31, Göring entrusted Heydrich with task of undertaking all necessary preparations for the "Final Solution," that is, emigration or evacuation of all Jews under German rule to Madagascar. This letter in fact declared (NG-2586-E, PS-710):

⁹ PA, E234152-58, quoted: E234152, E234155f.; for a transcript of the entire text see Weckert 2018, pp. 71-73; English translation in Weckert 2016, pp. 73-75.

¹⁰ NG-3104. The letter was signed by Walter Schellenberg on Heydrich's behalf.

"In addition to the task already entrusted to you by the decree of 14 January 1939, viz. to bring about an optimum solution to the Jewish question by emigration or evacuation in accordance with the conditions prevailing, I order you herewith to undertake all necessary preparations – organizational, administrative, and material – for a comprehensive solution of the Jewish question within the German sphere of influence in Europe. To the extent that the competence of other central agencies is concerned thereby, the latter are [to be requested] to participate.

I order you furthermore to submit to me in the near future a comprehensive proposal concerning the organizational, administrative, and material requirements for the implementation of the final solution of the Jewish question so envisaged."

This document is fully in accordance with the Madagascar Project. The directives issued by Göring "in addition" to those already issued to Heydrich by means of the decree of 24 January 1939 consisted, in fact, of completing the solution to the Jewish question "in the form of emigration or evacuation"¹¹ of the Jews of the Reich only, with a territorial "final solution" through evacuation to Madagascar of all the Jews from the territories occupied by the Germans. Precisely because it involved all the European Jews of the occupied countries, this solution was called the "comprehensive solution" (*"Gesamtlösung"*), a term which not accidentally recalled the "whole problem" of Heydrich's letter of June 24, 1940.

Writing on November 6, 1941, Heydrich himself, who had been responsible for preparing the "Final Solution" in Europe for years (PS-1624), clearly traced this responsibility back to the decree of January 24, 1939, and identified the "Final Solution" with the solution "in the form of emigration or evacuation" from Göring's letter dated July 31, 1941. This is also the context of the order conveyed to the foreign ministry by Adolf Eichmann on August 28, 1941, which prohibited "an emigration of Jews from the territories occupied by us in view of the impending final solution of the Jewish question in Europe now being prepared."¹²

The future "final solution" was therefore "impending", which peremptorily excludes even from Hilberg's perspective that it referred in any way to extermination, because he claims that the pertinent order for the European Jews had been given only subsequently (see Subchapter 1.6.).

Over the following months, the difficulties created by the war and the territorial prospects opened up by the Russian campaign led to an important change in destination in National-Socialist policies with regard to the Jews: the "Final Solution" through deportation of the European Jews to Madagascar was succeeded by a "territorial Final Solution" through the deportation of the European Jews into the German-occupied eastern territories.

¹¹ Legal emigration into other countries or deportation to the East (Poland: October 1939 – March 1940) or West (non-occupied France: October 1940).

¹² PA, Inland II A/B, AZ 83-85 Sdh. 4, Vol. 59/3.

This change was proposed on August 22, 1941 by SS *Sturmabführer* Carl Theo Zeitschel, advisor at the German Embassy in Paris, in a note drawn up by Ambassador Otto Abetz:¹³

"The continuing conquest and occupation of large territories in the East could at present offer us a rapid solution of the Jewish problem throughout Europe. As we can see from the cries for help addressed to the American Jews in the press of all the Jews in Palestine, some 6 million Jews are living in the regions recently occupied by us, especially in Bessarabia,^[14] amounting to one third of world Jewry. In the course of any new disposition of the eastern space, these six million Jews would in any case have to be grouped and a special territory would have to be staked out for them. It should not be a major problem to include the Jews from the remainder of the European states and to move there as well the Jews who are presently crammed into the ghettos of Warsaw, Litzmannstadt (Łódź), Lublin etc.

As far as the occupied areas are concerned, such as Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece, it would be easy to issue military orders for the removal of the Jews to the new territory in mass transports; other states could be encouraged to follow this example and to expell their Jews to this territory. Within a short period of time, Europe could be made free of Jews."

In General Governor Hans Frank's diary, dated July 17, 1941, we read (Präg/Jacobmeyer p. 386):

"The Governor General does not favor any further ghettos because the Führer expressly declared on 19 June that the Jews will soon be removed from the General Government with the latter becoming, as it were, a mere transit camp."

On August 20, 1941, after a visit to the Führer's headquarters, Goebbels noted in his diary (Reuth, pp. 1660f.):

"Furthermore, the Führer promised me that I could remove the Jews from Berlin immediately after the termination of the eastern campaign."

Zeitschel's proposal was approved by Hitler a few months later, who decided to abandon the Madagascar Project temporarily, and deport East all Jews found in the occupied territories. The Führer's decision certainly dates back to September 1941 – according to some to September 17 (Konze *et al.*, p. 185). On October 23, Himmler prohibited Jewish emigration effective immediately,¹⁵ and the evacuation of 50,000 western Jews to the East was ordered the next day. On October 24, Kurt Daluge, head of the regular police (*Ordnungspolizei*), issued a decree bearing the subject "Evacuations of Jews from the Old Reich and the Protectorate," which ordered (PS-3921):

¹³ CDJC, V-15.

¹⁴ The figure is enormously exaggerated.

¹⁵ T-394: "Reichsführer-SS and Chief of German Police has ordered that the emigration of Jews must be prevented effective immediately."

"Between November 1 and December 4, 1941, 50,000 Jews will be deported by the security police from the Altreich, the Ostmark [Austria], and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia into the region of Minsk and Riga in the East. The deportations will be carried out by Reichsbahn trains of 1000 persons each. The trains will be assembled at Berlin, Hamburg, Hannover, Dortmund, Münster, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Frankfurt/M., Kassel, Stuttgart, Nuremberg, Munich, Vienna, Breslau, Prague, and Brünn."

The new direction given to National-Socialist policies with regard to the Jews was officially communicated to the old Party hierarchy at the Wannsee Conference, which was convened for this primary purpose.

The conference, initially scheduled for December 9, 1941 (PS-709; NG-2586-F), was postponed due to the United States's entry into the war, and was eventually held in Berlin, at Am Großen Wannsee 56/58, on January 20, 1942. Heydrich was the speaker. The associated minutes open with an extensive recapitulation of National-Socialist policies implemented with regard to the Jews up until that time, as a consequence of which approximately 537,000 Jews had emigrated by October 31, 1941, including:

- approximately 360,000 from the Old Reich since January 30, 1933
- approximately 147,000 from the *Ostmark* [Austria] since March 15, 1938
- approximately 30,000 from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia since March 15, 1939.

Then we read there, among other things (NG-2586-G):

"In the meantime, the Reichsführer-SS and Head of the German Police [= Himmler] has forbidden any further emigration of Jews in view of the dangers posed by emigration in wartime and the developing possibilities in the East.

As a further possible solution, and with the appropriate prior authorization by the Führer, emigration has now been replaced by evacuation to the East.

This operation should be regarded only as a provisional option, though in view of the coming final solution of the Jewish question it is already supplying practical experience of vital importance."

By Hitler's order, therefore, the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" through voluntary or compulsory emigration of all the European Jews to Madagascar, was replaced by their evacuation to the occupied eastern territories, but only as a "provisional option," while awaiting the end of the war in order to return to the problem.

The Wannsee Conference was therefore convened to inform the authorities concerned of the abandonment of the policy of emigration or evacuation to Madagascar, and the commencement on a vast scale of a policy of deportation to the east, and to discuss the related problems.

The Madagascar Project was officially abandoned in early February 1942. An information letter from Rademacher to adjutant Harald Bielfeld of the Min-

istry of Foreign Affairs dated February 10, 1942 explains the reasons (NG-5770):

"In August of 1940 I transmitted to you for your files the plan elaborated by my department for the final solution of the Jewish question, whereby the island of Madagascar was to be ceded by France, with the practical implementation of this task to be entrusted to the RSHA. In accordance with this plan, Gruppenführer Heydrich was ordered by the Führer to carry out the solution of the Jewish question in Europe.

The war against the Soviet Union has meanwhile opened up the possibility of providing other territories for the final solution. The Führer has decided accordingly that the Jews will not be deported to Madagascar but to the East. Hence, Madagascar need no longer be considered for the final solution."

The "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" was therefore a territorial solution and consisted of the deportation of the European Jews into the German-occupied Eastern territories.

In contrast to this, Hilberg claims against all documentary evidence that the "‘territorial solution,’ or the ‘final solution of the Jewish question in Europe,’ as it became known, envisaged the death of European Jewry." (p. 4)

He does not mention this letter at all, the content of which is fully confirmed by another important document, the memorandum by Martin Luther (an official in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs) dated August 21, 1942. In this document, Luther first recapitulates the essential points of National-Socialist policies with regard to the Jews (NG-2586-J):

"The basic premise of the German policy in respect of the Jews, starting with the seizure of power [by Hitler in 1933], was to promote Jewish emigration by all available means. For this purpose, Generalfeldmarschall Göring, in his capacity as head of the Four-Year-Plan, created a Reich central agency for Jewish emigration and assigned its leadership to Gruppenführer Heydrich, the chief of the security police."

After setting forth the origins and development of the Madagascar Project, which was now superseded by events, Luther continued by noting that Göring's letter of July 31, 1941 was a follow-up to Heydrich's letter of June 24, 1940 according to which the Jewish question would no longer be resolved through emigration, but required "a territorial final solution."

"For that reason, Reichsmarschall Göring requested Gruppenführer Heydrich on July 31, 1941 to carry out all necessary preparations for a comprehensive solution of the Jewish question within the German sphere of influence in Europe (cf. [Document] DIII 709g). On the basis of this order, Gruppenführer Heydrich convened a meeting of all German agencies involved for January 20, 1942, with secretaries of state from the other ministries and myself from the foreign office attending. Gruppenführer Heydrich explained at the meeting that Reichsmarschall Göring had issued his order being so directed by the Führer, and that the Führer had now approved the evacuation of the Jews to the East."

Based on this order, Luther continued, the evacuation of the Jews from Germany was undertaken. The destination consisted of the Eastern territories via the General Government:

"The removal to the General Government is a temporary measure. The Jews will be moved on to the occupied eastern territories as soon as the material means are available."

A circular letter dated October 9, 1942 titled "Preparatory measures for a solution of the Jewish problem in Europe. Rumors concerning the situation of the Jews in the East" containing "Confidential information" intended for party officials, inspired by the headings related to "very severe measures" in the occupied Eastern territories which began to be spread in Germany and which were "usually in a distorted or exaggerated manner," summarized the stages and clearly explained the meaning of the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question":¹⁶

Die alten Juden sowie Juden mit hohen Kriegsauszeichnungen (E.K.I., Goldene Tapferkeitsmedaille usw.) werden laufend nach der im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren gelegenen Stadt Theresienstadt umgesiedelt. "The effort to expel the opponent completely from the territory of the Reich. In view of the fact that the living space available to the German people is very small, it was hoped that this problem could be solved by an accelerated emigration of the Jews.

Since the beginning of the war in 1939, emigration has become increasingly difficult; at the same time, the economic space of the German people has steadily increased in size compared to its living space so that, at the present time, a complete elimination through emigration is no longer possible in view of the large number of Jews present in this [economic] space. It is to be expected that already the coming generation will perceive this problem neither as vividly nor as clearly [as we do] on the basis of their own experience. Also, the matter has been set in motion and must be settled; hence, the problem as a whole must be resolved by the present generation.

Therefore, the complete expulsion or elimination of the millions of Jews present in the European economic sphere is an imperative task in the fight to guarantee the existence of the German people.

Starting in the Reich itself and then extending into the other European countries made part of the final solution, the Jews will be moved into large camps in the East, some already in existence, others yet to be set up, where they will be used directly as labor or moved on further east. Elderly Jews, as well as those with high military decorations (EK I [Iron Cross], Golden medal for bravery etc.) will be moved continuously to Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia."

With regard to this document, Hilberg can only say that this was "an official explanation for the deportations" (p. 489) or that these deportations were part of a "process of repression" by the German authorities (p. 1087).

¹⁶ PS-3244; Document Political Leaders-49, IMT, Vol. 42, pp. 328-330.

In a report dated December 14, 1942 titled “Financing the Measures for the Solution of the Jewish Question,” ministerial advisor Walter Maedel summarized National-Socialist policies regarding the Jews in the following terms (NG-4583):

“Some time ago, the Reichsmarschall ordered the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police to prepare the measures aiming at the final solution of the Jewish question. The Reichsführer-SS has entrusted the Chief of the Security Police and SD with the execution of this task. The latter initially promoted the legal emigration of Jews overseas by special measures. When emigration overseas had become impossible after the outbreak of the war, he implemented the gradual cleansing of Jews from the Reich by their deportation to the East. Lately, within the Reich territory, old-age homes (old-age ghettos) for Jews have been set up, for example at Theresienstadt. For details see note of August 21, 1942. The establishment of other old-age homes in the eastern territories is being planned.”

In April 1943, Richard Korherr, the *Reichsführer’s* statistical inspector, wrote a report titled “The Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe,” in which he reported the following data (NO-5193):

Territory	Period of time from... to Dec. 31, 1942	Emigration	Excess mortality
Old Reich (with Sudeten Jews)	Jan. 31, 1933 (Sept. 29, 1938)	– 382,534	– 61,193
Ostmark [Austria]	March 13, 1938	– 149,124	– 14,509
Bohemia and Moravia [Czechia]	March 16, 1939	– 25,699	– 7,074
Eastern territories (with Bialystok)	September 1939 (June 1940)	– 334,673	
General Government (with Lemberg)	September 1939 (June 1940)	– 427,920	
Total (all columns)		– 1,402,726	

Therefore, 557,357 Jews emigrated from the Old Reich, Austria and Bohemia-Moravia, in addition to nearly 600,000 of the 762,593 Jews from the General Government and the eastern territories cumulatively indicated by Korherr under the headings “Emigration” and “Excess mortality” (see Subchapter 3.12.). Therefore, the National-Socialist regime, from 1933 to 1942, encouraged or induced the emigration of approximately one million Jews from the territories under their control.

1.3. Destruction or Emigration?

Hilberg opens Chapter Eight ("Deportations") of his work with the following remarks (pp. 409f.):

"The mobile killing operations in the occupied USSR were a prelude to a greater undertaking in the remainder of Axis Europe. A 'final solution' was going to be launched in every region under German control.

The idea of killing the Jews had its shrouded beginnings in the far-distant past. There is a hint of killing in Martin Luther's long speech against the Jews. [...] Finally, in 1939, Adolf Hitler uttered a threat of total annihilation in language far more explicit than that of his predecessors. This is what he said in his speech of January 30:

['...'] Today I want to be a prophet once more: If international-finance Jewry inside and outside of Europe should succeed once more in plunging nations into another world war, the consequence will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and thereby the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation [Vernichtung] of the Jewish race in Europe.'

These remarks by Hitler have much more significance than the suggestions and hints of earlier German writers and speakers. To start with, the idea of an 'annihilation' was now emerging in the context of a definite expectation: another world war. As yet the image was not a plan, but there was an implication of imminence in the utterance. In the second place, Hitler was not only a propagandist but also the head of a state. He had at his disposal not only words and phrases but also an administrative apparatus. He had power not only to speak but to act. Third, Hitler was a man who had a tremendous urge — one could almost say a compulsion — to carry out his threats. He 'prophesied.' With words he committed himself to action.

Only seven months were to pass before the war began. It provided physical and psychological conditions for drastic action against Jewish communities falling into German hands. Yet, even as the anti-Jewish regime was intensified, unusual and extraordinary efforts were made to reduce Europe's Jewish population by mass emigration. The biggest expulsion project, the Madagascar plan, was under consideration just one year before the inauguration of the killing phase. The Jews were not killed before the emigration policy was exhausted."

On the claim — which is rather far-fetched — that "the idea of killing the Jews" in Germany dated back to Martin Luther as its "shrouded beginnings," I will discuss in Chapter 5.

Before examining the actual meaning of Hitler's "prophecy," it is best to turn our attention to Hilberg's comments.

Hilberg claims that a "'final solution' was going to be launched in every region under German control," meaning the extermination of the Jews according to his interpretation, which was "not a plan" yet, but Hitler's words were "an implication of imminence": but how could an extermination be imminent for which there was no plan, and therefore not even a decision?

This incoherent interpretation reflects the basic contradiction which distorts all of Hilberg's writings: at the end of the 1970s, he had taken a decidedly functionalist position, in particular during the interview he granted in 1979 to Claude Lanzmann (see Subchapter 4.2.), but he was really a crypto-intentionalist. To the definition of these terms and to Hilberg's position, I shall return in Chapter 5.

Still more-contradictory is his claim that, "as the anti-Jewish regime was intensified," that is to say, while a policy of extermination was prepared, "unusual and extraordinary efforts were made to reduce¹⁷ Europe's Jewish population by mass emigration": in other words, Hitler was plotting the extermination of the Jews, but simultaneously implemented a forced-mass-emigration policy, and the alleged extermination was only carried out when the possibility of "the emigration policy was exhausted"! Therefore, if such possibilities had not become exhausted, according to Hilberg, there would not have been any extermination of the Jews at all, or in other words: Hitler did not wish to exterminate the Jews at all, or at least not "for the simple fact of being Jews"!

1.4. Hitler's "Prophecy" of January 30, 1939

In his speech of January 30, 1939 before the *Reichstag* mentioned by Hilberg, Hitler declared (Domarus 2007, p. 399):

"Once again I will be a prophet: should the international Jewry of finance (Finanzjudentum) succeed, both within and beyond Europe, in plunging mankind into yet another world war, then the result will not be a Bolshevization of the earth and the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation (Vernichtung) of the Jewish race in Europe."

I note first of all that the translation of the term "*Vernichtung*" to "annihilation" is inappropriate to say the least, because "annihilation" implies an unambiguous biological extermination, whereas *Vernichtung* not necessarily so.

Next, although Hilberg quotes the preceding phrases, he does not quote the following one which offers a perfectly clear explanation of Hitler's threat (*ibid*, pp. 399f.):

"Thus, the days of propagandist impotence of the non-Jewish peoples are over. National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy possess institutions that, if necessary, permit opening the eyes of the world to the true nature of this problem. Many a people is instinctively aware of this, albeit not scientifically versed in it."

¹⁷ Hilberg uses this verb to narrow the effective scope of National-Socialist Jewish emigration policy, which until 1938 meant the emigration of *all* Jews living on Reich territory, as we have seen earlier.

Therefore the "annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe" would be achieved simply by pointing out to other peoples the German and fascist institutions that promoted scientific knowledge about the "Jewish question."

By its historical context, the motivation and its true meaning of Hitler's "prophecy" is revealed. In his speech to the Reichstag of January 30, 1941, Hitler reiterated (*ibid.*, p. 32):

"I would not like to forget the promise I made previously on September 1 [recte: January 30], 1939 before the German Reichstag, that is, that if the Jews should succeed in plunging the rest of the world into a world war, then the entire Jewish race will have played out its role in Europe. 1939 in the German Reichstag, namely the hint that, if the other [rest of the] world is plunged into a general war by Judaism, then Judaism as a whole will have ceased to play a role in Europe!"

If therefore Jewry ceased to carry on its role in Europe, the "Vernichtung" of 1939 was not a physical "destruction," but purely an annihilation of its political or societal role.

This is confirmed by Hitler's words in his speech at the *Sportpalast* on January 30, 1942 (*ibid.*, pp. 400f.):

"We are fully aware that this war can end either in the extermination of the Aryan peoples or in the disappearance of Jewry from Europe. I said as much before the German Reichstag on September 1, 1939. I wish to avoid making hasty prophecies, but this war will not end as the Jews imagine, namely, in the extermination of the European- Aryan peoples; instead, the result of this war will be the annihilation of Jewry. For the first time, the old, truly Jewish rule of 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth' will obtain.

And the more the fighting expands, the more anti-Semitism will spread—let that be said to world Jewry. Anti-Semitism will be fed in every prisoner-of-war camp, in every family enlightened to the reason why, in the end, it has to make this sacrifice. And the hour will come when the most evil enemy of the world of all time will at least be finished with for the next millennium."

This quotation confirms that the "Vernichtung" of the Jewish race in Europe of the speech of January 30, 1939 was not a biological extermination, because Hitler is speaking of the disappearance of Jewry "from Europe," which, together with the cessation of the political role of the Jews in the eastern occupied territories, can only be explained by means of the plans to deport the Jews into the occupied eastern territories, which were considered extra-European. As stated by the Security Service of the SS, the German population had interpreted the "prophecy" in the sense that

"the Führer's struggle against Judaism will be carried on to the very end with inexorable consistency, and soon the last Jew will be expelled from European soil." (Boberach, Vol. 9, p. 3235)

On February 24, 1942, the Führer returned to the argument. After affirming that the "conspiracy" of the plutocratic world and the Kremlin aimed at one

single and identical objective – “the extermination of the Aryan peoples and races” – he stated (Domarus 2007, p. 319):

“Today, the ideas of our National Socialist and Fascist revolution have conquered great and mighty states. My prophecy will be fulfilled that this war will not destroy the Aryan, but, instead, it will exterminate the Jew.”

In his annotations, Picker recorded the following on July 21, 1942 (p. 449):

“In fact – since he [Hitler] will have thrown the last Jew out of Europe with the end of this war – the Communist danger from the east will be extirpated root and branch.”

This figurative meaning of the verb “*ausrotten*” also appears – with the use of the corresponding substantive – in his speech of September 30, 1942, in which Hitler said (Domarus 2007, p. 405):

“At the Reichstag session of September 1, 1939 [recte: January 30, 1939], I said two things: First, [...]. Second, should Jewry instigate an international world war in order to exterminate the Aryan people of Europe, then not the Aryan people will be exterminated, but the Jews [original: “das Judentum” – Jewry].”

In his speech of November 8, 1942, Hitler paraphrased his “prophecy” of January 30, 1939 as follows (Domarus 1973, p. 1937):

“You will recall again the session of the Reichstag in which I declared: if Judaism deceives itself that it can cause an international world war for the extermination of the European races, then the result will not be the extermination of the European races, but the extermination of Judaism in Europe.”

Hitler then again explained his sense of this “extermination”: the recognition of the Jewish danger by the European peoples, and the introduction by them of anti-Jewish legislation similar to that which existed in Germany (*ibid.*):

“In Europe, this danger has been recognized, and state after state is adopting our legislation.”

Finally, in his speech of February 24, 1943, Hitler reiterated (Domarus 2007, p. 410):

“This fight will not end with the planned annihilation of the Aryan but with the extermination of the Jew [original: “des Judentums” – of Jewry] in Europe.”

With this, we also have the perfect equivalence of the terms “*Vernichtung*” and “*Ausrottung*,” both applied to the European peoples.

In his speech at Bad Tölz on November 23, 1942, Himmler declared (Smith/Peterson, p. 200):

“The Jewish question in Europe has also completely changed. The Führer said once in a Reichstag speech: should Jewry cause an international war, for instance in order to exterminate the Aryan peoples, it is not the Aryan peoples who will be exterminated, but Jewry. The Jew has been evacuated from Germany, he now lives in the East and works on our roads, railways, etc. This process has been implemented consistently, but without cruelty.”

Recapitulating, Hitler used the terms "*Vernichtung*" and "*Ausrottung*" in the figurative sense with reference to the European peoples and Judaism/Jewry, which is fully confirmed by the various quotations and their context.

That this is the correct interpretation – if there is any need for additional confirmation¹⁸ – has been declared explicitly by an orthodox historian beyond mainstream suspicion like Joseph Billig, a former researcher at the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris (Billig, p. 51):

"The term 'Vernichtung' (annihilation, destruction) indicated the absolutely negative determination with regard to the Jewish presence in the Reich. This determination declared itself prepared to go to any extremes if necessary. The term in question did not mean that extermination had already been achieved or even the deliberate intention to achieve it. A few days before the speech quoted [that of January 30, 1939], Hitler received the Czechoslovakian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He reproached his guest for his lack of energy of the government in Prague in its efforts to reach an understanding with the Reich, and recommended, in particular, energetic action against the Jews. To this end, he declared, by way of example, 'With us [in Germany], they are being annihilated (bei uns werden sie vernichtet)'. Are we to believe that Hitler, during a diplomatic conversation recorded in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,^[19] revealed a massacre in the Third Reich, which moreover was not correct at that time?"

Two years later, on January 30, 1941, Hitler recalled his 1939 'prophecy.' But, this time, he clarified its meaning as follows: '...and I won't forget the warning I once gave before the Reichstag, that is, that of the rest of the world (andere Welt) is plunged into war, Jewry will have completely played out its role in Europe.'

In his conversation with the Czechoslovakian Minister, Hitler mentioned England and the United States, which, according to him, could offer regions for the settlement of the Jews. In January 1941, he indicated that the role of the Jews in Europe will be liquidated, and added that this prospect would come true, because the other peoples understand the necessity in their countries. At this time, people believed in the creation of a Jewish reservation. But for Hitler, this was admissible only outside of Europe.

We have just noted that on January 30, 1941, Hitler simply announced the liquidation of the Jews' role in Europe."

Therefore, by placing Hitler's "prophecy" of January 30, 1939 in relation with the "threat of total annihilation," Hilberg completely distorts the meaning. This interpretation is all the more surprising since this "prophecy," as Hilberg well knew, fit perfectly into the context of preparatory measures with a view to Jewish removal from Germany and Austria. A few days earlier, on January 24,

¹⁸ For additional corroborating examples see Chapter V.

¹⁹ There recorded as "*Niederschrift über den Empfang des tschechoslowakischen Aussenministers Chvalkovsky durch den Führer und Reichskanzler am 11. Januar 1939 von 17-18 Uhr*". *Auswärtiges Amt* 1951, p. 170.

a "Reich Center for Jewish Emigration" had been set up, and on January 25, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had drawn up the report "The Jewish Question as a Factor in Foreign Affairs in 1938" mentioned earlier.

1.5. National-Socialist Emigration/Evacuation Policies According to Hilberg

Hilberg then summarizes National-Socialist Jewish emigration policies:

"The first forced emigration schemes were worked out in 1938, after the Germans had acquired Austria. When Hitler came to power, Germany had about 520,000 Jews. After five years, emigration and death had brought that number down to 350,000. However, in March 1938, when the Germans took Austria, 190,000 Jews were added to the 350,000, bringing the total to approximately 540,000, that is, 20,000 more than the original number. Obviously this was not progress. Some extraordinary measures had to be taken.

Thus, especially toward the end of 1938, Schacht, Wohltat, and a number of other officials were conferring with the Western democracies on ways and means of facilitating Jewish emigration." (p. 411)

In this context, Hilberg, among other things, describes the efforts of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernst von Weizsäcker to convince Polish Ambassador Lipski "to take back the 40,000 to 50,000 Polish Jews in the Reich" (p. 412), and mentions Ribbentrop's meeting with French Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges Bonnet on Jewish emigration, regarding which the German minister of foreign affairs said:

"I replied to M. Bonnet that we all wanted to get rid of our Jews but that the difficulties lay in the fact that no country wished to receive them." (p. 412)

In his speech of January 30, 1939, Hitler commented:

"It is a shameful example to observe today how the entire democratic world dissolves in tears of pity but then, in spite of its obvious duty to help, closes its heart to the poor, tortured Jewish people." (p. 412)

Hitler thought about the failure of the Evian Conference, which was held from July 6 to 15, 1938 in the well-known French health resort. The conference had been organized on President Roosevelt's initiative for the purpose of assisting the victims of National-Socialist persecution, primarily Jews. But the American president's good intentions appeared dubious from the start (Mazor, p. 23):

"At his press conference at Warm Springs, President Roosevelt already limited the possibilities of Evian by saying that neither any revision nor any increase in immigration quotas to the United States were anticipated as a result.

In his invitation to this conference directed at 33 countries, Roosevelt stressed that no country was expected to consent to receiving a larger number of immigrants than allowed by its current legislation."

With such preconditions, the Evian Conference was destined to fail from the outset. The results were in effect that "the free world abandoned the Jews of Germany and Austria to their pitiless fate" (*ibid.*, p. 25). The *New York Herald Tribune* of July 8, 1938 carried this headline: "650,000 Exiled Jews Refused at Evian" (Thalmann).

The position of the Reich government was clearly laid out in the report "The Jewish Question as a Factor in Foreign Affairs in 1938" (Auswärtiges Amt 1953, pp. 782f.):

"Both issues, whose resolution is a condition of orderly Jewish emigration, remained open: firstly, the question of how this emigration should be organized and financed, and secondly, the question of where emigration should be directed.

In order to answer the first question, international Jewry in particular did not seem inclined to make a contribution. Rather, the conference – and the committee it later formed in London under the leadership of the American Rublee – saw it as its main task to force Germany under international pressure to release Jewish assets as much as possible. Germany was therefore supposed to buy the emigration of its 700,000 Jews by giving up German national wealth. It is doubtful whether international Jewry seriously wishes at all the mass emigration of its racial comrades from Germany and from other states without the equivalent of a Jewish state. [...]

The second question, to which target countries an organized emigration of Jews should be directed, could not be answered by the conference in Evian either, since all of the participating countries, while generally professing their concern about the refugee problem, declared themselves unable to accommodate larger numbers of Jewish emigrants on their territory."

This, by contrast, is Hilberg's incredible comment (p. 412):

"This was not an idle accusation [by Hitler]; it was an attempt to drag the Allied powers into the destruction process as passive but willing accomplices."

Thus, the refusal of the future Allied powers to welcome Jewish emigrants at the beginning of 1939 was distorted by Hilberg into an attempt to involve the Allies in a "destruction process", when in fact at that time the entire objective of the Reich government's Jewish policy aimed at the "the emigration of all Jews living in Reich territory," when, therefore, the alleged extermination had neither been decided upon nor planned!

Hilberg then summarizes the measures adopted by the government of the Reich to encourage Jewish emigration, culminating in the creation of the "Central Office for Jewish Emigration" at Vienna on August 26, 1938, and the "Reich Center for Jewish Emigration" on January 24, 1939 (p. 413), to which was added a "Central Office for Jewish Emigration" created at Prague on July 15, 1939 (Adler 1958, p. 8). He then continues as follows:

"Emigration was still the policy after the war had broken out. In fact, the first reaction to the victories in Poland and in France was to punish these countries

for their attitude toward Jewish emigration by sending there some of the Jews who had previously been kept out." (p. 413)

Therefore, if we follow Hilberg's interpretation, first Hitler made his "threat of total annihilation" in his speech of January 30, 1939 in the event that international Jewry succeeded in plunging the peoples into another world war. Then, after that war had broken out (from Hitler's point of view), instead of implementing his alleged threat, he "punished" the defeated nations of France and Poland by sending them *some* of the Jews whom he had allegedly threatened to exterminate *totally*!

After correctly outlining the Madagascar Project, Hilberg comments:

"The Madagascar plan was the last major effort to 'solve the Jewish problem' by emigration. Many hopes and expectations had been pinned on this plan by offices of the Security Police, the Foreign Office, and the Generalgouvernement. Even as it faded, the project was to be mentioned one more time, during early February 1941, in Hitler's headquarters. [...]

Originally, he had been in a position to address himself at most to the Jews of Germany, but now the goal had to be the elimination of Jewish influence in the entire Axis power sphere." (p. 415; emphasis added)

Precisely this was the meaning of the "*Vernichtung*" of the Jewish race in Europe in Hitler's speech of January 30, 1939, as I have explained earlier. But if Hilberg was aware of this, why did he fallaciously interpret that term as the "threat of total annihilation"?

Hitler – Hilberg notes – had taken the Madagascar Project very seriously:

"When Bormann asked how the Jews could be transported there in the middle of the war, Hitler replied that one would have to consider that. He would be willing to make available the entire German fleet for this purpose, but he did not wish to expose his crews to the torpedoes of enemy submarines. Now he was thinking about all sorts of things differently, and not with greater friendliness (Er dachte über manches jetzt anders, nicht gerade freundlicher).

While Hitler was thinking, the machinery of destruction was permeated with a feeling of uncertainty." (p. 415)

While Hitler was still thinking about the Madagascar Project, for the realization of which he was even "willing to make available the entire German fleet," there nevertheless supposedly existed a "machinery of destruction" which no one had decided upon and which no one had planned: a sort of metaphysical entity equipped with its own existence which proceeded autonomously towards the objective of extermination, independently of the emigration policy adopted by the Reich government!

To render less-uncertain the "feeling of uncertainty" that permeated the machinery of destruction, Hilberg then plucks without comment quotes from documents containing the alleged terms in "coded language" such as "*Evakuierung*" (evacuation), "*Lösung der Judenfrage*" (solution to the Jewish question) and "*judenfrei*" (Jew-free). With that, as I have explained, he insinuates that

such documents referred to the "machinery of destruction." At the same time, the author exempts himself from the duty to explain them in their historical context. Somewhat later on, I shall examine the most-striking cases of this systematic distortion of documents. Here I shall reveal only that the term "*juden-frei*" could of course be used in a misleading sense, but not in the manner imputed by Hilberg. For example, the German-language daily newspaper *Lemberger Zeitung* of October 17, 1942 carried the following news item ("Die erste..."):

"Lublin is the first city in the General Government which has become free of Jews, and now steps are taken to liberate the territories of the individual counties from the Jews as well, who have thrown the economic life of this country into considerable upheaval. The first county which no longer has any Jews is Biala Podlaska. The procedure is carried out as follows: the heads of the counties establish a zone of residence for all the Jews of the county. During this cleansing, the two counties of Biala Podlaska and Radzin agreed to pick a town as the Jewish zone of residence, namely Międzyrzec. But since this town is located on the territory of Radzin County, Biala Podlaska no longer has any Jews."

According to Yitzhak Arad, the Jews of Biała Podlaska had been deported to Sobibór on June 10, 1942, and to Treblinka between September 26 and October 6. Those of Radzyń Podlaski were deported to Treblinka on October 1, and those of Międzyrzec Podlaski to the same camp on August 25-26 (Arad 1987, pp. 391, 395), therefore, if these assertions were true, there should have been no Jews left in these three localities by October 17, 1942.

Continuing his discussion, Hilberg writes (p. 416):

"In the neighboring Wartheland, a grass-roots movement to eliminate the Jews became even more pronounced."

He then mentions SS *Sturmabführer* Rolf-Heinz Höppner's letter to Eichmann dated July 16, 1941, according to which a "camp for 300,000 was to be created with barracks for tailor shops, shoe-manufacturing plants, and the like." Hilberg moreover quotes the following passage, which to he even adds the original German text:

"'This winter' said Höppner, 'there is a danger that not all of the Jews can be fed anymore. One should weigh earnestly,' he continued, 'if the most humane solution might not be to finish off those of the Jews who are not employable by some quick-working device. At any rate, that would be more pleasant than to let them starve to death. [Es besteht in diesem Winter die Gefahr, dass die Juden nicht mehr sämtlich ernährt werden können. Es ist ernsthaft zu erwägen, ob es nicht die humanste Lösung ist, die Juden, soweit sie nicht arbeitseinsatzfähig sind, durch irgendein schnellwirkendes Mittel zu erledigen. Auf jeden Fall wäre diese angenehmer, als sie verhungern lassen].'" (Ibid.)

For the sake of exactitude, "*nicht arbeitseinsatzfähig*" means "unfit for labor deployment," "*durch irgendein schnellwirkendes Mittel*," by contrast, means

"with some quick-acting agent." This file memo relating to the "Solution to the Jewish question" begins with these words:²⁰

"In the talks in the Reich prefecture [Reichsstatthaltereil], the solution to the Jewish question in the Wartheland was raised by several parties. The following solution was proposed:"

Hilberg's presentation is therefore inexact, because there is no question of a "grass-roots movement" here (but rather, proposals from local SS leaders or government agencies), nor of any movement "to eliminate the Jews," but of possible killings of Jews unfit for work as a "more humane solution" compared to a possible death by starvation.

In the letter accompanying the file memo, Höppner specified that "these things sound fantastic at times," even though he believed they were feasible.²¹

Hilberg comments:

"According to Höppner, the Reichsstatthalter had not made up his mind about these suggestions, but by the end of the year the Jews of the Wartheland were being killed in a death camp, Kulmhof, in the province (Gau)." (p. 416)

In this way, he seeks to enter into the "true" nature of the alleged elimination of the Jews, which he improperly attributes to the document with an apodictic reference to the alleged extermination camp at Chełmno (Kulmhof in German), to which I shall return in Subchapter 3.1.

Hilberg then continues his shell game of equivocations in this manner:

"On June 7, 1941, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, addressed two almost identical letters to the Interior and Justice Ministries, in which he wrote simply that Hitler considered the measure unnecessary. Lammers then addressed a third letter to his counterpart in the party, Bormann. In that letter Lammers repeated the message with a confidential explanation. 'The Führer,' he wrote, 'has not agreed to the regulation proposed by the Reich Minister of the Interior, primarily because he is of the opinion that after the war there would not be any Jews left in Germany anyhow. [Der Führer hat der vom Reichsminister des Innern vorgeschlagenen Regelung vor allem deshalb nicht zugestimmt, weil er der Meinung ist, dass es nach dem Kriege in Deutschland ohnedies keine Juden mehr geben werde.]' Hence it was not necessary to issue a decree that would be difficult to enforce, that would tie up personnel, and that would still not bring about a solution in principle." (p. 417)

In this context, the reader is led to interpret the statement that there would be no Jews left in Germany after the war as the result of extermination measures, also because, with his useless quotation from the German text, Hilberg seems to attribute great importance to the document, and he does nothing to dissuade the reader from this false interpretation, for instance by explaining that, "after the war," the Jews would be elsewhere, alive, according to Hitler.

²⁰ Facsimile of the original document in Leszczyński, pp. 60f.

²¹ YVA, O.51-68, p. 43.

As early as August 1940, Hitler had expressed his intention to evacuate all the Jews from Europe after the war. On August 15, 1940, Luther wrote to Rademacher (Auswärtiges Amt 1963 p. 399):

"On occasion of a meeting with Ambassador Abetz in Paris, he told me that the Fuehrer had told him during his lecture about France, which took place about two weeks ago, that he intends to evacuate all Jews from Europe after the war."

Hilberg does not mention this document at all, evidently because it makes clear the groundlessness of his interpretation regarding Hitler's "prophecy" in his speech of January 30, 1939.

A note from the Reich Chancellery of March-April 1942 states (PS-4025):

"Reich Minister Lammers informed me that the Fuehrer had repeatedly told him that he wanted the solution of the Jewish question to be postponed until after the war."

On July 24, 1942, Hitler expressed this same intention in colorful language (Picker, p. 456):

"After the end of the war he would rigorously take the position that he would smash up town by town if the Jews didn't come out and migrate to Madagascar or another Jewish nation-state."

The same point of view was expressed in Rosenberg's so-called "Brown Folder" ("*Braune Mappe*") of June 20, 1941, as we will see in Subchapter 1.8.

Here Hilberg, always eager to refer to all the sources favorable to his theories, even neglects Hans Lammers's statements before the Nuremberg Tribunal on April 8, 1946.

In 1943, rumors arose according to which the Jews were being killed. Lammers attempted to trace the rumors to their source, but without positive success, because they were always found to be based on other rumors, as a result of which he concluded that they originated in Allied radio propaganda.

Nevertheless, to clarify the matter, he addressed himself to Himmler, who denied that Jews were being legally [sic] killed: they were simply being evacuated to the East, and that this was the mission to which he had been assigned by the Führer. During such evacuations, fatalities could certainly occur among elderly or sick persons, and accidents, aerial attacks and revolts could happen, which Himmler was compelled "to suppress severely and with bloodshed, as a warning," but that was all (IMT, Vol. 11, p. 52).

Lammers then went to Hitler, who gave him the same answer as Himmler:

"He said, 'I shall later on decide where these Jews will be taken and in the meantime they are being cared for there.'" (*ibid.*, pp. 52f.)

At this point, Dr. Alfred Thoma, defense counsel for Rosenberg, asked him (*ibid.*, p. 53):

"Did Himmler ever tell you that the final solution of the Jewish problem would take place through the extermination of the Jews?"

LAMMERS: *That was never mentioned. He talked only about evacuation.*

DR. THOMA: *He talked only about evacuation?*

LAMMERS: *Yes, only about evacuation.*

DR. THOMA: *When did you hear that these 5 million Jews had been exterminated?*

LAMMERS: *I heard of that here a while ago."*

The head of Hitler's chancellery therefore declared that he had only learned of the alleged extermination of the Jews at Nuremberg. This declaration may be questionable, but cannot simply be omitted in a work like Hilberg's.

As we shall see, a similar omission is also found in Hilberg's discussion of Hans Frank's testimony at Nuremberg.

Hilberg then cites another document:

"Toward the end of the spring of 1941, officials in France were still approached with applications from Jews who were trying to emigrate. On May 20, 1941, a Gestapo official from the RSHA, Walter Schellenberg, informed the military commander in France that the emigration of Jews from his area was to be prevented because transport facilities were limited and because the 'final solution of the Jewish question' was now in sight." (p. 417)

Here, as well, by virtue of the meaning attributed by Hilberg to the term "final solution" on his pages 275f., he leads the reader to understand that the extermination of the Jews was approaching fast.

The source cited by Hilberg is Nuremberg Document NG-3104 (his note 27, *ibid.*). In reality, as I have explained earlier, the expression "in view of the doubtlessly approaching Final Solution of the Jewish Question" did not refer to any phantasmagorical extermination, but rather to the Madagascar Project, whose implementation was then considered imminent.

In his imaginary reconstruction of the origins of the alleged extermination, Hilberg at this point introduces Göring's letter to Heydrich which I quoted in its historical context in Subchapter 1.2. (see p. 14), and commented:

"With the receipt of this letter, Heydrich held the reins of the destruction process in his hands." (p. 418)

But what "destruction process" is he writing about? The letter referred to the Madagascar Project, as Hilberg well knew, since, as we have already seen, he wrote that the emigration project to Madagascar had been discussed in Hitler's headquarters in early February 1941, and that Hitler was "willing to make available the entire German fleet" for this project.

At the Zündel Trial, Hilberg maintained that Hitler's above-mentioned answer to Bormann implied that the Madagascar Project had now been abandoned,²² while it was officially abandoned only in early February 1942, as documented earlier (see also Section 5.1.2.).

²² District Court, p. 1232/Rudolf 2020a, p. 216.

1.6. The "*Führerbefehl*"

After this labored and inchoate run-up, Hilberg finally arrives at the fateful "extermination order":²³

"Then, one day toward the end of the summer, Eichmann was called into Heydrich's office, where the RSHA chief told him: 'I have just come from the Reichsführer: the Führer has now ordered the physical annihilation of the Jews. [Ich komme vom Reichsführer; der Führer hat nunmehr die physische Vernichtung der Juden angeordnet.]'" (p. 418)

The source, indicated in his Footnote 31 on p. 419, are pages 178f. and 229f. of Aschenauer's 1980 account of the Eichmann trial. In the same footnote, Hilberg explains:

"In his memoirs, Eichmann dates the meeting to around the end of the year (zur Jahreswende 1941/42). During his interrogation by Israel police in Jerusalem, he suggested more plausibly that Hitler's order had come two or three months after the June 22 German assault on the USSR. Jochen von Lang, ed., Eichmann Interrogated (New York, 1983), pp. 74-75. Auschwitz commander Höss recalls having been summoned to Himmler in the matter of killing the Jews during the summer. Höss also states that Eichmann visited Auschwitz shortly thereafter. Rudolf Höss, Kommandant in Auschwitz (Munich, 1963), pp. 138, 157-60. Chronology and circumstances point to a Hitler decision before the summer ended."

It is very odd that a matter of such fundamental importance as that of Hitler's alleged order to exterminate the Jews, in a book over 1,300 pages long, should be relegated to a mere footnote by Hilberg. Perhaps he did not wish to draw too much attention to this issue? He would have had every reason to hide it.

The source cited by him says in fact on the page indicated (Aschenauer, p. 177):

"Around the turn of the year 1941/42, Heydrich, the chief of the Security Police and the Security Service, informed me orally that the Führer had ordered the physical extermination of the Jewish enemy."

The same date is repeated on the following page (*ibid.*, p. 178):

"At the time mentioned at the turn of the year 1941/42, Heydrich, the chief of the Security Police and the Security Service, informed me about the 'physical destruction order'."

A few lines further down, this is followed by the words cited by Hilberg:

"When Heydrich said to me 'I'm coming from the Reichsführer; the Führer has now ordered the physical extermination of the Jews' [...]" (ibid.)

In the second reference to this source, Eichmann reiterates that the "physical extermination order was given as of the end of 1941" (*ibid.*, p. 230).

²³ For a more in-depth treatment of the question of the alleged extermination order and its historiographic implications, see Mattogno/Kues/Graf, pp. 166-377.

Over the course of his interrogations by the Israeli police, Eichmann declared that Heydrich had transmitted Hitler's alleged extermination order to him two or three months after the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, or at any rate during the late summer of 1941.²⁴ But this date cannot be considered "more plausible" than the other, because it is inserted into quite an anachronistic historical context. Heydrich, in fact, is said to have ordered Eichmann to travel to Lublin to "Globocnigg" [*Globocnik*], to whom Himmler is said to have issued already "pertinent instructions," to see how far along he had gotten with the task. Having reached Lublin, Eichmann visited a place whose name he could not recall, perhaps Treblinka, in which the Jews were being "poisoned" with the exhaust gases of a Soviet submarine engine, in a sort of cottage with two or three rooms. This was in the late summer or autumn of 1941.²⁵ But the first of SS *Brigadeführer* Odilo Globocnik's alleged "killing centers" – Belzec – was opened only in March 1942 according to Hilberg (p. 936), so that he must have been aware that it could not have been visited by Eichmann in the late summer or in the autumn of 1941.

Therefore, considering the real context of his account, neither one of the two dates suggested by Eichmann is possible. What is more, as we will see instantly, the dating claimed by Rudolf Höss, the former commandant of the Auschwitz Camp, is in further contradiction with these two dates. Hilberg attempted to overcome these difficulties by completely confounding the alleged extermination "decision" with the claimed extermination "order": Hitler is therefore said to have taken the extermination "decision" before the end of the summer of 1941, but is said to have issued the extermination "order" itself toward the end of the summer of that year. Nonetheless, Höss spoke unequivocally of an "order."

In his declaration of March 14, 1946, adopting the language of his interrogators, Höss had declared (NO-1210; but see Subchapter 4.3.):

"In June 1941 I was summoned to Himmler in Berlin where he basically told me the following. The Fuehrer has ordered the solution of the Jewish question in Europe."

And in his affidavit of April 5, 1946, which Hilberg repeatedly quotes in his Chapter Nine, Höss explicitly reiterated (PS-3868):

"I was ordered to establish extermination facilities at Auschwitz in June 1941."

Hilberg explicitly makes the same claim himself on p. 1062:

"Oral orders were given at every level. Höss was told to build his death camp at Auschwitz in a conversation with Himmler."

Höss repeatedly mentioned June or, more generally, the summer of 1941. During his interrogation on April 1, 1946, he insisted that his summons to Berlin

²⁴ State of Israel, Vol. 7, p. 169. Hilberg cites von Lang, pp. 74f.

²⁵ State of Israel, *ibid.*, pp. 171-174; von Lang, p. 76.

had taken place "before the Russian campaign had started," "before the date that the Russian campaign was launched," which puts it at the first 20 days of June (see Mattogno 2020, pp. 184-186). For Eichmann, on the other hand, the order was issued two or three months after the start of the war against the Soviet Union. These two testimonies are therefore irreconcilable, and putting them together while pretending that they corroborate each other amounts to blatant imposture. In his book *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders*, Hilberg returned to the same question (Hilberg 1992, p. 18):

"On July 31, 1941 he [Heydrich] received authorization from Göring to prepare a final solution of the Jewish question in Europe. But what kind of solution, precisely? Heydrich's specialist in Jewish affairs, Adolf Eichmann, noted in his memoirs after the war that Heydrich had heard from his superior, Himmler, of a decision by Hitler to annihilate the Jews physically."

Here, Hilberg once again refers to Eichmann's implausible declarations taken from Aschenauer's book as discussed earlier, referring to the turn of the year 1941/1942, and based on these statements, with sublime indifference to the chronological contradiction, he interprets the "real" meaning of Göring's letter from five months earlier!

To finish the hack job, Hilberg passes in silence over the statement by former SS *Hauptsturmführer* Dieter Wisliceny, Eichmann's representative in Slovakia, relating to a *written* extermination order by Himmler dating back to the spring of 1942, which Eichmann is said to have shown him in August of that year.²⁶ Already during the IMT's afternoon hearing of January 3, 1946, Wisliceny had stated that this alleged extermination order dated back to April 1942 (IMT, Vol. 4, pp. 358f.). In his cross-examination by the prosecutor for the Slovakian National Tribunal on May 6 and 7, 1946, Wisliceny confirmed:²⁷

"This order [to exterminate the Jews] was dated April 1942 and bore Himmler's handwritten signature, which I knew well. In the order, it said that Jews fit for labor should be temporarily exempted from extermination and be used for labor in the activities of the concentration camps. This was the content of the order."

In his Footnote 57 on p. 1056, Hilberg refers to Wisliceny's affidavit of November 29, 1945 ("*Conspiracy and Aggression*, VIII, 610"). In it, Wisliceny declared that he met Eichmann in his office in Berlin in July or August 1942, who told him that *all* the Jews were to be exterminated by Himmler's order. Wisliceny continued as follows:²⁸

"I requested to be shown the order. He took a file from the safe and showed me a top secret document with a red border, indicating immediate action. It was

²⁶ Declaration of Dieter Wisliceny dated November 18, 1946, in: Poliakov/Wulf, p. 94.

²⁷ LST, 36/48, p. 142.

²⁸ *Nazi Conspiracy...*, Vol. 8, p. 612, *Affidavit C* of Dieter Wisliceny ("This affidavit is substantially the same as the testimony given by Wisliceny [...] before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, 3 January 1946"; see IMT, Vol. 4, pp. 355-373).

addressed jointly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD [Heydrich] and to the Inspector of Concentration Camps [Richard Glücks]. The letter read substantially as follows: 'The Fuehrer has decided that the final solution of the Jewish question is to start immediately. I designate the Chief of the Security Police and SD and the Inspector of Concentration Camps as responsible for the execution of this order. The particulars of the program are to be agreed upon by the Chief of the Security Police and SD and the Inspector of Concentration Camps. I am to be informed currently as to the execution of this order'. The order was signed by Himmler and was dated some time in April 1942.'

Hilberg was therefore well aware of this declaration, and his omission must have been intentional.

To summarize, the alleged extermination order is said to have been issued sometime between June 1941 and April 1942!

In fact, since the earliest alleged order, the one issued to Höss, provided for the extermination of *all* Jews unable to work, it is necessary to postulate two orders, one for the total extermination of all Jews, and one for the partial extermination of some Jews only, with a temporary exemption for Jews able to work, while revoking this exemption for the alleged total-extermination camps of Chelmno, Bełżec, Sobibór and Treblinka!

These mutually contradictory declarations, and the historiographical problems they imply, mean absolutely nothing to Hilberg. His only interest is to extrapolate from them, and surreptitiously insinuate as fact, the arbitrary conjecture of Hitler's alleged extermination decision before the end of the summer of 1941, and an alleged extermination order in the late summer, permitting him to interpret all later documents as a confirmation for this alleged extermination. In so doing, as Robert Jan van Pelt would say, he is creating a purely fictitious "convergence of evidence" between the documents misinterpreted based on the alleged "coded language," and evidence misinterpreted based on the purported extermination decision.

1.7. The Final Objective of Jewish Emigration

The documents relating to the early Jewish deportations, which, for Hilberg, were obviously aimed at extermination fit primarily into this context:

"Deportations were now in the offing. On September 18, 1941, Himmler wrote to Greiser about Hitler's wish to empty the Reich-Protectorat area, and suggested Lodz as a stopover for about 60,000 of the deportees." (p. 419)

Hilberg's treatment of this document is rather superficial. The letter in question says:²⁹

²⁹ Letter from Himmler to Greiser, Sept. 18, 1941. BAK, NS 19/2655, p. 3; reproduced in Witte, p. 50.

"The Führer wishes that the Old Reich and the Protectorate shall be emptied and liberated from Jews as quickly as possible from west to east. I therefore aim at transporting, possibly still this year, the Jews from the Old Reich and the Protectorate initially as a first step into the Eastern territories newly acquired by the Reich two years ago, in order to expel them even further east next spring.

I plan on deporting for the winter approximately 60,000 Jews from the Old Reich and the Protectorate into the Litzmannstadt ghetto, which, as I have heard, has enough space to accommodate them. I ask you not only to understand this measure, which will surely entail difficulties for your Gau, but to support it with all available resources in the general interests of the Reich.

In due time, SS-Gruppenführer Heydrich, who is to implement this Jewish migration, will address himself to you or through SS-Gruppenführer Koppe."

Among other things, this document, which attests to the new National-Socialist policies of transferring the Jews to the occupied eastern territories, refutes Hilberg's insinuations relating to Höppner's letter to Eichmann of July 16, 1941.

Hilberg then goes on to another document:

"On October 10, at a Final Solution conference in the RSHA, Heydrich spoke about possible deportations of 50,000 Jews to Riga and Minsk, and of still others to camps prepared for communists by Einsatzgruppen B and C in the military areas of the occupied USSR." (p. 419)

On p. 932, Hilberg summarizes this document again (giving as his source "Israel Police 1193": his Footnote 24) in the following terms:

"On October 10, 1941, at a 'final solution' conference of the RSHA, Heydrich alluded to Hitler's desire to free the Reich of Jews, if at all possible, by the end of the year. In that connection, the RSHA chief discussed the impending deportations to Lodz, and mentioned Riga and Minsk. He even considered the possibility of shipping Jews to concentration camps set up for Communists by Einsatzgruppen B and C in operational areas."

The source is a prosecution document presented by the Israeli police during the Jerusalem Eichmann Trial and accepted into evidence by the Court as Document T/37(299).

I note first of all that the meeting in question did not take place "in the RSHA," which would have been its main office in Berlin, but in Prague, and it did not concern the "Final Solution," but the "solution of Jewish issues," plural ("Lösung von Judenfragen"). The document is in fact titled "Notes from the meeting of October 10, 1941 on the solution to Jewish issues," and the second line confirms that the meeting was called to discuss the measures "for [the] solution of Jewish issues" in the Protectorate and partly in the Old Reich.

Since, according to Hilberg's fallacious interpretation, the "Final Solution" was synonymous with the extermination of the Jews, Hilberg misleads the reader to understand that precisely this was the object of the meeting.

Equally misleading is the following phrase: "In that connection, the RSHA chief discussed the impending deportations to Lodz, and mentioned Riga and Minsk." In this regard, the document says:

"Difficulties arose due to the evacuation. The plan was to begin with it around October 15, to run the transports one by one until November 15, up to some 5,000 Jews – only from Prague. For now, the Litzmannstadt authorities have to be taken into account. Minsk and Riga are to receive 50,000 [Jews]. [...] 5,000 Jews are to be evacuated from Prague over the coming weeks. SS Brigadeführers Nebe and Rasch can accommodate Jews in the camps for Communist inmates in the zone of operations. According to a communication from SS Sturmbannführer Eichmann, this has already been initiated."

Heydrich then mention Theresienstadt:

"After evacuation from this temporary collection camp (whereby the Jews were already severely decimated) into the eastern areas, the entire area could then be developed into an exemplary German settlement."

The document presents the plan for the future Jewish deportations from Bohemia and Moravia and partly from the Old Reich and has absolutely nothing to do with any extermination intentions. With his cunning set of equivocations, by contrast, Hilberg insinuates that the document is proof of such alleged intentions. The reference to "decimation" in this document is a mere rhetorical device that does not detract from the pursued objectives of evacuation in the eastern territories.³⁰

With his careful game of equivocations, however, Hilberg insinuates that the document is proof of alleged exterminating intentions.

1.8. The Wannsee Conference

Hilberg claims that the Wannsee Conference was convened to resolve

"such knotty problems as intermarriage, the Jews in the armament industry, and the foreign Jews." (pp. 419f.)

He then reports the second paragraph (which contains the term "final solution") from Heydrich's letter of invitation to the officials concerned, dated November 29, 1941, but not the first paragraph, which refers to the task assigned to him by Göring on July 31, 1941 (PS-709):

"On August 31, 1941, the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich commissioned me, with the participation of the other central authorities in question, to make all the necessary organizational, factual and material prepara-

³⁰ On the question of "decimation," which is a completely different concept than that of total extermination, see Mattogno/Kues/Graf, pp. 201-212, 276f., 358f., 450f., 507-509.

tions for a comprehensive solution to the Jewish question in Europe and to submit a comprehensive draft to him as soon as possible."

There is therefore a close link between Göring's conferral of responsibility and the Wannsee Conference, which, as I have already stressed, was in fact convened to inform the high government hierarchies of the Party about the new orientation of National-Socialist policies toward the Jews, that is, about the fact that emigration had been replaced by evacuation of the Jews to the East, and to discuss the related problems.

When discussing the Wannsee Conference, Hilberg slips in a memorandum whose title he renders as "Requests and Ideas of the Foreign Office in Connection with the Intended Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe," explaining that the

"memorandum was a kind of priority deportation schedule, indicating which countries were to be cleared of Jews first." (p. 421)

The source is "Memorandum by Abteilung Deutschland submitted to *Un-
rerstaatssekretär* Martin Luther (chief of the division). December 8, 1941, NG-2586-F" (his Footnote 40, *ibid.*).

Hilberg only cites it to bandy the expression "Final Solution," which does not even appear in the document. The title of the document is in fact "*Wünsche und Ideen des Auswärtigen Amtes zu der vorgesehenen Gesamtlösung der Judenfrage in Europa*" – "Wishes and ideas of the Foreign Office on the envisaged comprehensive solution to the Jewish question in Europe." The term used, therefore, is "comprehensive solution" ("*Gesamtlösung*"), not "final solution" ("*Endlösung*").

Incredibly, Hilberg mentions this irrelevant document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but passes over Luther's fundamental memorandum of August 21, 1942 in complete silence. At the First Zündel Trial, Hilberg declared under cross-examination regarding this document:

"There was a phase in which Jews were deported from Germany to the so-called Government General, into ghettos, prior to the establishment of killing centres, prior to the establishment of death camps.

Now, as he [Luther] is writing this memorandum, these death camps had begun operation, in the case of one of them a month earlier, in the case of the other two, several months earlier; but he is writing a memorandum – we don't know the exact date on which it was drafted – in which he is recapitulating history [of National-Socialist policies between 1939 and 1942].

One aspect of this history was the temporary lodging of Jews from Germany in ghettos of Poland until such time as gas chambers were erected in order to receive them for gassing."

Douglas Christie, Zündel's defense counsel, elicited Hilberg's admission that the memorandum bore the date August 21, 1942, and was an expression of future intentions, to which Hilberg replied that Luther was behind compared to

the information possessed by the SS, or was not aware of the latest developments of National-Socialist Jewish policy.³¹

The superficiality of these explanations reveals that Hilberg omitted discussing the fundamental aspects of this important document in his *opus magnum*, because it severely undermined his theory.³²

Hilberg then returns to the Wannsee Conference, which he summarizes as follows:

"Heydrich opened the conference by announcing that he was the plenipotentiary for the preparation of the 'Final Solution of the Jewish question' in Europe; his office was responsible for the central direction of the 'Final Solution' regardless of boundaries. Heydrich then reviewed the emigration policy and cited statistics on emigrated Jews. Instead of emigration, he continued, the Führer had now given his sanction (Genehmigung) to the evacuation of the Jews to the East as a further 'solution possibility' (Lösungsmöglichkeit)." (pp. 421f.)

Here, as well, he confines his references to the passages that contain the magic term "final solution." By contrast, he does not mention the figures contained in these "statistics on emigrated Jews": 537,000 people are certainly not an insignificant number. He also passes over the immediately following passage in complete silence, because it does not lend itself to his interpretation of what the "final solution" was (NG-2586-G, p. 5):

"However, these actions are only to be considered as fallback procedures, but practical experiences are already being gathered here which are of important significance with regard to the coming final solution of the Jewish question."

Hence, if the evacuation actions to the east were to be considered "fallback procedures" in view of "the coming final solution of the Jewish question," how could these be actions aiming at extermination? The meaning of this phrase is clear from comparison with the following passage of the chapter headlined "Guidelines for the Handling of the Jewish Question" from the so-called "*Braune Mappe*" (Brown Folder), drawn up by Rosenberg on June 20, 1941, and subsequently incorporated into the so-called "*Grüne Mappe*" (Green Folder) of September 1942.³³

"All measures on the Jewish question in the occupied eastern territories must be taken from the point of view that the Jewish question will be resolved generally for all of Europe after the war. They are, therefore, to be designed as preparatory partial measures, and must be coordinated with the decisions otherwise made in this area."

³¹ District Court, pp. 1170f./Rudolf 2020a, pp. 205.

³² Hilberg cites the document in question several times, but only in peripheral matters: for example, FN 87, p. 464; FN 11, p. 577; FN 18f., p. 652; FN 17f., p. 761 and subsequent pages; and FN 71, p. 1076.

³³ "Richtlinien für die Führung der Wirtschaft in den neubesetzten Ostgebieten (Grüne Mappe)," Berlin, September 1942. EC-347. IMT, Vol. 36, p. 348.

On the other hand, the experience gained in dealing with the Jewish question in the occupied eastern territories can point the way for the solution of the overall problem, since the Jews in these areas together with the Jews of the General Government form the largest contingent of European Jewry.

Purely vexatious measures are to be avoided in any case as unworthy of a German."

And this is how Hilberg describes the fate of the Jews deported according to the "Wannsee Protocol":

"Next, Heydrich explained what was to happen to the evacuees: they were to be organized into huge labor columns. In the course of this labor utilization, a majority would undoubtedly 'fall away through natural decline [wobei zweifellos ein Grossteil durch natürliche Verminderung ausfallen wird].' The survivors (Restbestand) of this 'natural selection' process, who represented the tenacious hard core of Jewry, would have to be 'treated accordingly' (wird entsprechend behandelt werden müssen), since these Jews had been shown in the light of history to be the dangerous Jews, the people who could rebuild Jewish life. Heydrich did not elaborate on the phrase 'treated accordingly,' although we know from the language of the Einsatzgruppen reports that he meant killing." (p. 422)

First, I shall reproduce the related passage in the German original, and will then give my translation (NG-2586-G, pp. 7f.):

"Unter entsprechender Leitung sollen nun im Zuge der Endlösung die Juden in geeigneter Weise im Osten zum Arbeitseinsatz kommen. In großen Arbeitskolonnen, unter Trennung der Geschlechter, werden die arbeitsfähigen Juden straßenbauend in diese Gebiete geführt, wobei zweifellos ein Großteil durch natürliche Verminderung ausfallen wird.

Der allfällig endlich verbleibende Restbestand wird, da es sich bei diesem zweifellos um den widerstandsfähigsten Teil handelt, entsprechend behandelt werden müssen, da dieser, eine natürliche Auslese darstellend, bei Freilassung als Keimzelle eines neuen jüdischen Aufbaues anzusprechen ist. (Siehe die Erfahrung der Geschichte.)"

"As part of the Final Solution, the Jews are now to be deployed for work in the East in a suitable manner under appropriate guidance. In large labor columns, with the sexes separated, the Jews fit to work are led into these areas building roads, with a large part undoubtedly being lost through natural reduction.

Any eventually, finally remaining stock, as it is undoubtedly the most resistant part, will have to be treated accordingly, since this, being a natural selection, is to be addressed as the nucleus of a new Jewish reconstruction when released. (See the experience of history)."

Hilberg's translation presents a misrepresentation and an error of omission. First of all, "through natural decline" can only refer to natural mortality, hence cannot have referred to any direct or indirect policy of extermination. Next, this is fully confirmed by the words "when released" omitted by Hilberg, as I will explain momentarily.

There is no doubt that, in this context, this expression had a direct relationship with what was called "natürlicher Tod" "natural death" in documents relating to National-Socialist concentration camps, that is, all those deaths that cannot be traced back to any homicide or death sentences imposed by the courts, which were of course unnatural deaths. But "natural reduction" was also a demographic term. For example, in a document dated May 18, 1938 we read (Faludi, p. 187, Doc. 19):

"These figures show an overall reduction in the number of Jews since 1933 of 136,000 people. However, this number is not only due to emigration, but is also increased to a certain extent by the strong natural reduction in the number of Jews, which in 1937 alone amounted to 5,500 people. The fact that the natural decline will increase to a great extent in the coming years can be seen from the following statistics on the age distribution of the Jews of Mosaic Confession in Germany:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|
| <i>1. from 0-20 years</i> | <i>15.5%</i> |
| <i>2. from 20-45 years</i> | <i>31.8%</i> |
| <i>3. from 45 years onward</i> | <i>53.7%."</i> |

In our present context, "natural reduction" depended on the predominance of elderly cohorts among the deported Jews, but it was also synonymous, or more-exactly, a consequence of the "excess mortality," that is, an excess of deaths over births, as seen for example in the Korherr Report.³⁴ And it is clear that deportation to the East "with the sexes separated," hence preventing any procreation, would "finally" have further increased this excess of deaths over births.

As for the words "when released," the use of this expression, omitted by Hilberg, shows that the SS had in their prospects, albeit as a simple eventuality, the final liberation of the (surviving) Jews. If their intentions had aimed exclusively and irrevocably at extermination, even mentioning any possibility of their eventual release would have been absurd, and this is precisely the reason for Hilberg's omission: to hide this absurdity.

Finally, with regard to the construction of roads to the East, there are important parallels.

A report dated June 22, 1942 sent by the "Government of the General Government – Main Department Construction" to the local "Main Department Labor" reports that in the "maintenance and upgrading road works in the districts of Krakow, Warsaw, Lublin, Radom and Galicia" 18,365 Jews were deployed, who were urgently needed for "important work at the military transit roads of the General Government."³⁵

On October 5, 1942, Luther communicated to the Hungarian Ambassador Döme Sztojaj that "all evacuated Jews, and therefore of course also the Hun-

³⁴ NO-5193, p. 4. The pertinent table shows an excess of Jewish mortality from January 30, 1933 to September 29, 1938 of 61,193 individuals for Germany, 14,509 for Austria to March 13, 1938, and 7,074 for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to March 16, 1939.

³⁵ APL, sygn. 746, p. 387.

garian Jews, are at first deployed in the East in the construction of roads, and then they will be placed in a Jewish reservation" (Auswärtiges Amt 1963a, p. 26).

In his report of June 30, 1943, SS *Gruppenführer* Friedrich Katzmann spoke of Thoroughfare 4, a road over 2,000 km long which was to connect Berlin to the Caucasus via Galicia and Ukraine. In his area of responsibility, Katzmann had built 160 km of roads using 20,000 Jewish workers housed in 15 concentration camps.³⁶

The "General Plan [for the] East," the German colonization project for the annexed eastern territories, anticipated a highway network linking the individual settlements. For its realization, 230 million working hours were calculated with a total cost of 1.2 million Reichsmarks and the employment of prisoners of war and foreign workers in working columns (*kolonnenweise*).³⁷ When Soviet POWs could not be deployed for this construction anymore, the SS resorted to Jewish inmates (see Schulte 2002).

Hilberg then briefly summarized the rest of the document, accurately mentioning the passages in which the term "*Endlösung*" appears, and adding:

"Gradually the news of the 'Final Solution' seeped through the ranks of the bureaucracy. The knowledge did not come to all officials at once. How much a man knew depended on his proximity to the destructive operations and on his insight into the nature of the destruction process. Seldom, however, was comprehension recorded on paper. When the bureaucrats had to deal with deportation matters, they kept referring to a Jewish 'migration.' In official correspondence the Jews were still 'wandering.' They were 'evacuated' (evakuiert) and 'resettled' (umgesiedelt, ausgesiedelt). They 'wandered off' (wanderten ab) and 'disappeared' (verschwanden)." (p. 423)

These terms were taken from documents not indicated by Hilberg. Playing on the dishonest identification of "final solution" with "destruction process," Hilberg uses this theory of gradual awareness to attempt to explain the fact that later documents continue to speak of deportation to the East. But what they really explain is something quite different. He admits that Heydrich announced at the Wannsee Conference that "Instead of emigration, he continued, the Führer had now given his sanction (*Genehmigung*) to the evacuation of the Jews to the East as a further 'solution possibility' (*Lösungsmöglichkeit*)." and recognizes that the Jews, according to the document, were *really* going to be transferred to the East to be employed in work columns. He only insinuates (dishonestly, by omitting the expression "when released") that the survivors of "natural reduction" were to be killed.

This alleged new orientation of National-Socialist policies, replacing emigration, was communicated to the cognizant authorities – and was therefore

³⁶ L-018, IMT, Vol. 37, p. 393.

³⁷ IfZ, MA 1497, "*Generalplan Ost. Rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und räumliche Grundlagen des Ostaufbaues.*" Presented by SS *Oberführer* Prof. Dr. Konrad Meyer. Berlin-Dahlem, June 1942, pp. 28, 53.

fully in force – on January 20, 1942. But then, how can Hilberg claim that Hitler had already taken the extermination decision before the end of the summer of 1941, and that, at the end of 1941, “by the end of the year the Jews of the Wartheland were being killed in a death camp, Kulmhof”? Why should these Jews not have been included in a general plan to transfer all the European Jews to the East?

This claimed reorientation is also in conflict with the statements of Frank, whom Hilberg adduces in favour of his theory of “destruction.” He anticipates the question with this brief comment:

“In the Generalgouvernement the news of the ‘final solution’ conference was the thought, if not the topic, of the day. Frank was so impatient that he sent Staatssekretär Bühler to Berlin to sound out Heydrich. In personal conversation with the RSHA chief, Bühler found out everything there was to know.” (p. 420)

The source is the government meeting of the General Government of December 16, 1941, PS-2233. In Footnote 38 on that page, Hilberg refers to Josef Bühler’s testimony at the Nuremberg Trial, and states:

“In this testimony Bühler did not disclose how much he had been told. That Bühler had definitely been informed about the projected ‘liquidation’ of the Jews was revealed by Frank in a conference with his main division chiefs on December 16, 1941, Frank Diary, PS-2233. Frank’s remarks were recorded verbatim.”

Hilberg later supplies an ample summary of Frank’s speech in question and cites the passages which are supposed to show that Bühler “had definitely been informed about the projected ‘liquidation’ of the Jews.” The first quotation begins this way:³⁸

“‘I want to say to you quite openly,’ he began, ‘that we shall have to finish with the Jews, one way or another.’” (p. 502)

The second quotation is as follows:

“‘Certainly,’ said Frank, ‘a major migration is about to start. But what is to happen to the Jews? Do you think they will actually be resettled in Ostland villages? We were told in Berlin: Why all this trouble [Scherereien]? We can’t use them in the Ostland either; liquidate them yourselves! Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourself against all feelings of sympathy. We have to annihilate the Jews wherever we find them and wherever it is at all possible.’” (p. 502)

The third and last quotation says:

“‘The Jews are for us also very parasitical eaters. We have in the Generalgouvernement an estimated 2,500,000 [a gross overestimate], maybe – together with Mischlinge and all that hangs on [dependants], 3,500,000 Jews. We can’t shoot these 3,500,000 Jews, we can’t poison them, but we will be able to take some kind of action that will lead to an annihilation success, and I am referring

³⁸ For the original German text see PS-2233. IMT, Vol. 29, passages quoted from pp. 502f.

to the measures to be discussed in the Reich. The Generalgouvernement will have to become just as judenfrei as the Reich. Where and how this is going to happen is a task for the agencies which we will have to create and establish here, and I am going to tell you how they will work when the time comes." (p. 503)

Hilberg claims that Bühler visited Berlin and had a preliminary meeting with Heydrich *before* the Wannsee Conference (before December 16, 1941, to be exact), because, according to Hilberg, Frank was burning with impatience and wanted some advance news. In reality, Bühler never made this preliminary trip at all, but simply attended the conference. Hilberg was perfectly well aware of this, since Bühler's related testimony at Nuremberg, which Hilberg considered incomplete, began with Frank's above-mentioned speech. At the hearing of April 23, 1946, Dr. Alfred Seidl, defense counsel for Rudolf Hess and Hans Frank, asked Bühler (IMT, Vol. 12, p. 68):

"The Prosecution submitted an extract from Frank's diary in evidence under Number USA-281 (Document Number 2233(d)-PS.)^[38] This is a discussion of Jewish problems. In this connection Frank said, among other things: 'My attitude towards the Jews is based on the expectation that they will disappear; they must go away. I have started negotiations for deporting them to the East.'"

I shall now open a parenthesis. Hilberg himself mentions these negotiations, writing:

"On October 13, 1941, Frank spoke to the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Rosenberg. On this occasion he raised the question of moving the Generalgouvernement Jews into Rosenberg's new domains. Rosenberg replied that at the moment there was no possibility of such a resettlement." (p. 501)

Hilberg's summary of this meeting is not exactly beyond reproach. The related document actually says, in my translation (Berenstein *et al.*, p. 252):

"The governor general then mentioned the possibility of deporting the Jewish population of the general government to the occupied eastern territories. Reich Minister Rosenberg remarked that similar requests had already been made to him by the military administration in Paris.^[39] At the moment, however, he does not see any possibility of implementing such relocation plans. For the future, however, he declared himself ready to promote the emigration of Jews to the East, especially since the intention was to send asocial elements within the Reich to the sparsely populated eastern areas."

Now let's return to Dr. Seidl's quote from Dr. Frank's diary, which continues as follows:

"This question will be discussed at a large meeting in Berlin in January, to which I shall send State Secretary Dr. Bühler. This conference is to take place

³⁹ A clear allusion to the proposal by SS *Sturmabführer* Zeitschel dated August 22, 1941 – later approved by Hitler – to resolve the "Jewish Question" by deporting the Jews under German jurisdiction into the eastern occupied territories. See Subchapter 1.2.

at the Reich Security Main Office in the office of SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich. In any case Jewish emigration on a large scale will begin."

This anticipation of the themes of the conference is strictly in accordance with reality. Defense counsel Dr. Seidl then asked Bühler (IMT, Vol. 12, p. 68):

"I ask you now, did the Governor General send you to Berlin for that conference; and if so, what was the subject of the conference?"

Bühler replied (*ibid.*, pp. 68f.):

"Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of the conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance that from the beginning Jewish questions in the Government General were considered as coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader and handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish matters by the state administration was supervised and merely tolerated by the Police.

During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, mostly Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite of the objections and protests of the Governor General and his administration. This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and undesired bringing in of the Jewish population from other territories put the administration of the Government General in an extremely difficult position.

Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their health-combating epidemics for instance – almost, or rather, definitely overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening was the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also among the Polish population and the Germans in the Government General. It appeared as if that epidemic would spread even to the Reich and to the Eastern Front.

At that moment Heydrich's invitation to the Governor General was received. The conference was originally supposed to take place in November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have taken place in February 1942.

Because of the special problems of the Government General I had asked Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. On that occasion, among many other things, I described in particular the catastrophic conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary bringing of Jews into the Government General. He replied that for this very reason he had invited the Governor General to the conference. The Reichsführer SS, so he said, had received an order from the Führer to round up all the Jews of Europe and to settle them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia. I asked him whether this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the Government General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of Jews who had been brought into the Government General without the permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. Heydrich promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore that the Führer had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate, would become a reservation in which old and sick Jews, and weak Jews who could not stand the strains of resettlement, were to be accommodated in the future. This information left me definitely convinced that the resettlement of the Jews, if not for

the sake of the Jews, then for the sake of the reputation and prestige of the German people, would be carried out in a humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the Government General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the Police."

Bühler's declarations fully comport with the Wannsee Protocol, and this is all the more important since, at the time of his testimony, this document was still unknown. It was introduced into evidence only the year afterward, at the Wilhelmstrasse Trial.

It is therefore not conducive to judge Bühler's statements in the light of Frank's statements, as Hilberg does, but rather Frank's statements in the light of Bühler's. That Frank's statements reflected mere vain personal threats and not real intentions of the Reich government is clear from the fact that, *after* the Wannsee Conference, when he was informed by Bühler of its contents, he made no *threatening* comment any more at all. In fact, the only reference to the Wannsee Conference in Frank's diary as published by Werner Präg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer is by the editors and concerns the text mentioned above in the government meeting of December 16, 1942 (Präg/Jacobmeyer, p. 457).

Bühler himself asserted during his pre-trial interrogation of February 26, 1946 with reference to Frank's radical declarations, that "the circle to which Dr. Frank spoke, knew to the last man that he was exaggerating."⁴⁰

In contradiction to Hilberg's assertion that Frank "sent Staatssekretär Bühler to Berlin to sound out Heydrich," he writes in Footnote 26, p. 933:

"When Generalgouverneur Frank was in Berlin (middle of December 1941), he was told that 'nothing could be done with the Jews in the Ostland.'"

The reference is still to the government meeting on December 16, 1941. Thus, from this document (PS-2233) Hilberg deduces two visits to Berlin, one by Bühler, and one by Frank, but both visits are fictitious!

How much Frank felt himself accused by his diary, is made clear by the following fact, reported by David Irving (Irving, p. 174):

"On January 11, 1946, Hans Frank's lawyer Alfred Seidl would apply to the court for the former governor-general of Poland to be allowed to use his own diaries, of which he had voluntarily turned over forty volumes to the Seventh Army. Those volumes were now in the courthouse document room, but he too was allowed to use only those extracts that had been picked by the prosecution. Permission was refused."

Instead of the entire diary, a mere selection of it was presented at the trial. which constitutes document PS-2233.⁴¹ It contains all the important elements

⁴⁰ NARA, RG 238, M1270/2, OCCPAC. Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuremberg 1945-1947, p. 149.

⁴¹ The prosecution selected passages from 38 volumes. The individual extrapolations were then presented as evidentiary material (*Beweisstücke*). Document US-281 was taken from Volume 17, and contained extracts from the minutes of meetings held between October-December 1941 by the General Government. IMT, Vol. 29, p. 725.

supporting the prosecution's case, yet not a single extract cited by the defense in Frank's favor.

The least that can be said, therefore, is that Hilberg's exposition of the Wannsee Protocol is superficial and inconclusive. Moreover, he completely neglects an essential aspect that remains in the dark in the document: the question of Jews unable to work.

The fate reserved for the Jews is described in two apparently contrasting ways (NG-2586-G, pp. 7f.):

1) *"As part of the Final Solution, the Jews are now to be deployed for work in the East in a suitable manner under appropriate guidance. In large labor columns, with the sexes separated, the Jews fit to work are led into these areas building roads, with a large part undoubtedly being lost through natural reduction."*

2) *"In the course of the practical implementation of the Final Solution, Europe will be combed through from west to east. [...] First the evacuated Jews are taken step by step to so-called transit ghettos, from where they are transported further east."* (Emphases added)

If this distinction is to make any sense, then the second passage must refer to Jews unfit for work. In other words, those able to work would be deported "for work in the East", while those unfit for labor would first be sent to transit ghettos and then "further east." In his speech at the conference, Bühler hoped that the "final solution" would begin with the General Government: "Jews must be removed as quickly as possible from the territory of the General Government," specifying that "Of the approximately 2,500,000 Jews in question, the vast majority are unable to work" (*ibid.*, pp. 14f.) This is a confirmation of the fact that Jews unable to work were to be deported out of the General Government, that is to say "further east".

A note from Luther to Eichmann dated January 10, 1942 confirms this (Auswärtiges Amt 1969, p. 198):

"In response to the telephone inquiries there, it is reported that the governments of Romania, Croatia and Slovakia have given their consent to their Jews living in Germany being deported together with the German Jews into the ghettos toward the east."

A few weeks after the Wannsee Conference, on February 2, 1942, Heydrich explicitly hinted at the future fate of all European Jews, both fit and unfit for work, during a speech before officials and Party members in the Protectorate (Friedländer, 2006, pp. 370f.):

"Those who cannot yet be Germanized may perhaps, with the further development of the Arctic-Ocean region – where we will take over the concentration camps of the Russians, who, to our current knowledge, have around 15-20 million deportees there, and which therefore will be the ideal homeland of the 11 million Jews from Europe in the future – perhaps we can now deploy the

Czechs who cannot be Germanized in the supporting role of a pro-German task as overseers, foremen, etc."

Finally, on page 422, Hilberg trivializes the project to establish a ghetto for the elderly in Theresienstadt, which openly contradicts the extermination policy he attributes to the document:

"The intention is not to evacuate Jews over the age of 65, but to transfer them to an old people's ghetto – Theresienstadt is slated for this."

Immediately afterward, the Wannsee Protocol states that, as of October 31, 1941, about 30% of the 280,000 Jews present in the Old Reich and Austria were over the age of 65 (NG-2586-G, p. 8). It follows that about 84,000 elderly Jews, unable to work and therefore presumed to be the first to be killed, were exempted from the alleged extermination measures. Of course, Hilberg remains absolutely silent about this contradiction.

1.9. Goebbels and the Alleged Extermination of the Jews

To demonstrate the National-Socialist hierarchy's alleged gradual awareness of the extermination plan, Hilberg cites Goebbels as an example:

"When Goebbels found out that the SS and Police Leader in Lublin, Globocnik, was constructing killing centers, he wrote: 'Not much will remain of the Jews... A judgment is being visited upon the Jews [which is] barbaric... The prophecy which the Führer made about them for having brought on a new world war is beginning to come true in a most terrible manner.'" (p. 423)

The source is an entry in Goebbels's diary entry of March 27, 1942 (Hilberg's Footnote 44, *ibid.*).

This entry must be placed in its historical context. On March 7, Goebbels wrote (Fröhlich, Part II, Vol. 3, pp. 431f.; Reuth, pp. 1762f.):

"I read a detailed report from the SD and police regarding the final solution of the Jewish Question. An innumerable number of new viewpoints results from this. The Jewish Question must now be solved within an all-European framework. There are still more than 11 million Jews in Europe. Later at some point they will have to be concentrated initially in the East; possibly an island, such as Madagascar, can be assigned to them after the war. In any case, there can be no peace in Europe until the Jews are utterly shut off (ausgeschaltet) from the European area."

The "detailed report from the SD and police regarding the final solution of the Jewish Question" was the protocol of the Wannsee Conference, from which the figure of 11 million Jews was taken as well. Goebbels affirms that it contained "tremendous number of new viewpoints", which consisted in the solution of the Jewish question "within a pan-European frame" (and no longer just in the territory of "Greater Germany" alone), that is, in the "comprehensive so-

lution" (*Gesamtlösung*) mentioned earlier by deporting Europe's Jews to the East, to be sent elsewhere "after the war," perhaps to Madagascar. The concentration of these 11 million Jews in the East obviously did not imply their biological extermination, since they were to be sent to an island after the war.

Hilberg acknowledges that Goebbels "had received a copy of the protocol of the January 20 conference" (p. 438), therefore he was well aware of the start of the new policy of Jewish deportation to the eastern territories communicated by Heydrich during the conference, and he also knew that it did not involve an "extermination program."

On March 20, Goebbels noted that, in the Jewish question,

"Here the Führer remains implacable. The Jews must get out of Europe, if necessary, using the most brutal means." (Fröhlich, Part II, Vol. 3, p. 513)

Suddenly, on March 27, 1942, the following entry appears in Goebbels's diary (*ibid.*, p. 561; Reuth, p. 1776):

"Beginning with Lublin, the Jews in the General Government are now being evacuated eastward. The procedure is a pretty barbaric one and not to be described here more definitely. Not much will remain of the Jews. On the whole it can be said that about 60 percent of them will have to be liquidated whereas only about 40 percent can be used for forced labor.

The former Gauleiter of Vienna, who is to carry this measure through, is doing it with considerable circumspection and according to a method that does not attract too much attention. A judgment is being visited upon the Jews that, while barbaric, is fully deserved by them."

Less-circumspect historians quote the passage in full; Hilberg, on the other hand, who is more subtle, avoids the embarrassing reference to the 40% who can be deployed for labor (a percentage even higher than that claimed for Auschwitz).

What happened between March 20 and 27, 1942? On March 17, the alleged Belzec extermination camp started operating, but who had decided when to transform the policy of transferring European Jews to the East, outside Europe, in order to resolve the Jewish question "after the war" by assigning them an island, into a program of total extermination?

The decisions communicated on March 16, 1942 by SS *Hauptsturmführer* Hans Höfle, a deputy senior officer of the SS and Police Leader of the Lublin District (Globocnik), contain no reference to the alleged extermination program: Belzec was considered a transit camp for disabled Jews, who would have been deported "across the border" to the eastern territories. Their "shutting off" announced by Goebbels can only be interpreted in this sense, as is confirmed by his reference to Hitler's "prophecy", which, as we have seen, concerned the end of the political role of Jewry in Europe. Goebbels indeed added (*ibid.*):

"The prophesy which the Führer made about them for having brought on a new World War is beginning to come true in a most terrible manner."

The fact, well pointed out by Hilberg, that just then the "prophecy" was being fulfilled, was part of Goebbels's rhetoric, which was no-less-virulent than Frank's. Goebbels had said the same things four months earlier, in an article published in the newspaper *Das Reich* on November 16, 1941 (Goebbels 1941):

"The historic responsibility of world Jewry for the outbreak and widening of this war has been proven so clearly that it does not need to be discussed any further. The Jews wanted war, and now they have it. But the Führer's prophecy of January 30, 1939 to the German Reichstag is also being fulfilled: If international finance Jewry should succeed in plunging the world into war once again, the result will be not the Bolshevization of the world and thereby the victory of the Jews, but rather the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe. We are seeing the fulfillment of the prophecy. The Jews are receiving a penalty that is certainly hard, but more-than-deserved.^[42] World Jewry erred in adding up the forces available to it for this war, and now is gradually experiencing the destruction that it planned for us, and would have carried out without a second thought if it had possessed the ability."

A little further on, in the entry of March 27, 1942, Goebbels stated:

"The ghettos that will be emptied in the cities of the General Government will now be refilled with Jews thrown out of the Reich. This process is to be repeated from time to time." (Fröhlich, *ibid.*; Reuth, p. 1777)

On April 27, he returned to the evacuation/expulsion policy:⁴³

"I talked to the Führer once more in detail about the Jewish Question. His attitude toward this problem is unrelenting. He absolutely wants to push the Jews out of Europe. That is the right thing to do. The Jews have brought so much misery to our continent that the severest punishment meted out to them is still too mild. Himmler is presently implementing the large resettlement of the Jews from German cities to the eastern ghettos."

It is therefore clear that the German evacuation/expulsion policy had not changed, so the entry of March 27, 1942 must be considered in the light of it.

Moreover, the documents on Jewish deportation to the East deny that there was a "rather barbaric procedure".

At the beginning of January 1942, the "Guidelines for the technical implementation of the evacuation of Jews to the General Government (Trawniki near Lublin)" were issued, which begin with a general consideration:⁴⁴

"For the evacuation of Jews from the Reich territory and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to the General Government, the following guidelines have been issued, which must be strictly observed in all points."

⁴² Note, by all accounts, that this was well before the "Holocaust" began. Evidently the "penalty" involves being ghettoized, marked with a star, selectively deported to the East and, for those in the battle zone, risk of being shot.

⁴³ Fröhlich, Vol. 4, p. 184; Reuth, p. 1786; the last sentence was omitted from Reuth; here taken from Barth, p. 197.

⁴⁴ Eichmann Trial Document T/1395 [15-18].

The document first sets out the directives concerning "competent evacuation offices," followed by those on "Determining the scope of persons to be evacuated," which begins as follows:

"In the course of these evacuation actions, all Jews can be included (§ 5 of the 1st decree to the Reich-Citizen Law of Nov. 14, 1935, RGBl. I, p. 1333), apart from the following exceptions for the time being:"

Four categories of Jews were exempt from evacuation:

1. Jews who lived in mixed Jewish-German marriages.
2. Jews with foreign citizenship, including Soviet citizens, with the exception of stateless ones, former Polish citizens and those of Luxembourg citizenship.
3. Jews employed in war industries for which the competent authorities had not given the authorization for deportation.

The fourth exempted category is also the most-important one in the present context, so it is worth reporting the text of the document in full:

"4./ Jews

a) aged over 65 years;

b) as well as Jews at the age of 55-65 years who are particularly weak and therefore unfit for transport.

In Jewish marriages, in which one spouse is under 65 years and the other is over 65 years, both spouses can be evacuated, if the considered spouse is not older than 67 years and an attest of a public health officer for the ability to work can be provided for this spouse. No further exceptions are allowed under any circumstances.

(For the Jews not to be deported due to age a future separate regulation will be provided.)

Jewish legal advisers are to be included only in a corresponding relationship to the number of the initially remaining Jews.

Separation of spouses as well as separation of children up to 14 years from the parents is to be avoided."

The transport directives required each train to contain a maximum of 1,000 people and prescribed what each deportee had to bring along:

"Means of payment RM 50.- in Reich Credit Cashier Certificates or 100 Zloty

One suitcase or backpack with outfit items (no bulky items)

Complete clothing (sturdy shoes)

Bed linen with blanket

Provisions for 2 weeks (bread, flour, pearl barley, beans)

Dinnerware (plate or pan with spoon)"

Eichmann's express letter of January 31, 1942 addressed "to all State police (main) offices in the Old Reich (incl. Sudetengau), the State police office in Vienna, the Central Office for Jewish Emigration Vienna", issued the directives for deportations from the Old Reich, specifying (T/730):

"The evacuation of Jews to the East recently carried out in certain areas constitutes the beginning of the final solution of the Jewish question in the Old Reich, Ostmark [Austria] and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia."

Various categories of Jews were exempted from the evacuation, including:

"Jews a) aged over 65 years; b) as well as Jews aged 55-65 years who are particularly weak and therefore unfit for transport." (Emphasis in original)

On March 6, 1942, a meeting on Jewish deportations was held at the RSHA Office IV B 4; in a report dated three days later, we read:

"In his introduction, SS Obersturmführer Eichmann initially spoke about the further evacuation of 55,000 Jews from the Old Reich, as well as from the Ostmark [Austria] and the Protectorate.

Among other things, Prague with 20,000 and Vienna with 18,000 Jews to be evacuated take the biggest share in this connection. The strength of the other transports is regulated proportionally according to the number of Jews still present in the district of each Stapo (main) headquarters. In connection with this, a further transport of 1,000 Jews has been allocated to Düsseldorf." (Emphasis in original; T/37(39), p. 1; cfr. Adler 1958a, p. 9)

The next part of the document must be considered particularly in light of Hilberg's claim that the Jewish extermination decision was allegedly made well before the Wannsee Conference, which took place nearly two months prior to the compilation of this report (*ibid.*):

"In this context SS-Obersturmführer Eichmann emphasized that the issued guidelines, especially with regard to age, infirmity etc., must be closely observed, because during the transport to Riga some 40-45 cases were claimed by the Jewish Elders in Riga via District Commanders Lohse and Meyer to SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich as wrongfully evacuated. Even though upon closer investigation the majority of these cases proved to be justified evacuations, everything ought to be done to avoid such complaints in the future. Hence SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich will hold the Stapo heads solely responsible for the implementation of the guidelines in this context.

In order not to further expose individual Stapo posts to 'the temptation of deporting elderly and for them uncomfortable Jews,' SS-Obersturmführer Eichmann explained for reassurance that the Jews left in the Altreich will most probably be deported already during the summer or rather in the fall to Theresienstadt, which is earmarked as an 'elderly ghetto.' This town is currently being evacuated, and already 15 – 20,000 Jews from the Protectorate could temporarily be relocated there. This takes place in order 'to save face' to the outside world."

The guidelines mentioned here are the previously mentioned "Guidelines for the technical implementation of the evacuation of Jews to the General Government (Trawniki near Lublin)." The document in question completely confirms their validity, especially with regard to the prohibition of deporting elderly or weak Jews to the East. Indeed, in order to prevent the local Gestapo units

from illegally inserting them into transports, Eichmann felt compelled to reassure them, announcing that they would be transferred to the "ghetto for the elderly" in Theresienstadt, which was therefore a real "elderly ghetto". If this served to "save face", it does not mean that Theresienstadt was a propaganda ghetto, but that the SS wanted to avoid the reproach of deporting these categories of people. Everything is completely outside the logic of extermination.

Here are the guidelines regarding transports (*ibid.*, pp. 2f.):

"Only empty trains for Russians/worker transports to the Old Reich are available, which are supposed to roll back empty to the General Government and which will now be utilized by the RSHA in agreement with the OKW [Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht]. [...]"

The trains have a capacity of only 700 persons, but 1,000 Jews are to be accommodated in them. It is therefore recommended to timely reserve with the Reichsbahn freight cars for luggage in an adequate number."

The document thus unequivocally demonstrates that no Jewish extermination order existed back then, and that the deportations were planned in a rational way, with the cooperation of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. It also shows that the transports took place in passenger cars, and that freight cars for luggage had to be ordered from the German Railway.

On May 26, 1942, the Essen branch office of the State-Police Headquarters in Düsseldorf sent the central office a report on the distribution of local Jews according to established categories. Out of a total of 654 Jews, 245 were slated for deportation to Theresienstadt, and only 83 were available for "evacuation to the East" (T/1396 [110]).

The guidelines concerning the exemption from deportation of Jews unfit for labor were not mere statements of principle. On May 27, 1942, the State-Police Headquarters of Düsseldorf sent the RSHA a telex summarizing the deportations from its area of cognizance with reference to Eichmann's express letter of January 31, 1942 (T/1395 [89]):

"The Jews slated for the elderly ghetto Theresienstadt are divided as follows:

1. Over 65 years old or frail Jews over 55 years of age 1545, 571 of them male and 974 female."

Then there were 56 spouses of mixed marriages that no longer existed (No. 2), 83 "Mischlinge" (mixed-blooded, No. 3), 51 "Jews who were severely injured during the war [WWI] or who have the Wound Badge or high decorations for bravery." The report concludes that

"from the local district, 154 Jews can be deported to the east, and 1735 Jews to the elderly ghetto in Theresienstadt."

Candidates for deportation underwent a medical examination certifying or denying their suitability for work, the results of which were transcribed in a special form called "examination result" signed by a "police-certified physician" (T/1395 [45-48]).

On May 29, 1942 Josef Löwenherz, the head of the Israelite religious community of Vienna, met Eichmann in Berlin, at the RSHA headquarters. On June 1, Löwenherz wrote a file memo in which he wrote that Eichmann had informed him

"that Jews under 65 years of age emigrate to the East, and those over 65 years of age as well as some categories under 65 years, such as seriously war-disabled persons, those decorated during World War I, etc., shall be brought to Theresienstadt for permanent residence.

In accordance with the decree of 16 February 1942, the Czech inhabitants of Theresienstadt have to leave the town until 31 May 1942, so that the whole city area will be at the disposal of the Jews.

As a result, the deportation of the Jews assigned there for permanent residence will be started as well. The administration of the town is to be conducted autonomously by the Jewish Council of Elders. Except for the elderly, a number of several thousands of younger people ought to remain there as well, in order to carry out the necessary tasks in the city and in the country (approximately 250 hectares of land properties are available) and to take care of the old people." (T/821)

Hans Günther Adler reports an order from Himmler to Heydrich dated May 1, 1942 for the transfer to Theresienstadt of 120 sick Jews who were at that time in Munich (Adler 1958a, p. 15):

"120 sick Jews still remain in a Munich hospital. We want to establish this Jewish hospital as a midwives and nurses school for 'Lebensborn.'⁴⁵ Please ensure that the 120 Jews are taken to Theresienstadt as quickly as possible."

On June 6, 1942, Eichmann sent an express letter (*Schnellbrief*) to the State-Police Headquarters in Düsseldorf bearing the heading "Reichssicherheitshauptamt IV B 4 a 2093/42g (391)" with the subject "Evacuation of Jews to Izbica near Lublin," to which the new "Guidelines for the technical implementation of the evacuation of Jews to the East" were attached (T/1396, [128]).

To the four categories of Jews exempted from deportation already indicated, a fifth was added:

"Holder of the Wounded Badge and holder of high awards for bravery (Iron Cross, Class I, Gold Medal for Bravery, etc.)."

As before, the directives prescribed (T/1395 [121-127]):

"When the Jews are unregistered, the destination is not shown in the resident register of the registration offices, but only 'address unknown' or 'emigrated.'"

As for the Lublin District, Polish Jews were being moved further east to make room for Jews from the Reich. The directives of the government office in charge of the transfer, sent as an annex to the local authorities by the district

⁴⁵ "Spring of Life," a National Socialist welfare organization for unmarried mothers.

senior administrative councillor Lothar Weirauch on February 9, 1942, prescribed (Kermisz, p. 15):

"The Lublin District Office, Department of Internal Administration subdepartment Population and Welfare, is responsible to me that the Jews to be relocated receive sufficient accommodation as far as possible. The resettling Jews are allowed to bring sheets and blankets with them. They can also carry 25 kg per person of other luggage and household items. After arriving in their new settlement areas, the Jews must be medically monitored for three weeks. Any suspected typhus case must be reported immediately to the district doctor in charge."

On March 22, a transfer of Jews was carried out from Biłgoraj to Tarnogród, a village located 20 km south of this city. The related report states (*ibid.*, p. 46):

"On March 22, an evacuation of 57 Jewish families from Bilgoraj to Tarnograd occurred with a total of 221 people. Each family received a vehicle to take along the necessary furniture and beds. Custody and surveillance were ensured by the Polish Police and the command of the Special Service. The action went according to plan without incidents. The evacuees were all accommodated in Tarnograd the same day."

It is evident that Goebbels's entry of March 27, 1942 must be considered in the light of these documents, and it is revealing that Hilberg does not mention any of them.

2. The Deportations

2.1. Hilberg and the Einsatzgruppen

2.1.1. The Extermination Order

Before discussing the question of the deportations to the alleged "killing centers," we must focus on Hilberg's assertions regarding the *Einsatzgruppen* activities. These activities are in fact a summary of Hilberg's theory of the "destruction process" of the European Jews:

"The annihilation phase consisted of two major operations. The first was launched on June 22, 1941, with the invasion of the USSR. Small units of the SS and Police were dispatched to Soviet territory, where they killed Jewish inhabitants on the spot. Shortly after these mobile killings had begun, a second operation was instituted, in the course of which the Jewish populations of central, western, and southeastern Europe were transported to camps equipped with gassing installations." (p. 276)

The historiographical presupposition of this thesis regarding the first "major operation" is an alleged Hitler order, but Hilberg adduces no evidence of its existence.

At the Zündel Trial, defense counsel Douglas Christie noted that Hilberg had written in the first edition of his book on p. 177:⁴⁶

"How was the killing phase brought about? Basically, we are dealing with two of Hitler's decisions. One order was given in the spring of 1941, [...] Shortly after the mobile operations had begun in the occupied Soviet territories, Hitler handed down his second order."

The one is said to have been issued to the *Einsatzgruppen*, and the other to the "killing centers." With regard to the first order, the cross-examination proceeded as follows:⁴⁷

Q. Is there a footnote to indicate where that order is?

A. No. This is an introductory passage to a chapter.

Q. On page 177?

A. Yes. This is an introductory passage to an eighty-page chapter.

Q. I didn't ask you what it was. I asked you if there is a footnote.

⁴⁶ District Court, pp. 829, 851/Rudolf 2020a, pp. 147, 150.

⁴⁷ District Court, pp. 829-831/Rudolf 2020a, p. 147. Q = Christie; A = Hilberg

A. No, there is no footnote here.

Q. What order were you referring to?

A. In this particular case I have elaborated, in my second edition, since there is so much discussion and controversy over the nature of this order. So I could tell you not solely on the basis of what was published here in 1961, if you wish to hear it, but on the basis of all my knowledge to this date, to what I am referring to.

Q. What was the order?

A. Within the high command of the armed forces a plan was made for 'treatment of populations' inside the territories that were to be occupied following the invasion of the U.S.S.R. That order was submitted through channels to Adolph Hitler for his approval. He indicated that he wanted certain editions and changes made in this directive. We have, and I have quoted here, the directive dated March 1941. Excuse me, I am speaking of a directive not a Hitler order.

Q. I am interested in what it says here, one order was given by Hitler — [...]

THE WITNESS: The question was about the Hitler order. There was a draft directive. Hitler wanted changes made in it. The changes were subsequently made in April and were then resubmitted to Adolph [sic] Hitler's approval.

Q. MR. CHRISTIE: Okay. So there is a Hitler order, you say, that was approved by Adolph Hitler in 1941 in April.

A. By April, yes.

Q. By April, or in April?

A. Now you want the exact date.

Q. No, I don't. I want to know whether it was in April.

A. We are talking about several weeks, at the end of March when these discussions took place."

Hilberg stated immediately afterwards that he was referring to the so-called "Kommissarbefehl," the order relating to Soviet commissars.⁴⁸

"A. Adolph Hitler said that he wanted the Jewish Bolshevik Commissars to be liquidated.

Q. That's the order you refer to.

A. Well, that was the first part of it.

Q. I'm sorry I interrupted you. Go ahead.

A. He said that for this task he wanted organs of the S.S. and police to be directly involved and responsible. He then pointed out that for this purpose the military should discuss with the S.S. and police the details. Now, that was the content of the order as described by General Jodl.

Q. So we don't have the order?

A. The order was oral, and all we have are the reflections of Adolph Hitler's words as described by Jodl. We have, however, the words also of other people who were talking to Adolph Hitler which were more direct and more specific, but those words occurred in different contexts, such as Henry [Heinrich]

⁴⁸ District Court, pp. 832-834/Rudolf 2020a, p. 147.

Himmler's words, and words spoken by other people. In any case, the order was oral.

Q. The order was oral, and you don't know what the exact words were, I suppose.

A. You are quite correct. No one knows the exact wording.

Q. No. So you say there is an order to exterminate the Jews from Adolph Hitler that was oral, the content of which you don't know, and apparently nobody knows, and it was in the spring, in fact the month of April, 1941.

A. When I say that we do not know the words, I do not mean the general content. I meant the specific words.

Q. Now, you said it referred to Commissars. Right?

A. Jewish dash Bolshevik Commissars.

Q. Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars. There is a dash in it?

A. Yes, because there was a document and I am quoting Jodl."

Hilberg stated that the document in question had come to light in 1971 and that it could be found in the national archives of West Germany.

Mr. Christie then summarized the data revealed by the cross-examination:⁴⁹

"Q. Mm-hmmm. So really we don't have an order in existence in any written form. We have from you an interpretation of what Mr. Jodl is supposed to have said Adolph Hitler was supposed to have said, which you say was in the Archives of West Germany, and which you say has a dash between Jewish and Bolshevik.

A. That is my best recollection.

Q. Your best recollection.

A. Yes.

Q. So there is a dash in —

A. Well, it's a hyphen.

Q. So it, wasn't just Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars that had to be killed. It was Jewish people, was it?

A. Well, this particular problem is the one that caused a lot of discussion. There is no precise, clear answer as to what the exact wording was. We could only deduce from subsequent explanations by lowerranking individuals who passed on this particular command, particularly to the Einsatzgruppen, what it was that was being ordered.

Q. Oh, this was the Commissars' order to the Einsatzgruppen, was it?

A. Ultimately it was the order not only to the Einsatzgruppen, it was to the armed forces as well.

Q. So I want to understand clearly. This order says 'Annihilate Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars'. Right?

A. Mm-hmmm.

Q. And you interpret that to mean, Annihilate Jewish people and Bolshevik Commissars. Right?

A. Correct."

⁴⁹ District Court, pp. 835-837/Rudolf 2020a, pp. 147f.

In the "definitive," 1985 edition of his book, which, it should be stated again, was already finished at the time of the first Zündel Trial, Hilberg wrote the following about the topic of this exchange:

"A [first] written notation of the [Einsatzgruppen's] mission appeared in the war diary of the OKW's^[50] Wehrmachtführungsstab (WFSt) on March 3, 1941, at a time when invasion plans were already far advanced. The topic of the entry was a draft directive to troop commanders, which had been prepared by Warlimont's office Landesverteidigung in the WFSt, and which had been submitted by WFSt Chief Jodl to Hitler for approval. The war diary contains Jodl's enclosure of Hitler's comments, including a philosophical point defining the coming battle as a confrontation of two world views, and several specific statements, in one of which Hitler declared that the 'Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia [Intelligenz]' would have to be 'eliminated [beseitigt].' According to Hitler, these tasks were so difficult that they could not be entrusted to the army. The war diary went on with Jodl's instructions to Warlimont for revising the draft in conformity with Hitler's 'guidelines.' One question to be explored with the Reichsführer-SS, said Jodl, was the introduction of SS and Police organs in the army's operational area. Jodl felt that such a move was needed to assure that Bolshevik chieftains and commissars be 'rendered harmless' without delay. In conclusion, Warlimont was told that he could contact the OKH about the revisions, and that he was to submit a new draft for signature by Keitel on March 13, 1941." (1985, pp. 280f.; 2003, pp. 282f.)

As source, Hilberg adduces: "*Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab)*, ed. Percy Schramm and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 340-342" (his Footnote 8, p. 281 (1985), 283 (2003)). In this work, we read as follows in Hitler's above-mentioned "comments" (Schramm/Jacobsen, Part I, p. 341):

"This coming campaign is more than just a battle of arms; it also leads to a conflict between two worldviews. In order to end this war, given the vastness of the space, it is not enough to defeat the enemy's armed forces. The whole area must be dissolved into states with their own governments, with whom we can make peace. [...]"

Today's Russia can no longer be imagined without the socialist idea. It alone can be the domestic political basis for the formation of new states and governments. The Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia, as the current 'oppressor' of the people, must be eliminated. The former bourgeois-aristocratic intelligentsia, insofar as it is still present, especially among emigrants, is also ruled out."

The document continues as follows:

"In accordance with these guidelines by the Führer, the order must be changed as follows: [...]"

It must be examined with the Reichsführer SS whether it is necessary to involve units of the Reichsführer SS in addition to the Secret Field Police already

⁵⁰ Oberkommando der Wehrmacht: High Command of the Armed Forces.

there. The necessity to render harmless [=dispose of] all Bolshevik chieftains and commissars suggests that this is so."

It is therefore clear that, according to Hitler's directives, the Jewish-Bolshevik intellectual class had to be "eliminated" within the framework of a profound political reorganization of the territory of the Soviet Union, more for being Bolshevik than for the fact of being Jewish, and Alfred Jodl's instructions placed the accent upon the "Bolshevik chieftains and commissars," not on the Jewish-Bolshevik leaders.

Hilberg continues his narration as follows:

"On the specified date, the revised directive was signed by Keitel. The decisive paragraph was a statement informing the troop commanders that the Führer had charged the Reichsführer-SS with carrying out special tasks in the operational area of the army. Within the framework of these tasks, which were the product of a battle to the finish between two opposing political systems, the Reichsführer-SS would act independently and on his own responsibility. He was going to make sure that military operations would not be disturbed by the implementation of his task. Details would be worked out directly between the OKH⁵¹ and the Reichsführer-SS. At the start of operations, the border of the USSR would be closed to all nonmilitary traffic, except for police organs dispatched by the Reichsführer-SS pursuant to directive of the Führer. Quarters and supplies for these organs were to be regulated by OKH/GenQu (High Command of the Army/General Quartermaster-Wagner)." (pp. 283, 287; pp. 284-286 contain tables)

Here, Hilberg refers to a "Directive by OKW/L (signed Keitel), March 13, 1941, NOKW-2302" (his Footnote 9, p. 287).

Nevertheless, this directive speaks of "special tasks" (*Sonderaufgaben*) entrusted to Himmler by Hitler, but makes no mention either of "the Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia" (Hitler's words) or of "Bolshevik chieftains and commissars" (Jodl's words), let alone of the Jewish population in general. In practice, along the chain of command from Hitler to Keitel, every mention of Judeo-Bolshevism disappears. But then, how could Hilberg seriously and honestly interpret Hitler's original statements as if they constituted an order to "[a]nnihilate Jewish people and Bolshevik Commissars"?

Since during the trial, Hilberg explicitly referred to the discussion of the matter contained in the "definitive" (1985) edition of his book, which refutes his assertion as to the meaning of these instructions, his statements at trial constituted perjury.

Hilberg moreover referred to Otto Ohlendorf's affidavit of November 5, 1945:

"The four commanders of the Einsatzgruppen were briefed by Himmler personally. According to Ohlendorf, the only one of the four who testified after the war, they were informed that an important part of their task would be the elim-

⁵¹ *Oberkommando des Heeres*: High Command of the Army.

ination [Beseitigung] of Jews – men, women, and children – and of Communist functionaries.” (pp. 292f.)

In Footnote 26 on page 293, Hilberg states:

“Affidavit by Ohlendorf, November 5.1945. PS-2620. Ohlendorf’s veracity, and that of others testifying about predeparture orders to kill Jews, has been called into question by Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im ‘Fall Barbarossa’ (Heidelberg, 1981), pp. 74-93.”

Alfred Streim, a prosecutor working for West Germany’s Center for the Investigation of National-Socialist Crimes in Ludwigsburg, asserted, in fact (Streim, pp. 107f.):

“Ohlendorf’s statements and defense responses regarding the disclosure of the ‘Führer order’ by Streckenbach a few days before marching into the area of ‘Barbarossa’ on the occasion of a work meeting at Pretzsch are false. At the Einsatzgruppen Trial, the former leader of Einsatzgruppe D succeeded in persuading his fellow-defendants to adopt a defense strategy designed by himself, stating that, if the extermination actions against the Jews had been carried out from the start on ‘Führer order’, a milder sentence could be expected.”

In Chapter 5 we shall see that, with regard to the alleged Führer order, Holocaust historiography is groping around completely in the dark.

To be able to adduce Ohlendorf’s sworn statement as proof of his theory, Hilberg is compelled to ignore the statements signed by this SS officer over the course of his trial, which decisively disprove this theory. Interrogated by his defense counsel Rudolf Aschenauer whether he was aware of any plans or directives having as object any extermination based on racial or religious grounds, Ohlendorf assured him that he had never heard of any such plans; in the years 1938, 1939 and 1940, on the contrary, there existed plans for Jewish emigration, advocated by Heydrich with the cooperation of Jewish organizations. In 1941, he himself, Ohlendorf, intervened in favor of individual cases of emigration. When Himmler, in 1941 at Nikolayev, issued the alleged order summarized in Ohlendorf’s statement as cited by Hilberg, Himmler did not mention any race-based extermination (NMT, Vol. 4, p. 245).

I have investigated extensively the question of the claimed extermination order allegedly issued to the *Einsatzgruppen* in another study, to which I refer the reader for details (Mattogno 2018).

2.1.2. The Two Sweeps

Hilberg distinguishes between two “sweeps” of massacres:

“The first sweep was completed toward the end of 1941. It had a limited extension in newly occupied territories of the Crimea and the Caucasus during the spring and summer months of 1942. The second sweep began in the Baltic area in the fall of 1941 and spread through the rest of the occupied territory during

the following year. Hence, while the first sweep was still proceeding in the south, the second had already started in the north." (p. 382)

Between these two "sweeps," Hilberg finds his chance to insert, we know not how, an "intermediate stage" (p. 353) – but "intermediate" to what, if the end of the first sweep is chronologically superimposed upon the beginning of the second? This stage is said to have consisted of ghettoization, with regard to which Hilberg himself writes in further self-contradiction:

"When the civil administration took over part of the occupied territory in July and August of 1941, the mobile killing units had already completed a large part of the ghettoization process." (p. 356)

Which is true, but it contradicts the theory of any general order of extermination of all Russian Jews. In this regard, Streim noted (Streim, p. 114):

"Not compatible with the assumption that the 'Führer order' was disclosed in the period from the end of July to the end of August 1941, however, is that at that time the Einsatzgruppen reported the establishment of ghettos and the registration of Jews 'as ordered,' because ghettoization and registration are not conducive to extermination, but rather to preservation."

This contradiction, observes Streim, could also be explained as preparatory measures for extermination, which is precisely how Hilberg interprets it, asserting that "at least 2,000,000" Jews were still alive, and that, to the Einsatzgruppen, these "masses of bypassed Jews presented a crushing burden" (p. 353). But this explanation does not escape contradiction either, because – as Graf noted (2015, pp. 42-44) – the alleged mass extermination and ghettoization were virtually concurrent, meaning that, if the Einsatzgruppen had really been ordered to ghettoize the Jews, they could not at the same time have received an order to shoot them all *en masse*, and vice-versa. On the other hand, if the Einsatzgruppen had received an order to exterminate all the Jews in Russia, as Hilberg averred, ghettoization with all the problems that it involved could have been a mere exception – even if only temporary – from that order. This in turn would have required another order, of which there is no trace either. Hilberg does not even consider the matter. He writes simply, "The Polish-type ghetto thus made its appearance in the occupied USSR" (p. 356).

2.1.3. The Origins of the "Gas Vans"

On pp. 343f., Hilberg dwells at length on Himmler's well-known visit to Minsk "on August 15, 1941," which I have dealt with in detail elsewhere (Mattoigno 2018, pp. 283-291). Hilberg reports an anecdote how Himmler, with growing uneasiness, observed the mass shooting of Jews, and after having been informed that this mass slaughter was causing irreparable trauma among the firing squads, Himmler asked to think about "other killing methods more humane than shooting" (p. 344). As his source for this, Hilberg contented himself with citing an article titled "The Life of an SS General" ("*Leben eines SS-*

Generals”) as published by the Jewish-American periodical *Aufbau* – without bothering to trace the original document, which should not have been difficult for him, given that it is the protocol of a pre-trial interrogation carried out by the Americans. In fact, Hilberg specified:

“My early probing had been concentrated principally on Nuremberg evidence and on stores of captured German records located in the United States at the time.” (p. XII)

The source of the statement published by *Aufbau* is known only in the official English translation titled “Declaration von dem Bach,” which undoubtedly dates back to March 1946.⁵²

Hilberg later adds:

“The eventual answer to Himmler’s request was the gas van. Such a vehicle had already been used in 1940 for the gassing of East Prussian and Pomeranian mental patients at Soldau, a camp located in the former Polish corridor.” (p. 344)

Here, he no longer refers to documents as his source, but rather to works of Holocaust literature:

“Wilhelm in Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 543-51. Indictment of Wilhelm Koppe by prosecutor in Bonn, 8 Js 52/60 (1964), pp. 174-89. See also Adalbert Rückerl, NS-Vernichtungslager (Munich, 1977), pp. 258-59” (Footnote 211, p. 344)

However, the first work cited also refers to von dem Bach-Zelewski’s account and to other works of Holocaust literature (Krausnik/Wilhelm, Footnote 26, pp. 543f.), and presents a long extract from the post-war interrogation of former Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich Jeckeln dated December 11, 1945 (*ibid.*, pp. 548-552). Rückerl, on the other hand, limits himself to stating (Rückerl 1979, p. 259):

“During the pre-trial investigations relating to the Soldau Transit Camp, it was stated by witnesses that the Sonderkommando Lange was using gas vans for killings already back then.”

Hilberg therefore adduces no documentary evidence whatsoever for the use of the alleged “gas vans.” He continues as follows:

“The 1940 model, a product of the RSHA’s technical branch (II-D) under Obersturmbannführer Rauff, was equipped with bottled carbon monoxide. A gas chamber on wheels, it was camouflaged with a sign saying ‘Kaisers-Kaffee.’ Carbon monoxide bottles, however, were too expensive and cumbersome for use in the occupied USSR.” (p. 344)

Once again, Hilberg refers to works of Holocaust literature (Footnote 212, p. 345) – three, to be exact, one of which is the German anthology *Nationalsozialistische Massentötungen durch Giftgas* (Kogon *et al.* 1983, pp. 80-86). But

⁵² YVA, O.18-90, pp. 20-81.

here, at the beginning of the chapter titled "Killings in the Gas Vans behind the Front," it is claimed without any documentary evidence (*ibid.*, p. 81; I quote from the translated English edition, 1993, p. 52):

"But the procedures that had been used in the 'euthanasia' operations were not suitable for the occupied territories of the Soviet Union – the transportation of metal tanks of gas over long distances would have proved too difficult."

This is followed by a few pages on the "development of the gas vans," as Hilberg puts it (Footnote 212, *ibid.*), in which the sources consist merely of post-war testimonies by Albert Widmann, Walter Rauff, Friedrich Pradel and Theodor Leidig (*ibid.*, 1993, pp. 52-54).

As I demonstrated in another study, the orthodox narrative about the origins of the "gas vans" has no basis in documentary fact, and the related literature is utterly unreliable and inconclusive (Mattogno 2017, pp. 9-16; see also Alvarez).

Hilberg then asserts:

"The RSHA's invention lent itself to out-of-sight killing operations in Poland and Serbia. Starting in December 1941, two or three vans were sent to each of the Einsatzgruppen as well." (p. 345)

However, if we follow the *Einsatzgruppen* reports, which Hilberg cites profusely, the victims were all shot. Hilberg adduces not one single document mentioning killing in "gas vans," indeed, he doesn't even care about this problem.

And yet, according to the above-mentioned anecdote, on Himmler's order, executions carried out after August 1941 should have been carried out using other methods of execution, more-humane than firearms, meaning precisely by way of "gas vans." The *Einsatzgruppen* reports' silence is all the odder since, according to the *Enzyklopädie des Holocaust*, a good 250,000 Jews were allegedly murdered by means of "gas vans" "in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union"! (Jäckel *et al.*, p. 597)

2.1.4. The Ghettoes

Hilberg claims that "the mobile killing units were interested only in concentrating the Jews to facilitate the second sweep" (p. 367) and later adds:

"But in August 1942, the mass shootings began." (p. 402)

He describes the method of extermination employed during this "second sweep" on roughly four pages (pp. 402-405). Apart from a document introduced into evidence by the Soviets at Nuremberg (USSR-119(a)), all of his sources merely consist of three post-war affidavits of two witnesses:

- Alfred Metzner, October 15, 1947 (FN 91, p. 403); September 18, 1947 (93, p. 403; FN 97, 99, 101, p. 404; FN 102f., p. 405);
- Hermann Friedrich Graebe, November 10, 1945 (FN 92, 95, p. 403; FN 98, 100, p. 404).

Hilberg later also quotes a few passages from Graebe's affidavit (p. 1188).

In 1965, the German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* published an article on Graebe's testimony, who, before moving to the United States and obtaining U.S. citizenship (in 1954), called himself Gräbe. His post-war affidavit of November 10, 1945 was accepted into evidence during the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal as Document PS-2992 (IMT, Vol. 31, pp. 441-450). On March 23, 1965, he was declared a *Righteous among the Nations* at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. *Der Spiegel* wrote ("NS-Prozesse"):

"But this renowned witness to the German past shies away from the German present. He, who had so much to say about violent National-Socialist crimes, no longer wishes to appear before German courts today without full immunity. He has good reason to avoid the Federal Republic [=West Germany]: The public prosecutor's office at Stade is investigating against him – for suspicion of perjury.

Because in the final legal reckoning of the National-Socialist past, serious doubts have been raised as to prosecution witness Graebe's trustworthiness. The Nuremberg/Fürth Jury Court attested in 1963 that he had made 'false statements,' and considered him suspect of perjury; and the Celle Upper District Court also recognized the same year that Graebe was 'at least suspected of negligently swearing a false oath.'"

Gräbe did not return to Germany to clarify his position before the German courts.

For having been a mere preparation "the second sweep," the Russian ghettos had a rather long life. For example, Hilberg writes regarding Vilnius:

"By August and September 1943, the Vilna Ghetto was dissolved. Most of its inmates were sent to Estonia and Latvia, where they were subjected to attrition and shootings, and from where the remainder was subsequently routed to the Stutthof concentration camp. Other thousands were transported to the Sobibór death camp, and still others were rounded up and shot." (p. 398)

The last assertion is simply dumbfounding: the Germans, who had already shot 136,421 Jews in Lithuania (p. 407), instead of shooting a few "other thousands" of Jews from the Vilna Ghetto right there, sent them to die at Sobibór after a journey of over 400 kilometers! Hilberg cites no source, but Arad writes:

"The liquidation of the Vilna ghetto took place on September 23-24, 1943. [...] During the final liquidation, all the Jews were taken outside the ghetto to Rossa Square; there the men were separated from the women and children. The men and women who were able to work were selected and sent to concentration camps – men to Estonia and women to Latvia. About 4,300 to 5,000 elderly women and children were sent to Sobibor in the last days of September 1943." (Arad 1987, p. 137)

However, to back this up, Arad does not refer to any document, but merely to an earlier book by him published in 1982,⁵³ although there he wrote:

"Another 4,300-5,000 women and children were sent to the Maidanek gas chambers." (Arad 1982, p. 432)

Hence, there is no evidence that any elderly inmates and children were "sent to Sobibor in the last days of September 1943."

With reference to the dissolution of the Baltic camps, Hilberg asserts:

"From August 1944 to January 1945, several thousand Jews were transported to concentration camps in the Reich. In a camp in Klooga, Estonia, where the Einsatzgruppe Russland Nord of the Organisation Todt operated a sawmill and barracks production plant with Jewish labor brought up from Lithuania, the inmates were shot just before the arrival of the Red Army." (p. 401)

Hilberg's source is Franz W. Seidler's 1998 book *Die Organisation Todt*, and to a photo showing people lying between a number of logs on page 807 of Gutman's *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* (FN 83, p. 401). As for the shooting of the Klooga inmates shortly before the arrival of Soviet troops, Hilberg fails to produce even one single documentary source. A critical analysis of this and similar other photos concluded, according to the author, that they were staged by living people posing between fresh wooden logs, while Soviet soldiers were observing this performance (see Kuras).

As for the transferees, we know for certain that 16 Jewish transports carrying a total of 25,043 persons from the Baltic concentration camps reached the Stutthof Camp between July 12 and October 14, 1944, including precisely 10,458 from Kovno (Kaunas), and 14,585 from Riga. These fragmentary transport lists also contain the names of approximately 1,250 "boys" and "girls" between six and fifteen years of age (Mattogno 2018, pp. 230-232).

2.1.5. The Death Toll

The death toll of the Einsatzgruppen, as estimated by Hilberg, is a cause of perplexity. He writes:

"When the Einsatzgruppen crossed the border into the USSR, five million Jews were living under the Soviet flag. The majority of the Soviet Jews were concentrated in the western parts of the country. Four million were living in territories later overrun by the German army:" (p. 295)

These Jews were distributed as follows: 1,910,000 in the "Buffer Territories," and 2,160,000 in the "Old Territories" (p. 295), for a total of 4,070,000.

As for the massacres, Hilberg claims, first of all, with reference to the "first sweep," that a "half million people were shot by the Einsatzgruppen" (p. 304). He then states:

⁵³ Arad 1987, FN 13, p. 413; see Mattogno 2018, Part 1, Subchapter 4.2., "The Liquidation of the Ghettos in the Baltic Countries," pp. 228-234.

"An administrative task of drastic proportions had been tackled successfully, but it was by no means solved. Of 4,000,000 Jews in the area of operations, about 1,500,000 had fled. Five hundred thousand had been killed, and at least 2,000,000 were still alive. To the Einsatzgruppen the masses of bypassed Jews presented a massive burden." (p. 353)

Those remaining Jews were therefore destined for extermination in the "second sweep." But in the final statistics which appear on page 408, Hilberg asserts:

"These partial figures, aggregating more than 900,000, account for only about two-thirds of the total number of Jewish victims in mobile operations. The remainder died in additional shootings by Einsatzgruppen, Higher SS and Police Leaders, Bandenkampfverbände, and the German army, as result of Romanian operations in Odessa-Dalnik and the Golta camp complex, and in the course of privations in ghettos, camps, and the open woods and fields."

On p. 1320, under the heading "Open-air shooting," Hilberg supplies the figure of "1,400,000" victims, which includes everything:

"Einsatzgruppen, Higher SS and Police Leaders, Romanian and German armies in mobile operations; shootings in Galicia during deportations; killings of prisoners of war; and shootings in Serbia and elsewhere."

But if 500,000 Jews were killed in the "first sweep," 2,000,000 were still left after that, and a total of 1,400,000 Jews had been exterminated at the end of all operations, the number of victims of the "second sweep" would have amounted to $(1,400,000 - 500,000 =) 900,000$; but in that case, what happened to the remaining $(2,000,000 - 900,000 =) 1,100,000$ Jews who were never listed, either among the dead or among the survivors?

Of the 900,000 Jews recorded by Hilberg in his above-mentioned "partial figures," a good 363,211 refer to the period between August and November 1942 (p. 408). This data is derived from Document NO-1128,⁵⁴ which is a letter from Himmler to Hitler dated December 29, 1942 regarding "Southern Russia, Ukraine, Bialystok" (FN 113, p. 407). The data contained in this document are not even remotely corroborated by the data contained in the documents on the executions of Jews, and therefore present completely unreliable orders of magnitude (see Mattogno 2018, pp. 242-251).

Hilberg introduces the topic by asserting that, during the summer of 1942, the new wave "was launched without delay, and the feverish pitch of the killing infected the bureaucracy" (p. 393), but instead of documenting the extent of the massacres and the numbers of their respective victims, he limited himself to referring to *how* they were allegedly committed, based, moreover, on the few affidavits listed here in Section 2.1.4. In this context, he makes a fleeting mention of killings in the ghettos of Slonim, Janów (Yanov) and Pinsk (pp. 404-406), but without supplying any figure. These localities were located in the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine, one of the three administrative areas re-

⁵⁴ A partial translation of this document into English (also classified NO-511) was published in: *Trials of War Criminals*, Vol. 13, pp. 269f.

ferred to in Document NO-1128. Another area was the Białystok District, which Hilberg does not mention anymore in this context in the 2003 edition of his book.

The third area was the *Reichskommissariat Ostland*. Hilberg asserts that there were approximately 100,000 Jews in this region at the end of 1942 (p. 394), then states that a total of 68,000 Jews lived under German control in the ghettos of the Ostland (p. 395) and concludes:

"In conjunction with the antipartisan operations, the stage was set for the destruction of the remaining Ostland ghettos." (p. 396)

But these ghettos, as is known, were liquidated in the years 1943-1944, so they cannot be included in the data contained in Document NO-1128. In this context, Hilberg mentions one single massacre chronologically compatible with it, which is the killing of 1,826 Jews in Byelorussia (p. 395). In conclusion, Hilberg does not even attempt to prove the figure of 363,211 Jews alleged murdered according to Document NO-1128.

The fact that Hilberg cites Document NO-1128 at all, knowing perfectly well that the figures it contains are at least extremely exaggerated, is proof of his carelessness.

2.1.6. "Action 1005"

On p. 406, Hilberg mentions the so-called "Action 1005":

"In June 1942, Himmler ordered the commander of Sonderkommando 4a, Standartenführer Paul Blobel, 'to erase the traces of Einsatzgruppen executions in the East.' Blobel formed a special Kommando with the code designation 1005. The Kommando had the task of digging up graves and burning bodies. Blobel traveled all over the occupied territories, looking for graves and conferring with Security Police officials. Once he took a visitor from the RSHA (Hartl) for a ride and, like a guide showing historical places to a tourist, pointed to the mass graves near Kiev where his own men had killed 34,000 Jews."

The source for Himmler's alleged order is Blobel's affidavit of June 18, 1947, Document NO-3947 (FN 110, *ibid.*). As source for Blobel's alleged guided tour with Hartl, Hilberg refers to Albert Hartl's affidavit of October 9, 1947, NO-5384 (FN 111, *ibid.*). In this affidavit, Hartl stated:

"In March or April 1942, I met Paul Blobel in Kiev. We both were making a trip to the area of the commander in chief in Kiev, Dr. Thomas; on the outskirts of the city, in the vicinity of the cemetery, Blobel showed me a certain place and said that Jews whom he had shot together with his unit were buried there. It was an old tank ditch, which had since been filled in."

Before signing this affidavit, Hartl, who had been arrested on May 26, 1945, had already undergone three interrogations by the Americans, on March 22, 1946, May 18, 1946 and January 9, 1947. In the latter, he had stated:⁵⁵

⁵⁵ NARA, RG 238, M1270, OCCPAC. Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings

"SS-Standf [Standartenführer] Blobel told me personally that in KIEV he had shot 60,000 [persons] in an antitank ditch and 30,00 in another place."

But in none of the known versions of the claimed executions at Babij Yar were the victims buried in an "antitank ditch". In the "Preamble" of the analysis of the interrogation drawn up by the American investigators we read that Hartl "is known as a boaster of the highest order." In the account of the alleged event he is said to have made in the presence of Gitta Sereny, he fully confirmed the accuracy of this assessment (Sereny, p. 97):

"At one moment – we were driving along a long ravine. I noticed strange movements of the earth: clumps of earth rose into the air as if by their own propulsion – and there was smoke: it was like a low-toned volcano; as if there was burning lava just beneath the earth."

On the alleged "Action 1005," I refer the reader to a study of mine, in which I document that the evidence adduced for its origin, its implementation and its conclusion are a mixture of senseless, at-times-absurd, technically impossible and contradictory testimonies interspersed with very few documents of ambivalent meaning (Mattogno 2018, Part Two).

That said, let's move on to the Jewish deportations to the alleged "killing centers".

2.2. The Purpose of the Deportations

Hilberg claims that the deportations of Western Jews to the East were intended to destroy them, even before the "killing centers" began their operations. Already on p. 213, he postulates this assertion as a proven fact:

"In October 1941, mass deportations began in the Reich. They did not end until the destruction process was over. The object of these movements was not emigration but the annihilation of the Jews."

This assertion is refuted by the evacuation order given by Hitler himself, which appears in a note of October 24, 1941 regarding a "Meetings in Berlin on October 23, 1941 at [Office] IV B 4, chaired by SS-Sturmbannführer Eichmann." The document with the subject "Führer order. (Evacuation of 50,000 Jews from the Old Reich including Ostmark [Austria] and the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia)" starts with the following sentence:

"In the period from Nov. 1 until Dec. 4, 50,000 Jews are evacuated from the aforementioned areas to Minsk and Riga."

That such an "evacuation" did not aim at extermination is demonstrated by the fact that, according to the note under discussion, Jews over 60 years old as well

at Nuernberg 1945-1947, Hartl, Albert, p. 59.

as the sick and infirm, regardless of age, were exempt from deportation, among others.⁵⁶

From these provisions then developed the "Guidelines for the technical implementation of the evacuation of Jews to the General Government (Trawniki near Lublin)" of January 1942, as examined earlier.

Hilberg subsequently claims that the Łódź Ghetto "was to be the recipient of tens of thousands of Jews who were sent [...] to some form of destruction," and adds:

"The late fall months of 1941 were a transition period during which deportations were already under way, but killing centers had not yet been established." (p. 364)

In support of this alleged homicidal intention, almost 600 pages later, Hilberg asserts:

"By the end of the month [of October 1941] the race expert (Sonderdezernent für Rassenpolitik) in Bräutigam's office in the East Ministry, Amtsgerichtsrat Wetzel, drafted a letter in which he stated that Brack was prepared to introduce his gassing apparatus in the East. Brack had offered to send his chemical expert, Dr. Kallmeyer, to Riga, and Eichmann had referred to Riga and Minsk in expressing agreement with the idea. 'All things considered,' wrote Wetzel, 'one need have no reservation about doing away with those Jews who are unable to work, with the Brackian devices [Nach Sachlage, bestehen keine Bedenken wenn diejenigen Juden, die nicht arbeitsfähig sind, mit den Brackschen Hilfsmitteln beseitigt werden]' There were, however, some second thoughts about directing a continuing flow of transports to the icy regions of the occupied USSR. Dr. Kallmeyer, told to wait in Berlin because of the cold in the east, spent Christmas at home. The scene of the action had already been shifted to the Generalgouvernement." (p. 933)

In Footnote 25 on that same page, Hilberg refers to the following source: "Draft memorandum by Wetzel for Lohse and Rosenberg, October 25, 1941, NO-365," but immediately adds: "In Jerusalem, Eichmann declared that he had not discussed gas chambers with Wetzel" (emphasis by Hilberg).

This document is described as the "draft" (*Entwurf*) of a letter which, as far as is known, was never sent, and which bears a single handwritten notation at the end, which the analysts of the Staff Evidence Analysis at the Office of US Chief Counsel interpreted as "Wet 25/10." Above this, the letters "N.d.H.M." are said to appear, written faintly in pencil, which are said to mean "*Nachschrift dem Herrn Minister*," "Copy for the Minister,"⁵⁷ except that "*Nachschrift*" does not mean "copy," but rather, "postscript." In the original document, this handwritten addition does not appear. I have discussed this docu-

⁵⁶ YVA, O.53-76, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Translation of Document NO-365. Office of U.S. Chief Counsel. Staff Evidence Analysis, p. 2. NA, Record Group No. 238, NO-365.

ment extensively in another study, to which I refer (Mattogno 2018, pp. 146-152).

The chemist Helmut Kallmeyer is mentioned by Hilberg only on this occasion. In Footnote 32 on p. 934, Hilberg writes:

"Kallmeyer to Stahmer, June 18, 1960, Belzec case, vol. 5, pp. 974-75. In the letter Kallmeyer asserts that he was not needed."

As for Erhard Wetzel, Hilberg says that he was "In Soviet captivity. Released, 1955. Ministerialrat in Lower Saxony. Retired, 1958. Subsequent West German investigations terminated without trial" (p. 1193), which is surprising, considering the contents of the draft letter attributed to him. At any rate, as far as one can tell, no one asked him to confirm the letter's authenticity.

This document, which is addressed to *Reichskommissar für das Ostland* Lohse and relates to the *Solution of the Jewish Question*, begins as follows:

"Referring to my letter of 18 Oct. 1941, you are informed that Oberdienstleiter Brack of the Chancellery of the Fuehrer has declared himself ready to collaborate in the manufacture of the necessary shelters, as well as the gassing devices. At the present time the devices in question are not on hand in the Reich in sufficient numbers; they will first have to be manufactured. Since in Brack's opinion the manufacture of the devices in the Reich will cause more difficulty than if manufactured on the spot, Brack deems it most expedient to send his people directly to Riga, especially his chemist Dr. Kallmeyer, who will have everything further done there." (NO-365)

Since for Hilberg, "the Brackian devices" consisted of the utilization for homicidal purposes of "bottled, chemically pure carbon monoxide" (p. 931), one might wonder what these "gassing devices" consisted of: simple cylinders of carbon monoxide? In that case, production would doubtlessly have been easier in the Reich, contrary to the assertion made in the letter. The passage which precedes the passage cited by Hilberg moreover contradicts the theory of planned homicide:

"On information from Sturmbannfuehrer Eichmann, camps for Jews to be set up in Riga and Minsk to which Jews from the old Reich territory may possibly be sent. At the present time, Jews being deported from the Old Reich are to be sent to Litzmannstadt [Łódź], but also to other camps, to be later used as labor in the East so far as they are able to work."

But the alleged planned homicide also contradicts what Hilberg writes on p. 364:

"On October 11, 1941, the Generalkommissar of Latvia, Dr. Drechsler, was sitting in his private apartment in Riga when a visitor arrived: Brigadefuehrer Dr. Stahlecker, chief of Einsatzgruppe A. Stahlecker informed his surprised host that, in accordance with a 'wish' of the Fuehrer, a 'big concentration camp' was to be established near Riga for Reich and Protektorat Jews. Could Drechsler help out with necessary materials?"

Hilberg's insinuation that the Jews were no longer sent "to the icy regions of the occupied USSR," presumably because they were to be gassed with the phantasmagorical "gassing devices" instead, since the "scene of the action had already been shifted to the Generalgouvernement," is far-fetched and anachronistic, because the evacuation "Führer order" mentioned earlier dated to October 23, and already provided for the deportation of 50,000 Jews "to Minsk or Riga".

With regard to the deportations, Hilberg asserts:

"By November 8, 1941, Lange sent a letter to Lohse, reporting that 50,000 Jews were on the move. Twenty-five thousand were due in Riga, 25,000 in Minsk. A camp was being built at Salaspils, near Riga. Since the Reichskommissar was in Bertin, his political expert, Regierungsrat Trampedach, wrote to the capital to urge that the transports be stopped. The chief of the ministry's Political Division, Dr. Leibbrandt, replied that there was no cause for worry, since the Jews would be sent 'farther east' anyway (that is, they would be killed)." (p. 364)

This interpretation is totally misleading, as shown by the historical context (see Mattogno 2018, pp. 85-100). Here it is worth mentioning the two documents to which Hilberg alludes. On November 9, 1941, Lohse sent Rosenberg a secret telegram, in which he reported the following:⁵⁸

"Security police report carrying out of transport of 50,000 Jews to Ostland. Arrival of the 1st transport in Minsk on November 10, in Riga on November 19. Urgent request to prevent [further] transports, since Jewish camps must be re-located much further east."

On November 13, Dr. George Leibbrandt sent the following telegram to the Reichskommissar for the Ostland Lohse saying:⁵⁹

"Regarding the transport of Jews to the East. Detailed letter underway. Jews come further east. Camps in Riga and Minsk are only provisional measures, so no concerns here."

It follows that, in order to better kill the Jews, Lohse asked to prevent the departure of the transports that were to be exterminated!

A more-serious objection comes from Andrej Angrick and Peter Klein, who comment (Angrick/Klein, p. 189):

"Why this transfer farther east was necessary remains a mystery, but Trampedach seemed to know, at least in the case of Minsk, that the Security Police there in fact wanted to send two arriving transports to Borisov and Bobruisk. This would have meant that the civil-administered General Commissariat Byelorussia would have merely served as another stop along the way for additional evacuations to military administered Rear Area Army Group Center."

⁵⁸ GARF, 7445-2-145, p. 52.

⁵⁹ GARF, 7445-2-145, p. 54. The telegram is written in capital letters without umlaute.

But the railroad situation in Army Group Center refused to permit this during the battle for Moscow."

In support of his theory, Hilberg mentions only two extermination actions involving Western Jews, which would in any case have involved less than 10% of the deportees. Hilberg asserts:

"Meanwhile, other transports were arriving in Kaunas and Minsk. Five thousand Jews from the Reich and the Protektorat were shot in Kaunas by the efficient personnel of Einsatzkommando 3 on November 25 and 29 [1941]." (p. 366)

As his source, Hilberg refers to a report by SS *Standartenführer* Karl Jäger dated December 1, 1941⁶⁰ (FN 42, *ibid.*), which describes the executions in "Fort IX" of 2,934 "evacuees" Jews from Berlin, Munich and Frankfurt upon Main on November 25, 1941, and of 2,000 Jews from Vienna and Breslau on November 29,⁶¹ for a total of 4,934 persons, all members of the five transports. Nonetheless, according to the existing partial data, over 160 inmates from these transports, mostly Jews from the Reich, as well as a few Jews from Austria and the Protectorate, were still alive at Kovno in the summer of 1944, almost two years later.⁶²

The second alleged extermination, mentioned by Hilberg in Footnote 37 on page 365, concerns a transport sent to Riga:

"A transport from Berlin, the first to be directed to the Riga area, departed on November 27 [1941]. Three days later the victims were unloaded in the Rumbula forest and shot."

But here, the source is not even a document, but merely a book published in 1979! (Schneider 1979, pp. 14f., 155).

At the Zündel Trial, Hilberg flatly declared that all the Jewish transports sent to Riga were destined for immediate execution:⁶³

"When you are referring to deportations of Jews to Riga from Berlin and from other German cities, in the late fall of 1941, following the operation of the Einsatzgruppen, the idea was, to the best of my reconstruction of events, that these Jews were to be shipped there in order to be shot upon arrival by Einsatzgruppen personnel stationed in Riga. This was not colonization."

In the footnote mentioned above, Hilberg continues as follows:

"A telephone log kept by Heinrich Himmler in his own handwriting at the Wolfschanze (Hitler's headquarters) contains a cryptic note about a conversation with Heydrich at 1:30 P.M. on November 30. Five words of the entry are:

⁶⁰ The document is said to have been discovered in the central archive of Lithuania at Vilnius in March 1959. Jäger, after his arrest, committed suicide in June 1959, before he could be asked about the authenticity and reliability of the report.

⁶¹ RGVA, 500-1-25/1, p. 113a (p. 5 of the document). The report was published in the documentary appendix of Rückerl 1971.

⁶² AMS, I-IIB-10.

⁶³ District Court, p. 856/Rudolf 2020a, p. 150.

'Judentransport aus Berlin. Keine Liquidierung. [*Jewish transport from Berlin. No liquidation.*]' Facsimile in David Irving, *Hitler's War* (New York, 1977), p. 505. Riga is not mentioned, but no other transport left Berlin during November 27-30, and on December 1 there was another Himmler-Heydrich conversation about 'executions in Riga' (Exekutionen in Riga). See Martin Broszat, 'Hitler und die Genesis der Endlösung,' *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 25 (1977): 760-61."

In the passage indicated by Hilberg, Broszat reports the following entry in Himmler's log, dated December 1, 1941 (Broszat 1977, FN 46, p. 761):

"13.15 h, SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich. Executions at Riga.)"

But this entry does not prove that the Jews deported in the transport of November 27 were shot in Riga. This is simply deduced from the fact that there was talk of "executions," but it is not known in what terms. The editors of Himmler's service diary comment that the annotation referred "probably" ("wahrscheinlich") to the shooting of the transport in question, but this is only a conjecture (Witte/Wildt/Voigt, p. 280, FN 3).

Hilberg concludes his footnote with the following observation:

"Subsequent transports, however, were not killed off immediately."

Of course, this is in blatant contradiction to his theory. In fact, various Jewish transports were directed to the East *after* the inauguration of the alleged "killing centers," bypassing Auschwitz and Treblinka, while other Jewish transports from the West were sent at the same time to these camps for the alleged purpose of extermination.

The "Comprehensive Report from October 16, 1941 to January 31, 1942" contains an entire section titled "Jews from the Reich" which states:⁶⁴

"Jewish transports have been arriving from the Reich at short intervals since December 1940 [recte: 1941]. 20,000 of these Jews were sent to Riga and 7,000 to Minsk. The first 10,000 Jews evacuated to Riga were housed partly in a provisionally extended collection camp, partly in a newly-erected camp of huts in the vicinity of Riga. The other transports were sent to a separate part of the Riga Ghetto at first. Deploying all Jews fit for labor, construction of the camp of huts is being carried out at such a pace that by spring it will be possible to house all evacuated Jews in this camp who survive the winter. Only a small percentage of the Jews from the Reich are fit for work. Approximately 70-80% are women and children as well as elderly people unable to work. The mortality rate is constantly rising, also due to the extraordinarily hard winter. The performance of the few able-bodied Jews from the Reich is satisfactory. As a workforce, they are more valuable than Russian Jews due to the fact that they speak German and are relatively cleaner. The Jews have a remarkable ability to adapt, trying to change the way they live to fit the circumstances.

⁶⁴ RGVA, 500-4-92, pp. 63f.

The crowding of the Jews into the smallest space, which occurs in all ghettos, necessarily leads to a greater danger of epidemics, which we are attempting to prevent through the use of Jewish doctors, insofar as possible. In individual cases, infected, contagious Jews were separated on the pretext of taking them to an old people's home or a hospital, and executed."

Hilberg affirms that "[t]he veto, possibly prompted by arguments from the Reichskommissariat, had evidently been without effect" (FN 37, p. 365), but this presupposes that the transports to Riga were all destined for execution, and that a "veto" was issued only for the one from Berlin – no one knows why. To substantiate this interpretation, he resorts to a little trick, asserting, as we have seen, that "[s]ubsequent transports, however, were not killed off immediately" (so were there other "vetoes"?), which means that the Jews of some transports were killed immediately: this, as he well knew, is false, because after that of November 30, 1941 there were no more executions of entire convoys.

Neither Hilberg nor the other Holocaust historians who have dealt with the question have been able to provide a reasonable explanation of the meaning of "No liquidation," because it leads to senseless conclusions, no matter how it is interpreted from an orthodox point of view. This is due to the fact that this point of view is based on a wrong assumption.

As I have shown in another study, in which I dealt with the issues raised in this subchapter, "No liquidation" did not even refer to a "Jewish transport from Berlin," but was a separate note that more likely concerned public executions in the Protectorate (Mattogno 1918, pp. 208-217).

It is important to point out the fact that many Jewish transports kept being directed to the East *after* the alleged inauguration of the "killing centers." At least 28 transports carrying approximately 1,000 Jews each arrived at Minsk between May 6 and November 28, 1942 (Mattogno/Graf, pp. 199-201). The 24 transports from Vienna followed the Vienna-Lundenburg-Prerau line, and were then directed to Auschwitz by way of Oppeln (Opole) and Tschenstochau (Częstochowa), and continued on to Warsaw. From Warsaw, some transports continued to Volkovysk-Minsk via Białystok, and therefore passed through Malkinia, 4 km from the Treblinka "killing center." Others travelled by way of Siedlce, passing directly through the "killing centers" of Treblinka to the north and Sobibór to the south.

For example, the notice appearing on Timetable No. 40 of the German Central Railway Administration with headquarters in Minsk on May 13, 1942, reads:⁶⁵

"According to an announcement by RBD [Reichsbahndirektion, Reich Rail Administration] Königsberg, there will be a weekly special train (Zugg [sic] 30,9) on Friday/Saturday with about 1,000 persons from Vienna via Białystok-

⁶⁵ *Hauptseisenbahndirektion Mitte, Fahrplananordnung Nr. 40, dated May 13, 1942. NARB, 378-1-784.*

Baranowitsche to Minsk Gbf [freight station] having the following schedule: [...]"

And the notice appearing on Timetable No. 517 of the Vienna Railway Administration dated May 18, 1942 indicates the following route for the transports from Vienna to Minsk:⁶⁶

"Vienna Station Aspang – Vienna North Station – Lundenburg – Prerau-Olmütz – Gross Wisternitz – Jägerndorf – Neisse – Oppeln – Częstochowa – Warsaw West Station – Siedlce – Platerow – Czeremcha – Volkovysk – Minsk."

The fragmentary name lists of passengers traveling on the transports from Kovno and Riga to Stutthof during the summer of 1944 mentioned above include at least 959 German Jews. One of these, Berthold Neufeldt, was born on June 17, 1936.⁶⁷ He was deported at the age of 5 or 6 and was still alive in the summer of 1944.

There are at least 102 other survivors of the Jewish deportation from Theresienstadt to Riga on January 9, 1942, and 15 survivors of the deportation of January 15, in addition to another 40 survivors from the deportation of September 1, 1942 to Raasiku, in Estonia. These Jews were liberated from the following locations:

Bergen-Belsen, Bratislava (Pressburg), Bromberg, Buchenwald, Burggraben, Bydhost, Dachau, Danzig, Gottendorf, Gottenhof, Hamburg, Jagala, Kaiserwald, Kaufering, Kieblasse, Kiel, Langenstein, Lauenburg, Kattowitz, Libau, Magdeburg, Neuengamme, Neustadt, Raasiku, Raguhn, Riga, Sachsenhausen, Salaspils, Sophienwalde, Strassenhof, Stutthof, Terezin (Theresienstadt), Torun (Thorn). More than seven survivors of the transport from Theresienstadt to Minsk of November 16, 1941 were liberated at Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, Dachau, Flossenbürg, and Terezin (data taken from Kárny).

These transfers did not involve individual persons, but rather entire groups of people, who would have been treated uniformly as a group. If we have evidence that some of them survived, this means that there was no policy to kill them all. This applies for instance to the transports of January 9 and January 15, 1942, of which five respectively four Jews were liberated at Magdeburg, and seven respectively three at Buchenwald.

These persons even survived the hygienic-sanitary catastrophe which swept the German camps in 1945. Therefore, the number of survivors should have been much higher in 1944.

⁶⁶ *Deutsche Reichsbahn. Reichsbahndirektion Wien, Fahrplananordnung Nr. 517*, dated May 18, 1942. NARB, 378-1-784.

⁶⁷ AMS, I-IIB-10, p. 176.

2.3. The Deportations to the "Killing Centers"

In a chapter titled "Deportations" that is over 500 pages long (pp. 409-919), Hilberg deals at great length with the individual countries from which the Jews were deported by the Germans. But do the purpose, preparations, methods, implementation and the destinations of these deportations really comport with Hilberg's theory of a "destruction process" initiated by an order from Hitler "before the summer [of 1941] ended"? In other words, were the deportations really a part of any "destruction process" ordered by Hitler before the end of summer 1941?

In this chapter, I shall deal with these questions as regards France, Serbia, Croatia, Slovakia and Hungary.

2.3.1. France

2.3.1.1. The Documents

Contrary to the claims of some orthodox Holocaust historians, the beginning of the deportations from France had nothing to do with exterminations. For example, Ian Kershaw affirms (Kershaw, p. 166):

"Some Nazi leaders, at least, were well aware by now, what deportation to the east meant. When Goebbels, still pressing to have the Jews of Berlin deported as quickly as possible, referred in mid-December to the deportation of Jews from the occupied part of France to the east, he said it was 'in many cases synonymous with the death penalty'."

On December 12, 1941, the Germans carried out a reprisal operation in Paris following a series of attacks on occupying German forces. 1,043 Jews were arrested, then locked up in the Compiègne Camp. Kershaw refers to an entry in Goebbels's diary of December 14, 1941, which was a commentary on the proclamation by General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, military commander in France, issued on that day. In addition to the imposition of a fine of one billion francs on the Jews of occupied France, it announced (Daniel/Krumeich, p. 77):

"2. A large number of criminal Jewish-Bolshevik elements are deported to the east for forced labor. [...]

3. 100 Jews, communists and anarchists who are close to the group of perpetrators are being shot."

This document explicitly states that the purpose of the deportation was forced labor, not killing. Executions actually took place in France by firing squad and concerned the aforementioned "100 Jews, Communists and Anarchists." Therefore, only malicious intent would adduce this passage of Goebbels's diary as evidence of an intention to exterminate the Jews. Especially since here Goebbels's rhetorical "death penalty" concerned "many cases", not all cases.

Here emerges a striking orthodox contradiction regarding Goebbels's state of knowledge, who either knew or did not know, depending on what might serve a current purpose: until the day before March 27, 1942, he knew practi-

cally nothing about plans to exterminate the Jews, but on December 14, 1941, he was already perfectly informed!

The news of Stülpnagel's proclamation reached London immediately. On December 15, the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* reported the following news from the day before ("French Jews..."):

"The execution of 100 hostages in Paris, including many Jews, the announcement that French Jews will be deported 'east' for hard labor and the imposition of a billion francs fine on Jews in the occupied territory were reported today by the Vichy radio.

In Paris, the Vichy radio said, General Von Stuepnagel, commander of the Nazi occupation forces in France, ordered the execution of 100 hostages, charging that attacks on German soldiers in occupied France were the work of 'an organized Jewish, anarchist, Anglo-Saxon plot' to ruin France.

He also announced that 'a large number of criminal Judeo-Bolshevik elements' will be deported to hard labor in the eastern territories (probably Poland). Other deportations of still greater numbers will follow immediately should there be further attacks, and this independently of any other measures that may be taken."

Even Rosenberg intervened in the affair and urged Hitler "to shoot 100 or more Jewish bankers, lawyers, etc. instead of 100 Frenchmen," because the instigators of the communist bomber plotters were the Jews of London and New York, so it was only just that their French co-religionists paid for it, but "not the small Jews; all leading Jews."⁶⁸ This suggestion was ignored, though.

In fact, the deportation to the East of the Jews from occupied France as a whole was not even related to the reprisal measures, but the implementation of a general decision prior to these events.

On October 8, 1941, Zeitschel sent a letter to SS *Hauptsturmführer* Theodor Dannecker, responsible for Jewish affairs in France stating that the Jewish deportation had already been approved by Himmler (Klarsfeld/Klarsfeld, p. 25):

"On occasion of the last visit of Ambassador Abetz to the headquarters, I gave him the record^[69] you are familiar with, with the suggestion that our Jews in the concentration camp should be deported to the east as soon as possible because of the shortage of camps. On the basis of this record, Ambassador Abetz personally consulted the Reichsführer SS and was promised by him that the Jews in the concentration camp in the occupied area can be deported to the east as soon as the means of transportation permit. I ask you to not give up in this regard, in which I have succeeded in obtaining the Reichsführer's basic consent, and to send a report to Berlin every few weeks with the urgent request that the Jews be deported from occupied France as soon as possible."

⁶⁸ "Aktennotiz für den Führer," December 18, 1941. PS-001, IMT, Vol. 25, pp. 1f.

⁶⁹ Zeitschel's file memo of August 22, 1941.

Moreover, on December 23, 1941, 73 of the 1,043 Jews were released, some of them because they were over the age of 65 or were sick, others because of political pressure. On December 24, the head of the Gestapo, Heinrich Müller, informed the Security Police in France that the announced deportation of the 1,000 Jews was to be postponed for lack of rail transport capacity (Klarsfeld 1983, pp. 32f.).

This was reiterated on January 6, 1942 by the military commander in France in a letter to the representative of the head of the Security Police and the Security Service in Paris (F-967. IMT, Vol. 37, p. 388):

"According to the OKH, the 1,000 Jews made available for the deportation can currently not be deported to the east. Their deportation is not expected to be possible until February or March of this year."

A letter from Eichmann to German Foreign Office of March 10, 1942 informs about the developments (Kempner, p. 186):

"It is intended to deport 1,000 Jews to the Auschwitz Concentration Camp (Upper Silesia) who were arrested on the occasion of the reprisal measures carried out in Paris on December 12, 1941 for the attacks on German Wehrmacht members."

On March 11, Eichmann communicated that, in addition to the 1,000 Jews mentioned above, it was planned to deport another 5,000 to Auschwitz (*ibid.*, p. 189). Finally, on March 20, Rademacher informed Eichmann that the German Foreign Office had no objection to the "deportation of 6,000" Jews to Auschwitz (*ibid.*, p. 192).

In the report dated March 10, 1942, Dannecker wrote, with reference to the meeting held in March at Office IV B 4 of the RSHA, that they could undertake the preliminary negotiations with the French authorities "regarding the deportation of some 5,000 Jews to the East" (RF-1216). Dannecker continued:

"In this regard, the people involved ought to consist initially of Jews fit for work, no more than 55 years old"

The mass deportation of Jews residing in France, as well as of Dutch and Belgian Jews, was decided upon three months later. On June 22, 1942, Eichmann wrote a letter addressed to Consular Adviser Rademacher of the German Foreign Office with the subject "Labor Deployment of Jews from France, Belgium and Holland," in which he wrote (Kempner, p. 199):

"The plan is to deport initially some 40,000 Jews from the occupied French territory, 40,000 Jews from the Netherlands, and 10,000 Jews from Belgium, to Auschwitz Camp for labor deployment, in special trains, running daily, each carrying 1,000 persons, starting in mid-July or early August of this year."

On June 28, Luther transmitted the text of Eichmann's letter to the German embassies at Paris, Brussels and The Hague (NG-183). The persons to be deported was to be limited to "Jews able to work" (*ibid.*).

During this period, the Germans, with their policy of deportating only Jews fit for labor to Auschwitz, aimed essentially at procuring slave-labor manpower, therefore the problem of persons unfit for labor was still marginal. Thus, on June 15, Dannecker wrote a note on the future deportation of Jews from France:

"a) Topic. For military reasons, it will no longer be possible to deport Jews from Germany into the area of eastern operations during the summer. For this reason, the Reichsführer-SS has ordered the transfer to Auschwitz Concentration Camp of larger numbers of Jews from south-eastern Europe (Rumania), or the occupied regions of the West, for the purpose of utilizing their labor. The basic condition is that the Jews (of both sexes) are aged between 16 and 40 years. 10% Jews unfit for work can be deported along with them.

b) Decision. It has been agreed upon that 15,000 Jews from the Netherlands, 10,000 from Belgium and a total of 100,000 from France, including the non-occupied zone, will be deported." (RF-1217)

The "Guidelines for the Evacuation of Jews," issued on June 26, 1942 by the leaders of the Security Police and Security Service in France and signed by proxy by Dannecker, prescribe, in Point 1), that, "within the framework of the evacuation action, all Jews of both sexes between the ages of 16 and 45 and fit for work who are subject to compulsory marking [=wearing the Star of David] can be included" (RF-1221).

A month later, on July 27, 1942, Karl Otto Klingenfuss, an official of the German Foreign Office, communicated to Eichmann (T/448):

"The Foreign Office has basically no objections to the planned deportation to the Auschwitz camp of the specified number of Jews from the occupied French territory, from the Netherlands and Belgium for labor deployment."

A telegram from the German Deputy Ambassador to Paris Rudolf Schleier to the Foreign Office dated September 11, 1942 sums up the National-Socialist Jewish policy in France (Auswärtiges Amt 1974, p. 485):

"In the meantime, the Reich Security Main Office ordered at the beginning of July 1940 [sic] that, for the purpose of the final solution to the Jewish question, Jews should begin to be transported on a larger scale from the areas occupied by Germany for the purpose of labor deployment. The Jewish question should be resolved in these areas by deporting the Jews in stages. As the first stage, stateless Jews should be transported off. The Reich Security Main Office has contacted the Reich Ministry of Transport regarding the provisioning of railway material required for the transport. This has to make available the necessary trains in such a way that from July 17, 1942, 3 trains a week can leave from the unoccupied area of France with 1000 Jews each. Transport material will initially be available until the end of September, but probably even until November 15, 1942. As part of these measures, from July 17 to September 4, 22,931 stateless Jews have been deported to the east, which, together with the

5,138 evacuated earlier, results in a total of 28,069 Jews deported from France."

The problem of the deportation of children and non-able-bodied adults was discussed in July and August. In a memorandum dated July 21, 1942, Dann-ecker wrote with reference to a telephone conversation the day before (RF-1233):

"The question of the evacuation of children was discussed with SS Obersturmbannführer Eichmann. He decided that, as soon as deportation into the General Government is possible again, children transports can move. SS Obersturmbannführer Novak assured to make possible some 6 transports to the General Government at the end of August—beginning of September, which can contain Jews of all types (including Jews unable to work and elderly Jews)."

It is necessary to point out that, from the official German point of view at that time, Auschwitz was not located in the General Government, but in the territory of the Reich. During that period, 14 Jewish transports reached that camp between July 17 and 31, 1942: four from the Netherlands, two from Slovakia, seven from France, and one whose country of origin is not known (Czech 1990, pp. 198-207). Therefore, the six transports mentioned above, which should have contained children and adults unfit for labor, were not intended to go to Auschwitz, but in fact to the ghettos of the General Government (meaning occupied Poland).

The RSHA later decided differently. On August 13, SS *Sturmbannführer* Rolf Günther sent the SS authorities at Paris a telegram with the subject: "Deportation of Jews to Auschwitz. Here, evacuation of Jewish children," in which he stated that the Jewish children housed in the camps at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande could be "gradually allocated to the planned transports to Auschwitz," but no transports consisting solely of children were to be permitted.⁷⁰ This provision originated from the RSHA ("according to the instructions of the Reich Security Main Office, trains with only Jewish children may not be deported"), and served an obvious propagandistic purpose. It was therefore decided to mix the Jewish children housed in the camps at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande with adults, in a proportion of 300 children and 500 to 700 adults, but in no case fewer than 500 (RF-1234).

The first transport carrying a small number of children (approximately 10% of the total) reached Auschwitz already on August 14,⁷¹ although the program drawn up on July 28, 1942 provided for the departure of the first transport with "Jewish children arrested in Paris on July 16 and 17, 1942" on August 19, and another three on 21, 24 and 26 August.⁷²

⁷⁰ CDJC, XXVb-126.

⁷¹ Klarsfeld 1978, table of transports based on the ages of the deportees (unpaginated book).

⁷² Klarsfeld 1983, pp. 292-294. Facsimile of an excerpt from the original document in: Klarsfeld 1978, page relating to Convoy No. 11.

These documents constitute unequivocal proof that the initial intentions of the SS were to deport children and elderly adults unfit for work to the General Government, first directly, and later by way of Auschwitz as a transit camp.

In accordance with the guidelines set forth earlier, the first transports sent to Auschwitz contained exclusively Jews fit for labor who were all duly registered in that camp. The following table summarizes the data relating to the first 18 transports (Czech 1990, on dates indicated).

Date	No. of deportees	Origin	Men registered		Women registered	
			#	Reg. Nos.	#	Reg. Nos.
March 3	999	Slovakia	/	/	999	1000-1998
March 28	798	Slovakia	/	/	798	1999-2796
March 30	1112	Compiègne	1112	27533-28644	/	/
April 2	965	Slovakia	/	/	965	2797-3761
April 4	997	Slovakia	/	/	997	3763-3812 3814-4760
April 13	1077	Slovakia	634	28903-29536	443	4761-5203
April 17	1000	Slovakia	973	29832-30804	27	5204-5230
April 19	1000	Slovakia	464	31418-31881	536	5233-5768
April 23	1000	Slovakia	543	31942-32484	457	5769-6225
April 24	1000	Slovakia	442	32649-33090	558	6226-6783
April 29	723	Slovakia	423	33286-33708	300	7108-7407
May 22	1000	KL Lublin	1000	36132-37131	/	/
June 7	1000	Compiègne	1000	38177-39176	/	/
June 20	659	Slovakia	404	39923-40326	255	7678-7932
June 24	999	Drancy	933	40681-41613	66	7961-8026
June 27	1000	Pithiviers	1000	41773-42772	/	/
June 30	1038	Beaune-la-Rolande	1004	42777-43780	34	8051-8084
June 30	400	KL Lublin	400	43833-44232	/	/
Total	16,767		10,332		6,435	

The transports originating from Slovakia carried Jews unfit for work only from July 4, and from France from July 17.⁷² As we shall see in the next chapter, Auschwitz served as a transit camp for the Jews deported within the framework of the *Ostwanderung* (migration to the East): those able to work remained at the camp, while those who were not, including children, continued on their way east.

The locations to which at least some of these people were diverted is shown by the report of SS *Untersturmführer* Horst Ahnert on a meeting held on August 28, 1942 at Office IV B 4 of the RSHA. The meeting was organized to discuss the Jewish problem, particularly on the “Jewish evacuation” into the occupied countries, and to discuss the problem of the transports. The evacuation of the Jews to the East was to occur through the Auschwitz Camp. Among the matters discussed, under Point c) we read, in fact:⁷³

⁷³ “Tagung beim Reichssicherheitshauptamt am 28.8.1942 über Judenfragen.” Report from SS *Untersturmführer* Ahnert dated September 1, 1942. CDJC, XXVI-59.

"Inclusion of blankets, shoes, and eating utensils for the transport participants.

It was demanded by the commandant of the Auschwitz internment camp that the necessary blankets, work shoes, and eating utensils are absolutely to be included in the transports. Insofar as this has not been done so far, they are immediately to be sent on to the camp."

Point e) refers to the "purchase of barracks":

"SS-Obersturmbannführer Eichmann has attempted to purchase the barracks ordered by the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei (commander of the Security Police) at The Hague, effective immediately.

The camp must be built in Russia. The transport of the barracks may be effected in such a way that 3-5 barracks can be carried on each train."

This document is never mentioned by Hilberg for obvious reasons, like all the others that do not fit into his preconceived notion.

Some orthodox simpleton actually tried to erase the import of this document by imaginatively hypothesizing that it contains a blunder, that Ahnert mistakenly wrote "Russland" but really meant "Rheinland," because there was a German project to establish a Jewish "collection camp" in the western part of Germany, precisely in Düsseldorf, in the Rhineland (Rheinland), in fact in North Rhine-Westphalia. Of course, this would entail the insane logistics of first sending the inmates, together with pre-fabricated barracks entrained in the Netherlands, northwest of the Reich, to Auschwitz at the very southeast of the Reich, only to turn them around and send them straight back to the very west of the Reich. Such attempts at rewriting documents in trying to make inconvenient evidence go away is telling. As written, this document further refutes the alleged intentions to exterminate the Jews deported from France to Auschwitz.

On August 17 1942, SS *Standartenführer* Rudolf Siegert, an official of the RSHA's Office Group II C, wrote the following letter to the Reich Minister of Finance (Lichtenstein, insert between pp. 80 and 81):

"As part of the general solution to the Jewish question and to secure the occupation troops in the occupied French territories, Jews are constantly being transported from France to the Reich. First, the evacuated Jews will be accommodated in the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, but a special collection camp is to be built in the western part of the Reich. The barracks required for this are stored in the occupied French territory [and not The Hague] ready for dispatch and can be transported to the Reich immediately after payment of the purchase price of 340,000 RM.

It is intended to dispatch 13 railway trains with Jews to the Reich territory every month. By August 10, 1942, 18 trains have left France for the Auschwitz Camp, causing the following transportation costs:

a) 76,000 RM [from France] up to the Reich border,

b) 439,000 RM from the [Franco-]Reich border to the Auschwitz Camp.

The costs for b) can be reduced significantly in the future by setting up a collection camp in western Germany."

A note by SS *Obersturmführer* Heinz Röthke for Ahnert dated August 26, 1942 (CDJC document, VI-194), contains these questions under Point VIII (Klarsfeld 1983, pp. 365f.):

"When can we count on the construction of the barracks at the Düsseldorf camp? Has construction already begun there? Where exactly should the camp be set up?"

There is not a hint of extermination in any of these documents. Stupefyingly, that didn't stop Hilberg from claiming otherwise anyway. After noting that the payment of deportation transports was complex, because the transports passed through various countries with different currencies, he wrote the following mindboggling comment with reference to Siegert's letter (École..., p. 231):

"Les opérations nécessitées par ces transactions étaient si coûteuses et si difficiles qu'à un certain moment on envisagea la possibilité d'établir un camp de mort dans l'Ouest de l'Allemagne pour les Juifs des pays occidentaux."

"The operations necessary for these transactions were so expensive and difficult that at a certain point the possibility was considered to set up a death camp in West Germany for Jews from Western countries."

Hence, for Hilberg, a "collection camp" a "death camp" with the stroke of his pen!

2.3.1.2. Hilberg's Interpretation

Hilberg writes (p. 672):

*"On March 11 [recte: 10, 1942] Eichmann decided to get the Foreign Office's permission to deport the 5,000 Jews to Auschwitz, along with the 1,000 whose deportation was already scheduled."*⁷⁴

These 1,000 Jews were sent to Auschwitz in reprisal for partisan attacks on German soldiers in France (NG-4954).

A few lines on, Hilberg adds:

"On March 18, 1942, an embassy official commented that the appointment of a Higher SS and Police Leader in France (Oberg) would have 'an especially favorable effect on the Final Solution' in the country, and on the 27th the first train left Compiègne for Auschwitz."

Immediately afterwards, with reference to a document dated May 13, which he plucked from Klarsfeld (Klarsfeld 1983, p. 200; cf. Billig, p. 94), Hilberg reports that Lieutenant General Otto Kohl

"revealed himself to the Hauptsturmführer as an absolute opponent of the Jews and a wholehearted supporter of a 'Final Solution to the Jewish problem' with a view to complete annihilation (restloser Vernichtung)" (p. 673)

⁷⁴ These 1,000 Jews were sent to Auschwitz in reprisal for partisan attacks on German soldiers in France. NG-4954.

It is a "memo" by Dannecker dated May 13, 1942 with the subject "Assignment of rolling stock for Jewish transport" which mentions an interview with Generalleutnant Kohl, head of the rail-transport section way, Dannecker reports:

"In the conversation lasting one and a quarter hour, I gave the general an overview of Jewish issues and Jewish policy in France. By so doing, I was able to confirm that he [Kohl] was an implacable enemy of the Jews, and approved a 100% Final Solution of the Jewish Question for the purpose of total annihilation of the adversary."

Then Dannecker reports these words from Kohl:

"If you tell me. 'I want to transport 10,000 or 20,000 Jews from France to the East,' you can definitely count on me to provide the necessary material and the locomotives."

Thus, Dannecker had given Kohl "an overview of Jewish issues and Jewish policy in France", on the basis of which Kohl had stated that he "approved a 100% Final Solution of the Jewish Question for the purpose of total annihilation of the adversary," but at the time the "Jewish policy in France" pursued by Dannecker was the one I outlined earlier.

Hence, if Dannecker's guidelines regarding the deportation of Jews to Auschwitz related as late as June 26, 1942 solely to Jews of both sexes, aged 16 to 45, who were fit for work, precisely because the purpose of their deportation was labor deployment, the phrase "annihilation of the adversary" may not be understood to refer to annihilation in a biological sense.

Hilberg, by contrast, tacitly frames the deportations of Jews from France within the alleged process of "destruction," implying that they were destined for extermination at Auschwitz. Precisely for this reason, he passes in silence over the fact that the 5,000 Jews mentioned earlier had to be Jews *fit for labor*, as well as the fact that *all of them were registered* at Auschwitz. He then gives the game away by writing:

"On June 11 Eichmann called together his experts from The Hague, Brussels, and Paris to discuss further measures. The experts were considering statistics to be used in negotiations with ETRA West. The figure was an initial 100,000. The deportees were to consist of men and women in the age group 16-40, and a sum of 700 Reichsmark per person was mentioned as the transportation fee to be charged the French state. The first train was to roll on July 13." (p. 674)

Such a project obviously aimed at the utilization of Jewish labor, rather than gassing them; but Hilberg simply ignored this fact.

With regard to the case of the Netherlands, Hilberg writes:

"On June 22, 1942, the deportation chief of the RSHA, Eichmann, informed the Jewish affairs expert in the Foreign Office, Rademacher, that arrangements had been concluded with the railways for the deportation of 90,000 Jews from the Netherlands, Belgium, and occupied France to Auschwitz. The Dutch quota was 40,000." (p. 615)

The source is: "Eichmann to Rademacher, June 22, 1942, NG-183" (FN 67, p. 615). Hilberg makes no mention of the fact that this letter had as its subject the "Labor Deployment of Jews from France, Belgium and the Netherlands," which explicitly cites the reason for the deportation of these 90,000 Jews – "for labor deployment to the Auschwitz Camp" – and the fact that the measure regarded, first and foremost "Jews fit for labor" (NG-183).

Hilberg later asserts:

"Now the SS men could go ahead with their plans. On June 26, 1942, Dannecker drew up a set of guidelines (Richtlinien) for the deportation of the French Jews. He fixed the age limits at 16-45 and decided that the deportations could embrace Jews of French nationality as well as those 'stateless' Jews who were not effectively protected by a foreign power. Next he prepared a list of things that the victims were to take along: two pairs of socks, two shirts, two pairs of underdrawers, a towel, a cup, a spoon, etc. For the guidance of the transport command, he itemized the quantities of food to be stocked in the supply car of each train. Since the trains were to be made up of freight cars, he directed that each car be provided with a pail." (p. 676)

These directives are also in contradiction to the alleged plan of exterminating the deportees. What the document says about food supplies is worthy of note:

"Furthermore, a food supply for a total of 14 days (bread, flour, barley, beans etc. in bags) is to be added to the transport in a separate freight car." (RF-1221)

The provisions for a 14-day journey are in accordance with the transfer to Russia mentioned in the report by SS *Untersturmführer* Ahnert of September 1, 1942.

In conclusion, the origins of the Jewish deportations from France, their purpose and their destination, are in open contradiction with Hilberg's theory of the "destruction process," with regard to which he moreover produces no documentary proof whatsoever.

2.3.2. Serbia

Hilberg writes:

"In Russia the German army had been very nervous about the partisans, and that same scourge struck the Germans in Serbia. The Serbs dislike foreign domination in practically any form, and German-occupied Serbia was consequently the scene of continuous partisan warfare. As in the case of Russia, so also in Serbia, the German army reacted to the rebellious outbreaks by shooting hostages, especially Jewish hostages."

In the beginning the shootings were carried out on a relatively small scale. [...] During the late summer of 1941, however, two camps were set up, one in Belgrade, the other in Sabac. At the same time, systematic roundups of Jewish men were set in motion in the entire Serbian territory. Apparently the military was already beginning to think in terms of large-scale shootings of Jews." (p. 729)

He then refers to the proposal of the Plenipotentiary for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, Felix Benzler, to deport 1,200 Jews from the Šabac Camp, which was on the border at the time. But his suggestion was impracticable.

"Rademacher then turned to Adolf Eichmann for advice. The RSHA's expert on Jewish affairs had a remedy: 'Eichmann proposes shooting.' The idea appealed to Rademacher very much, and on September 13 he wrote Luther that there was really no necessity for deporting the 1,200 Jews in the Sabac camp. The shooting of 'a large number' of hostages would solve the problem just as well.

On September 28, 1941, however, another message was received from Serbia. Benzler now explained that General Böhme, the plenipotentiary commanding general, wanted to deport all 8,000 Jewish men in Serbia. Böhme could not place 8,000 people into camps; besides, the general had heard that deportations had successfully been carried out in other countries, such as the Protektorat." (p. 730)

At the town of Topola, Hilberg continues, a truck convoy was ambushed by partisans. 22 German soldiers were killed immediately. Two days later, General Böhme ordered the execution of 2,100 inmates of the Sabac and Belgrade Camps as a reprisal. The shootings started on October 9 (p. 731).

"At first there was some doubt as to whether the hostage order also applied to women, but that question was clarified in the negative. Only men were to be shot.

The army was now fully involved in the destruction process." (p. 732)

Further along, he writes:

"While the German army was completing the shooting of 4,000 to 5,000 Jewish men in their prime of life, it stopped short of killing the old men, the women, and the children, for 'it was contrary to the viewpoint [Auffassung] of the German soldier and civil servant to take women as hostages,' unless the women were actually wives or relatives of insurgents fighting in the mountains. The Jewish women and children consequently had to be 'evacuated.'" (p. 735)

For Hilberg, as we shall see below, "evacuation" was an obvious euphemism for "killing." But the issue is not that simple. On September 8, 1941, Benzler sent the German Foreign Office a telegram saying (Kempner, pp. 289f.):

"It has been verified that Jews emerged as accomplices in many acts of sabotage and insurgence. It is therefore now urgently necessary to provide in an accelerated manner for the securing and removal of all male Jews. The number to be considered for this purpose may be about 8,000. At present a concentration camp is under construction, but in view of the future development it seems advisable to get these Jews out of the country as soon as possible, i.e. with empty freight barges down the Danube river, in order to disembark them on Romanian territory (islands in the Danube delta). I ask for the creation of the pertinent required prerequisites regarding acceptance on part of Romania."

On 11 September, Luther replied (*ibid.*, p. 290; NG-3354):

"No approval can be given for the deportation of Jews into foreign territory. In this way a solution of the Jewish question will not be achieved. It is suggested to secure the Jews in labor camps and to use them for necessary public labor."

Benzler replied in another telegram the next day, saying:

"Accommodation in labor camps under current internal conditions [is] not possible, because containment [is] not ensured. Jewish camps hamper and endanger even our troops. Therefore, an immediate clearing of the camp with 1,200 Jews in Sabac is necessary, because Sabac [is] combat zone and in the surroundings insurgent gangs with the force of several thousand men have been identified."

He added that the "deportation of initially the male Jews is the essential prerequisite for the re-establishment of orderly conditions." Benzler therefore reiterated his proposal; if it were to be denied once more time, then only the "immediate deportation to the General Government or to Russia" would be left, even though this would imply transport difficulties (*ibid.*, p. 291, facsimile of the document).

Rademacher then involved Eichmann: he called him by telephone on 13 September, taking down a note of the discussion in which reads:

"According to information from Sturmbannführer Eichmann RSHA IV D VI accommodation in Russia and General Government impossible, not even the Jews from Germany can be accommodated there. Eichmann proposes shooting." (*ibid.*, p. 292; NG-3354)

Nonetheless Ribbentrop, according to a note by Walter Weber, embassy advisor to the Foreign Office dated October 2, 1941, decided that it was necessary to get in touch with Himmler to clarify "whether he could not take over 8,000 Jews, in order to bring them to Eastern Poland or elsewhere" (*ibid.*).

On October 25, Rademacher summarized the decisions taken:

"The male Jews are shot by the end of this week, so that the problem raised in the mission's report is solved."

Regarding the "remaining about 20,000 Jews⁷⁵ (women, children and elderly people) as well as about 1,500 Gypsies, of whom the males will also be shot," the decision was the following (Kempner, p. 293):

"As soon as the technical possibility exists within the framework of the comprehensive solution of the Jewish question, the Jews will be deported on the waterways to the reception camps in the East."

All this has nothing to do with programmed "destruction" or a deliberate determination to exterminate the Jews of Serbia because they were Jews. The shootings affected only male Jews as reprisal victims, and on grounds of security, and even this was simply a stop-gap action, because the possibility of de-

⁷⁵ This figure is greatly exaggerated; in April 1941, at the onset of the German occupation, there lived an estimated 16,700 Jews – men and women – in Serbia, including the Banat region; Romano, p. 3.

porting them outside the country was not available. The women and children, by contrast, were to be deported to the East. Since this constituted the alternative to shooting, this deportation was real, and could not be considered a "legend," as claimed by Hilberg (p. 800).

According to Hilberg, women and children were exterminated in the Semlin Camp. In this regard, he supplies the following description:

"In early March, a special vehicle arrived from Berlin. It was a gas van. [...] Every day except Sundays and holidays, batches of women and children were loaded on the van and driven several hundred yards to a damaged Sava River bridge on which traffic had to alternate. On the Belgrade side, the hose was connected with the van's interior and the vehicle moved with the dying Jews through the city to a shooting range where graves had been dug by Serbian prisoners. A small detachment of men from the 64th Police Battalion, under Polizeimeister Wetter, supervised the burial.

The depopulation of the camp proceeded apace. In March 1942 the inmate count fluctuated between 5,000 and 6,000. In April the number dropped to 2,974, and on May 10 the operation was over. Up to 8,000 died in the camp or in the van. Counting those that were shot, the toll was close to 15,000. Grati-fied, Dr. Schäfer reported that apart from Jews in mixed marriages there was no longer any Jewish problem in Serbia (keine Judenfrage mehr). At the same time he returned to Berlin the gas van, which was to see further service in White Russia." (pp. 736-738)

This description, insofar as it concerns the alleged extermination, is not based on documents, but on a book by Christopher Browning (1985), cited by Hilberg three times (FN 39+41, p. 736; FN 43, p. 737).

He adduces not one single document showing that any Jews were actually murdered. The reduction in numbers at the camp pending its closing is also explicable through the deportation of its inmates to the East.

The verdict of the trial against former SS *Oberführer* Emanuel Schäfer, who had been commander of the Security Police and the Security Service in Serbia, as pronounced by the District Court of Cologne on June 20, 1953, mentions various documents on Semlin (Rüter/Fuchs, p. 153):

"From the report of the commanding general of December 20, 1941, it emerges that 'the newly established Jewish and Gypsy Camp in Semlin was brought to 5281 people by December 15, 1941'. In the report of March 10, 1942, under VI it states: '5780 people (mostly women and children) were in the Jewish camp Semlin.'"

The other documents cited there mention variations in the strength of the Semlin Camp, none of them mentions killings. The verdict states further:

"Although, according to a report of March 19, 1942, another 500 Jews were transported from Kosovska-Mitrovica to Semlin, who are not included in the previous figures, the camp occupancy decreased from February 26, 1942 to March 25, 1942 to 5293 Jews. (Compare report from March 10th and March

31st, 1942). According to the report of April 20, 1942, there were still 4005 Jews in the camp on April 15, 1942. According to the report of April 30, 1942, this number fell to 2,974 Jews. In the ten-day report of July 1, 1942, Jews are no longer mentioned." (*ibid.*, pp. 153f.)

The verdict also states that the victims were loaded 25 at a time into the "death vehicle," which was then set in motion. "While driving, the driver used a lever to direct the engine's exhaust gases through a hose into the interior of the vehicle, so that the occupants fell asleep in the manner described above, and died of carbon-monoxide poisoning within a quarter of an hour," then the corpses were unloaded, and the gas van returned to the camp to pick up a new human load (*ibid.*, p. 153).

What device made it possible to divert the vehicle's exhaust gases into the cargo box with a simple "lever"?

As for the alleged extermination, it can easily be calculated that the alleged "gas vans" made $(5,780 \div 25 =)$ 231 gassing trips of half an hour each, that is, at least about 3,500 km (at an average of about 30 km/h) in order to "gas" all these Jews and Gypsies, all of whom could easily have been shot in a single day. And luckily the SS were so attentive to the economic aspects of the extermination that they planned a "death camp" in Germany!

Here it is appropriate to examine the figures of the alleged gassings, which I summarize in this table:

Date	Occupancy	"gassed"	days	"gassed" per day
Dec. 15, 1941	5,281	/		
Feb. 16, 1942	$5,780 + 500 = 6,280$	/		
March 25, 1942	5,293	987	27	37
April 20, 1942	4,005	1,028	31	42
May 30, 1942	2,974	1,031	15	69
Totals		3,046	73	42

In practice, for the first two periods, less than two "gassings" with a full load (25 people per batch) would have been carried out per day, in the third less than three, hence on average less than two!

The arrival of a "gas van" at Semlin is not attested to by any document. Browning refers to a letter from Harald Turner, head of the military administration in Serbia, to Karl Wolff, dated April 11, 1942, from which he quotes the following excerpt:⁷⁶

"Already a few months ago, I shot all the Jews that could be captured in this country, and I had all the Jewish women and children confined to a camp; at the same time, with the assistance of the Security Service, I acquired a 'delousing vehicle' which will now have completely cleared out the camp within about two to four weeks..."

⁷⁶ Browning 1999; for the original document see Alvarez, pp. 339-341.

Nevertheless, as Browning also confirms, the Serbian male Jews were shot in reprisal in their capacity as hostages (Browning 1978, pp. 56-67), and it was Turner himself who created an "obstacle" with regard to the last 1,500 designated hostages, seeking to obtain their deportation through Benzler (*ibid.*, p. 61).

While the shootings are documented, however, no document shows that the decision to deport the Jewish women and children to the East was changed later: when, by whom, and why is this supposed to have happened? Turner's letter speaks only of a "delousing vehicle." On the other hand, Emmanuel Schäfer's telegram to Friedrich Pradel dated June 9, 1942 cited by Hilberg in his FN 48 (p. 738), mentions a "special vehicle" (*Spezialwagen*) shipped by rail from Belgrade to Berlin after the two drivers had "carried out a special assignment," without the slightest mention of gas or killing, so that here as well, writers like Hilberg are compelled to fall back upon "code language." Santiago Alvarez, who subjected these documents to meticulous historico-linguistic analysis, reached the conclusion that they are forgeries fabricated by the Americans.⁷⁷

In summary, the case of Serbia only illustrates cases of reprisal shooting of male Jews. As far as women and children are concerned, the sequence of events has nothing homicidal about it:

- On September 8, 1941, Benzler proposed to move them to an island in the Danube.
- On September 12, he renewed the suggestion of their "immediate deportation to the General Government or to Russia."
- On October 2, Ribbentrop ordered that Himmler should be contacted, so he would decide whether these Jews could be transported "to Eastern Poland or elsewhere."
- on 25 October, it was decided that the "remaining about 20,000 Jews (women, children and elderly people) as well as about 1,500 Gypsies" – except for the males – were to be locked up in a ghetto in Belgrade and then "deported on the waterways to the reception camps in the East," as soon as "the technical possibility exists within the framework of the comprehensive solution of the Jewish question."
- on December 8, 1941, Rademacher wrote the following "memo":⁷⁸

"Ambassador Benzler, who is currently in Berlin, communicated by phone: Regarding the plan for the further treatment of the Serbian Jews, a change had occurred at the Belgrade meeting insofar as the Jews were no longer brought to a Serbian island, but to the Semlin Camp. The initially planned island is submerged. The Croats agreed that the Jews be brought to Semlin as a temporary camp. Ambassador Benzler asked for the Jews to be removed to

⁷⁷ Alvarez, pp. 55-59, 87-92; the documents are reproduced on pp. 291 and 339-342. See also Weckert 2019.

⁷⁸ Auswärtigen Amt 1970, p. 805; original: TNA, GMF 33/346, Serial 482.

the east as soon as possible. I replied that this would by no means be possible before the spring, since the deportation of the Jews from Germany has priority. Deportation in the spring is also still doubtful."

The Serbian Jews (women and children) were sent to Semlin Camp as a "temporary camp" ("Übergangslager"), a term synonymous with "transit camp" ("Durchgangslager"), waiting to be sent "to the East". This project was part of the real plan for the deportations of Jews from the Reich to the East. In the spring of 1942, the Semlin Camp was gradually emptied according to plans, and a "delousing vehicle" was sent, evidently for the disinfestation of those who were to be relocated.

When is this logical sequence of events supposed to have been broken? How, when, why and by whom would it have been decided to "gas" these Jews? If these questions are not answered sensibly, any claim regarding alleged gassings remains a mere unfounded conjecture.

2.3.3. Croatia

Hilberg lists the camps for Jews created in Croatia. From the Tenje Camp

"In August 1942, a transport was sent to Auschwitz, followed by a second transport in August to Jasenovac. A third transport was directed via Loborgrad to Auschwitz."

"One transport went to Auschwitz" from the Loborgrad Camp (p. 760). According to Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*, four transports from Yugoslavia arrived at Auschwitz on August 18, 22, 26 and 30, 1942 (Czech 1990, pp. 222, 225, 227, 230). The strange thing is that, according to Hilberg, there were two "death camps" in Croatian territory: Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška (p. 760). It is therefore unclear why the four above-mentioned transports were sent to Auschwitz instead of being exterminated locally. On the other hand, Hilberg is unusually laconic about these alleged "death camps":

"More than half of Croatian Jewry had been delivered to these camps. Shunted from one to the other, the Jews were marked for attrition and annihilation. They died in this process of typhus, starvation, shootings, torture, drownings, knifings, and blows with hammers to the head." (*ibid.*)

These accusations are not based on any document. In the associated footnote (FN 10, *ibid.*), Hilberg refers "particularly" to "photographs" reproduced in two books describing the crimes committed against the Jews in Yugoslavia. But attempting to prove the existence of two "death camps" on the basis of a few photographs is presumptuous, to say the least. Some of these photographs, originating from the "State Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities of the Occupying Powers and their Lackeys in Yugoslavia" and introduced into evidence at Nuremberg, allegedly show scenes of "German atrocities" (including the crushing of one victim's head with a huge hammer) which are said to

have been committed against Yugoslavian partisans (IMT, Vol. 30, pp. 403-413).

Hilberg says nothing about the number of alleged victims.

2.3.4. Slovakia

On the beginning of the deportations of Jews from Slovakia, Hilberg asserts:

"In January 1942, the Slovaks repeated the tender [exchanging Slovak expats working in Germany for Jews in Slovakia], mentioning 20,000 Jews. This time Himmler seized the opportunity, instructing the RSHA to place a request through the Foreign Office for the deportation of '20,000 young, strong Jews' to the East." (p. 776)

A few lines down, he adds:

"The exaction consisted of a bill presented by the Reich to the Slovak government for 'shelter, food, clothing, and [professional] retraining [Unterbringung, Verpflegung, Bekleidung und Umschulung].' For these fictitious expenses the charge was not less than 500 Reichsmark per head, or 45 million Reichsmark if all 90,000 Slovak Jews were to be deported. [...] To the surprise of the Foreign Office, the Slovak authorities agreed 'without any German pressure.'" (pp. 776f.)

Here, too, Hilberg distorts the facts. Slovakia undertook the deportation to the East of its own Jews upon the proposal of the Reich government. On February 16, 1942, Luther sent a teletype to the German ambassador at Bratislava informing him that, "within the framework of measures for the Final Solution of the European Jewish Question," the Reich government was prepared to transfer "20,000 young, strong Slovakian Jews" "to the East," effective immediately, where there was a need for labor manpower (T-1078).

As in the case of France, the origins of the Jewish deportations from Slovakia were closely related to the need for labor deployment of Jews fit for work.

With reference to the above-mentioned teletype, Luther wrote in his report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated August 21, 1942 (NG-2586-J, pp. 5f.):

"The number of Jews deported to the East in this way was not sufficient to meet the demand for work force there. On directive of the Reichsführer-SS, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt [RSHA] therefore approached the Foreign Ministry in order to ask the Slovak government to make available 20,000 young strong Slovak Jews from Slovakia for deportation to the East. The embassy in Bratislava reported to D III 1002 that the Slovak government took the proposal with eagerness, that preliminary steps could be initiated."

The initial timetable of Jewish transports from Slovakia was drawn up on March 13, 1942, and consisted of ten trains to Auschwitz and ten to Lublin in the following chronological order (Hubenák, pp. 59f.):

Date	Convoy No.	Origin	Destination
March 25	1	Poprad	Auschwitz
March 26	2	Zilina	Lublin
March 27	3	Patrónka	Auschwitz
March 29	4	Sered	Lublin
March 30	5	Novák	Lublin
April 1	6	Patrónka	Auschwitz
April 2	7	Poprad	Auschwitz
April 4	8	Zilina	Lublin
April 6	9	Novák	Lublin
April 7	10	Poprad	Auschwitz
April 8	11	Sered	Lublin
April 10	12	Zilina	Lublin
April 11	13	Patrónka	Auschwitz
April 13	14	Poprad	Auschwitz
April 14	15	Sered	Lublin
April 16	16	Novák	Lublin
April 17	17	Poprad	Auschwitz
April 18	18	Patrónka	Auschwitz
April 20	19	Poprad	Auschwitz
April 21	20	Novák	Lublin

Every transport was to carry 1,000 persons (*ibid.*, pp. 38f.).

On March 24, SS *Obersturmbannführer* Arthur Liebehenschel, head of Office DI (Central Office) of the SS-WVHA (Economic and Administrative Main Office of the SS), sent a teletype to the commander of Lublin POW Camp, SS *Standartenführer* Karl Otto Koch, with the subject "Jews from Slovakia," in which he wrote (Leszczyńska, p. 182):

"As already communicated, the 10,000 (ten thousand) Jews from Slovakia destined for the camp there are being transferred there with special trains starting on March 27, 1942. Every special train carries 1,000 (one thousand) inmates. All trains are routed via the border station Zwardon (Upper Silesia), where each of them arrives at 6:09 in the morning, and during a two-hour stop they are forwarded toward their destination by escort commands of the security police under the supervision of the Kattowitz branch of the state police."

On March 27, an employee of the State Police Office in Kattowitz, a certain Woltersdorf, forwarded a report to Office Group D of the SS-WVHA and two other offices on the first transport of Slovakian Jews to Lublin, bearing the subject "Labor Deployment of 20,000 Jews from Slovakia," stating:

"Arrival of the 2nd train at Zwardon with 1,000 Jews fit for work on March 27, 1942 at 6:52 h. Departure from Zwardon at 8:05 h. for Lublin Concentration Camp. The transport also carried a Jewish doctor, so that the total number is 1,001 persons." (reproduced in Dziadosz/Duszek, Photo 38)

On April 29, the German ambassador at Bratislava transmitted a "verbal note" to the Slovakian government with the subject "Costs for food, clothing and ac-

commodation for Jews transferred from Slovakia to Reich territory," where we read:

"The Jews already transported and others still to be transported from the territory of Slovakia into the territory of the Reich, following preparation and occupational retraining will be deployed for labor services in the General Government and in the occupied Eastern territories.

The housing, provisioning, clothing and occupational retraining of the Jews including their relatives caused expenses which cannot be covered by the initially only small labor output of the Jews, since occupational retraining will show effects only after some period of time, and since only some of those already transported or still to be transported are able to work."

To cover these expenses, the Reich government asked the Slovak government for a reimbursement of 500 Reichsmarks per person, a figure allegedly resulting from previous experience (Hubenák, p. 105).

On May 11, SS *Hauptsturmführer* Wisliceny, Eichmann's representative in Slovakia, wrote the following letter to the Slovak minister of domestic affairs (*ibid.*, pp. 108f.):

"As the Reich Security Main Office, Berlin, informed me telegraphically on May 9, 1942, the possibility exists of accelerating the deportation action of the Jews out of Slovakia, by being able to send additional transports to Auschwitz. However, these transports may only contain only Jews fit for labor, no children. It would then be possible to increase the deportation quota by 5 trains per month. For practical implementation, I permit myself to present the following proposal: When transferring the Jews from the cities, Jews considered fit for labor are picked out and taken to the two camps of Sillein [Zilina] and Poprad."

The proposal was not accepted, because in the month of May, the 19 Jewish transports which left Slovakia were all sent into the district of Lublin, intended for Lubartów, Luków, Międzyrzec Podlaski, Chełm, Dęblin, Puławy, Nałęczów, Rejowiec and Izbica. Overall, approximately 20,000 Jews were deported.⁷⁹

In a letter dated March 24, 1943, Gisi Fleischmann, the well-known Slovak Zionist leader whom Hilberg mentions on p. 780, wrote (Weissmandel, Doc. 23, outside of text):

"However, these days schlichtim [=deportees] brought us reports justifying our small hope that small remains are still there. We received about 200 letters from Deblin-Irena and Konskowola, Lublin District, where, in addition to our

⁷⁹ The list of Jewish transports departing Slovakia in 1942 as preserved in the Moreshet Archives (archive reference: D.1.5705), 18 transports are listed for May 1942 with a total of 18,937 deportees. This does not include the transport from Trebišov on May 4, however, which appears in the evacuation list for the month of May drawn up on April 16, 1942. On the other hand, the summary of deportations carried out in 1942 drawn up by the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 14, 1943, mentions 19 transports for the month of May (Hubenák, pp. 41, 48). The total number of deportees for the month of May was therefore approximately 20,000.

Jews, there are also Belgian ones that have been added during the last few weeks."

It should be noted that, until March 1943, all transports of Jews from Belgium had been routed to Auschwitz (Klarsfeld/Steinberg, pp. 42-45), therefore the Belgian Jews who were in Dęblin-Irena⁸⁰ and Końskowola, a small village some 6 km from Puławy in the Lublin region, necessarily must have come through Auschwitz – as part of the migration to the East mentioned earlier.

The deportations to Auschwitz only began again starting on 19 June 1942.

Hilberg does not say that the "20,000 young, strong Jews" were *really* deported to the East, approximately 10,000 to Auschwitz and 10,000 to Lublin-Majdanek, perhaps because they were not exterminated in these two alleged "killing centers," but rather registered and given work. Therefore, his claim concerning the "'resettlement' legend," a term he mentioned in this context in his 1985 "definitive" edition (p. 728), but deleted in the 2003 edition, also falls apart.

The transports sent to Auschwitz also carried a small percentage of children, all of whom were regularly registered. In the early women's transports there were children between 12 and 16 years of age who were assigned to the so-called children's squad (*Kinderkommando*) and given the easiest work, such as pulling weeds in the Rajska gardens (Kubica, p. 214).

The 5,094 Slovakian Jews who arrived at Auschwitz between April 17 and July 11, 1942 included 85 children aged 8 to 15. The youngest, Ernst Schwarcz, born August 21, 1934, formed part of the transport of April 19, and was registered under Number 31527. The transport which arrived on April 29 carried 56 children between 11 and 18 years of age. The transport of June 20 carried 9 children aged 11 to 15. The youngest were Markus Ullman, born February 22, 1931, registered under Number 40071, and Paul Schlesinger, born March 2, 1930 and registered under Number 40075 (*ibid.*, pp. 214f.). A large proportion of these deportees perished in the early months of their stay at the camp due to the severe hygienic and sanitary conditions which prevailed there.

Hilberg reports the following anecdote:

"In Budapest, the Papal nuncio, Monsignor Angelo Rotta, received an unsigned, undated Jewish note from Bratislava. It said: 'We are condemned to destruction. With certainty we know that we are to be transported to Poland (Lublin).'" (p. 778)

In the related Footnote 59, Hilberg writes:

"Rotta to Cardinal Maglione, March 13, 1942, enclosing Jewish note, in Secrétairerie d'Etat de sa Sainteté, Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, vol. 8 (Vatican, 1974), pp. 457-58. See also Vatican Secretary of State to Slovak legation, March 14, 1942, expressing anxiety about the imminent expulsion of 80,000 Jews to Galicia and Lublin without regard to religious adherence. Ibid., pp. 459-60."

⁸⁰ Irena is a suburb of Dęblin.

Attached to the letter of March 13, 1942, Nunzio Rotta sent the Vatican "a petition to the Holy Father of the unfortunate Jews of Slovakia threatened with a general expulsion to Poland." The petition, drawn up in German by the Jewish community of Pressburg (Bratislava), begins with these words (*Actes et documents*, Vol. 8, pp. 457f.):

"Holiest Father!

The Jews of the whole of Slovakia, 90,000 souls, turn to Your Holiness for help and rescue. We are doomed. As you certainly know, we are to be transported out to Poland (Lublin)."

Here, there is no mention of "destruction" (as understood by Hilberg: "*Ausrottung*," "*Vernichtung*"), but rather, of "doom" ("*Untergang*"). This actually referred to the pending deportation of the aforementioned 10,000 Jews fit for work to the Lublin-Majdanek Camp for labor deployment.

The letter from the papal secretary of state to the Slovak Delegation of March 14, 1942 contains the following sentence (*ibid.*, p. 460):

"These persons (approximately 80,000) are to be deported to Galicia and in the region of Lublin, and the deportation would be carried out separately for men, women and children."

On May 23, 1942, Karol Sidor, plenipotentiary minister of the Republic of Slovakia before the Holy See, provided Secretary of State Luigi Maglione with a note on the solution to the Jewish question. This note, dated May 8, 1942, was the response to a Holy See request for information of November 12, 1941. After explaining the reasons for the delay in sending the response, the note states:

"But a change occurred regarding the solution to the Jewish question during this period of time [between November 1941 and January 1942]. Negotiations on the solution to the Jewish problem in Europe were held between the Slovak government and the German government, and the emigration of the Slovak Jews was considered as only one part of a broader overall program. Half a million Jews will be sent from Europe to Eastern Europe at the present time. Slovakia would be the first country whose residents of Jewish origin will be accepted by Germany. The emigration of the Jews from France (from the occupied part), from Holland, Belgium, the Protectorate, and the territory of the Reich will be carried out at the same time. Thus, also Hungary expressed its preparedness to send away 800,000 Jews, as stated by the president of the council, Dr. Kallay, in his speech of April 20 of this year.

The Slovak Jews will be placed in various locations in the vicinity of Lublin, where they will remain permanently. The Aryan population will be transferred from those territories, and instead an exclusively Jewish district will be organized with its own administration, where the Jews will be able to live together and provide for their existence through their own labor. Their families will remain united." (*ibid.*, pp. 542f.)

This is fully confirmed by a file memo of April 10, 1942, of which only the Slovak translation exists. I report the main part:⁸¹

"The president of the government, Dr. Vojtech Tuka, today met with the plenipotentiary of the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler and the plenipotentiary of the Reich Marshal Göring, who received the order to resolve the Jewish question in Europe from the Reich Chancellery and the Führer Adolf Hitler. At the meeting it was established that resettlement of Slovak Jews is only part of the plan. The resettlement of half a million Jews from Europe to Eastern Europe is now being implemented. Slovakia is the first state whose Jews the German Reich was ready to take charge of. At the same time, a resettlement of Jews from France (occupied territory), Holland, Belgium, the Protectorate as well as the Reich territory is carried out. Slovak Jews are resettled to some localities in the Lublin area (Lublin District), where they will remain permanently. Families will stay together. From the point of view of international law and citizenship, the Jews will be Schutzbefohlene [German in text; wards] of the German Reich."

On page 787, Hilberg wrote:

"The nuncio in Bratislava, Monsignor Giuseppe Burzio, had a long conversation with Tuka at the beginning of April 1943. Fearing more deportations, Burzio brought up the 'sad reports' about Jewish deportees in Poland and Ukraine (sic). Everyone spoke of it."

The original text says (*ibid.*, Vol. 9, p. 249):

"Your Excellency is undoubtedly aware of the sad news about the atrocious fate of the Jews deported to Poland and Ukraine. The whole world talks about it."

As stated in the introduction to Vol. 9 of the *Actes et documents*, this does not mean that Burzio or Rotta had any reliable news about this (*ibid.*, Vol. 9, pp. 37f.):

"Until 1942 and even more in 1943, the word 'deportation' implied the feeling of a nameless tragedy. What was the real fate of the victims at the end of their deportation? Starting in 1942, the charge d'affaires of the Holy See at Bratislava, Monsignor Burzio, wrote that the deportation 'was equivalent to certain death'.^[82] A few weeks afterwards, the nunzio at Budapest, Angelo Rotta, reported in the same manner the conviction of Jewish circles in Hungary that the Slovakian deportees were 'destined in large part for certain death'. A year later, in his conversation with Minister Tuka, Monsignor Burzio is said to have made reference to the 'sad news about the atrocious fate of the Jews deported to Poland and Ukraine'. In the meantime, the news of the treatment inflicted upon the Polish Jews or non-Jews in the concentration camps had been broad-

⁸¹ Engel *et al.*, pp. 6f. (my numbering, as the book is unpaginated).

⁸² The exact text reads: "Deportation 80,000 persons into Poland at the mercy of the Germans is equivalent to a certain death sentence for a great many of them." *Actes et documents*, Vol. 8, p. 453.

ly disseminated by the Polish government in exile. The world, including the papal representatives in the eastern countries, was probably aware of the fact that a special treatment was reserved for the Jews, that they were being exterminated upon arrival, at least those incapable of doing any work?"

The question is obviously rhetorical. The source of the news, by contrast, is perfectly typical: the Polish government in exile in London, that is, the largest anti-German propaganda machine on the planet at that time.

The above-mentioned statements do, however, contain one significant reference: the destination of the deportations was not just Poland, but Galicia and the Ukraine, regions to the east of the "killing centers" or even the Bełżec and Sobibór Transit Camps.

In 1942, the deportation of the Slovakian Jews to the region of Lublin was carried out as shown in the following table (Mattoгно/Graf, pp. 242-244):

Departure Date	Destination	# of Deportees
27 March 1942	Lublin	1,000
30 March 1942	Lublin	1,000
31 March 1942	Lublin	1,003
5 April 1942	Lublin	1,495
12 April 1942	Lubartów	1,040
14 April 1942	Lubartów	1,038
16 April 1942	Rejowiec	1,040
20 April 1942	Rejowiec	1,030
22 April 1942	Nałęczów	1,001
27 April 1942	Nałęczów	1,251
5 May 1942	Lubartów	1,040
6 May 1942	Łuków	1,038
7 May 1942	Łuków	1,040
8 May 1942	Międzyrzec Podl.	1,001
11 May 1942	Chełm	1,002
12 May 1942	Chełm	1,002
13 May 1942	Dęblin	1,040
14 May 1942	Dęblin	1,040
17 May 1942	Puławy	1,028
18 May 1942	Nałęczów	1,025
19 May 1942	Nałęczów	1,005
20 May 1942	Puławy	1,001
23 May 1942	Rejowiec	1,630
24 May 1942	Rejowiec	1,022
25 May 1942	Rejowiec	1,000
26 May 1942	Nałęczów	1,000
29 May 1942	Izbica	1,052
30 May 1942	Izbica	1,000
1 June 1942	Sobibór	1,000
2 June 1942	Sobibór	1,014
5 June 1942	Sobibór	1,000
6 June 1942	Sobibór	1,001

Departure Date	Destination	# of Deportees
8 June 1942	Sobibór	1,000
9 June 1942	Sobibór	1,010
11 June 1942	Sobibór	1,000
12 June 1942	Sobibór	1,000
13 June 1942	Sobibór	1,000
14 June 1942	Sobibór	1,000
	Total:	39,889

On May 13, 1942, the district chief of Puławy sent a letter to the governor of the Lublin District, which stated (Berenstein *et al.*, p. 438):

"In the period from May 6 to May 12 inclusive, 16,822 Jews were expelled from the Pulawy District beyond the Bug on the instructions of the SS and Police Leader."

The Jews who were "expelled [...] beyond the Bug" traveled through the Belżec and Sobibór Transit Camps.

Hilberg then makes fleeting mention of a fact worth mentioning (pp. 787f.):

"Tuka wanted a Slovak commission, composed of a parliamentary deputy, a journalist, and perhaps a Catholic priest, to inspect the camps to which the Jews had been sent. The legation passed on the request to the Jewish expert of the Foreign Office, von Thadden, and, helpless, the Legationsrat transferred the burden to Eichmann. This was Eichmann's reply dated June 2, 1943:

'With reference to the proposal put forward by Prime Minister Dr. Tuka to the German Minister in Bratislava to send a mixed Slovakian commission to one of the Jewish camps in the occupied territories, I wish to state that an inspection of this kind has already been undertaken recently on the part of Slovakia, by Fiala, the chief editor of the periodical Der Grenzbote [Ethnic German newspaper].

With regard to the description of conditions in Jewish camps requested by Prime Minister Dr. Tuka, attention should be drawn to the comprehensive series of articles by this editor that have appeared with numerous photographs, etc., in the periodicals Der Grenzbote, Slovak, Slovenska Politika, Gardiste, Magyar Hirlap, and the Pariser Zeitung...

For the rest, to counteract the fantastic rumors circulating in Slovakia about the fate of the evacuated Jews, attention should be drawn to the postal communications of these Jews with Slovakia, which are forwarded directly through the adviser on Jewish affairs with the German legation in Bratislava [Wisliceny] and which, incidentally, amounted to more than 1,000 letters and postcards for February-March this year. Concerning the information apparently desired by Prime Minister Dr. Tuka about the conditions in Jewish camps, no objections would be raised by this office against any possible scrutinizing of the correspondence before it is forwarded to the addressees."

Regarding Fritz Fiala's inspection, notwithstanding its obvious importance, Hilberg has not one word to say. It is worthwhile reporting what Wisliceny stated in this regard in an affidavit dated July 15, 1946:⁸³

"Subject: Editor-in-Chief of the 'Grenzbote', Fritz F i a l a .

During the deportation of the Jews from Slovakia, in early summer 1942, at a social event, I believe it was the so-called 'advisors' evening' at the automobile club, I met Fritz Fialla [sic], editor of the 'Grenzbote', whom I knew since 1940. Over the course of the conversation, Fialla asked me whether it would be possible for him to visit such a labor center in Poland to which the Jews allegedly had been brought. He would then publish a report in the Grenzbote and in the Slovakian press, and he believed that such a report would do a lot to calm public opinion. I told Fialla that I would forward his proposal. I then spoke with Eichmann once on the phone about this suggestion, without him expressing an opinion on this. A few weeks later, Eichmann called me and told me that Himmler had ordered that articles on the labor camps in Poland be published in the foreign press. The Foreign Office, meaning Ribbentrop, was also very interested in the idea. He had thought about a visit to Theresienstadt by the Berlin representatives of the neutral press, but did not expect it to be a success. [He asked] whether I could go with Fialla to Sosnowice, to which representatives of the Slovakian government had already been in 1941. I was to speak with Fialla immediately. So I spoke with Fialla, who objected, however, that his articles in the Slovakian press would have any impact only if he could talk to Slovakian Jews. Fialla moreover stated that he was the senior correspondent of the 'Pariser Zeitung' [German-language newspaper in Paris], and that his reports could reach the French press also in this way. I in turn reported this to Eichmann, who responded that he would talk to Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz, so that Fialla could talk to Slovakian and French Jews in the 'labor camp' there. This way, the details of the visit were arranged by Eichmann. Since the Foreign Office was on it, Envoy Ludin was involved in this matter as well, and I went to see him with Fialla shortly before our trip. On Eichmann's order I had to inform Fialla, however, that his articles would be submitted to Himmler personally for preliminary censorship. Fialla agreed to this as well. He then led me to understand that he was working as a confidant for the Security Service. The trip took place in mid-summer of 1942. We first took my car to Žilina, where Fialla visited the barracks in the concentration camp and took photographs. There he also 'interviewed' a certain Antal, who claims to have been a state secretary in the government of Bela Kun in Hungary. We left early the next morning via Čadca for Kattowitz, where, by Eichmann's order, we had to report to a detective superintendent, whose name I no longer recall, at the office of the State Police. He acted as our escort and guide during the visit to Sosnowice and Bendzin. Some 100,000 Jews lived at that time in the city district Bendzin, who had been concentrated there from all over Upper Silesia. During the morning, we visited a series of industrial and non-industrial work-

⁸³ Affidavit of Dieter Wisliceny dated July 15, 1946. LST, 36/48, pp. 174-178.

shops. Fialla spoke with the manager and with workers, and he also talked to the head of the Jewish Council of Elders. The general impression was not bad. We had lunch at Sosnowice. We then drove to Auschwitz. We arrived there at around 14.00 hours. Höss was waiting for us at the headquarters. After the introductions, he took us to a complex of buildings located near the headquarters. There, we saw a dormitory, a washing and a shower room, a very modern kitchen facility and a concert hall where the camp orchestra was rehearsing. We then left by automobile and went to a laundry facility, where Jewish girls from Slovakia were working. Fialla spoke with these girls and took photographs. Then we went to a large joinery workshop by car. Here, Fialla spoke with Jews from Slovakia and France, who worked there, and again took photographs. With this, the visit was over. I turned down Höss's invitation because we wanted to cross the border before it got dark. So, we left Auschwitz towards 16.00 hours, and reached Žilina only that night, because we had a breakdown on the road. Approximately 14 days later, Fialla delivered to me his articles and the photographs. I sent them to Berlin via courier. The articles then were forwarded to Himmler, who only found time to read them weeks later. Then, Government Councilor Bosshammer came to Vienna on Eichmann's orders and raised several objections, which Himmler had annotated with green pencil. Bosshammer demanded that the articles be completely rewritten. I rejected this, saying that Fialla was an accredited journalist who would not put up with this. In the end, Bosshammer only changed a few items. After approximately 8 days, Eichmann called me and released the articles for publication. During these weeks, Fialla called me almost every day and pushed for the release of the articles. He declared that he was not at all in the mood of having to wait for weeks for the articles. The articles then appeared toward the end of October or early November. —

During our visit to Auschwitz, we saw absolutely nothing that would have been indicative of an extermination of Jews.

As regards the publication of the articles, Fialla is a victim of his journalistic curiosity and his convictions at that time."

Fiala's report, although rose-tinted, was not substantially untrue. In the article published in the *Pariser Zeitung* on December 23, 1942, he reported having interviewed four Jews deported from France, supplying exact personal data, and, as noted by Adam Rutkowski, "it turns out that three (and maybe all four) names correspond to real characters," since the name of the fourth person was probably merely garbled (Rutkowski, pp. 26 and 30). Since the check was performed against the list of deportees, which during the war was accessible only to the SS and officials from Vichy, one can hardly consider the article a product of pure propaganda.

2.3.5. Hungary

Hilberg deals with the deportation of the Jews from Hungary within the framework of his theory of "destruction," ignoring the background of these de-

portations. He discusses the topic on almost 70 pages (pp. 853-919), yet tears it entirely out of its historical context. Only later in his book does he provide some context, where he writes:

"On March 1, Speer and Milch had formed the Jägerstab (Pursuit Planes Staff), a coordinating committee that had the job of building aircraft factories in huge bunkers. [...] For its building projects the Jägerstab needed about a quarter of a million construction workers. The experts took one look at the labor supply and decided that Jews would have to be employed. On April 6 and 7, 1944, Saur talked about the problem to Hitler personally, with the result that Hitler consented as a last resort to the utilization of 100,000 Hungarian Jews who were shortly expected in Auschwitz." (p. 1000)

As Eberhard von Thadden communicated to the Foreign Office on April 29, 1944, the Reich plenipotentiary in Budapest had reported "that [the] Hungarian minister president makes available 50,000 Jews for labor in Germany."⁸⁴ On May 9, Hitler ordered the withdrawal of 10,000 men from Sevastopol to supervise the approximately 200,000 Jews who were to be sent to the concentration camps of the Reich to work in the "interceptor-plane construction program" (*"Jäger-Bauprogramm"*; NO-5689). The project was also mentioned by Himmler on May 24, 1944 in his speech to the generals at Sonthofen (Smith/Peterson, p. 203):

"Currently, however – this is peculiar in this war – we first bring 100 000, then later another 100 000 male Jews from Hungary into concentration camps, with whom we build underground factories."

During a meeting held on May 26, 1944, Albert Speer, in his capacity as chairman of the *Jägerstab*, asked how things were coming along with the Hungarian Jews. SS *Gruppenführer* Hans Kammler, at that time plenipotentiary of the *Reichsführer* SS before the Ministry of Armaments and War Production and head of the *Jägerstab*, replied:

"They are on route. At the end of the month, the first transports arrive for the surface bunker installations."

Architect Walter Schlempp, in charge of building the underground factories, reported that Xaver Dorsch, who was in charge of aircraft construction and Schlempp's superior, had told him the day before that he wished to employ 100,000 Hungarian Jews (NOKW336).

Hilberg describes the preparations for the deportations as follows:

"To bring about the rapid disappearance of Hungary's Jews, the Germans wasted no time. A railroad conference was planned for May 4-5 in Vienna to consider the dispatch to Auschwitz of four daily transports, holding 3,000 Jews each, beginning in mid-May." (p. 895)

As his source, Hilberg refers to a note by Eberhard von Thadden, head of the Domestic Department *Inland II* of the Foreign Office, to the German Consulate

⁸⁴ YVA, O.51-112, p. 107.

at Budapest dated May 5, 1944 (FN 133, *ibid.*), although that document mentions neither the four convoys with 3,000 Jews, nor Auschwitz (Braham, 1963, p. 369). The figures – but not the destination – appear instead in the telegram of SS *Standartenführer* Edmund Veesenmayer to the Foreign Office of May 4, 1944 (*ibid.*, p. 366; NG-2262). Hilberg continues (*ibid.*):

"The Foreign Office foresaw difficulties with routes: Lvov might be unavailable for military reasons, Budapest-Vienna was undesirable because the Jewish community in the Hungarian capital might become alarmed, and the German legation in Bratislava was jittery about a traversal of Slovak territory. The railway men, meeting in the offices of the Wehrmachttransportleitung Südost, hammered out the transport program with Slovakia, as the shortest way, in mind." (Emphasis added)

In this case as well, Hilberg supplies an imprecise and tendentious reconstruction of the events. I summarize what I have already written with regard to this in my study of the deportation of the Hungarian Jews (Mattogno 2007a, pp. 31-35).

On May 2, von Thadden sent the following telegram to the German Embassy in Bratislava (Braham 1963, p. 364):

"The itinerary for the deportation of a larger number of Hungarian Jews for labor deployment in the Eastern territories will be assembled in Vienna on May 4 and 5. Probably a large proportion of these transports will have to be routed through Slovakia. If serious reservations should exist against this, please send wire report."

On May 3, Hans Ludin, German minister in Bratislava, replied (*ibid.*, p. 365):

"When transporting large numbers of Hungarian Jews to the eastern territories for labor deployment, please do not touch the territory of Slovakia if possible."

On May 5, von Thadden sent Ludin another message bearing the subject "Deportation Hungarian Jews for labor deployment in the Eastern territories," in which he stated (*ibid.*, pp. 367f.):

"The following difficulties arise with the issue indicated: A transport route through Lemberg is extraordinarily difficult for military reasons, a transport from eastern Hungary – in this territory the deportation is supposed to start – via Budapest-Vienna would lead to a considerable and partly undesirable disquieting of the population in Budapest. Therefore, the RSHA desires very much that at least the transports from Eastern Hungary are routed through Slovakia, if they cannot run via Lemberg. [...]"

Note: The RSHA is also very much interested in a transport route via Lemberg, because it would be the shortest way. To the extent that the Lemberg route is made accessible at all by the military authorities, it shall be made use of for the transports." (Emphasis added)

These documents clearly show that the deportation of the Hungarian Jews was to begin in eastern Hungary, that the purpose of the transports was "labor de-

ployment," that the destination of the transports was the "Eastern territories," and that the shortest route to reach this destination was via Lvov (Lemberg in German). Hence, Hilberg's claim that the shortest route would have been through Slovakia is wrong. But when departing from eastern Hungary, the shortest route passing through Lvov was precisely the route to the "Eastern territories", not to Auschwitz.

Many transports from eastern Hungary (Felsővisó, Kőrösmező, Máramarosziget, Huszt, Iza, Munkács) in fact travelled through Lvov via Stryi (Gilbert, p. 197), and it is therefore very probable that some transports, instead of turning west towards Przemyśl-Auschwitz, continued north towards the Eastern territories according to the original plan. This no doubt explains the presence of Hungarian Jews at Kaunas (in German documents: Kauen).

The following Hungarian Jewish females reached the Stutthof Camp in 1944 from Kaunas:⁸⁵

- 54 (registration Numbers 48947-49000) on July 19, 1944 in a transport carrying 1,097 Jewish females.
- 588 on August 4, 1944, in a transport carrying 793 Jewish females, 743 of whose names are known.

The following Hungarian Jewish females arrived at Stutthof from Riga:

- 484 on August 9, 1944, in a transport carrying 6,382 Jewish females, 1,858 of whose names are known, so that the percentage of Hungarian Jewish females of known names amounts to 26%.⁸⁶
- 15 on October 1, 1944, in a transport carrying 1,777 Jewish females, 817 of whose names are known.⁸⁷

Overall, a minimum of 1,141 Hungarian Jewish females arrived at Stutthof from Kaunas and Riga. Many of them probably traveled through Lvov, including the 10,000 Jewish females requested on May 14, 1944 by SS *Standartenführer* Gerhard Maurer for the Płaszów Camp, located in the outskirts of Krakow, and the transport which reached Lublin-Majdanek from Hungary on May 25, 1944.⁸⁸

On the other hand, precisely in conjunction with the beginning of the deportations from Hungary, a transport of 878 Jews, almost all of them fit for work, departed Drancy with destination Kaunas on May 15, 1944 (Klarsfeld 1978, pp. 13 and 20; my page numbers).

As I noted in my study mentioned earlier, Auschwitz then became a "collection camp" ("*Sammellager*") for Hungarian Jews, probably for, or at least partially for, the "*Jäger-Bauprogramm*," but only as a stop-gap solution: the Auschwitz camp administration was surprised by the arrival of this enormous

⁸⁵ AMS, I-IIB-10.

⁸⁶ AMS-I-III-12.

⁸⁷ AMS-I-IIB-12.

⁸⁸ Mencil, p. 454 (Table of transports arriving at Majdanek in the years 1941-1944, compiled by Zofia Leszczyńska).

mass of persons, and did not have the time to organize the proper accommodation of these forced laborers for the Reich. Of course, this would apply even more to the alleged extermination installations (Mattogno 2007a, pp. 12-18 and 35).

Not even the deportation of the Hungarian Jews can therefore be explained with Hilberg's "destruction" theory.

The story of Joel Brand renders Hilberg's theory even more inconsistent. He summarizes it on pp. 903-905, asserting that Eichmann proposed, with Himmler's consent, "a scheme whereby the lives of the Hungarian Jews could be saved for a price, to be paid in goods" (p. 903). He then lists these goods, but does not indicate the number of Jews which Himmler was prepared to release in exchange for such goods. At the end of his book, Hilberg returns to the issue, laying it out accurately (pp. 1218-1226). He explains what was at stake: a million Jews for 10,000 trucks, plus a few thousand tons of tea, coffee, soap and other items (p. 1219).

This is how Rudolf Kastner, secretary of the Zionist assistance committee of Budapest, described the terms of the plan (Kastner, p. 93):

"For the delivery of one million Hungarian Jews, the Germans requested 200 tons of tea, 800 tons of coffee, 2 million crates of soap, 10,000 trucks as well as other strategic merchandise, particularly tungsten, the quantity of which was not indicated."

Brand, who carried on the negotiations, was arrested by the British while attempting to enter Palestine. At Cairo, he met Lord Moyne, at that time British minister of state for the Middle East, who asked him for information on Eichmann's proposal.

"Brand replied that the offer encompassed a million people. 'But Mr. Brand,' the British host exclaimed, 'what shall I do with those million Jews? Where shall I put them?'" (p. 1226)

How can one reconcile Himmler's proposal to exchange one million Hungarian Jews with Hilberg's theory of "destruction"?

In conclusion, in no case does Hilberg show that the Jewish deportations constituted the implementation of a "destruction process" by virtue of a specific order issued by Hitler "before the end of the summer of 1941." On the contrary, the existing documentation, as a whole, plainly debunks this theory.

It now remains for us to examine whether the evidence adduced by Hilberg demonstrates that the camps to which most of the Jewish transports were sent were really "killing centers."

3. The "Killing Centers"

3.1. Chełmno

Hilberg opens his Chapter Nine ("Killing Center Operations") with these words:

"The most secret operations of the destruction process were carried out in six camps located in Poland in an area stretching from the incorporated areas to the Bug." (p. 921)

These camps were: Chełmno (Kulmhof for Germans), Bełżec, Sobibór, Treblinka, Lublin-Majdanek and Auschwitz.

The first center mentioned by Hilberg is that of Chełmno. He writes:

"In 1941 Gauleiter Greiser of the Wartheland obtained Himmler's permission to kill 100,000 Jews in his Gau." (pp. 927, 929; p. 928 has a table)

The source (FN 15, p. 929) is a letter from Greiser to Himmler dated May 1, 1942 (Document NO-246). But no mention is made of "killing" in that document, where we read only:

"Reichsführer!

The operation of special treatment of approximately 100,000 Jews in the territory of my Gau as approved by yourself, in agreement with the head of the Reich Security Main Office, SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich, may be concluded in the coming 2-3 months."

This "special treatment" was nothing other than the extension of an order by Himmler to the Jews of the Wartheland. That order, transmitted to Greiser on September 28, 1941, originally related only to the expulsion, "next spring," that is, the spring of 1942, of the Jews of the Old Reich and the Protectorate through the Łódź Ghetto. I have discussed the matter in detail in another study (Mattogno/Kues/Graf 2015, pp. 247-250).

Hilberg adds:

"Three [gas] vans were thereupon brought into the woods of Kulmhof (Chełmno), the area was closed off, and the first killing center came into being." (p. 929)

The source for this assertion is the article "Extermination Camp at Chełmno" by investigating judge Władysław Bednarz published in 1946 in the compendium *German Crimes in Poland* (FN 16, *ibid.*). But this source cites not one

single document on the use of the three alleged gas vans in that camp (Bednarz 1946a&b).

On page 938, Hilberg repeats that "Kulmhof in the Wartheland was being set up with gas vans," but he fails to cite any source in support of that assertion. In fact, the orthodox narrative about the Chełmno "extermination camp" has no basis in historical or documentary facts. In my study of this camp (Mattoigno 2017), I showed that:

1. The establishment of Chełmno Camp fits perfectly into the National-Socialist policy of deporting the Jews to the east.
2. No documentary or material trace exists for the use of "gas vans" in this camp. The truck photographed by the Commission of Inquiry into the German Crimes in Poland in the courtyard of the Ostrowski Factory was used to disinfest clothing or to transport furniture.
3. There is no evidence for the first alleged systematic extermination of Jews in the Warthegau, and no one can specify when or how it was perpetrated.
4. The first witness account about the alleged extermination at Chełmno, the "Szlamiek Report," is completely unreliable. Similarly unreliable and even mutually contradictory are the witnesses of the postwar era.
5. Only one cremation furnace has been confirmed archeologically in the Chełmno Camp. It would have taken almost nine years to cremate all the bodies of the alleged victims of homicidal gassings in that furnace. There are no material traces of the alleged mass cremation.
6. Rudolf Höss's visit to the "field incinerators Aktion Reinhardt" had nothing to do with Chełmno.
7. The camp's claimed death-toll number is not based on any documentation. It was set to 1,300,000 by the Commission of Inquiry into the German Crimes in Poland, but later reduced to 340,000 by Judge Bednarz. Polish historiography today assumes a figure of about 152,000 victims, which in practice coincides with the number of Jews who, according to the Korherr Report, were led "through the camps of the Warthegau... 145,301," (NO-5194, p. 9).
8. The transports of Jews sent to the Łódź Ghetto included a high percentage of people unable to work (elderly and children), only some of whom were evacuated to make room for Jews fit for work.
9. The Chełmno Camp ceased operations in April 1943, which would be inexplicable if it really had been an extermination camp for the Jews in the Warthegau, especially for the Jews of the Łódź Ghetto. This is all-the-more-inexplicable because on March 1, 1944, 4,495 children under 8 years of age and 392 elderly persons aged 70 years and over were still alive in the ghetto.
10. Even more inexplicable, from the perspective of orthodox Holocaust historiography, is the reopening of the camp in April 1944. The claim that it had to exterminate the Jews of the Łódź Ghetto has no documentary support,

and there is no evidence that the 10 Jewish transports evacuated from the ghetto "for labor" between June and July 1944 were gassed at, or even went to, Chełmno. In fact, the analysis of name lists of the deportations permits us to rule out this possibility, as they included almost exclusively people fit for work.

11. No documentary evidence exists for the alleged extermination at Chełmno of Gypsies from the Łódź Ghetto.
12. No documentary evidence exists either for the alleged extermination at Chełmno of the children of Lidice.

3.2. Bełżec, Sobibór, Treblinka

On the origins of the alleged eastern extermination camps, Hilberg writes:

"Under primitive conditions, three camps were built by Amt Haushalt und Bauten (after the reorganization of March 1942, the WVHA-C) and its regional machinery at Bełżec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. The sites were chosen with a view to seclusion and access to railroad lines. In the planning there was some improvisation and much economizing; labor and material were procured locally at minimum cost." (p. 933)

The implementation of Hitler's alleged "extermination order" was therefore not taken very seriously by Globocnik, its alleged executor.

In less than a page and a half, Hilberg then summarizes the origins of the camps at Bełżec, Sobibór and Treblinka, citing a few post-war testimonies and two documents relating to the construction of the Treblinka Camp. In this regard, he writes:

"Dr. Eberl also availed himself of the resources of the ghetto for supplies, including switches, nails, cables, and wallpaper. Again, the Jews were to be the unwitting contributors to their own destruction." (p. 935)

As a source, he refers to the book by the Jewish Historical Institute of Warsaw titled *Faschismus – Getto – Massenmord*,⁸⁹ and more specifically to a letter sent by Eberl to the commissioner of the Jewish District dated June 26, 1942 (Hilberg's FN 38, *ibid.*). This document states (Berenstein *et al.*, p. 304):

"Subject: Treblinka Labor Camp.

The following items are urgently needed for the expansion of the Treblinka labor camp: ..."

Hilberg therefore omitted the embarrassing term "labor camp." That term appears again in another letter from Eberl, dated July 11, 1942, requesting construction material and stating:⁹⁰

⁸⁹ I use the 1960 edition, whose pagination corresponds to the 1961 edition cited by Hilberg.

⁹⁰ <http://www.deathcamps.org/treblinka/pic/bigeberl.jpg> (last accessed on April 20, 2021).

"Subject: Treblinka Labor Camp.

The Treblinka Labor Camp will be operational on Saturday, July 11, 1942."

There are two other requests for materials from Eberl: one from June 19, 1942, and the response by the commissar of the Warsaw Ghetto, Dr. Heinz Auerswald, about shipping the requested materials as listed by Eberl (Wojtczak, pp. 167f.; Gumkowski/Rutkowski). These documents make no allusion in favor of the "extermination camp" thesis.

Hilberg then describes the SS preparations for the alleged extermination of the Jews:

"Even while the three camps were being erected, transports with Jewish deportees from the Krakow District, the Reich, and the Protektorat were arriving in the Hrubieszow-Zamosc area. The director of the Population and Welfare Subdivision of the Interior Division in the Gouverneur's office of Lublin (Türk) was instructed by the Generalgouvernement Interior Main Division (Siebert) to assist Globocnik in making room for the Jews pouring into the district. Türk's deputy (Reuter) thereupon had a conversation with Globocnik's expert in Jewish 'resettlement' affairs, Hauptsturmführer Höfle. The Hauptsturmführer made a few remarkable statements: A camp was being built at Belzec, near the Generalgouvernement border in subdistrict (Kreis) Zamosc. Where on the Dęblin-Trawniki line could 60,000 Jews be unloaded in the meantime? Höfle was ready to receive four or five transports daily at Belzec. 'These Jews would cross the border and would never return to the Generalgouvernement [Diese Juden kämen über die Grenze und würden nie mehr ins Generalgouvernement zurückkommen].'" (p. 936)

The source is the already-cited book *Faschismus – Getto – Massenmord*, pp. 269-270 (FN 39, *ibid.*). Hilberg implies that the Jewish transports sent to the Hrubieszów-Zamość region were destined for extermination (and to this end they arrived "[e]ven while the three camps were being erected"); that they were unsure where to unload 60,000 Jews along the Dęblin-Trawniki railway line, but that "Höfle was ready to receive four or five transports daily at Belzec," meaning that these 60,000 Jews all had to be exterminated.

In reality, however, the document in question says something quite different. I shall summarize the analysis which I have already performed in my study of the Belżec Camp, to which I refer for a general discussion of the matter (Mattogno 2016g). I shall first of all cite the translation of the document (Berenstein *et al.*; pp. 269f.):

"I agreed to a talk with SS-Hauptsturmführer Höfle for Monday, 16 March 1942, at 17:30 h. During the talk, SS-Hauptsturmführer Höfle declared as follows:

1. It would be advisable to subdivide the Jewish transports arriving in the Lublin District into those who are able-bodied and those who are not, as early as at the station of departure. If subdivision at the station of departure is impracticable, it might be necessary to subdivide the transport at Lublin based on the above-mentioned criteria.

2. *Jews unable to work should all be sent to Be[l]zec, which is the outermost borderline station in the Zamość District.*

3. *Hstuf. Höfle is thinking of building a large camp in which the employable Jews can be registered in a file system according to their occupations and requisitioned from there.*

4. *Piaski will be relieved of the Polish Jews and will become the collection point for Jews arriving from the Reich.*

5. *For the moment, Jews will not be quartered at Trawniki.*

6. *H. asks where on the Dęblin-Trawnicki route 60,000 Jews can be unloaded. Informed of the Jewish transports now departing from here, H. explained that of the 500 Jews arriving in Susiec, those who were unemployable could be sorted out and sent to Belzec. According to a government teletype dated March 4, 1942, a Jewish transport, whose destination was the Trawnicki station, is rolling out of the Protectorate. These Jews are not unloaded in Trawnicki, but have been brought to Izbiza. An inquiry of the Zamosz District, asking to be able to request 200 Jews from there for work, was answered in the affirmative by H.*

Finally, he declared that he could accommodate 4-5 transports of 1,000 Jews per day with final destination Be[l]zec station. These Jews will be taken further on, beyond the border and would never return to the General Government."

This document does not reconcile with Hilberg's thesis of a deportation for the purpose of extermination, because the Jews fit to work had to be used for work, while those unfit for labor would all be sent to Belzec. This camp could "accommodate 4-5 transports of 1,000 Jews per day," who were to be deported "beyond the border and would never return to the General Government." For this reason, Belzec was called "outermost borderline station in the Zamość District." This phrase only makes sense based on a real cross-border transfer, that is, into the Reichskommissariat of the Ukraine, whose border was close-by.⁹¹

Piaski was to become the "the collection point" for Jews arriving from the Reich. This locality is located 24 km southeast of Lublin by road and 104 km from Belzec. The distance from Belzec by rail is even greater (approximately 155 km).

This fact is fully confirmed by the report dated April 7, 1942 from SS *Hauptsturmführer* Richard Türk, head of the Population and Welfare Department in the offices of the district governor of Lublin. The report, relating to the month of March, in fact contains a chapter titled "Jewish Resettlement Operation of the SS and Police Leaders," in which Türk reports:

⁹¹ Calculating the times on the basis of the data provided by the "eyewitness" Rudolf Reder, the gassing of 10,000 Jews per day (sic) in the six alleged gas chambers of the camp's second phase, with all the related and connected operations, would have required about three days and three nights of uninterrupted work, or about six working days, because the SS only operated from dawn to dusk, that is, at most for about 12 hours a day. In this regard, see Mattogno 2007, pp. 45-48; 2021, pp. 81-83. Thus, the gassing of 4,000-5,000 Jews a day in the three alleged gas chambers of the first phase of the camp was *a fortiori* impossible.

"The possibilities of accommodation, limited to places along the Dęblin-Rejowiec-Belzec railway line, were and are currently being discussed with the representative of the SS and Police Chief. Alternative possibilities were determined.

On the basis of my proposal, there is a fundamental understanding that as Jews from the west are being settled here, local Jews are to be evacuated in like numbers, if possible. The current status of the settlement process is that approximately 6,000 were settled here from the Reich, approximately 7,500 have been evacuated from the district, and 18,000 from the City of Lublin.

Individually, 3,400 have been evacuated from Piaski, District of Lublin, and 2,000 Reich Jews have come in so far; 2,000 from Izbica, Krasnystaw district, and 4,000 Reich Jews arriving in it; from Opole and Wawolbnica, Puławy district, 1,950 have been evacuated."

The report later mentions the resettlement of Jews from Mielec and Bilgoraj and makes clear that the majority of the evacuees was unfit for labor:⁹²

"On March 13, 1942, the Cholm District received approximately 1,000 Jews, of whom 200 were accommodated in Sosnowice and 800 in Włodawa.

On March 14, 1942, Międzyrzec, Radzyn District, received 750 Jews. On March 16, 1942, the Hrubieszow District received 1,343 Jews, 843 of which have been accommodated in Dubienka and 500 in Belz. The majority were women and children, with men fit for labor only a minority. On March 16, 1942, the Zamosz district received 500 Jews, all of whom have been lodged in Cieszanow.

On March 22, 1942, 57 Jewish families with 221 persons were resettled from Bilgoraj to Tarnograd."

The transports were organized by the Central Office for Jewish Emigration. An order of the headquarters of the regular police of Vienna dated March 20, 1942 specified:⁹³

"In the near future, the Central Office for Jewish Emigration will again carry out evacuation transports of 1,000 Jews each to Jewish ghettos in the Eastern Territory from the Vienna-Aspang Station."

The history of the National-Socialist policy of transferring the Jews into the Lublin district fully confirms Höfle's above-mentioned directive and openly contradicts the orthodox theory of the extermination of the Jews. Within the framework of this policy, in the Lublin District, where the creation of a "Jewish reservation" was originally planned, 69,084 Jews in 72 transports were deported from the Old Reich, Slovakia, Vienna and the Theresienstadt Ghetto between March 11 and July 15, 1942. Some of these Jews were later assigned to local labor camps, while others were transported into the Eastern Territories.⁹⁴

⁹² Berenstein *et al.*, p. 271. Cf. Kermisz, pp. 10-46.

⁹³ YVA, O.51-88a, p. 11.

⁹⁴ Mattogno/Graf, 234-267, in particular pp. 242-245 (list of transports).

The "Protocol No. 14/138 of the first meeting of the *Judenrat* (Jewish Council) of Lublin on March 17, 1942" documents the discussion regarding the "decree on the resettlement issue," which "was read to the president of the council on the night of March 16-17, 1942." The following instructions were given:⁹⁵

"For the resettlement, each individual person can carry along 15 kg of baggage, any amount of money and valuables.

For the seriously ill who cannot be transported, a place must be organized in the hospital between Ghettos A and B. The Judenrat [Council of Jews] provides doctors and medical personnel.

Jews who are subject to resettlement must prepare for it, meaning they have to walk about 3 km, then continue the journey [in a vehicle].

Epidemic hospitals remain behind with the sick and the staff.

Around 1,400 people will be resettled each day.

The resettlement begins from the top, and precisely from Unicka Street.

Jews who remain in empty houses after the eviction are shot.

Authorized Jews [stemplowi: stamped] who move from Ghetto A to Ghetto B can take everything with them.

The dead must be buried immediately."

These provisions testify in favor of a real resettlement rather than an extermination.

Hilberg goes on to write that

"The gas first used at Belzec was bottled [!], either the same preparation of carbon monoxide that had been shipped to the euthanasia stations or possibly hydrogen cyanide." (p. 936)

In Footnote 40 (*ibid.*), Hilberg explains:

"Bottled gas (Flaschengas) is mentioned by Oberhäuser [recte: Oberhauser] (Obersturmführer at Belzec). See text of his statement in Rückerl, NS-Vernichtungslager, pp. 136-37. The court judgment in the Oberhäuser case identifies the gas as cyanide (Zyklon B). Ibid. [=Berenstein et al.], p. 133."

In this source, Josef Oberhauser is, in fact, speaking of gassings "with bottled gas" (Rückerl 1979, p. 137), yet the verdict mentions the use of "Zyklon B-Gas" (*ibid.*, p. 133).

Zyklon B was "hydrogen cyanide" or "hydrocyanic acid," a liquid absorbed on a porous substance and packaged in hermetically sealed cans. Hilberg, by contrast, implies that the substance in question might have been bottled hydrogen cyanide, perhaps in order to create a fictitious confirmation of Kurt Gerstein's claim of having transported steel bottles with liquid hydrogen cyanide to Belzec (see Subchapter 3.7.).

As for the three above-mentioned "killing centers," Hilberg states:

⁹⁵ "Protokół Nr 14/138 Walnego zebrania Rady Żydowskiej w Lublinie z dnia 17.3.1942," in: GFHA, Catalog No. 6862.

"The limited capacity of the camps troubled SS and Police Leader Globocnik; he did not wish to get 'stuck.'" (p. 937)

The source is Viktor Brack's letter to Himmler dated June 23, 1942, Document NO-205. But this document does not even mention a "limited capacity of the camps" at all; that is an expression invented by Hilberg. The text says:

"On this occasion, Brigadeführer Globocnik expressed the opinion to carry out the entire Jewish operation as quickly as possible in order to avoid getting stuck in the middle of it one day, if any difficulties require stopping the operation."

Such a concern can also be explained from the point of view of real evacuations.

The Main Department Justice of the General Government decreed on August 27, 1942 that, as a rule, Jews subjected to criminal proceedings could be resettled, but this did not apply to criminal proceedings that could result in the death penalty. "In these cases, a revocation of detention for the purpose of resettlement is out of the question."⁹⁶ Hence, in the eyes of that authority, a resettlement did not equal a death sentence, quite on the contrary, it allowed convicts to escape any kind of prison sentences *except* capital punishment.

In ten lines, Hilberg summarizes the alleged expansion of the gassing capacity in the three camps mentioned earlier by way of the erection of newer, better, larger gas chambers (p. 937), commenting in a footnote:

"Information about the number and size of gas chambers in each camp rests not on documentation but on recollection of witnesses." (FN 44, *ibid.*)

It is indeed a fact that no documents have been found in this regard. To judge the value of these testimonies, it suffices to examine the case of Bełżec in this regard. For this camp, Hilberg adduces three testimonies: Kurt Gerstein, with whom I shall concern myself later, Rudolf Reder, and Chaim Hirszman (FN 59, p. 1037), all three of whom are considered "unreliable" by one of the greatest orthodox Holocaust experts on the Bełżec Camp, Michael Tregenza (Tregenza, pp. 242f.). In fact, the first two statements are irreconcilable: while Gerstein attributed the death of the victims in the gas chambers to the exhaust gases produced by a "Diesel engine,"⁹⁷ Reder spoke of a "gasoline-driven engine" which consumed "4 cans of gasoline per day,"⁹⁸ a "gasoline-driven engine" ("*motor pędzony benzyną*") which consumed "approximately 80-100 liters of gasoline per day" (Reder, pp. 44, 46). However, the exhaust gases of this engine were *not* used to kill the victims. In fact, during his interrogation of December 29, 1945, Reder demolished the story of the homicidal gassings with motor exhaust at Bełżec, declaring:⁹⁹

⁹⁶ YVA, O.21-3, p. 77.

⁹⁷ PS-1553, p. 6; PS-2170, p. 6; T-1310, p. 14.

⁹⁸ Interrogation of December 29, 1945. AGK, OKBZN Kraków, 111, pp. 3-3a.

⁹⁹ Reder, pp. 50f. For a detailed analysis of Reder's various statements and a comparison with Gerstein's testimony, see Matogno 2021.

"I don't know whether any gas was released through these pipes into the chambers, whether the air in the chambers was compressed or whether the air was pumped out of the chambers. [...] The air in the rooms, after their opening, was clean, transparent and odorless. In particular, no smoke or combustion gases from the engine could be perceived. These gases were discharged by the engine directly to the outside and not into the chambers."

See in this regard my detailed study *Rudolf Reder versus Kurt Gerstein: Two False Testimonies on the Belżec Camp Analyzed* (Mattogno 2021).

In his 1992 book *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders*, in the chapter dedicated to the "messengers," Hilberg – in addition to the ubiquitous Gerstein – also cites Jan Karski, who claims to have visited the Belżec Camp in October 1942. After outlining Karski's testimony, Hilberg states (Hilberg 1992, pp. 223):

"In fact, Jewish transports from Warsaw were routed to Treblinka, not Belżec. No transport left Warsaw in October. The guards in Belzec were mainly Ukrainian, although a few Baltic nationals may have been among them. The same composition applies to the guard force in Treblinka. Above all, trains did not leave Belzec or Treblinka so that the passengers could die in the cars. Belzec and Treblinka were death camps with gas chambers, and these facilities were not mentioned in Karski's account."

In practice, Karski was a false witness who invented his visit to Belżec. But if that is so, why did Hilberg choose him as one of the two most-representative persons among the "messengers" – "people who brought the dire news of annihilation to the outside world"? (*ibid.*, p. 217) Unless, of course, this was a sort of "Freudian slip," indicating that the "dire news" was a purely propagandistic invention...

On p. 504, Hilberg lists the Belżec Camp as intended for the extermination of the Jews of Galicia, but later on, with reference to December 31, 1942, he states that in "the Galician District the remaining Jews were being shot" (p. 558). In the related footnote, Hilberg informs us that "[t]he deportation figure as of November 10, 1942, was 254,989, and the total by June 27, 1943, was 434,329. Katzmann to Krüger, June 30, 1943, L-18" (FN 187, *ibid.*).

According to Höfle's report to SS *Obersturmbannführer* Willi Heim, dated January 11, 1943 and intercepted and deciphered by the British secret service, the number of persons transferred to Belżec by December 31, 1942 was 434,508. No transport reached the camp in the 14 preceding days.¹⁰⁰ The figure of 550,000 victims cited by Hilberg in the 1985 "definitive edition" of his book (p. 1219, based on secondary orthodox Holocaust literature) therefore exceeded the total number of deportees by approximately 115,000. He revised that down to Höfle's number in his 2003 edition, though (p. 1320).

If we are to believe the list of Jewish transports to Belżec drawn up by Y. Arad, approximately 30,000 Jews were deported to the camp from mid-No-

¹⁰⁰ Witte/Tyas; cf. Mattogno 2016g, Doc. 17, p. 127.

vember to mid-December 1942, most of them from Galicia,¹⁰¹ so that the number of deportees to Bełżec from this region by December 31, 1942 amounted to (254,989 + 30,000 =) approximately 285,000 Jews. It follows that, according to Hilberg's interpretation, approximately 285,000 Galician Jews were gassed at Bełżec, while the remaining (434,329 – 285,000 =) roughly 149,000 were shot instead! But if there were so many Jews still left to "process," why was the "killing center" closed in November or December 1942?

Hilberg neglects to mention that on November 10, 1942, when the alleged "killing center" at Bełżec was winding down its activities or had already ceased them, SS *Obergruppenführer* Friedrich Wilhelm Krüger, in his capacity as higher SS and police leader in the General Government and as secretary of state for security, created as many as 32 residential areas for Jews in the Galicia District (Mattogno/Graf, pp. 266f.). Hilberg's omission is all-the-more-surprising since the creation of these zones is explicitly mentioned by SS *Gruppenführer* Fritz Katzmann precisely where Katzmann cites the deportation figures cited by Hilberg (IMT, Vol. 37, p. 398):

"By the time the Higher SS- and Police Leader intervened in a general manner in the Jewish question with his police decree on the creation of Jewish residence areas dated November 10, 1942,

2 5 4 , 9 8 9 J e w s

had already been evacuated or transferred."

Katzmann then speaks of the use of some part of the remaining Jews in the German armaments industries, whose conditions of detention he describes as follows (*ibid.*, pp. 399f.):

"In addition to the main meal, we also have to supply lunch and dinner. We need to guarantee a complete diet, even in the case of illness. [...]

The Jewish workers are permitted to take abundant clothing, especially winter clothing, with them before being transferred to the camp. [...]

The Higher SS and Police Leader of Galicia and the armaments command at Lvov agree that it is necessary to keep the Jewish workers fit for work, which requires appropriate lodgings, clothing and medical assistance."

On June 26, 1943, there were 21,156 of these Jews, scattered among 21 labor camps (*ibid.*, p. 401).

As for the number of "victims" cited by Hilberg, the report states (*ibid.*):

"In the meantime, further resettlement was carried out energetically, so that all Jewish residential areas could be dissolved effective June 23, 1943. In this way, with the exception of the Jews located in the camps under the control of the SS and Police Leader, the district of Galicia has therefore been made
f r e e o f J e w s .

¹⁰¹ Arad 1987, pp. 383f. This list names approximately 517,000 deportees, at least (517,00–434,508=) 82,492 of whom are fictitious.

Jews captured individually are subject to special treatment by the related Security Police and Gendarmerie stations. As of June 27, 1943, a total of

4 3 4 , 3 2 9 J e w s

have been resettled."

The report speaks of "special treatment" and twice of "specially treated" (*"sonderbehandelt"*) in relation to the "indolent and asocial Jewish riffraff," and to Jews who had obtained work certificates by fraudulent means (*ibid.*, pp. 393f.). Since Hilberg considers that even this "special treatment" is a "euphemism" for killing, we must believe that Katzmann used two series of "euphemisms": resettlement-resettled/evacuation-evacuated for the Jews presumably murdered at Bełżec, and special treatment-specially treated for those presumably murdered in Galicia. The 149,000 Jews presumably shot, as mentioned earlier, would also have to form part of these. Hence, they should fit into the second category, but for Hilberg they are included in the 434,329 who had been resettled, therefore this "euphemism" would simultaneously refer to those alleged gassed at Bełżec (254,989 Jews) and those allegedly shot in Galicia (149,000 Jews)!

A secret memorandum dated August 6, 1942 with the subject "Conversation on the resettlement of the Jews" shows that the expedient of "euphemisms" is without basis in fact. This document says:¹⁰²

"Brigadeführer Katzmann informed me that within half a year, there will be no more free Jews in the General Government. These people are partly resettled, partly brought into camps. The Jews living here and there in the countryside are being killed by individual units. The Jews concentrated in the cities are partly liquidated, partly resettled, partly brought together in labor camps."

It is therefore obvious that "resettled" was not synonymous with "liquidated" or "killed."

Of the alleged 149,000 Jews presumably shot, Hilberg only attempts to document them in part, to a very limited extent:

"The general mode of procedure in Galicia may be illustrated by events in three towns.

In Stanislawow, about 10,000 Jews had been gathered at a cemetery and shot on October 12, 1941. Another shooting took place in March 1942, followed by a ghetto fire lasting for three weeks. A transport was sent to Belzec in April, and more shooting operations were launched in the summer, in the course of which Jewish council members and Order Service men were hanged from lampposts. Large transports moved out to Belzec in September and October, an occasion marked by the bloody clearing of a hospital and (according to reports heard by a German agricultural official) a procession of Jews moving to the train station on their knees." (p. 517)

But he never bothers to document any of it; rather, he relies solely on post-war "eyewitness testimonies" from the years 1947-1948 (FN 61, *ibid.*).

¹⁰² DALO, R-35,13, p. 70.

I shall now close this subchapter with Jean-Claude Pressac's comments on the "killing centers," who also mentions Hilberg. In an article titled "Inquiry into the Death Camps," Pressac wrote (1995, p. 121):

"Instead of starting with the assumption of a facility for killing people, the hypothesis must be accepted that from the end of 1941 until mid-1942, three de-lousing facilities were established in Belzec, Sobibór, and Treblinka. The fact that places were chosen for this at a border that had become obsolete, can be explained if one recalls the concepts of prophylactic hygiene and the battle against typhus by means of killing the insects carrying it, the lice, and if one considers that the Germans had typhus more or less under control in their zone of occupation, but not in the conquered Soviet territories. Thus, the program for the deportation of the Jews to the east, as decided upon at the Wannsee Conference of January 20, 1942, was adhered to by processing the deportees through these three hygiene facilities."

In his opinion, the alleged homicidal gas chambers were built later; but with regard to these same installations, he declared in an interview granted to Valérie Igounet on June 15, 1995:¹⁰³

"I have attempted to determine the number of victims of the camps designated as extermination camps on the basis of material facts: the surface area of the gas chambers and number of the persons which they could hold; time for a gassing; number of gassings daily; number of transports arriving daily with consideration of the actual capacity of the chambers, etc. In comparison with the numbers of Hilberg, which are based upon Polish sources, I arrive at the following figures:

<i>Chelmno:</i>	<i>80,000 to 85,000</i>	<i>instead of 150,000;</i>
<i>Belzec:</i>	<i>100,000 to 150,000</i>	<i>instead of 550,000;</i>
<i>Sobibor:</i>	<i>30,000 to 35,000</i>	<i>instead of 200,000;</i>
<i>Treblinka:</i>	<i>200,000 to 250,000</i>	<i>instead of 750,000;</i>
<i>Majdanek:</i>	<i>fewer than 100,000</i>	<i>instead of 360,000."</i>

Assuming the minimum figures, Pressac reduced the total number of the victims of the "so-called" extermination camps from 2,010,000 to 510,000 and concluded (Igounet, p. 641):

"Concerning the massacre of the Jews, several fundamental notions must be questioned. The numbers arrived at [by orthodox historiography] are to be thoroughly revised. The expression 'genocide' is no longer suitable [le terme 'génocide' ne convient plus]."

Since Galicia formed part of the General Government, Bełżec also functioned as the "outermost borderline station" for those leaving for the Reich Commissariat of the Ukraine.

As mentioned earlier, Hilberg sets forth his knowledge of the alleged "extermination operations" at Chelmno, Bełżec, Sobibór, Treblinka, Majdanek and Auschwitz-Birkenau in a total of only 18 pages (pp. 1027-1044), which are

¹⁰³ Igounet, p. 640. Note that Hilberg claims 50,000 Jewish victims of the Majdanek Camp (p. 1320).

haphazardly and uncritically cobbled together – 18 pages out of 1,388! Yet Hilberg is supposed to have been the world's supreme expert on the Holocaust!

3.3. Lublin-Majdanek

Hilberg then discusses the Lublin-Majdanek Camp, with regard to which he asserts:

"In September-October 1942, three small gas chambers, placed into a U-shaped building, were opened. Two of them were constructed for the interchangeable use of bottled carbon monoxide or hydrogen cyanide gas, the third for cyanide only. [...] The gassing phase, which resulted in about 500 to 600 deaths per week over a period of a year, came to an end with the decision to wipe out the entire Jewish inmate population in one blow. After the Lublin camp acquired administrative control of the Trawniki and Poniatowa labor camps, mass shootings took place at all three sites in the beginning of November 1943." (p. 938)

The story of the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Majdanek has no basis in historical fact. It is not supported by either documents or testimonies. Quite the contrary: it is contradicted by both documents and testimonies.

The alleged "U-shaped building" mentioned by Hilberg never existed as such; rather, there was a disinfestation complex consisting of two sets of barracks located side by side (Barracks 41 and 42, denominated Bath and Disinfection I and II), and by a concrete structure located behind Barracks 41, which was alleged to contain two of the three homicidal gas chambers mentioned by Hilberg. The third – the one located inside Barracks 41 – is no longer considered a homicidal gas chamber by orthodox Holocaust historians (Shermer/Grobman, p. 162).

The original plan of the concrete structure, a drawing of which has been preserved – the drawing by the Construction Office titled "PoW Camp Lublin. Disinfestation Facility. Building XII^A" dated August 1942 – shows a rectangular block measuring 10.76 m × 8.64 m × 2.45 m which had two disinfestation chambers measuring 10 m × 3.75 m × 2 m. The existing documentation shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was a "disinfestation installation of the hydrogen-cyanide-disinfestation system" intended "for the Lublin Fur and Garments Workshops" (Graf/Mattogno, pp. 126-136). No document indicates that this installation was used for homicidal purposes; the scarce testimonies which do exist were made long afterwards and are very vague.

As for the alleged carbon-monoxide installation, I should like to note first that no orthodox historian has ever explained why the SS, in spite of allegedly having already two homicidal gas chambers using Zyklon B, one of them equipped with an air heater, would have divided Chamber II into two parts, using only the first part (measuring approximately 17 square meters) as a carbon-

monoxide chamber, while equipping Chamber I, which worked with Zyklon B, with a carbon-monoxide system, too. And this, although Zyklon B was never in short supply at Majdanek. According to the related documentation – which is complete – the camp was supplied with a total of 6,961 kg of Zyklon B between June 1942 and June 1944.¹⁰⁴

But there is another argument which is much-more-important. There is no proof that the piping installed in the two above-mentioned rooms was ever used for injecting carbon monoxide into these rooms. There are no documents and no testimony in this regard. The only “proof” consists of two steel cylinders which were placed by the Poles in an adjacent room after the war. During the 1990s, a sign in five languages stated that “From here the supply of carbon monoxide to two chambers was regulated.” But where is the proof that the two cylinders actually contained carbon monoxide? There is no such proof. In fact, the following engraving on the cylinders was visible:¹⁰⁵

“Dr. Pater Victoria Kohlensäurefabrik [carbonic acid factory] Nußdorf Nr 6196 Full. 10 kg [illegible...] und Fluid Warszawa Kohlensäure [carbonic acid; illegible...] Fluid Warszawa Lukowski. Pleschen 10,1 kg CO₂ gepr.[üft = tested]”

Hence, the two cylinders did not contain carbon monoxide (CO), but rather carbon dioxide (CO₂), which is not a toxic gas, as is well known.

As regards the testimonies, the journalist Constantin Simonov, who visited Majdanek Camp immediately after the arrival of the Soviets and wrote a report which was published in the form of a booklet in 1944, related the following, allegedly based on inmate testimonies, regarding the claimed homicidal carbon-monoxide gas chamber, in front of which two Zyklon-B cans reportedly lay on the floor when he inspected it (Simonov, p. 8):

“The contents of the cans were introduced through the pipes into the adjoining room when it was full of people. [...]

The ‘Zyklon’ was introduced through the pipes; the SS-man leading the operation supervised the asphyxiation process which, according to different eyewitness accounts, took between two and ten minutes.”

Therefore, upon the liberation of the camp, not one single witness knew anything about homicidal gassings using bottled carbon monoxide, while the procedure of gassing with Zyklon B described by the witnesses is unfeasible, as the gypsum granules of Zyklon B cannot be fed through pipes.

During the show trial staged by the Poles in 1945 against a few former members of the camp staff, only one witness, Tadeusz Budzyn, spoke of killings in the chambers equipped with pipes, but with a system that did not include “cylinders” (*Majdanek*, p. 52):

¹⁰⁴ Graf/Mattogno, pp. 191-206; see in particular the table on p. 202.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143. On-the-spot inspection by the author in July 1992 and in June 1997, as well as a letter of confirmation from the Archives Director of Majdanek Museum sent to the author on January 30, 1998.

"President – Was there also asphyxiation?

Witness – It began with the fact that, when there was no Zyklon B [yet], there was already the first gas chamber, and it could poison with exhaust gas [przy pomocy gazu spalinowego]. This chamber is made in such a way that on one side there are pipes connected to a Diesel engine that led the gas into the chamber. Ultimately, the Germans in Majdanek had the idea of building trucks that were gas chambers at the same time. These trucks were structured so that, when the driver drove off, the gas was conveyed inside through the exhaust pipe, and after the driver had arrived, the prisoners were already dead."

On the supplies of Zyklon B to Majdanek Camp, Hilberg refers to three documents published in facsimile in a Polish work of 1979, and to one testimony, but then states: "The gas was routinely used in camps also for fumigation" (FN 45, p. 938), meaning disinfestation. But if that is so, what do the documents adduced by Hilberg actually prove?

If he had taken the trouble to visit the camp, Hilberg would have learned that a collection of approximately 60 original documents on the supply of Zyklon B to Majdanek for disinfestation purposes still existed in the archives of the local museum.¹⁰⁴

The story of the alleged mass shooting of up to 42,000 Jews in November 1943, 12,000 to 17,000 of them Majdanek inmates (FN 46, *ibid.*), is based exclusively on "eyewitness testimonies" unsupported by either documents or physical evidence. These "testimonies," such as those by SS *Oberscharführer* Erich Mussfeldt, for example, are moreover demonstrably false (Graf/Mattogno, pp. 207-228).

Recourse to shooting in order to eliminate from 12,000 to 17,000 inmates in an alleged "killing center" abundantly equipped with Zyklon-B gas chambers for mass murder is already inexplicable due to the fact that it would have been impossible to maintain secrecy. Even more inexplicable is the fact that this alleged shooting is said to have involved specifically not just inmates who were unable to work, but rather practically *all* of the inmates, since the camp only had a total of approximately 15,400 inmates in August 1943 (PS-1469).

Hans Frank's service diary published by Präg and Jacobmeyer does not contain any hint, not even veiled, of this alleged wanton mass execution. The entire month of November 1943 is covered on just six pages (Präg/Jacobmeyer, pp. 754-759). It is evident that Hilberg's sources are a drastic selective presentation of the documentation, in turn based entirely on hostile testimony.

For the month of October, however, there appears a note worthy of interest in Frank's diary. On the 19th, a government meeting on security in the General Government was held in Krakow, in which there was mainly talk of the resurgence of partisan activity, but also with a reference to Jews (*ibid.*, p. 741):

"The meeting turned to this question, and the Governor General gave the head of the Armaments Inspection, General Schindler, SS Oberführer Bierkamp and Major General Grünwald the task of looking through the lists of the Jewish camps in the General Government to see exactly how many of the inmates were

employed as workers. The rest should be deported from the General Government."

Frank's order therefore concerned the expulsion from the General Government of Jews not employed as workers in the armaments industry. They all were to be expelled, not murdered.

Therefore, while in Galicia, it was "necessary to keep the Jewish workers fit for work," which included "appropriate lodgings, clothing and medical assistance," at Majdanek they were allegedly and incomprehensibly subjected to wholesale executions.

3.4. Auschwitz

Hilberg outlines the origins of the alleged extermination at Auschwitz, embracing uncritically all the Höss declarations consisting of an inextricable tangle of absurdities, contradictions and falsehoods, which is impossible to summarize even briefly (see Mattogno 2020). I will therefore limit myself to showing how ruthlessly Hilberg uses these statements, starting with the following quote:

"Höss recalled that in the summer of 1941 he was summoned to Berlin by Heinrich Himmler himself. In a few spare words, Himmler told him of Hitler's decision to annihilate the Jews. One of the factors in the choice of Auschwitz, said Himmler, was its location near railways. The details of this assignment would be brought to Höss by Eichmann. [...] During the following weeks, Eichmann came to Auschwitz, and Höss attended a conference in Eichmann's office about railroads and arrangements for trains." (pp. 940f.)

His sources are Höss's autobiographic text written while in Polish custody (Höss 1959), Höss's deposition at the Nuremberg IMT (Vol. 11, p. 398), and his affidavit of March 14, 1946 (NO-1210; FN 56f., p. 941).

On the utter unreliability of Höss's various Holocaust claims, please see my separate study *Commandant of Auschwitz: Rudolf Höss, His Torture and His Forced Confessions* (Mattogno 2020).

It is indeed true that Höss repeatedly and unflaggingly claimed after the war to have received this order from Himmler "in the summer of 1941" during a meeting in Berlin as the "final solution of the Jewish question" (see Mattogno 2020, pp. 184-186). But Hitler cannot have ordered the "Final Solution" in terms of total physical extermination of the Jews in the summer of 1941, because as I documented in Subchapter 1.2., and as is confirmed by a major Hilberg source, this term did not possess that meaning at the time.

In fact, Eichmann's memoirs, cited by Hilberg in his footnote 31 (p. 419), states the following (Aschenauer, p. 230):

"The concept of a 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' was clarified after the reunification with Austria. 'Final Solution' had nothing to do with the physical end, or the end of a physical person. The bureaucratic term of 'Final

Solution of the Jewish Question' was used continually. No one thought that this concept could include the killing of Jews. When physical extermination was ordered later, after the end of 1941, the innocuous designation 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' was kept also for this for camouflage purposes. That which had initially meant the satisfaction of both parties through emigration, through separation from the host people, was now a camouflage term for physical extermination. But the term 'Final Solution' still retained its original meaning even during this period, since, for example, the emigration through Kastner in Hungary or the ghettoizations had nothing to do with extermination, but was nevertheless subsumed under the term 'Final Solution'; it was therefore an umbrella term, a bureaucratic term, which should be clear."

Ignoring for the sake of argument the insurmountable contradictions discussed earlier about the existence and dating of the alleged extermination order, this important source, often cited by Hilberg, asserts that at least until the end of 1941, the expression "final solution of the Jewish question" did *not* refer to the extermination of the Jews. But then, how could Hitler have ordered it in this sense in the summer of 1941?

This dating also conflicts with the statements of Wisliceny, who said:¹⁰⁶

"Starting with the outbreak of the war with Russia and the entry of the United States into the war, a profound change began to appear in our treatment of the Jewish problem. This change did not come about from one day to the next, but gradually, reaching its apex only in the spring of 1942."

I should like to remind the reader that for Wisliceny the extermination order allegedly issued by Himmler to Höss in the summer of 1941 "actually" dated to April 1942. Hilberg has nothing to say about these major contradictions.

For his claim cited above, Hilberg also refers to Höss's so-called autobiographical text, which was first published as an English translation in 1959 (Höss 1959). Already earlier, he had referred to Höss's autobiography when discussing Hitler's alleged extermination decision, stating that "Höss recalls having been summoned to Himmler in the matter of killing the Jews during the summer [1941]" (FN 31, p. 419). He does not mention Höss's even more detailed statements in this regard contained in his affidavit of April 5, 1946, which he cites only later in a different context. This is easy to explain.

In his memoirs, Höss asserted that the extermination order had already been issued during the summer of 1941, and that Himmler had explained to him (Höss, p. 205):

"The existing extermination centers in the East are not in a position to carry out the large actions which are anticipated."

In his affidavit of April 5, 1946 (PS-3868, IMT, Vol. 33, pp. 275-279, here p. 277), Höss specified which camps were the "existing extermination centers":

¹⁰⁶ Declaration by D. Wisliceny of November 18, 1946, in: Poliakov/Wulf, p. 90.

"I was ordered to establish extermination facilities at Auschwitz in June 1941. At that time there were already in the General Government three other extermination camps; BELZEK, TREBLINKA and WOLZEK."

No camp by the name Wolzek or any similar name ever existed. Hilberg omitted this passage intentionally, because he claims that the Belzec Camp was opened only a few days after March 16, 1942, that the Treblinka Camp was operational by July 1942, while Sobibór (not Wolzek) was only opened in April 1942 (pp. 934-936). So how could these camps have existed as early as June 1941?

The peculiar thing is that the affidavit in question was read in open court during the same hearing mentioned by Hilberg. In the transcript, it is located only 18 pages after the pages cited by Hilberg (Vol. 11, starting on p. 414; the sentences quote here are on p. 416).

But this anachronism is not the only contradiction contained in Höss's statements. There is another contradiction, no less serious, which Hilberg tried to conceal already in his 1985 "definitive" edition, where we read:

"In the meantime, Höss went ahead with the construction of killing installations, which were to contain two major improvements. The first of these was compactness. Höss built his installations as combination units, each of which contained an anteroom, a gas chamber, and an oven for body disposal. Second, he decided after visiting Treblinka that the carbon monoxide method was not very 'efficient.' Accordingly, he introduced in his camp a different type of gas: quick-working hydrogen cyanide (prussic acid – commercial name, Zyklon)." (1985, p. 882)

The source is Höss's affidavit of April 5, 1946 (FN 55, *ibid.*). Hilberg refers to Crematoria II and III, which, according to the orthodox Auschwitz narrative, each had an undressing room ("anteroom") and a gas chamber, and not one, but five triple-muffle furnaces. But this is irrelevant in view of Höss's statements about Treblinka. Here is the relevant passage from his affidavit (PS-3868, p. 2):

"I was ordered to establish extermination facilities at Auschwitz in June 1941. At that time there were already in the General Government three other extermination camps; BELZEK, TREBLINKA and WOLZEK. These camps were under the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and SD. I visited Tremblinka [sic] to find out how they carried out their exterminations. The Camp Commandant at Tremblinka told me that he had liquidated 80,000 in the course of one-half year. He was principally concerned with liquidating all the Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto.

He used monoxide gas and I did not think that his methods were very efficient. So when I set up the extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyclon B, which was a crystallized Prussic acid which we dropped into the death chamber from a small opening"

Therefore, Höss introduced Zyklon B at Auschwitz *after* his visit to Treblinka, where he considered the killing system with carbon monoxide to be not very effective. When did Höss's visit to Treblinka take place? It must have happened before Höss started building his own "extermination facilities," the first of which is said to have been the crematorium in the Main Camp, which according to Hilberg was used for gassings from "February-December 1942" (Table 9-4, p. 949). It follows that Höss's visit to Treblinka must have happened before "February 1942," although that camp started operating only in July 1942!

In the typed transcription of Höss's handwritten declaration of March 14, 1946 (NO-1210), a passage was added by the typist that is not included in Höss's handwritten text, according to which the alleged visit to Treblinka took place "in the spring of 1942" (Mattoigno 2020, p. 360), but during the interrogation of April 3, 1946, Höss corrected this: the year was 1941 (*ibid.*, pp. 60f.). Either way, it follows that Höss had the privilege of visiting this camp even before it was built, and at the time of the visit, Höss claimed that the Treblinka Camp had already been in operation for six months, and had already "liquidated" 80,000 Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto (*ibid.*, p. 66), although it is well known that this "liquidation" began only on July 22, 1942!

Hilberg not only did *nothing* to resolve this inextricable tangle of contradictions that already by itself demolishes his artificial reconstruction, he dishonestly hushed it up. In the 2003 edition, this entire passage was completely rewritten. It now contains no reference anymore to Höss's visit to Treblinka at all (pp. 941-946). The only trace left from the passage quoted above is the following sentence on page 946:

"Thus an altogether more efficient system [based on Zyklon B], which guaranteed much more rapid processing than in other camps, had been devised in Auschwitz."

Unable to face, let alone resolve, the inextricable contradictions created by Höss's statements, Hilberg simply relegated Höss's claimed visit to Treblinka to the memory hole.

But the contradictions do not end here. As already quoted at the beginning of this subchapter, Hilberg writes on p. 941:

"The details of this assignment would be brought to Höss by Eichmann. [...] During the following weeks, Eichmann came to Auschwitz, and Höss attended a conference in Eichmann's office about railroads and arrangements for trains."

The source is Höss's deposition at Nuremberg, where he stated (IMT, Vol. 11, p. 399):

"I met Eichmann about 4 weeks after having received that order from the Reichsführer. He came to Auschwitz to discuss the details with me on the carrying out of the given order. As the Reichsführer had told me during our discus-

sion, he had instructed Eichmann to discuss the carrying out of the order with me and I was to receive all further instructions from him."

It should be noted that the term "details" was not used by Höss during his testimony at Nuremberg, but it does appear in Höss's memoirs (Höss, p. 205):

"You will learn further details from Sturmbannführer Eichmann of the Reich Security Head Office who will call on you in the immediate future."

Eichmann's visit to Auschwitz is supposed to have taken place in July 1941, but there is no documentary trace of it.

During the pre-trial interrogations in preparation for Israel's 1961 show trial against Adolf Eichmann, Eichmann stated rather confusedly that in 1941 he was sent by the head of the Gestapo Müller "to all these centers," meaning the "extermination camps," in order to report to Müller. In this context, he claimed to have visited the Auschwitz Camp as well (*State of Israel*, Vol. 7, pp. 363f.). Hence, Eichmann was not sent to Auschwitz by Himmler in order to discuss details about Himmler's extermination directives with Höss, but he was sent by Gestapo Müller in order to report back to him. But to report on what exactly? We don't know.

Today, after the two studies by Jean-Claude Pressac (1989, 1993) and after the 1999 article by Karin Orth, no competent historian believes anymore that Auschwitz was an "extermination camp" already in 1941.

While it is true that Hilberg could not have been familiar with Czech's 1990 *Auschwitz Chronicle* when he published the 1985 "definitive" edition of his book (or the 1989 German original *Kalendarium*, for that matter), which I quote here repeatedly, it is also true that he was familiar with the first edition of the "Kalendarium," which appeared in a series of articles in the late 1950s and 1960s, hence way before 1985. Already there we can read that the first alleged use of Zyklon B for homicidal purposes is said to have occurred on September 3, 1941 (Czech 1959, p. 109). In his 2003 edition, Hilberg endorses this anachronistic dating with explicit reference to Höss and Czech (FN 58, p. 941). This brings us straight back to the contradiction noted above, given that Höss claimed to have introduced Zyklon B at Auschwitz only after his alleged visit to Treblinka.

On the origins of the alleged gas chambers, Hilberg constructs a version which contradicts that of Höss. He writes:

"In the summer of 1941, when the physical destruction of the Jews was in the offing for the whole of the European continent, Himmler consulted with the Chief Physician of the SS (Reichsarzt-SS und Polizei), Gruppenführer Dr. Grawitz, on the best way to undertake the mass-killing operation. Grawitz advised the use of gas chambers." (p. 932)

The source is Konrad Morgen's affidavit of July 13, 1946, Document SS(A)-65 (FN 23, *ibid.*). The related passage of the document states (IMT, Vol. 42, p. 559):

"In order to carry out the mass extermination ordered by Hitler, Himmler had asked him [Grawitz] to propose a method of killing that was both painless and saved the victims from fear of death. That is why a procedure has been chosen that leaves those concerned in complete ignorance of their fate until the moment of the unexpected use of a rapidly acting, highly volatile gas."

This version is at least more-logical than that of Höss, although, like the latter, it is not supported by any proof. For the execution of a Hitler order, Himmler is said to have addressed himself reasonably to the highest medical authority in the SS, who is said to have immediately suggested the most suitable gas for extermination. According to Höss, by contrast, Himmler is said to have had recourse to Eichmann, who stated four months after his alleged visit to Auschwitz that he "had not yet discovered a suitable kind of gas" (Höss, p. 207).

3.5. Höss and the Origins of the "Gas Chambers"

Hilberg then goes on to describe the origins and development of the alleged extermination installations:

"One day, when Höss was away on business, his deputy, Fritzsich, locked some of the prisoners into a cellar and killed them with hydrogen cyanide, a gas in stock for fumigation. The experiment was repeated when Höss returned. The building (or 'block' as it was called in Auschwitz), numbered 11, had to be aired out for two days, and the next gassing was therefore planned for a somewhat larger number of Russians in the crematorium. Holes were made in the earth and in the concrete roof over the crematory's morgue. After the cyanide was introduced into the room, some of the Russians shouted, 'Gas!' and tried to break down the door, but the bolts did not give way. Höss observed the corpses and listened to the explanations of the camp physician. The victims, he was assured, had not suffered in agony. He concluded that death from the gas was bloodless and that its use would spare his men a great psychological burden.

The mortuary now became the first gas chamber. It was in operation, with an interruption for repair of the smokestack, for a year. Since the size of the chamber and the capacity of the two ovens were not sufficient for the task at hand, Höss looked for a new location to carry out additional gassings. Accompanied by Eichmann, he found two small farmhouses in Birkenau that seemed suitable. Work was begun to fill in their windows. The interior walls were removed and special airtight doors installed. The two gas buildings were placed in operation during 1942, the smaller one in March, the larger in June. They were called Bunker I and II. [...]

The bodies of the people gassed in the two bunkers were buried in mass graves. A survivor reports that in the summer of 1942 the corpses swelled, and a 'black, evil-smelling mass oozed out and polluted the ground water in the vicinity.' From the end of summer to November 1942, the accumulated decom-

posing bodies infested with maggots had to be uncovered and burned." (pp. 941f.)

In separate studies I demonstrated that the claims about the first homicidal gassing with Zyklon B cannot be substantiated with documents (Mattogno 1992, 2016c), that the morgue in Crematorium I was never used as a homicidal gas chamber (2016e), and that the so-called "bunkers" at Birkenau never existed as extermination installations (2016f).

For the claimed first gassing in the basement of Block 11, Hilberg refers to Höss's "autobiography," to the German edition of Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*, and to a 1994 article on the "Gas Chambers and Crematoria" of Auschwitz by Franciszek Piper (FN 58, p. 941). For the alleged gassings in the Main Camp's crematorium, Hilberg relies on the two books by Pressac (1989, 1993) and the German edition of Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*. For the claims about the "bunkers," he cites Pressac's 1989 book, the German edition of Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*, and a post-war affidavit by former Auschwitz physician SS *Hauptsturmführer* Friedrich Entress (April 14, 1947; NO-2368; FN 59, p. 942). Hilberg's claims about the mass graves are supported by Höss's memoirs and by Filip Müller's 1979 memoirs (FN 60f., *ibid.*).

For starters, it is worth noting that the three entries Hilberg quotes from Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle* also refer as their source to Höss's memoirs, and two of them also to a post-war declaration by former SS *Rottenführer* Pery Broad.¹⁰⁷ The same is true of Piper's paper, which relies to a considerable extent also on the statements made by Höss, Broad and Müller, although drawing also from numerous witness accounts given during the Polish show trials of the immediate post-war time and from the Auschwitz Museum's collection of testimonies recorded decades later, its anecdotal source base being considerably wider.¹⁰⁸ When it comes to substantiating homicidal gassing claims, Pressac relies in his two books exclusively on post-war witness statements as well, among them again Höss, Broad and Müller, but also Charles Bendel, Miklós Nyiszli, Henryk Tauber, Szlama Dragon and Stanisław Jankowski, among others.

I will abstain from reviewing them all here, as I have done this already in the three studies mentioned above, as well as in additional studies published more recently, where I show that all of these testimonies are to some degree or

¹⁰⁷ Czech 1989, pp. 174f., 186f., 238f. The equivalent entries in Czech 1990 are: a claimed gassing in Crematorium I on February 15, 1942, p. 135, which Czech backs up with Höss and Broad; the claimed start of operation of "Bunker 1" on March 20, 1942, p. 146, backed up with Höss and Broad; the claimed start of operation of "Bunker 2" on June 30, 1942, p. 189, backed up with Höss. Broad's declaration can be found in Bezwińska/Czech 1973, pp. 137-200 (German); 1992, pp. 139-198 (English).

¹⁰⁸ Apart from Höss, Müller and Broad, Piper refers to witness statements by Dybus, Fejkel, Tondos, Glinski, Przeda, Szweda, Szczerbowski, Kłodziński (first gassing); Badenitz, Stark, Sulkowski, Koczorowski, Hałgas, Kula, Korkowski (Crematorium I); Gulba, Wisinska, Dragon, Wohlfarth, Puchala, Bilan, Rosin, Merbach, Przeda, Kula, Plaskura, Wolken (bunkers); Tauber, Kula, Dragon, Girs, Nyiszli, Jankowski, Markus (Crematoria II-V). Most of these statements, however, are superficial and thus of mere marginal importance.

another riddled with absurdities, technical impossibilities as well as internal and external contradiction.¹⁰⁹

Here, I will focus on the less-known affidavit by Friedrich Entress, and juxtapose it with claims made by Höss, the most-frequently quoted key witness for the orthodoxy's narrative on how gas chambers came to be at Auschwitz. These are two out of a plethora of unreliable and contradictory testimonies on these alleged extermination installations, which also contradict each other, as is amply demonstrated in the three above-mentioned books. Dr. Entress, who served as a physician at Auschwitz between December 11, 1941 and October 20, 1943, declared about the so-called "bunkers":¹¹⁰

"The first gassings at Auschwitz-Birkenau began in the summer of 1942. They concerned gassings of Jews from Poland and Russia. [...]

Two old farmhouses were used as the first gas chambers; they had been modified specifically for the gassings. The construction work was done by the SS construction office. The windows were walled up, the inner walls removed and a special door put in, which sealed the room air-tight.

The capacity was laid out for about 300 people. The detainees had to undress in a barrack nearby and were led into the gas chamber from there."

In contrast to this, Höss wrote in this regard (Höss, p. 208):

"I cannot say on what date the extermination of the Jews began. Probably it was in September 1941, but it may not have been until January 1942."

He stated that "Bunker 1" could accommodate 800 persons (*ibid.*, p. 207), while "Bunker 2" could hold 1,200 (*ibid.*, p. 210). Moreover, "Two huts near bunker I and three near bunker II were erected, in which the victims undressed" (*ibid.*).

Therefore, the exterminations in the "bunkers" began for Höss at the latest in January 1942, but for Entress only in the summer of 1942. The total capacity of the installations was (800+1200=) 2,000 persons for Höss and (2×300=) 600 for Entress; there were five undressing barracks in all for Höss, but only two for Entress. Can one seriously believe that Hilberg was not aware of these blatant contradictions?

I should add that Höss also contradicted himself, since in the above-mentioned declaration of March 14, 1946 (NO-1210), he asserted in this regard that the victims undressed in the open, "behind erected brushwood screens" – therefore, the five undressing barracks did not exist – and that the naked victims entered the rooms, 200-300 at a time, depending on their size, and therefore a total of 400-600 for both facilities, not 2,000.

Hilberg asserts that Himmler, *Gauleiter* Fritz Bracht and Higher SS and Police Leader Ernst Heinrich Schmauser "watched a procedure from the unload-

¹⁰⁹ Mattogno 2020 on Höss; 2020b on Nyiszli and Bendel; 2021b on Müller, Jankowski and others; 2021c on Tauber and Dragon.

¹¹⁰ Affidavit of F. Entress dated April 14, 1947 (NO-2368), pp. 3f.

ing of the living to the removal of the dead at Bunker II" (p. 942). As a source, he cites Höss's autobiography (FN 60, *ibid.*).

Himmler's visit to Auschwitz took place on July 17 and 18, 1942. On these two days, two trains arrived at Auschwitz with Jews from the Dutch camp of Westerbork, and one train with Jews from Slovakia. Based on the camp records showing when some of the deportees on these trains were registered, the first transport arrived no earlier than 8 pm on the 16th, and no later than 6 am on the 17th, while the other two arrived no earlier than 8 pm on the 17th and no later than 6 am on the 18th.

According to Himmler's service diary, he landed at Kattowitz Airport at 3:15 pm on the 17th. Therefore, he could not have seen the alleged gassing of the Dutch Jews from the first transport, which is said to have happened before 6 am on that day. His visit to Auschwitz was concluded at 8 pm, with dinner in the officers' quarters. After dinner, Himmler was accompanied to Kattowitz, where he was put up for the night by Gauleiter Bracht. On the morning of July 18, at 9 am, he was still at Bracht's house, and visited Auschwitz again after breakfast. Therefore, he could not have seen even the other two Jewish transports, which were presumably gassed between 8 pm on the 17th and 6 am on the 18th (for details and sources see Mattogno 2016, pp. 16-25).

Therefore, Himmler could *not* have been present at *any* of the alleged gasings.

3.6. The Birkenau Crematoria

In the 1985 "definitive" edition, Hilberg displayed a poor understanding of the Birkenau crematoria's design, and of the complexities of their design (1985, pp. 883f.). One might object that, for chronological reasons, he could not have been familiar with the works of the latter-day Western experts on this camp – Jean-Claude Pressac and Robert Jan van Pelt – whom I have thoroughly refuted in a specific study (Mattogno 2019). But Hilberg was equally ignorant of the sole historical sources available to him at the time, that is, the abundant literature produced by the Auschwitz Museum, which at least would have provided him with an elementary understanding of the camp's history, and this neglect is inexcusable for the author of the "single most-important book on the Holocaust."

Hilberg amended these flaws to some degree in the 2003 edition, where he relies mainly on Pressac's two books (pp. 942-948), mentioning a number of "criminal traces" which Pressac notoriously listed in his books. Already in my first critique of Pressac's second book, published in the U.S. in 1994,¹¹¹ I documented that his methods of cherry-picking, misrepresenting and outright dis-

¹¹¹ Mattogno 1994; cf. more thoroughly: Mattogno 2019.

torting documentary evidence are highly flawed, but Hilberg paid no attention to this.

Here I want to focus on Hilberg's claim that the Auschwitz Camp's Central Construction Office implemented the "secret" project of mass extermination using gas chambers by building the Birkenau Crematoria. In fact, Himmler is said to have issued his extermination order to Höss with the following admonition (Höss, p. 205):

"The departments concerned will be notified by me in due course. You will treat this order as absolutely secret, even from your superiors."

However, if we understand the bureaucratic structure and practices of all agencies involved, it becomes very clear that "secrecy" from Höss's superiors would have been an impossible illusion.

The Central Construction Office formed part of Office Group C of the WVHA, the SS's Economic and Administrative Main Office, headed by SS *Oberführer* Hans Kammler. This was just one of the office groups in which the WVHA was organized, which in turn was headed by SS *Gruppenführer* Oswald Pohl.¹¹² The WVHA was created on February 1, 1942. In June 1941, the Construction Office of Auschwitz, as it was called then, was subordinate to Office II of the *Hauptamt Haushalt und Bauten* (HHB), the Main Office Budgeting and Construction, which later became Office Group C within the WVHA, and which was also headed by Kammler. The HHB had been created by Pohl in 1940, as Hilberg correctly notes (p. 924). SS *Brigadeführer* Richard Glücks was inspector of concentration camps. At the time, the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps was still subordinate to the SS *Führungshauptamt* (SS Leadership Main Office). When this office, and the Main Office Budgeting and Construction were merged into the SS-WVHA on February 1, 1942, the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps was incorporated into Offices Group D – Concentration Camps, command of which was retained by Glücks.

Now that we know the main characters in charge of that organization, let us return to Höss's alleged meeting with Himmler. As we have seen, Himmler put Höss directly in charge while ignoring the chain of command, bypassing all the superiors in between for reasons of secrecy, foremost RSHA Chief Reinhardt Heydrich, Gestapo Chief Heinrich Müller, WVHA Chief Oswald Pohl, concentration-camp Chief Richard Glücks, and construction Chief Hans Kammler. All of these bigwigs were to be left in the dark by Höss as to what he was doing in Auschwitz.

Therefore, Himmler entrusted the Construction Office of Auschwitz with the technical implementation of the "final solution" by way of mass murder in gas chambers, but that office could do *nothing* without the approval and knowledge of Kammler and therefore Glücks, not to mention all the other high-caliber individuals in the chain of command, who would have been very

¹¹² Hilberg himself describes the WVHA's organizational structure on pp. 924-926. For more details on the organization of the Auschwitz Central Construction Office, see Mattoigno 2015.

familiar with what was going on anyway, as they were implementing a vast array of other measures in fulfillment of the "final solution," if we are to believe the orthodox narrative! This shows just how absurd Höss's lead story of "secrecy" is which he put forward to justify his claim that Himmler approached him directly with this order.

No less absurdly, Höss asserted during his interrogation by U.S. investigators at Nuremberg on April 1, 1946 (Mendelsohn/Detwiler, Vol. 12, p. 26):

"Q. What did you do in Auschwitz?"

A. I immediately got in touch with the chief of a construction unit and told him that I needed a large crematorium. I told him that we were going to receive a large number of sick people, but I did not give him my real reason.

Q. And then?"

A. And after we had completed our plans, I sent them to the Reichsfuehrer. After I had changed them in accordance with the real purpose of his instructions, they were approved."

Thus, SS *Sturmabannführer* Karl Bischoff, head of the Central Contruction Office of Auschwitz, is supposed to have built a homicidal gas chamber without even knowing it!

What is more, as we have seen earlier, according to Dieter Wisliceny, Himmler's alleged extermination order of April 1942 was explicitly addressed not only to Heydrich, but also to the "Inspector of Concentration Camps," hence to Glücks, the superior with regard to whom Höss was supposed to treat "as absolutely secret" Himmler's alleged order!

Hilberg takes no interest in this whole muddle of contradictions. He doesn't even consider the matter.

To shore up the theory of the alleged homicidal gas chamber in Crematorium I, Hilberg asserted during the Zündel Trial, "I have studied the documents," then added:¹¹³

"Including those pertaining to construction and, thus, was aware, many years before I ever set foot in Auschwitz, that there was a gas chamber in Auschwitz in the first old part of the camp which was in use prior to the establishment of additional gas chambers in Auschwitz 2, known as Birkenau."

In the end, Hilberg stated:

"In 1942, and I now speak on the basis of documents, not observation, two gas chambers were established."

Here he is referring to the so-called "bunkers" at Birkenau. In reality, there are *no documents* relating either to the alleged gas chambers in Crematorium I or to the alleged "bunkers," and Hilberg was well aware of this – so well that, in the final edition of his work, there is no mention of any documentary sources at all.

The whole matter amounts therefore to nothing more than more perjury.

¹¹³ District Court, pp. 775f./Rudolf 2020a, p. 139.

3.7. Zyklon B

Hilberg then concerns himself with a detailed discussion of Zyklon B, dedicating a good eight pages to this topic, which he starts as follows:

"Hydrogen cyanide, or Zyklon, was a powerful lethal agent – a deadly dose was 1 milligram per kilogram of body weight. Packed in containers, the Zyklon was put to use simply by opening the canister and pouring the pellets into the chamber; the solid material would then sublime." (p. 951)

In fact, hydrogen cyanide is a highly volatile liquid at room temperature, and it is not equivalent with Zyklon B, which was just a trade name. The type of Zyklon B used at Auschwitz consisted of gypsum pellets that were soaked with hydrogen cyanide.¹¹⁴ Once a can was opened, the liquid began to evaporate, leaving behind the solid gypsum pellets, which had to be collected after a fumigation and treated as hazardous material due to remnants of hydrogen cyanide in them (see NI-9912). Hence, the "solid material" – the gypsum carrier – did not "sublime," meaning turn directly from a solid into a gas.

Hilberg then explains:

"TESTA sold Zyklon in different concentrations. Invoices presented to municipal or industrial clients for fumigations of buildings were printed with columns headed C, D, E, and F, each denoting a category of potency and price. As explained in a letter to the Ostland, strength E was required for the eradication of specially resistant vermin, such as cockroaches, or for gassings in wooden barracks. The "normal" preparation, D, was used to exterminate lice, mice, or rats in large, well-built structures containing furniture. Human organisms in gas chambers were killed with Zyklon B." (p. 955)

As for the various categories of Zyklon, Hilberg is referring to three documents dating back to February-March 1942, on non-classified microfilm (FN 115, *ibid.*).

The fact is that the Tesch & Stabenow Company had a cost-estimate questionnaire for the disinfestation of buildings (regardless of whether they were public or private, large or small) which included only two types of products: Zyklon B and T-Gas (ethylene oxide).¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the financial statements of the Tesch & Stabenow Company for the years 1941-1944 only mentioned Zyklon B.¹¹⁶

A document introduced during the Tesch Trial, with partially burnt margins (owner and date missing) mentions these letters:¹¹⁷

<i>"For gassing with Zyklon:</i>	<i>with gas potency 'D' and...</i>
<i>for objects up to 10,000 cubic meters in volume...</i>	<i>RM 130</i>

¹¹⁴ The contents of Zyklon-B cans left behind by the Germans were analyzed in 1998; see Mazal.

¹¹⁵ Tesch & Stabenow, "Fragebogen für Kostenvoranschlag," undated, APMM, I, d.2, Vol. 1, pp. 119f.

¹¹⁶ Affidavit by Alfred Zaun, accountant of the Tesch & Stabenow Company, dated October 20, 1945, NI-11396.

¹¹⁷ TNA, WO 309-1603.

"	"	over 10,000/30,000 cubic meters	"	"	...	"	120
"	"	" 30,000/60,000	"	"	"	"	115
"	"	" 60,000 cubic meters of volume...				"	110
every 1,000 cubic meters of volume (external dimensions)							

Although the fight against more resistant parasites, such as cockroaches, requires higher gas potencies, ... the basic price increases from time to time corresponding to the greater use of chemicals, for gas potency 'F' (double of 'D') for example of 80... compared to the rates for normal gas potency 'D'."

In German contemporaneous manuals for pest control, the term "*Gasstärke*" ("gas potency") meant concentration, hence referred to the *quantity* of gas applied on a given volume to be fumigated, not to a different kind of gas. For example, in Walter Dötzer's manual we read (Dötzer, p. 113):

"At the latest after one hour of working in the gas (with normal gas potency), the gas filter must be changed."

As the example of T-Gas clearly shows, the "gas potency" was actually the quantity of product used per cubic meter of volume to be disinfested (*ibid.*, p. 129):

"Gas potency. For a fumigation are needed: 45 grams of ethylene oxide = 50 grams of T-Gas per cubic meter of volume."

In the lecture "Improper use of hydrogen cyanide as a delousing agent," Erich Wüstinger confirmed (NI-9098, p. 38):

"Every fumigation expert knows that the usual gas potency for fumigating a space and the exposure time of hydrogen cyanide – mostly 10 g/m³ for 20 hours..."

This explains the presence of the various volumes in the questionnaire quoted above, even if the pricing criterion is not clear. But it is certain that the relative "gas potency" always referred to Zyklon B. A text from 1929 speaks, for example, explicitly of the use of "Zyklon B, gas potency C," and adds that "usually for cargo spaces of ships, gas potency B is used" (Staatsinstitut..., p. 90).

From this it can be deduced that the Tesch & Stabenow Company provided for the use of Zyklon B at various concentrations in its estimates, depending on the type of parasite to be eliminated and the volume of the space. This also explains the difference in price. In fact, if the "gas potency" went from 5 to 10 grams per cubic meter, for example, the quantity of Zyklon B necessary for disinfestation doubled, and so did the price.

Hilberg, on the other hand, erroneously suggests that there were various types of Zyklon, called B, C, D, E, F, which were all different kinds of "preparations," of which Type B was used for homicidal gassings, the others for disinfestations. In reality, however, it was always Zyklon B, but applied in various quantities which produced certain concentrations of gas (e.g. 5, 10, 15 g/m³).

The source of the alleged killing of human beings with Zyklon B, by contrast, is Höss, as Hilberg informs us in his footnote 116 (p. 955), where he nev-

ertheless adds: "The same preparation was used for the delousing of clothes," meaning that Zyklon B was used also for disinfestations after all.

One last observation: on p. 951, Hilberg writes that "Zyklon was one of eight products manufactured by these firms, which undertook large-scale fumigations of buildings, barracks, and ships," in support of which he refers to "Lectures by Dr. Gerhard Peters and Heinrich Sossenheimer (gas experts), February 27, 1942, NI-9098" (FN 103, *ibid.*). In this lecture with the title "Development and Expansion of the 9 Degesch Processes," Heinrich G. Sossenheimer declared (NI-9098, p. 15):

"The following forms of Zyklon are in use today.

Zyklon, liquid hydrogen cyanide absorbed in diatomaceous earth (Diagriess), or a synthetic gypsum substance (Erco), and Zyklon-Discoids, liquid hydrogen cyanide absorbed on wood-fiber discs."

Since 1924, 250 million cubic meters of space had been disinfested using Zyklon B, 100 million of them in Germany.

On the amount of Zyklon B used at Auschwitz, Hilberg writes:

"The amounts required by Auschwitz were not large, but they were noticeable. At various times sizable portions of these deliveries were used for gassing people."¹¹⁷ (p. 955)

This is a noticeable change to what he wrote in 1985, where we read:

"The amounts required by Auschwitz were not large, but they were noticeable. Almost the whole Auschwitz supply was needed for the gassing of people; very little was used for fumigation."⁸⁵ (pp. 889f.)

What had changed? The footnotes still point to the same anecdotal sources, although the 2003 edition has Höss added to the roster of eyewitness testimonies. But Höss only made statements about the amount of Zyklon B used per gassing, not about what portion of the total deliveries were used for homicidal purposes, as Hilberg himself indicates in his Footnote 117.

Fact is that this issue is dealt with by orthodox historians in such an arbitrary manner that Jean-Claude Pressac, the world's greatest orthodox Holocaust expert on Auschwitz, asserted precisely the opposite, although with no better reasons than Hilberg. For Pressac, only 2-3% of the Zyklon-B supplies would have sufficed for the claimed gassings, so that "between 97 and 98% of the gas could be dedicated to delousing" (Pressac 1993, p. 47).

The three anecdotal sources listed by Hilberg in his Footnote 117 (p. 955) are:

"Testimony of Dr. Charles Sigismund Bendel (Jewish survivor) at trial of Bruno Tesch, tr. pp. 28-31, NI-11953. Heinrich Schuster, former Austrian intelligence agent imprisoned in Auschwitz, estimated the annual consumption of Zyklon for fumigations of barracks and freight cars at 1,700 kilograms (3,750 lbs.). Affidavit by Schuster, October 13, 1947, NI-11862. Höss estimated that only 13 lbs. (in six one-kilogram cans) were needed for the gassing of 1,500 people. See his affidavit of May 20, 1946, NI-03."

It is quite true that Bendel, a professional liar (see Mattogno 2020b, pp. 304-333), stated in the aforementioned testimony:¹¹⁸

"During the whole period from 10th December 1943 until the 18th January 1945 I remember only one disinfection of barracks."

Hilberg took Bendel's claims at face value, never examining the witness's reliability, and does not appear greatly concerned with the matter. Here are a few more of Bendel's claims regarding the consumption of Zyklon B:¹¹⁹

"During the month of June [1944] the number of gassed was 25,000 every day. [...]"

[Question] In the months of May and June 1944 how many tins of Zyklon B do you estimate were used for exterminating people? [...]"

Bendel – Two tins for one thousand persons; 25,000 per day; then we may say 50 tins per day."

This amounts to some 1,500 cans of Zyklon B per month. But in contradiction to this figure, he also asserted:¹²⁰

"During the months of May and June of 1944 I estimate that a total of 400 tins of Zyklon per month were used for killing people."

Moreover, if 25,000 Jews were gassed daily in June 1944, the total number for the entire month would have amounted to 750,000. But in reply to the question: "How many were gassed in May and June 1944?," Bendel replied: "About 400,000" (NI-11953, p. 3).

To avoid going into too much detail, this is how the witness described the alleged gas chambers of Crematoria II and III (NI-11390, p. 1):

"There were 2 gas chambers, underground, roughly 10 metres long, 5 metres wide and 1 1/2 metres high, each one."

Hilberg knew the real dimensions of Morgue #1, the semi-subterranean morgue of Crematoria II and III allegedly repurposed as homicidal gas chambers, because in the 1985 "definitive" edition, he correctly indicates their surface area: 210 square meters ("250 square yards," p. 884). He derived this information from the above-mentioned article by Jan Sehn (his FN 64), which states:

"Leichenkeller 1 (Cellar 1) had a surface area of 210 square meters and a height of 2.4 meters." (Sehn 1946b, p. 84)

These measurements correspond to those of the blueprints (30m × 7 m × 2.41 m). In the 2003 edition, he repeatedly refers to blueprint reproductions in Presac's 1989 book, especially in his Footnotes 77f. on page 945, so Hilberg was familiar with these buildings down to the smallest detail.

For Bendel, by contrast, these premises had a surface area of 50 square meters and were only 1.5 meters high, hardly high enough for any grown-up to

¹¹⁸ Interrogation of C.S. Bendel on March 2, 1946. NI-11953, p. 4.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 2f.

¹²⁰ Affidavit of C.S. Bendel dated October 21, 1945. NI-11390, p. 7.

stand upright. It is important to note that Bendel was a self-proclaimed member of the so-called Sonderkommando, therefore presumably an "eyewitness"! But for Hilberg, no contradiction was even strident enough to merit his attention. As I demonstrate abundantly in Subchapter 4.3., Hilberg is never the slightest bit interested in verifying the trustworthiness of any witness or the veracity of their claims, as long as they are useful in proving his theory.

Let us now turn to the witness Schuster. In the affidavit cited by Hilberg, Schuster declared:¹²¹

"The whole Birkenau camp consisted of the three main sectors, BI, II, III (see enclosed diagram). Altogether, there were 263 huts. As mentioned before,^[122] one can of Cyklon containing about 5 kilogram was required to fumigate one hut. In this connection, it must be remembered that many huts were also sprayed with various other disinfectants.^[123] However, assuming that each hut was fumigated once a year with Cyklon B, we arrive at a yearly consumption of 1,350 kilogram. Taking into consideration the remaining two important camps (Auschwitz and Monowitz with 28 and 44 huts, respectively, a total of 68 [huts; recte: 72]), we get a further requirement of 350 kilogram Cyklon B per year. Thus, there would be an annual consumption of approximately 1,700 kilogram Cyklon for disinfecting purposes, always assuming that only Cyklon B was used."

This calculation is worthless, since it is based on erroneous assumptions.

1. The Zyklon-B cans delivered to Auschwitz in 1944¹²⁴ by Gerstein contained 500 grams hydrogen cyanide, not 5 kg. The largest Zyklon-B can available contained 1.5 kg of hydrogen cyanide.
2. The dosage of Zyklon B for disinfestation purposes was 8-10 grams per cubic meter (NI-9912, p. 1. This document is even cited by Hilberg: FN 102, p. 951). Therefore, the disinfestation of a housing barracks, with a volume of approximately 1,032 cubic meters, required approximately 8 to 10 kg of Zyklon B, or some 16 to 20 cans.
3. The total number of barracks was greater than that indicated by Schuster.
4. The witness disregards the Zyklon-B disinfestation chambers which also existed in the camp and thus consumed Zyklon B.
5. The disinfestation of the barracks only once a year is refuted by the existing documentation.

On the other hand, a general disinfestation of the entire camp complex Auschwitz-Birkenau-Monowitz, with a total volume to be disinfected of about 500,000 m³ of building space and a concentration of 8-10 g/m³ would have re-

¹²¹ Affidavit of H. Schuster dated October 24, 1947. NI-11862, p. 8.

¹²² The witness had previously described Zyklon B as "cylindrical cans with a content of approximately 5 kg."

¹²³ But "disinfectants" are not effective against parasites. The witness is confusing "disinfestation" with "disinfection."

¹²⁴ The witness was transferred to Birkenau in November 1943 and remained there until January 18, 1945.

quired approximately 4,024-5,035 kg of Zyklon B, as I have shown in detail elsewhere (Mattoigno 2019, pp. 444-449). This ignores the three Zyklon-B disinfestation chambers which certainly existed in 1944 (one in *Block 3* of the Auschwitz Main Camp, one in so-called *Kanada I* and one in *BW5a* at Birkenau), and it also does not consider the other satellite camps belonging to that camp complex.

Hilberg goes on, and writes:

"The camp administration itself did not buy the gas. The purchaser was Obersturmführer Gerstein, Chief Disinfection Officer in the Office of the Hygienic Chief of the Waffen-SS (Mrugowski). As a rule, all orders passed through the hands of TESTA, DEGESCH, and Dessau. From the Dessau Works, which produced the gas, shipments were sent directly to the Auschwitz Extermination and Fumigation Division (Abteilung Entwesung und Entseuchung). [...] Deliveries to SS installations for fumigation purposes were made every six months or so, but Auschwitz required a shipment every six weeks because Zyklon deteriorated easily and a supply had to be on hand at all times. To discerning eyes that frequency was noticeable too." (pp. 955f.)

The source is Höss's interrogation of 14 May 1946, Document NI-36 (FN 121, p. 956), in which the former commandant at Auschwitz declared (see Mattoigno 2020, p. 111):

"My conclusion I can draw from this is that the company [Tesch & Stabenow] could have known it [of the alleged homicidal use of Zyklon B at Auschwitz] only because Auschwitz constantly requested it, while it was delivered to the other units of the SS troops only once or at intervals of half a year."

He added that at Auschwitz, the deliveries were made on average every six weeks (*ibid.*, p. 112). These statements are, however, completely unfounded, as Hilberg well knew, because the document which he cites in his Footnote 118 (p. 955: NI-7278) lists 12 invoices from Degesch addressed to Gerstein that concern the supply of the quantities of Zyklon B to Auschwitz and Oranienburg in 500-gram cans as listed in the table overleaf.¹²⁵

Therefore, the same quantities of Zyklon B at very similar intervals were delivered to both the Auschwitz Camp and to Oranienburg, which was not a so-called extermination camp. Only thanks to this omission is Hilberg able to present Höss's false statements as the truth.

At this point, a reference to Hilberg's related testimony during the Zündel Trial is indispensable. In the first edition of his book, on page 570, he translated the heading "*Abteilung Entwesung und Entseuchung*," which appears on the invoices produced by Gerstein, as "Extermination and Fumigation Division."

While it is true that pest-control contractors are called "exterminators" in the English language, this term never refers to exterminating humans. Furthermore, while "exterminator" is a term that is pretty much limited to pest

¹²⁵ PS-1553, pp. 15-26.

Camp	Delivery date	Invoice date	Number of cans	Quantity in kg
Auschwitz:	14 February 1944	14 February 1944	390	195
	8 March 1944	13 March 1944	420	210
	20 March 1944	30 April 1944	390	195
	11 April 1944	30 April 1944	390	195
	27 April 1944	30 April 1944	390	195
	31 May 1944	31 May 1944	390	195
		Total	2,370	1,185
Oranienburg:	16 February 1944	16 February 1944	390	195
	8 March 1944	13 March 1944	420	210
	20 March 1944	30 April 1944	390	195
	11 April 1944	30 April 1944	390	195
	12 May 1944	18 May 1944	390	195
	26 May 1944	31 May 1944	390	195
		Total	2,370	1,185

control, the term “extermination” has a much broader meaning, and can refer to the destruction/annihilation of anything. Vice-versa, the German term Hilberg translated here – “*Entwesung*” – *never* refers to killing of humans, but only to pest control. Therefore, translating “*Entwesung*” with “extermination” in the present context of claims involving the extermination of human beings is highly misleading, if not outright mendacious. Even more serious was Hilberg’s shamelessness when he defended himself about this mistranslation under cross-examination during the 1985 Zündel Trial (Q: defense counsel; A: Hilberg):¹²⁶

Q. What is the translation for ‘Entwesung’?

A. To deprive something of life – that is extermination. There is no very accurate translation which doesn’t carry connotations, but I think you will find that that’s an acceptable translation of the German term.

Q. I put it to you that it means ‘delousing’, and it refers specifically to vermin.

A. No.

Q. That word —

A. No. The term ‘Wesen’ is a live thing; anything alive. The prefix ‘Ent’ is to negate life, to deprive it of life. The suffix ‘ung’ in ‘Entwesung’, and having been deprived of life, or depriving something of life.”

After some additional discussion, defense counsel Christie asked Hilberg:

“Q. You agree that ‘Entwesung’ is a term meaning to use just disinsecticidization.

A. It refers to any killing, any deprivation of the quality of life of something that is alive.

Q. I see. So it could refer to anything, according to you.

A. Well, ‘Entwesen’ is anything that walks, anything that has life.”

¹²⁶ District Court, pp. 1131f./Rudolf 2020a, pp. 198f.

Hilberg grew up in Austria, hence he was fluent in German. He therefore knew that he was lying here. First, “*ent-*” is a prefix of the general meaning of removing something, like the English prefix “*de-*”. A “*Wesen*” in this context means “creature.” The suffix “*-ung*” serves to turn verbs into nouns, like the English suffix “*-ing*”. Hence “*Entwesung*” literally translates to “de-creature-ing” – pest control. While humans are creatures, too, Hilberg should have been aware that the use of “*Entwesung*” is strictly limited to pest control in the German language, with pests referring to small animals – and animals only – that are a nuisance, cause damage or spread disease, in the English language also referred to as “vermin.”

Hilberg did not wish to admit that the term “*Entwesung*” means “disinfestation” or “pest control,” and he even induced the prosecutor, Peter Griffiths, to present before the court and to introduce into evidence a photocopy of the page from a German-English dictionary showing the definition of the word “*Wesen*,”¹²⁷ without ever even bothering – either one of them – to consult the translation of the word “*Entwesung*”!

The lawyer Christie could have countered with any specialist work on disinfestation from the 1940s, such as that of Walter Dötzer, the second half of which is dedicated entirely to “*Entwesung*,” the meaning of which is explained as follows (Dötzer, p. 72):

“Entwesung is the destruction of small animals which are harmful to man or to human health, to the extent to which they live together with him or occur in his habitat. Entwesung forms part of the struggle against vermin, which concerns itself with the destruction of all forms of animal life harmful to livestock, crops or supplies.”

One could quote here even the well-known German war-time “Guidelines for the Use of Prussic Acid (Zyklon) for the Destruction of Vermin (Disinfestation)”: “*Richtlinien für die Anwendung von Blausäure (Zyklon) zur Ungezieferverteilung (Entwesung)*”, as issued by the Health Authority of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Prague (NI-9912).

Hilberg’s mendacious attempt to turn a term strictly used for pest control into one that sounds like the extermination of human beings is refuted also by a source he added to his 2003 edition, the work by Norbert Frei *et al.* on garrison and headquarters orders of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, cited by Hilberg in Footnote 2 on page 1028. Frei’s book contains a subject index, in which the term “*Entwesung*” is listed with four entries, always with reference to disinfestation. In particular, the Garrison Order No. 55/43 of December 15, 1943 prescribes that to all lodgings (of SS family members, members of the SS troop, civilian workers and inmates) “in which a *Entwesung* [disinfestation] is carried out,” access was allowed only after the disinfector in charge, SS *Oberscharführer* Klehr, had given permission (Frei *et al.*, p. 380; see also pp. 174, 179, 199).

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1237/p. 217.

Hilberg's bad faith is further demonstrated by the fact that Zyklon-B shipments from Dessau to Oranienburg, for which the orthodoxy claims no exterminations of human beings, were also directed to the local disinfestation and disinfection section (PS-1553):

"... von Dessau an das Konzentrationslager Oranienburg Abt. Entwesung und Entseuchung, Station"

After falsely translating the expression *"Abteilung Entwesung und Entseuchung"* with "Extermination and Fumigation Division", Hilberg not only refused to acknowledge his "mistake," but insisted on it, trying to bamboozle the jury with sophisticated, misleading gyrations, and repeated the falsehood in the 1985 edition (p. 891) as well as in the last edition of 2003, where he again wrote: "Auschwitz Extermination and Fumigation Division (Abteilung Entwesung und Entseuchung)" (p. 955). A truly astounding perseverance in lying!

It is moreover clear that his introduction of the various types of Zyklon, C, D, E and F, were solely intended to insinuate that Zyklon type B was used essentially for extermination purposes by the alleged "Extermination Department" at Auschwitz.

In this manner, he committed another perjury.

Regarding the quantities of Zyklon B delivered to Auschwitz, a list of invoices from Degesch to SS *Obersturmführer* Kurt Gerstein, Oranienburg, Account No. G 36, also contains an invoice for 210 kg of Zyklon B dated March 18, 1944, and the following ones for 1943 (NI-7278):

- June 30, 1943: 240 kg
- September 21, 1943: 200 kg (twice)
- October 4, 1943: 195 kg
- November 9, 1943: 195 kg (twice)

Two invoices dated November 19 only bear the wording "Zyklon," without indicating the quantity or even the intended recipient.

Let us return to the book. Continuing with his tactic of deliberate omissions, Hilberg then writes:

"The SS in the meantime began to be concerned over the possibility that it had received the Zyklon too early. On May 24 [1944], the disinfection officer, Obersturmführer Gerstein, wrote a letter to Dr. Peters inquiring how long the shipment would last. When would it deteriorate? So far, it had not been used at all. 'On the other hand, under certain circumstances large quantities — that is to say, actually the entire quantity — might have to be used all at once [Andererseits werden erhebliche Mengen — d.h. eigentlich die ganzen verwahrten Mengen — unter Umständen plötzlich benötigt]." (p. 957)

The source for this is Document NI-9808 (FN 127, *ibid.*). Hilberg is apparently referring to a possible use of stocks of Zyklon B for homicidal purposes, all the more-so since at that time the Hungarian Jews were being deported to Auschwitz. That those Jews were slated to be killed with Zyklon B, Hilberg hints at in his next paragraph:

"The SS did not have to wait too long. By end of May transports were rolling into Auschwitz, and on August 6 the Referat für Schädlingbekämpfung der Waffen-SS und Polizei in Auschwitz (Anti-vermin Office of the SS and Police in Auschwitz) asked for more Zyklon. The supply was kept up to the very end. The SS did not run out of gas." (p. 957)

However, the first trains with Jews from Hungary had arrived there already on May 17, so a week *before* Gerstein wrote his letter (see Mattogno 2007a, p. 47). Hence, if the Hungarian Jews were being killed *en masse* already for a week straight, why would Gerstein have worried about the Zyklon-B supply on hand in Auschwitz going bad? In fact, Hilberg states that Gerstein wrote the Zyklon B "had not been used at all." One week of mass gassings with Zyklon B, and the Zyklon B available at Auschwitz had not been used at all?

In his 1985 "definitive" edition, Hilberg stated in this regard expressly that "the great bulk of the 1944 deportees [from Hungary] were gassed in the Auschwitz killing center upon arrival" (1985, p. 936), but that sentence got excised from the 2003 edition (p. 1002). Yet still, Hilberg maintains that "[d]uring May and June [1944] the Hungarian Jews alone were gassed at a rate of almost 10,000 a day" (p. 1044), which requires that almost all Jews arriving at Auschwitz from Hungary were killed upon arrival.¹²⁸

Hilberg's allusions to mass gassings with Zyklon lose their last semblance of credibility if we consider the entire text of Gerstein's letter, from which Hilberg cherry-picked a few statements (NI-9908):

"Also, please tell me how long you consider the shelf life to be of the special delivery Oranienburg and Auschwitz. Should there be any doubt as to the duration of the storage, we ought to use the supplies from the first shipments for disinfection purposes (zu Entwesungszwecken) and in each case only store fresh deliveries. So far, none of these quantities has been used. On the other hand, considerable quantities – that is, actually the entire quantity in storage – could be needed suddenly in some circumstance. But of course, safety and shelf life are the primary considerations."

The letter therefore *explicitly* refers to the use of Zyklon B for *disinfection* purposes at Auschwitz and Oranienburg.

Dr. Peters transmitted the letter to Degesch, which replied to Gerstein on June 9, 1944 as follows (PS-1553, p. 11):

"As regards the question of the shelf life of the goods, we can inform you that we provide a one-year warranty. We do not doubt that the goods can also be stored longer, but we wish to request, in view of the present precarious situation, that you not exceed the recommend storage period, but rather use the oldest shipments already for disinfection purposes together [with newer shipments]. [...]"

Regarding the shelf life of the goods, we also wish to stress in particular that a decomposition of them can hardly occur, but that it is after all possible for the

¹²⁸ On the claimed extermination of Hungarian Jews deported to Auschwitz, see Mattogno 2007a.

cans to become corroded. The slightest impurity in the sheet metal, which is often visible only under a microscope, are the cause of corrosion. Thus, small holes develop, through which small quantities of hydrogen cyanide can escape. But even in this case, there is no danger, provided that the goods are kept in a well-ventilated warehouse, as is stipulated by us. In the event of any perceptible odor of hydrogen cyanide, it is recommended to examine the respective crates and to use damaged cans as soon as possible."

Hilberg's claim that "Auschwitz required a shipment every six weeks because Zyklon deteriorated easily" is therefore completely without basis in fact, as he must have been aware, since he was familiar with the above set of documents, quoting other parts of it several times, but only those that suited his purpose (in particular Gerstein's "confession," see below).

A few lines further on, Hilberg asserts:

"The advantages of Zyklon as a lethal gas became known. Even while Höss was still building his gas chambers in 1942, a distinguished visitor from Lublin, Brigadeführer Globocnik, visited Auschwitz in order to learn of the new method [of extermination]." (p. 957)

The source is Höss's interrogation of March 14, 1946, NI-36, cited earlier (FN 129, *ibid.*). This is the text relating to Hilberg's topic (Mattozzo 2020, p. 109):

"Q 12) What do you know about Globotschnigg [Globocnik] regarding his friendship with Wolff¹²⁹?"

A. I know absolutely nothing about the friendship Globotschnigg-Wolf. I know Globotschnigg only from a visit to Lublin, and Globotschnigg was once in Auschwitz.

Q 13) At what point in time was that?

A. I can no longer tell the point in time, 1942-1943. At any rate, it was at that point in time when the crematoria had already been finished."

Höss said nothing about the reason for Globocnik's visit. The Birkenau crematoria were completed between March and June 1943, as is well known. Therefore, Globocnik's alleged visit to Auschwitz cannot have taken place before this period of time. This means that Hilberg selectively attributes to Höss both the date of the presumed visit (1942), and the reason for it, because it suits his purpose ("in order to learn of the new method [of extermination].") The latter doesn't even make sense, because by mid-1943, Globocnik's alleged extermination camps were already at the end of their activity, and he, together with his staff from the "Aktion Reinhardt," was transferred in early September 1943 to Trieste, where he then assumed the position of "Higher SS and Police Leader in the Operational Zone Adriatic Coast." For what purpose, then, could he have had any need "to learn of the new method" of extermination involving Zyklon B? This is moreover in contradiction with Kurt Gerstein's alleged "mission," which I will address in a moment.

¹²⁹ SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, Himmler's adjutant.

What is more, no visit to Auschwitz by Globocnik is attested to by any document, and he is not even mentioned in Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*.

Hilberg then tells us his version of Kurt Gerstein's "mission":

"This rivalry [about which method is the best] came to a head one day in August 1942 when Eichmann's deputy, Günther, and the chief disinfection officer, Kurt Gerstein, arrived in Belzec." (p. 957)

The source is: "Statement by Gerstein, April 26, 1945, PS-1553" (FN 130, p. 960), which he later characterized as an "Affidavit" (FN 8, p. 1028; FN 101, p. 1042). This is already a mischaracterization, because Gerstein's text is not an "affidavit," meaning a statement sworn to be true before an official, but merely a private text written in several different versions, one of which Gerstein delivered to two U.S. officers (Document PS-1553; see Mattogno 1985, 2021; Roques 1989).

According to this document, SS *Sturmbannführer* Rolf Günther did not accompany Gerstein to Belzec at all, but limited himself to transmitting to him the assignment on the part of the RSHA of procuring 100 kg of hydrogen cyanide (PS-1553, p. 4).

Hilberg continues his narration as follows (pp. 957, 959; p. 958 has a table):

"They had about 200 pounds of Zyklon with them and were about to convert the carbon monoxide chambers to the hydrogen cyanide method."

A pound corresponds to some 0.45 kg, therefore "approximately 200 pounds" would have been roughly equivalent to Günther's 100 kg, which were not "Zyklon" at all, however, but "hydrogen cyanide." The testimony cited by Hilberg does not mention Zyklon in connection with Belzec at all. This is not an irrelevant detail, because, when interrogated by French Investigating Judge Mattei on July 19, 1945, Gerstein declared that he picked up, at Kolin, not 100 kg, but 260 kg, and not *hydrogen cyanide*, but "potassium cyanide" in 45 *steel bottles*.¹³⁰ The substance was nevertheless liquid, and could only have been hydrogen cyanide. In addition to being self-contradictory, this is also nonsensical for a number of reasons:

- The procedure of disinfestation using liquid hydrogen cyanide had not been in use since 1934 (Lenz/Gassner, p. 8).
- The RSHA is said to have ordered Gerstein to travel over 700 km in mid-August 1942 with an extremely dangerous cargo. In fact, due to its low boiling point and the possibility of decomposition (polymerization), liquid hydrogen cyanide could only be transported under refrigeration, at night and in a special vehicles (Rüter *et al.*, p. 137).
- Prior to the invention of Zyklon B, liquid hydrogen cyanide for disinfestation purposes was filled in steel bottles. For use, it was nebulized by means of compressed air or evaporated by warming the bottle, then led through appropriate tubing. Both procedures were dangerous (Lenz/Gass-

¹³⁰ Wellers 1980, p. 28; Mattogno 2021, pp. 98f., 118f.

ner, pp. 8f.). Hydrogen cyanide in glass flasks, used in France and the French colonies in particular as well as in England, constituted the so-called "Galardi Process," which consisted in pouring liquid hydrogen cyanide from the flask into a bowl or directly onto the floor (Peters 1933, pp. 54f.). This is evidently an unfeasible procedure for homicidal gassings.

- It is truly noteworthy that a couple of weeks before Gerstein's departure for Lublin (where Globocnik was awaiting him), the Tesch & Stabenow Company had supplied the Majdanek Camp with 360 cans of Zyklon B weighing 1.5 kg each, for a total of 540 kg (see Graf/Mattogno, p. 202). No person in their right mind would have hauled, or ordered hauling, a dangerous cargo of 45 steel bottles of liquid hydrogen cyanide on a 700 km trip across Europe, if all he needed was available next door, so to say, and in a much-safer and -easier-to-handle format to boot.

Hilberg goes on to say:

"Gerstein obliged, ordering the Zyklon to be buried on the pretext that it had spoiled." (p. 960)

In this regard, Gerstein made the following contradictory statements before French Investigating Judge Mattei (Wellers 1980, pp. 28, 31; Mattogno 2021, pp. 118f.):

"The forty-four bottles that remained were not taken to the BELCEC camp but were hidden by the driver and myself about twelve hundred meters away from the camp."

"I arrived with the cyanide at the camp and told the camp commandant what had happened to me along the way with regard to the bottle, which had not been closed properly."

The judge noted the contradiction and confronted Gerstein about it:

"This morning you told us that forty-four cyanide bottles – your entire load, one of the bottles having been emptied – had not arrived at the BELCEC Camp because they had been hidden by the driver and yourself at about twelve hundred meters away from the camp; just now you just told us that you arrived at the camp with your load. When are you telling the truth?"

Hilberg returns to this issue later, asserting:

"When Obersturmführer Gerstein, the gas expert, completed his tour of the Generalgouvernement camps in the late summer of 1942, he spilled the whole secret on the Warsaw-Berlin express to a fellow passenger, Swedish diplomat Baron von Otter. The baron reported the existence of the killing centers to Stockholm, but the Swedish government did not disseminate the information to the world." (pp. 1029f.)

Hilberg's source in his footnotes 13f. are the 1953 transcript of one of Gerstein's texts in a German orthodox history journal, plus the comments of one of the journal's editors (Rothfels 1953).

In practice, he relied on a witness – Kurt Gerstein – about whom he himself declared during the Zündel trial that he was “was a very excit[e]able person [...] capable of all kinds of statements,” and that certain parts of Gerstein’s statement are “pure nonsense.”¹³¹

As for von Otter’s “confirmation”, the source cited by Hilberg reports (Rothfels 1953, FN 10, p. 181):

“Likewise, a letter from the Swedish Foreign Office (November 10, 1949) to the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine in Paris confirms that G.[erstein], in the last days of August 1942 while on the train from Warsaw, gave this the relating information to von Otter, a member of the Swedish embassy in Berlin, and that it was forwarded to the Foreign Office.”

Fact is that von Otter decided only in 1964 to reveal “all the details” of what Gerstein allegedly had confided to him, by having his account published in a German weekly newspaper (Braumann 1964). But instead of relying on his own records or memories of the event, which evidently didn’t exist, he brazenly plagiarized Léon Poliakov’s 1964 article “*Le dossier Kurt Gerstein*,” in which the latter had presented a falsified version of Gerstein’s French text of April 26, 1945 – and von Otter faithfully copied all of Poliakov’s changes, typos included! (cf. Mattogno 2021, pp. 143f.) Hence, von Otter’s “confirmation” was dictated merely by political opportunism, which renders Hilberg’s reference to him, repeated in the final 2003 edition (FN 14, p. 1030), pathetic at best.

Hilberg continues, asserting (p. 960):

“Höss and Wirth were henceforth enemies. The Auschwitz commander, even after the war, spoke proudly of his ‘improvements’. [...] among these architects of the killing centers there was fierce competition and rivalry.”

The source is: “Affidavit by Höss, April 5, 1946, PS-3868” (FN 131, *ibid.*).

This refers to Höss’s invented visit to Treblinka, which I discussed earlier. Höss claimed that the killing system with carbon monoxide allegedly implemented at Treblinka was not “very efficient”; he then declares: “another improvement we made over Tremblinka was...” (see Mattogno 2020, p. 67). This is where Hilberg got his “improvements” from, not only by hiding from his readers the insurmountable anachronism concerning Höss’s alleged visit to Treblinka, but he also created a fictional context for the alleged rivalry between Höss and Christian Wirth by shifting to a time after August 1942 what in Höss’s fictional chronology referred to 1941.

On p. 1076, Hilberg regurgitates this fictitious tale:

“Again, within the SS itself, a jealous struggle was waged between two technocrats of destruction, Obersturmbannführer Höss and Kriminalkommissar Wirth, over the replacement of carbon monoxide with Zyklon B in the death camps.”

¹³¹ District Court, pp. 904f.; Rudolf 2020a, pp. 158f.; see Subchapter 4.3.

This presumed “jealous struggle” is also taken from Kurt Gerstein’s contradictory tale about his absurd alleged “mission,” which I have adequately exposed elsewhere (Mattoigno 2021, pp. 95-136). Hilberg fallaciously justifies his theory of a “jealous struggle” by referring to Höss’s interrogation of May 14, 1946 and to Gerstein’s statement of April 26, 1945 (FN 72, *ibid.*). But Höss didn’t mention Wirth at all, and Gerstein never mentioned Höss! Hilberg was possibly thinking instead of Konrad Morgen’s affidavit of July 19, 1946, in which he stated:¹³²

“With Auschwitz, Hoess entered the mass extermination at a much later point in time. Hoess only exterminated the Jews unfit for labor. Because of his methods, Wirth called him his untalented student.” (Emphasis added)

On the one hand, this contradicts the date of Himmler’s summoning of Höss (June 1941), on the other it contradicts Globocnik’s alleged trip to Auschwitz “in order to learn of the new method [of extermination],” and also Gerstein’s alleged “mission” aimed at introducing Zyklon B in the eastern camps.

3.8. Euthanasia and the “Killing Centers”

The chapter “Organization, Personnel, and Maintenance,” which begins on p. 960, deals with marginal issues regarding the central topic of the claimed extermination. I examine only the most important issues discussed by Hilberg.

Hilberg notes that “[a]lmost all of Wirth’s German personnel had euthanasia experience” (p. 961), and as such this staff is said to have been the precursor of the “Final Solution.” Thus, the personnel specializing in the murder of mental patients in the euthanasia centers are said to have been sent to the camps at Bełżec, Sobibór and Treblinka to carry out the extermination of the Jews in these camps. But Hilberg also writes that for most members of these units, “there was a hiatus between euthanasia and the Generalgouvernement assignment. Several of them were sent during that interval to the occupied USSR to care for wounded or frostbitten German soldiers, but were soon recalled” (FN 10, p. 962). But why would expert personnel trained in mass-murdering people be sent to look after the wounded? This evidently means that they were *not exclusively* trained to murder people, which alone would unambiguously indicate that they were sent to these camps as professional mass murderers.

In effect, the orthodox theory, according to which the gas chambers in the Aktion Reinhardt camps were built by the personnel of the euthanasia operation following the model of the chambers at their former institutes is not only without basis in fact, but implies devastating consequences for orthodox histo-

¹³² IMT, Vol. 42, pp. 563-565; Affidavit SS-67.

riography, as I have explained elsewhere (Graf/Kues/Mattogno, pp. 270-281; Mattogno 2016a, pp. 62-72).

Hilberg dedicates some six pages just to the production and distribution of Zyklon B (pp. 951-957). In this regard, thanks to the numerous documents that exist, practically everything is known. In the face of this detailed knowledge, what is known about the carbon-monoxide cylinders allegedly used for homicidal purposes in the euthanasia institutes and in Lublin-Majdanek? Hilberg merely states in this regard (p. 931):

"During 1940 and the first eight months of 1941, the annihilation of 70,000 adults in euthanasia stations equipped with gas chambers and bottled, chemically pure carbon monoxide gas."

Since he opines that "'Euthanasia' was a conceptual as well as technological and administrative préfiguration of the 'Final Solution' in the death camps" (p. 932), in the economy of the *The Destruction of the European Jews*, it should have received central importance. Hilberg, however, disposes of this topic in a couple of pages, where he refers to general literature on the topic for "detailed descriptions" (FN 20, p. 931).

This incredible superficiality raises more than legitimate questions:

1. What documentary evidence is there that carbon-monoxide cylinders were used for homicidal purposes by the euthanasia centers?
2. Which companies produced carbon monoxide in cylinders? And which supplied it to the euthanasia centers?
3. What documentary evidence is there that the euthanasia centers were equipped with carbon-monoxide gas chambers?
4. What documentary evidence is there that people were murdered there with carbon monoxide?

Neither Hilberg nor any other Holocaust historian has so far answered these simple questions,¹³³ so the murder of the mentally ill in carbon-monoxide gas chambers in euthanasia centers cannot be considered a historically established fact.

Therefore, the claim that the alleged gas chambers at Belzec (and then Sobibór and Treblinka) were built on the model of those of the euthanasia centers is unsupported by any known documents.

From the Holocaust point of view, the only link between the euthanasia centers and the eastern "extermination camps" would be the "gassing devices" (*Vergasungsapparate*) mentioned in Wetzel's letter of October 25, 1941 examined earlier, which, from the point of view of orthodox historiography, could

¹³³ The alleged involvement of the Mannesmann Röhrenwerke in the supply of steel cylinders to euthanasia centers – which are said to have been fitted with a pressure gauge by chemist August Becker and then filled with carbon monoxide by IG Farben's Ludwigshafen factory (Kogon *et al.* 1993, pp. 30f.) – is not based on documentary evidence, and the only two documents mentioned in this context – two letters from IG Farben dated 17 December 1943 and 18 February 1944 (*ibid.*, Note 86, p. 256) – were never published neither in original nor in transcript.

only be simple carbon-monoxide cylinders.¹³⁴ But in that case, when, why and by whom were they replaced by exhaust gases produced by either a Diesel or a gasoline engine? The only two persons who could have carried out this task were the alleged gas-chamber experts Helmut Kallmeyer, chemist, mentioned in Wetzel's letter, and Albert Widmann, head of Section VD2 (chemistry and biology) at the Institute for Forensic Technology (*Kriminaltechnisches Institut* or KTI) within the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*. But Kallmeyer declared that he had never concerned himself with gas chambers within the framework of his position in the euthanasia operation, that he had never been sent to Riga, or any extermination camp, and no one has ever proven the contrary. And not even Widman had any part in this task. By whom then was this change carried out? According to orthodox Holocaust historiography, the task of designing and constructing the alleged gas chambers is said to have been entrusted to SS *Scharführer* Lorenz Hackenholt for Bełżec, to him and to SS *Unterscharführer* Erwin Lambert for Treblinka, and to this same pair of men for the expansion of the "gassing installation" at Sobibór. But Lorenz Hackenholt has been linked to the alleged gas chambers only on the basis of the "Gerstein Report" – a notoriously unreliable document (see Mattogno 2021) – while Lambert was a mere master builder and bricklayer. And these, a sergeant major and a sergeant, are supposed to have been the "experts" on "gas chambers" within the framework of a general extermination plan devised by the top echelons of the National-Socialist regime?

But there is an even-more-serious problem. Wetzel's just-mentioned letter fully confirms the policy of deporting the Jews to the East:¹³⁵

"At the present time, Jews being deported from the old Reich are to be sent to Litzmannstadt [Łódź], but also to other camps, to be later used as labor in the East so far as they are able to work."

The only thing that is new about this letter consists of the plan to "doing away with those Jews who are not able to work," in camps to be built at Riga and Minsk. The killing, according to the orthodox interpretation, was to be carried out by means of the "gassing devices," but it is well known that this did not happen. Now, since it is certain that National-Socialist policies with regard to Jews did not involve their extermination, but rather their deportation to the East, since there is no documentary evidence of any change of course in this regard, of a point of interruption (which would correspond to the phantasmagorical *Führerbefehl*), the *only* reasonable conclusion which orthodox historiography could draw from the transfer of the euthanasia personnel to the Aktion Reinhardt camps is the extension of the *euthanasia* program to the Jews who were to be deported to the East. But in this case, not *all* deportees sent to the camps at Bełżec, Sobibór and Treblinka (except for the small number of those

¹³⁴ Alvarez suggests that the "*Vergasungsapparate*" could have consisted of disinfestation equipment (2016, p. 96).

¹³⁵ NO-365; NMT, Vol. 1, p. 870.

selected to work in those camps) would have been murdered there, but only a small part. It would therefore be impossible to speak any longer of "pure extermination camps." Belżec, Sobibór and Treblinka would have served a double function: a *principal* function as transit camps (*Durchgangslager*) for the resettlement to the East, and a *secondary* function as euthanasia centers for mental patients and the incurably ill.

Therefore, this Holocaust argument backfires against one of the cornerstones of orthodox Holocaust historiography: the notion of the pure extermination camps.¹³⁶ In fact, from an orthodox perspective, there never was any kind of "selection" of deportees fit for labor in the camps at Belżec, Sobibór and Treblinka that would have been even remotely comparable to that claimed for Auschwitz.

3.9. The Camp Administration

3.9.1. Sadism and Corruption

Another topic discussed by Hilberg in this chapter regards the sadism and corruption of the SS.

"The personnel problem arose in two different forms: sadism and corruption. The former was posed primarily by the guards, the latter chiefly by the old officials of the camps." (p. 969)

He then draws a horrifying picture based almost exclusively upon "survivor testimonies" (p. 970). For example, for Hilberg, "*Sport machen* ('to do sport')", meaning to have the inmates do some physical exercises, was essentially "a way in which the guards relieved their boredom, and while not exactly encouraged in official directives, little was done to stop this practice" (*ibid.*). Hilberg explains that

"The whole problem of sadism was therefore narrowed to a special kind of activity: the so-called excesses. In general, an "excess" involved a massive orgy or a sexual aberration." (*ibid.*)

He then reports the unfounded stories about Irma Grese and Otto Moll repeated by the "survivors' literature" (*ibid.*), and describes the horrific living conditions at Majdanek and Auschwitz, based on the same sources (pp. 973-978).

In *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders*, Hilberg shows a truly remarkable degree of credulity and absence of critical sense when credulously reporting with all seriousness the following propaganda claptrap of immense caliber (Hilberg 1992, p. 54):

¹³⁶ For an in-depth examination of the matter, please refer to my comments in Chapter 8.4. ("Euthanasia and Aktion Reinhardt") of Graf/Kues/Mattogno, pp. 270-281.

"Again and again, witnesses recalled that small children were thrown out of windows, or tossed like sacks into trucks, or dashed against walls, or hurled live into pyres of burning corpses.

In some instances, sadism was pristine. This form of conduct emerged in face to face contacts of those men who wanted to exhibit their mastery over Jews. Essentially these individuals played with their victims. In the early days, they gave toothbrushes to Jews to clean sidewalks. In newly occupied Polish towns, they cut the beards of pious Jews or used Jews as ponies for rides. In the permissive environment of a camp, they could make use of Jews for target practice, or they could select women as sex slaves. In Auschwitz, the arch sadist Otto Moll promised life to an inmate if he could run barefoot twice across a ditch of burning corpses without collapsing. The master of life and death also had its reverse side. An Auschwitz inmate was flogged for having unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide."

Before examining in detail any of the specific aspects of this alleged "sadism," we should note that Hilberg forgets to mention here the following statements made at Nuremberg by Höss, the witness whom he believed anything uncritically if it helped shoring up his theory of "destruction" (IMT, Vol. 11, pp. 403f.):

"Until the outbreak of war in 1939, the situation in the camps regarding feeding, accommodations, and treatment of internees, was the same as in any other prison or penitentiary in the Reich. The internees were treated severely, but methodical beatings or ill-treatments were out of the question. The Reichsführer gave frequent orders that every SS man who laid violent hands on an internee would be punished; and several times SS men who did ill-treat internees were punished.

Feeding and billeting at that time were on the same basis as those of other prisoners under legal administration.

The accommodations in the camps during those years were still normal because the mass influxes at the outbreak of the war and during the war had not yet taken place. When the war started and when mass deliveries of political internees arrived, and, later on, when prisoners who were members of the resistance movements arrived from the occupied territories, the construction of buildings and the extensions of the camps could no longer keep pace with the number of incoming internees. During the first years of the war this problem could still be overcome by improvising measures; but later, due to the exigencies of the war, this was no longer possible since there were practically no building materials any more at our disposal. And, furthermore, rations for the internees were again and again severely curtailed by the provincial economic administration offices.

This then led to a situation where internees in the camps no longer had the staying power to resist the now gradually growing epidemics.

The main reason why the prisoners were in such bad condition towards the end of the war, why so many thousands of them were found sick and emaciated in the camps, was that every internee had to be employed in the armament indus-

try to the extreme limit of his forces. The Reichsführer constantly and on every occasion kept this goal before our eyes, and also proclaimed it through the Chief of the Main Economic and Administrative Office, Obergruppenführer Pohl, to the concentration camp commanders and administrative leaders during the so-called commanders' meetings.

Every commander was told to make every effort to achieve this. The aim was not to have as many dead as possible or to destroy as many internees as possible; the Reichsführer was constantly concerned with being able to engage all forces available in the armaments industry.

DR. KAUFFMANN: There is no doubt that the longer the war lasted, the larger became the number of the ill-treated and tortured inmates. Whenever you inspected the concentration camps did you not learn something of this state of affairs through complaints, et cetera, or do you consider that the conditions which have been described are more or less due to excesses?

HOESS: These so-called ill-treatments and this torturing in concentration camps, stories of which were spread everywhere among the people, and later by the prisoners that were liberated by the occupying armies, were not, as assumed, inflicted methodically, but were excesses committed by individual leaders, subleaders, and men who laid violent hands on internees.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean you never took cognizance of these matters?

HOESS: If in any way such a case came to be known, then the perpetrator was, of course, immediately relieved of his post or transferred somewhere else. So that, even if he were not punished for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, even then, he was taken away from the internees and given another position."

Note that Hilberg drew the term "excesses" from this very passage! In this context, he forgets to cite another source, whom he cites when required to shore up his theory: SS Judge Konrad Morgen. In his affidavit of July 13, 1946, mentioned by Hilberg several times, this witness supplies the following description of some positive aspects of the concentration camps:¹³⁷

"The food ration for working inmates was 2,750 calories per day. Mostly in the form of potatoes, legumes, farinaceous products, vegetables and bread. The camps, and especially the companies that employed the inmates, consistently made efforts to procure additional provisions, on occasion by intentionally ignoring laws of war economy. In camp canteens, inmates could also acquire additional food within the limits of the military situation, and could also receive unlimited packages, foreigners through or by the Red Cross. The general nutritional condition of the inmates was good. I saw small numbers of badly undernourished prisoners only in the hospitals. This depended on the constitutional physical weakness or was the consequence of illnesses such as dysentery, typhus, or tuberculosis. The medical and sanitary installations were good, some of them exemplary. In addition to the SS physicians, inmate physicians were employed, including international authorities. Medicinal supplies were limited by military conditions just as they were for German civilians, but SS pharma-

¹³⁷ Affidavit of K. Morgen dated July 13, 1946. SS(A)-65. IMT, Vol. 42, pp. 552-554.

cists were always ready to assist, insofar as possible. For labor deployment, attention was paid to an inmate's physical condition, skills and social background while considering possible past criminal convictions and conduct in the camp.

Apart from exceptions, the rate of work and the inmates' performance was considerably lower than that of the civilian work force. The principle was not to goad the inmates, but rather to give them an incentive in the form of premiums and other compensations. This also explains why the supply of tobacco to the inmates during the war was much better than to the German civilian population or even to concentration-camp guards.

The lives and property of the inmates were protected in this way:

It was strictly forbidden to kill or strike inmates. This was repeatedly stressed in warnings to the camp personnel. The commandant had to confirm knowledge of this order in writing. The related declaration was found in the personnel file. Habeas-corpus hearings were made at regular intervals by the RSHA. For the first time 3 months after the internment of an inmate, later at longer intervals. For the investigation and prosecution of crimes by inmates, there was a criminal secretary in every camp from the nearest office of the State Police, the head of the so-called Political Department of the concentration camp. Only the common courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the punishment of crimes committed by inmates. For crimes against inmates committed by members of the SS, the local SS and Police court had exclusive jurisdiction. In the camp, a sworn legal official served to assist that court. Every death of an inmate had to be communicated by teletype, and in the case of any obvious or suspected unnatural death, a report had to be submitted to the SS court accompanied by documents – autopsy reports, photographs of the crime scene, situation map, testimonies of inmates and SS members. Only the inspector of concentration camps could order any corporal punishments of a disciplinary nature, after an investigatory report and a statement by the accused inmate and signed in his own hand had been submitted. The punishment could only consist of blows on the buttocks administered in the presence of a physician and an officer. The maximum number of precisely defined blows was 25. This maximum punishment was inflicted only rarely on criminals with serious criminal records in the camp. Execution of the punishment, usually by another inmate, only after a medical examination and issuance of a medical certificate of non-objection.

Inmate property was stored separately against issuance of a receipt.

Within the camp, the inmates enjoyed freedom of movement, camp radio, a camp library, they could send and receive letters, receive newspapers and packages; there were variety shows, films, a brothel, sports and games of all kinds, including sports competitions.

The internal affairs of the concentration camp were managed and directed by the inmates themselves.

All these measures did not just remain a dead letter."

And all these things, as I have shown in a separate study, are backed up by documents, including for Auschwitz, and applied also to Jewish inmates, in-

cluding the provisions regarding their property (see Mattogno 2016b, Part One, pp. 13-85).

Hilberg's historical ignorance with regard to the concentration camps is stupefying: nearly all his information is derived exclusively from eyewitness testimonies, which are extremely dubious.

As we have seen, Hilberg attributes the alleged sadism of the SS to orgies or sexual aberrations. This Freudian fixation inevitably leads to serious misunderstandings, such as in the case of the brothels in the concentration camps. In this regard, he writes:

"Although Auschwitz was to become the subject of a special Nazi investigation, these particular incidents appear to have been overlooked. There was no concerted effort to curb sadism. Such an effort would have been difficult in any case. The only prescribed remedy would have rendered the offending guards into 'asocials' (sex criminals). However, the problem was recognized. For one thing, the camp administration established a number of brothels." (p. 971)

On June 12, 1943, the head of the *Bauinspektion Reich-Ost* forwarded to the Central Construction Office of Auschwitz a request from Office Group D of the WVHA to construct rapidly a "inmates' special building 'B'". An attachment contained a sketch of the "special barracks" (*Sonderbaracke*), for the construction of which Himmler stressed a particular urgency.¹³⁸ The surviving documents show that this special barracks was a brothel. In actual fact, the letter "B" stood for "*Bordell*," German for brothel. The barracks was not built, but the brothel was created regardless. However, the brothel was *not* intended for use by the SS, as claimed by Hilberg, but rather for male inmates (see Mattogno 2016, pp. 110f.). As we have seen, this fact was also explicitly stated by Judge Morgen, so that Hilberg could not have been unaware of it.

3.9.2. Inmate Living Conditions

On this topic, Hilberg writes on p. 974:

"Lublin, for example, in the fall of 1942 had five blocks with a total of twenty-two barracks. The barracks were partially unfinished. Some had no windows. Others had cardboard roofs. None had water. Provisional latrines (fill-in type) spread odors throughout the habitat."

This description is based on an "[a]ffidavit by Ruppert, August 6, 1945, NO-1903" (FN 64, *ibid.*). Friedrich Wilhelm Ruppert, former SS *Obersturmführer*, was transferred from the Dachau Camp to the Lublin-Majdanek Camp on September 18, 1942. He was one of the defendants during the Dachau show trial (November 15 to December 13, 1945) and was hanged in Landsberg prison on May 28, 1946. In this affidavit, he painted a catastrophic picture of the Majdanek Camp for obvious reasons. But keep in mind that the letter from the

¹³⁸ Letter from the *Leiter der Bauinspektion Reich-Ost* to the *Zentralbauleitung* of Auschwitz dated June 12, 1943. RGVA, 502-2-108, p. 3.

Central Construction Office of the Lublin Camp to the SS economist at the higher SS and police leader in the General Government, dated October 22, 1942, describes the completed work as follows:¹³⁹

"108 housing barracks, 5 kitchen and 5 washing barracks, 10 inmate supply barracks, 5 workshop barracks, 1 housekeeping barracks, 2 disinfection barracks with baths, built partly on wooden pilings and partly on a solid foundation, were erected, in addition to 7 barracks in the area of the headquarters and 19 barracks in the area of the guard battalion."

For the water supply, 1,200 meters of piping was installed inside the camp and 5,500 outside; for the sewage, 300 and 1,100 meters respectively.

"B work (finishing work)^[140] was executed to the extent that they were necessary within the scope of the camp's degree of occupancy."

The camp structure was therefore already well organized, and the barracks remaining unfinished were obviously not yet occupied by inmates.

The "Breakdown of buildings for the construction of a women's concentration camp in Lublin" dated November 20, 1942 reports under Point 4:¹⁴¹

"Building IV – 2 washing and toilet barracks."

The washing and toilet facilities are installed into 2 barracks. [...] For water supply and drainage, the barracks are connected to the fresh-water and waste-water networks."

Hilberg manages to distort even the claims of his witness, who stated:¹⁴²

"The Lublin Camp consisted of five separate sectors with 22 barracks each, although some of them were not yet finished and in very poor structural condition. In some, the windows had no panes and the roofs were only covered with cardboard, so that when it rained it was almost impossible to live or sleep in the barracks. The barracks had no water supply, and it took several months to install it. The makeshift latrines gave off a terrible stench."

Hilberg manifests his surprising ignorance even of the Majdanek Camp's basic terminology: the camp was in fact divided into "*Felder*" (fields), which Ruppert improperly calls "complexes" ("*Anlagen*"), a term Hilberg translated into "blocks".

In Footnote 59 on p. 909 of the 1985 edition, Hilberg offered another, equally unfounded description:

"In Auschwitz II at that time [June 1944], up to 32,000 women shared a single latrine barracks."

The testimony cited as evidence is that of Gisella Perl. In reality, in the women's camp at Birkenau, Camp Sector BI, there were ten latrine barracks (*Abort-*

¹³⁹ WAPL, ZBL, 8, p. 22.

¹⁴⁰ The "B-Arbeiten" were interior finishing jobs which could be done during the winter.

¹⁴¹ WAPL, ZBL, 8, p. 13.

¹⁴² Affidavit by F.W. Ruppert of August 6, 1945; transcript in: *Zeszyty Majdanka*, XXIII, 2005, pp. 101-107; the quoted passage is on p. 103.

baracken) of brick, five in Sector BIa, and five in Sector BIb (Czech 1990, p. 5), and on August 22, 1944, the occupancy of this camp amounted to 39,234 female inmates (*ibid.*, p. 695). This undoubtedly implied an uncomfortable situation for the inmates, but the witness cited by Hilberg renders it eight times as serious. Maybe this is the reason why that sentence and Perl as its source were deleted from this footnote in the 2003 edition (FN 65, p. 974).

In the context of the inmate living conditions, Hilberg claims:

"When a Jew died, no special report had to be made; a death list sufficed. Whether an individual Jew lived or died did not matter." (*ibid.*)

However, the sources cited by Hilberg – a letter from Glücks (yet signed by Liebehenschel) to the camp commandants dated July 15, 1943 (NO-1246) and an undated file memo by Rudolf Höss (NO-1553; Hilberg's FN 62, p. 974) – are actually about *communication rules* of inmate-mortality data to Office Group D of the WVHA: the deaths of Jewish inmates had to be communicated in lists, not individually, in contrast to the deaths of other inmates, but this does not at all imply that "no special report had to be made."

The letter of July 15, 1943 was preceded by an order from Glücks dated November 21, 1942, bearing the subject "Communication procedure relating to mortality cases in the concentration camps," which ordered the listing of the deaths of Jews, both male and female, in a common list, containing a serial number, first and last name, nationality, domicile, date of death, cause of death, and the authority having ordered the arrest of the deceased inmate – data which could only be obtained from the relevant death certificates.¹⁴³

Hilberg's unfounded deduction is refuted in a striking manner by the Auschwitz Death Books. To cite only a few examples, the last death certificate in Volume 25, concluding the year 1943, is that of the Jew Zelik Gieclik, who was born at Poddebice on May 25, 1909, died on December 18, 1943 due to sudden cardiac arrest.¹⁴⁴ The Jewess Johanna Sara Seiner, who was born at Bejscht on January 26, 1871, died on December 27, 1943 at the age of 72 years due to weakness caused by old age (*Alterschwäche*).¹⁴⁵ The Jew Josef Hoffmann died of the same cause on June 22, 1942 at the age of almost 90 years, having been born on August 12, 1852 at Vrutky.¹⁴⁶

The text which I cited above continues as follows:

"There only had to be a sufficient number of inmates to take care of work requirements, and if the supply was more than sufficient, the SS could weed out

¹⁴³ NO-1543. I have sufficiently well refuted Hilberg's theories in Mattogno 2016b, Chapter 5.2, pp. 91-96.

¹⁴⁴ *Standesamt II Auschwitz. Sterbebuch (Zweitbuch) 1943*, Vol. 25, Certificate No. 36991, December 31, 1943. These documents are currently in the archives of the Auschwitz Museum (*Politische Abteilung. Sterbebücher*). The RGVA, where they were originally located, retains only photocopies of them.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Certificate No. 36299, December 31, 1943.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 1942, Vol. 9, Certificate No. 12134, June 27, 1942.

the Jewish inmate population by sending the excess number to the gas chamber." (ibid.)

However, according to the orthodox Holocaust narrative, these alleged gasings concerned inmates who were unable to work, not the "excess number" who were quite able to work. As is well known, these "excess workers" were housed in the Birkenau Transit Camp, from where they were transferred to other camps. The letter from the head of the Birkenau inmate-clothing department to the camp's clothing administration of July 14, 1944 informs that, just during the period from May 16 to July 14, 1944, 48 transports with 45,132 inmates had left the Birkenau transit camp.¹⁴⁷ I will return to this topic later.

Not even the story of the gasings of inmates unable to work is based on any documented fact, as I have shown elsewhere (Mattogno 2016b, Part Two, pp. 87-216).

Hilberg goes on to assert:

"Depending on the arrival of new transports or a selection of victims to be put to death, the camp population could be doubled or halved within a short time." (ibid.)

The afflux of new convoys in itself was irrelevant for purposes of the alleged extermination. On the other hand, the case cited by Hilberg is unique. It involves in fact a letter from *SS-Hauptsturmführer* Rudolf Wagner of Auschwitz "reported to WVHA D-IV on March 25, 1942, that it expected an inmate increase from 11,000 to 27,000 in the next few days; NO-2146" (FN 63, *ibid.*). Wagner, who was the camp kitchens manager, knew of the imminent transfer to Auschwitz of 5,000 male inmates and 11,000 female inmates. Wagner therefore informed his superiors that the kitchens were not equipped to deal with the number of anticipated new arrivals.¹⁴⁸ Nothing strange about that. In fact, if this proves anything, then the fact that the camp kitchen was expected to feed *all* these inmates, hence that they *all* were expected to remain alive.

The alleged halving of the number of inmates in a short time due to the "selection of victims to be put to death," by contrast, fits in perfectly with the theory of the "killing centers." Hilberg notes in this regard:

*"On October 17, 1944, the women's camp in Auschwitz II had 29,925 inmates. On November 25, 1944, the number was 14,271. Frauen-Lager LK Au II/Abt. IIIa (Birkenau) strength reports, October 18 and November 26, 1944, Dokumenten i materialy, vol. 1, p. 118." (FN 63, *ibid.*)*

His source is Blumental's 1946 collection of documents. The data are reported correctly, but he has misinterpreted them. Incredibly, Hilberg seems to have been completely unaware of the fact that Auschwitz was in the process of evacuating inmates at that time due to the approaching front line. As a result,

¹⁴⁷ AGK, NTN, 88, pp. 111-113. I provided the text and translation of the most-important passage of this letter in Mattogno 2007a, pp. 12-14.

¹⁴⁸ Letter from *SS-Hauptsturmführer* R. Wagner to the administration of Auschwitz Concentration Camp dated March 25, 1942. NO-2146.

he neglected the "transfers," a category which appears clearly under the heading "departures" in the above-mentioned documents. This series of documents clearly shows that the majority of missing inmates simply had been transferred; for example, 1,009 on October 20, 510 on October 21, 2,100 on October 23, 497 on October 27, 1,812 on October 28, 653 on October 29, 2,351 on November 1, 798 on November 2, 2,366 on November 4. Dozens of inmates were also released from the camp during this period (listed under "releases").¹⁴⁹ For the reduction of the camp's occupancy due to "special treatment," albeit in considerably fewer numbers than transfers, I refer to my discussion of the matter in my study specifically dedicated to this topic (Mattogno 2016b, pp. 179-210).

After his unfounded assertions concerning the sanitary installations at the Lublin-Majdanek Camp as examined earlier, Hilberg adds in this regard:

"During an Auschwitz construction conference on June 16, 1944 (Pohl, Maurer, Höss, Bischoff, Baer, and Wirths participating, among others), the 'completion' (Ausbau) of barracks in Camp II was still a subject of discussion. In this connection, it was pointed out that the installation of washing and toilet facilities was necessary only in every third or fourth barrack." (ibid.)

The source is Document NO-2359 (FN 65, *ibid.*), which is a file memo by Karl Bischoff, at that time the head of the Auschwitz Central Construction Office, with the subject "Talk on the occasion of the visit of the head of the Main Office, SS *Obergruppenführer* and General of the *Waffen SS* Pohl, on construction issues at Auschwitz." The point mentioned by Hilberg concerned the "upgrading" ("*Ausbau*") of already existing barracks in KL (II)," not their "completion." This "upgrading" consisted in the "installation of washing and toilet rooms" in every third or fourth barracks. A later document in fact reports as follows:¹⁵⁰

"Ausbau von Baracken im KL II (Wasch- und Aborträume)"

"Upgrading of barracks in KL II (washing and latrine rooms)"

This however was not a negative measure denoting a particular degree of "sadism" on the part of the SS, but rather, quite the contrary. The inmates' lodging barracks were normally without sanitary installations, which were found in separate barracks. In fact, Construction Sector II at Birkenau had 14 washing barracks (Building 6b) and 14 Latrine Barracks (Building 7b).¹⁵¹

The installation of wash basins and latrines in separate rooms inside some of the lodging barracks (in every third or fourth of them), was therefore an improvement in general hygienic conditions.

¹⁴⁹ APMO, *Stärkemeldung*, AuII- 3a, FKL.

¹⁵⁰ "*Aufstellung der im Bau befindlichen Bauwerke mit Fertigstellungsgrad*" ("List of structures currently under construction, with degree of completion"), compiled by the head of Zentralbauleitung, SS *Obersturmführer* Werner Jothann, on September 4, 1944. RGVA, 502-1-85, p. 195a.

¹⁵¹ "*Kostenvoranschlag zum Ausbau des Kriegsgefangenenlagers der Waffen-SS Auschwitz.*" RGVA, 502-2-60, p. 85.

When describing the alleged "sadism" of the SS, Hilberg also mentions the overcrowding of the lodging barracks, without realizing that, by so doing, he is refuting his theory of mass extermination:

"The overcrowding in the barracks was a constant plague for the inmates; there was simply no limit to the number of people who could be put into a hut. Inmates slept without blankets or pillows on so-called Pritschen, wooden planks joined together. On October 4, 1944, the administrative division of Auschwitz II wrote to the central administration for 230 new Pritschen. Instead of having been used by five inmates, as regulations prescribed, each of the Pritschen had held up to fifteen inmates. Because of this weight, the upper layer of the Pritschen had broken apart, and all the inmates had fallen on top of the people lying on the middle layer. The second layer had thereupon collapsed, and everybody had crashed through the lowest layer." (pp. 974f.)

The source is again Blumental's *Dokumenty i materialy*, pp. 95f. (FN 66, p. 975. Hilberg's account is inexact and incomplete to say the least. First of all, the request, sent by the Administration of KL Auschwitz II (Birkenau) to the Central Construction Office (not the central administration), was not just for 230 *Pritschen*, but also for "6,000 woolen blankets" and 8,000 bottom boards for *Pritschen* (*Pritschenbodenbretter*). Point 2 of the document also says:

"The woolen blankets are to be distributed in such a way that each block gets 500 of them, and every inmate gets 2 of them."

The result of the collapse mentioned by Hilberg was that "the bottom boards and to some extent also the *Pritschen* could no longer be used." Therefore, what Hilberg calls *Pritschen* – long wooden boards – were in reality the bottom boards, while the *Pritschen* were straw mattresses placed on top of the planks. The inmates were therefore supplied with straw mattresses and woolen blankets.

Point 1 of the document says:

"This camp is used as a reception and transit camp."

To Hilberg, it must have seemed so incredible that there was a transit camp *Durchgangslager* in the alleged extermination camp of Birkenau that he preferred not even to mention the matter. And yet this camp not only existed, but at least 98,600 inmates were transferred to other camps from there (Mattogno 2003, p. 397; 2004, pp. 26f.), including at least 79,200 Hungarian Jews (Mattogno 2007a, p. 20), and at least 11,500 Jews from the Łódź Ghetto (Mattogno 2004a, pp. 30f.).

The "overcrowding" mentioned by Hilberg resulted precisely from the fact that the "excess" was not sent "to the gas chamber," but to the transit camp at Birkenau.

With regard to the Łódź Ghetto, Hilberg writes:

"In fact, Lodz had become the largest ghetto by default, its 80,000 people struggling with a prison diet and a twelve-hour day for two more years. Then,

in August 1944, announcements were posted in the ghetto under the heading 'Verlagerung des Gettos [transshipment of the ghetto].'" (p. 543)

"By the end of August [1944] the ghetto was empty except for a small cleanup Kommando. The victims were shipped not to Germany, to work in plants, but to the killing center in Auschwitz, to be gassed to death." (pp. 544f.)

In reality, as I have documented elsewhere, the Jews evacuated from the Łódź Ghetto amounted to 65,000 people at the most, no more than 22,500 of them reached Auschwitz (Mattogno 2004a, pp. 27-29), of whom approximately 11,500 women were transferred to Stutthof. Of the approximately 11,000 male Jews deported to Auschwitz from the Łódź Ghetto, approximately 3,100 were registered; the fate of the remaining 7,900 is not documented. It is nevertheless known that the transport which departed from Auschwitz on September 3, 1944 included about forty Jewish babies or children between the ages of 6 months and 14 years from the Łódź Ghetto. These were not gassed, but regularly registered and transferred to Stutthof with their mothers (*ibid.*, pp. 32f., names list). This makes it extremely questionable that the 7,900 adult Jews mentioned above were gassed.

Hilberg's claim is all the more inconsistent since he refers as a source to a letter from the WVHA dated August 15, 1944 (Document NO-399; FN 142, p. 545). This document is identical to PS-1166 (IMT, Vol. 27, pp. 46-49).

On August 15, 1944, the head of Office Group D IV (Concentration-Camp Administration) of the WVHA, SS *Sturmbannführer* Wilhelm Burger, sent the head of Office Group B, SS *Gruppenführer* Georg Lörner, a letter relating to a "inmates report" and "inmates clothing." The letter says that on August 1, 1944, the occupancy of the concentration camps amounted to 379,167 male inmates and 145,119 female inmates, to which had to be added the already-announced new admissions of inmates from seven more locations, among them 60,000 inmates "from Lodz (police jail and ghetto)." The list of new admissions – 612,000 persons in total – closed with the following comment:

"A large part of the inmates is already on the move, and will arrive for internment at the concentration camps over the next few days" (ibid., p. 47)

Burger declared that there was not enough clothing for the 612,000 new inmate arrivals and requested the allocation of "special quotas of textile material and leather." Office DIV/4 was in fact in charge of "clothing," therefore the WVHA really anticipated having to issue clothing to these inmates, particularly the 60,000 Jews from Łódź, whose evacuation into the concentration camps had already been underway for several days by August 15.

Therefore, the document cited by Hilberg strikingly debunks his theory: not only does it not mention Auschwitz at all, but it asserts that all these 60,000 Jews, practically all of whom were evacuated from the ghetto, were to be registered, clothed and lodged.

Hilberg then describes the problem of the lack of food for the inmates:

"The basic diet of Jewish inmates was watery turnip soup drunk from pots, supplemented by an evening meal of sawdust bread with some margarine, 'smelly marmalade,' or 'putrid sausage.'" (p. 976)

Here Hilberg refers once again to Gisella Perl (FN 73-75, *ibid.*). But Jan Sehn's article, which he cites in connection with the crematoria at Birkenau refutes this description: the daily bread ration (Sehn does not even mention the ridiculous claim of "sawdust bread") was 350 grams, but Sehn says that the inmates only received 300 grams. For breakfast they received half a liter of coffee or tea (according to the regulations) and 3 kg of sugar every 300 liters. At lunch, there were two types of soup: one with meat, four times a week, and a vegetable soup three times a week. Moreover, every day, every inmate was entitled to 40-50 grams of margarine, sausage or marmalade (Sehn does not confirm that these foods were "putrid" or "smelly"), although those rations were allegedly reduced before being handed out (Sehn 1946b, pp. 63-70).

Of course, the picture drawn by Sehn is based on witness testimony as well, although they are at least a little more credible. But it is worthwhile recalling Judge Morgen's declaration in this regard as quoted earlier:

"The food ration for working inmates was 2,750 calories per day. Mostly in the form of potatoes, legumes, farinaceous products, vegetables and bread."

In his directive of October 26, 1943 on the improvement of living conditions for inmates in the concentration camps, including Auschwitz, Pohl listed 22 provisions on the subject of nutrition (see Mattogno 2016b, pp. 15-17).

Hilberg adds:

"The living conditions in the killing centers produced sickness and epidemics including dysentery, typhus, and skin diseases of all kinds. Sanitation measures were almost nil. The Auschwitz grounds were not suitable for canalization; hence fill-in latrines were the only facilities available." (p. 976)

These assertions are based, as usual, upon a single testimony (FN 76, *ibid.*).

If Hilberg had possessed enough curiosity to study a map of the Birkenau Camp with a minimum of attention, he would have realized that there was a suitable sewer system with three sewage-treatment plants (*Kläranlagen*), one located to the south of Crematorium II, one – the main one – between Crematorium III and the *Effektenlager* (known as Kanada, a personal-effects warehouse) and the third, in Sector BIII, to the north of Crematorium V. Obviously, the latrine barracks were all connected to this system.

His sanctimonious self-righteousness prevented Hilberg from inspecting what remains of the alleged "extermination centers." If he had visited Birkenau, he would have seen the gigantic network of drainage channels that still exists today.

As regards hygienic arrangements, it is sufficient to refer to Jean-Claude Pressac's first book, in which he dedicated six chapters to the camp's hygienic-sanitary installations, three of which were located at Birkenau and are still recognizable as such today (Pressac 1989, Chapters 2-7).

Hilberg concludes his review of the horrors at Auschwitz with this observation:

"Water was not purified. Soap and articles for cleansing were very scarce. Rats ran loose in the barracks. Only occasionally was a block fumigated with Zyklon. Hospitals were barracks, and inmate doctors worked with few medicines and few instruments. When the sickrooms became overcrowded, the SS doctor made an inspection and dispatched the worst cases to the gas chamber." (ibid.)

Without going into detail, the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex was equipped with several hospitals for the inmates. The main one was located in the Main Camp. There was a women's hospital at Birkenau in Sector BIa, and a men's hospital in Sector BIIf. Another hospital was located at Monowitz. In December 1943, the Main Camp's hospital consisted of the following departments: a radiological department, chemical laboratory, an ear, nose and throat department, optical laboratories, healing (UV) lamps department, medicinal herbs pharmacy, diet kitchen, dentistry department. The same hospital was equipped with an operating theater, a physiotherapy department and a convalescent unit.¹⁵² The records of the surgical operations show that 11,246 surgical operations were performed between September 10, 1942 and February 23, 1944, an average of twenty per day! (Świebicki, p. 330)

In May 1943, construction of a vast inmate hospital began in Sector BIII of Birkenau, providing, among other things, for 114 barracks for non-critically ill patients and another 12 for the seriously ill. The project was completed only in part because of the military situation (see Mattogno 2016b, Chapters 2-4, pp. 42-85).

In terms of testimonies, it is worth remembering the expert eye-witness testimonies by the Italian Jewish physician Leonardo de Benedetti as well as by the well-known author Primo Levi. Both were deported to Auschwitz on February 26, 1944. In 1946, they published a "Report on the Hygienic-Sanitary Organization of the Monowitz Concentration Camp for Jews (Auschwitz, Upper Silesia)," from which the following passages are taken:¹⁵³

"Illnesses of the stomach and digestive tract. [...] The standard treatment was of a dual nature and encompassed both nutrition and pharmacological therapies. [...] For this nutritional regimen, the sausage ration as well as the soup was eliminated from lunch, white bread substituted for black bread, and for supper there was a very nutritious sweet semolina soup. [...] The pharmacological treatment consisted of three or four Tannalbin pills and the same number of activated-carbon tablets; in severe cases the patients also received five

¹⁵² Quarterly report on the health service of Auschwitz Concentration Camp, compiled by the Auschwitz camp physician on December 16, 1943, and addressed to Office DIII of the SS WVHA. GARF, 7021-108-32, pp. 93-98.

¹⁵³ L. de Benedetti, P. Levi, "Rapporto sull'organizzazione igienico-sanitaria del campo di concentramento per Ebrei di Monowitz (Auschwitz – Alta Slesia)." ISR, C 75; for more extracts see Mattogno 2016b, pp. 54-57.

drops of tincture of opium each day as well as some drops of 'Cardiazol.' " (p. 8)

"Infectious diseases. [...]"

The severe cases of psoriasis were transferred to the Auschwitz hospital to receive x-ray treatments." (p. 9)

"Surgical Cases.

[...] We shall cover such matters with the remark that even surgeries requiring a high surgical standard were performed, above all those involving penetration of the body wall such as gastroenteroanastomosis for duodenal ulcers, appendectomies, rib resectioning for emphysema, as well as orthopedic interventions for fractures and sprains. Where the overall condition of the patient did not assure that the trauma of the surgery could be withstood, the patient received a blood transfusion before initiating the procedure; transfusions were also performed to alleviate secondary anemia as well as severe hemorrhage from an ulcer or trauma sustained in an accident. For donors, recent arrivals to the camp were selected who were in good health; donation of blood was voluntary and was rewarded with 15 days' stay in the hospital, during which time the donor receives a special diet, so that there was never any lack of volunteers for blood donation. [...]"

On the subject of aseptic surgery, we note that inguinal hernias were regularly operated upon at the request of the patient, at least until mid-Spring 1944; after that such operations were discontinued, except in cases of very serious hernias that were actually a hindrance to work; it had to be assumed that the patients requested the operation in order to secure a month's rest in the hospital. The greatest number of interventions were against phlegmons and were conducted in a department specifically for septic surgery. Next to diarrhea, phlegmons were the most common sickness in the concentration camp. [...]"

Acute ear infections were also rather numerous, which arose in extraordinary numbers from complications of mastoiditis; these also were regularly operated on by specialists in otorinlaryngology." (pp. 9-11)

[...] during our stay in the camp, the following departments were in regular operation:

Clinic for general medicine; clinic for general surgery; ear, nose and throat clinic; dermatology clinic; dental office (where also fillings were done as well as the crudest of dentures); suite for aseptic surgery with attached otorinlaryngological department; suite for septic surgery; suite for general medicine with a section for nervous and mental ailments (the latter even equipped with a small electroshock device); suite for infectious diseases and diarrhea, as well as finally a ward designated for 'recovery,' in which dystrophic and edematous patients were placed along with certain convalescents. The hospital possessed a physical therapy room with a quartz lamp for ultraviolet light as well as a lamp for infrared light; in addition, a room for chemical, bacteriological and serological analyses.

There was no x-ray machine, and when an x-ray was judged necessary, the patients were sent to Auschwitz, where there was a good facility of the kind available, and from which they returned with an x-ray diagnosis." (p. 12)

All this is reflected in the documents. Hence, the testimonies upon which Hilberg relies with mind-boggling credulity in this connection are seriously unreliable.

On pp. 976f., Hilberg writes:

"Up to the end of 1942, Lublin had received 26,258 registered Jewish inmates. A total of 4,568 had been transferred; 14,348 had died. Auschwitz had obtained 5,849 registered Jewish inmates up to the same date; 4,436 had died."

But the source he cites, the Korherr Report of March 27, 1943 (NO-5194; his FN 78, p. 977) does not use the word "registered" anywhere. According to D. Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*, over 58,000 Jews had been registered at Auschwitz by December 31, 1942. The Korherr Report instead refers to Jews *not included* in the evacuation action (*Evakuierungsaktion*).

As for Lublin Camp, 4,560 Jews transferred out of 26,258 interned is decidedly too many for a "killing center."

A few pages further along, Hilberg observes:

"Thus, by hook and crook, the guards, the weapons, and the transport were assembled. But Pohl was still worried. There were many doomed people in the camps. In a report to Himmler dated April 5, 1944, Pohl outlined the preparations he had made for the eventuality of a mass break from Auschwitz. The count of Auschwitz inmates was then 67,000. From this number, Pohl deducted 18,000 sick inmates and 15,000 in work parties who could be 'done away with' (abgesetzt), 'so that practically one has to count 34,000 inmates.'" (p. 980)

Hilberg's source is Document NO-21, a letter by Oswald Pohl to Himmler (FN 94, *ibid.*), but that document says something quite different:

"From the total number of 67,000 inmates, we need to subtract the inmates located in external camps and the hospital in-patients, if we must take into consideration the question of the danger for Upper Silesia of a possible revolt or escape."

On this basis, Pohl performs the following computation (NO-21, p. 2):

<i>"Of the total number of</i>	<i>67,000 [inmates]</i>
<i>those lodged in the external camps (Lager III)</i>	<i>15,000 are deducted</i>
<i>The number of in-patients and invalids is currently</i>	<i>18,000</i>
<i>Therefore, in practice, we must calculate</i>	<i>34,000 inmates."</i>

Therefore "*abgesetzt*" does not mean "done away with," but deducted, subtracted, which is more than obvious, since the 15,000 inmates *lodged* (*untergebracht*) – not "in work parties"! – in 14 external camps, and the 18,000 stationary patients and invalids (!) at Auschwitz-Birkenau would not have represented any danger in the event of a revolt or mass escape from that camp.

The presence of such a large number of *in-patients* and *invalids* radically contradicts Hilberg's theory of deferred extermination, which, among other things, is in further contradiction with the plan for the above-mentioned camp hospital in Construction Sector III of Birkenau, with its 114 barracks for non-critically ill patients and its 12 barracks for the seriously ill.

Hilberg does not inform his readers that the "sick inmates" were in-patients, meaning that they had been admitted to a hospital, and he hides the fact that this number of 18,000 inmates also included *invalids*. He has nothing to say about this fact which directly contradicts his thesis of extermination. On the other hand, he himself draws attention to a document dated June 1943 according to which "the 160,000 prisoners of the WVHA camps", the most-important of which was Auschwitz, 22% were unable to work as of spring of 1943, hence 35,200 (p. 985).

3.9.3. The Activity of the SS Courts

Hilberg also dedicates a couple of pages to the activities of the SS courts regarding the conduct of commandants and SS officials of the concentration camps. In fact, he mentions the case of the commandant of Buchenwald, SS *Standartenführer* Karl Otto Koch, and Höss. For the first, the information that he was sentenced to death by an SS court and executed appears on half a line, after more than half a page in which Hilberg describes the alleged obstacles placed in the way of Koch's arrest (p. 972).

Hilberg's account of these events gives the impression that the SS courts prosecuted very few members of the SS, as he only mentions the sentencing of Koch and two of his subordinates, and this against the resistance of superior authorities. Strangely, to describe the activities of SS Judge Morgen, he never refers to Morgen's statements, but rather to the statements of Judge Werner Paulmann, whom he cites five times (FN 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, pp. 972f.). But, even in reporting this testimony, Hilberg is very far from exact. For example, he asserts that, in 1941, the legal proceedings against Koch "failed" (p. 972), but this did not happen due to any sort of cover-up, but rather, as Paulmann says, "*mangels Beweises*" "due to a lack of evidence."¹⁵⁴ Koch's subsequent arrest was not due to the fact that the "the court did not let loose" (*ibid.*), but rather due to Himmler's intervention: "Based on the new investigations, Himmler immediately authorized Koch's re-arrest," as Paulmann put it, who carried out the arrest in August 1943.¹⁵⁴

Hilberg refers in this context to this anecdote:

"In Buchenwald a Hauptscharführer, Koehler, was arrested as a material witness. A few days after his arrest, he was found dead in his cell, apparently poisoned. The investigating official, Dr. Morgen, was furious. Suspecting the camp doctor (Dr. Hoven) of the murder, Morgen ordered that samples of the chemical found in the dead man's stomach be administered to four Soviet pris-

¹⁵⁴ Sworn statement by W. Paulmann dated July 11, 1946. SS-64. IMT, Vol. 42, p. 545.

oners of war. The four men died in the presence of several witnesses, including Morgen, corruption officer Wehner, and Hoven's colleague Dr. Schuler (alias Ding). Armed with this proof, Morgen arrested Hoven." (p. 972)

In practice, therefore, Judge Morgen is said to have been no less criminal than the criminals he prosecuted! In reality, however, this story is not only not attested to by Morgen's statements, but is refuted by Paulmann's statements. These explicitly state that the camp physician Waldemar Hoven had been sentenced to death for committing illegal killings of inmates at the camp hospital (IMT, Vol. 42, p. 547).

Hilberg's source is the testimony of ex-Buchenwald inmate Eugen Kogon during the NMT's Medical Case (FN 53, p. 972), which was held between December 9, 1946 and July 27, 1947. Kogon testified on January 6-8, 1947. However, the fragment of the interrogation published in the trial transcripts refutes Hilberg's version of the story (NMT, Vol. 1, p. 637):

"In the first case various preparations of the so-called alkaloid series were put into noodle soup and administered to 4^[155] of these prisoners of war who were in Block 46. They, of course, had no idea what was going on. Two of these prisoners became so sick that they vomited, one was unconscious, the fourth showed no symptoms at all. Thereupon, all four were strangled in the crematorium. They were dissected and the contents of their stomachs and other effects were determined. The experiment was ordered by the SS court, by the SS investigating judge, Sturmbannführer Dr. Morgen. It was carried out in the presence of Dr. Ding, Dr. Morgen, Dr. Wehner, SS Hauptsturmführer and SS judges, and one of the three camp leaders, I do not know whether it was SS Sturmbannführer Schubert or SS leader Florstedt."

Therefore, instead of relying on direct witnesses, Hilberg incautiously refers to a hearsay witness with no first-hand knowledge of the matter who was repeating simple rumors.

In a file memo on the criminal case against Koch dated Weimar, September 11, 1944, Morgen wrote among other things (NO-2380, p. 2):

"According to matching witness testimony, a new era begins in the concentration camps with the beginning of SS Gruppenführer Glücks's office term in 1939, which mandates the maintenance and care of the prisoners as workers and forbids the unauthorized killing of prisoners of any kind. The head doctor with the inspectorate of the concentration camps, SS Standartenführer Dr. Lolling, states that these orders were communicated repeatedly to all physicians, and that compliance with them was monitored. SS Gruppenführer Glücks and SS Gruppenführer Müller, head of the State Police, stated that they had no idea about these incidents and disapproved of them."

As Judge Morgen reported in his affidavit of July 1946, the criminal investigations against high-ranking SS members were vastly more numerous than can be inferred from Hilberg's account (SS-65. IMT, Vol. 42, p. 556):

¹⁵⁵ The text erroneously says 40.

"The commandants of the Buchenwald, Lublin, Warsaw, Herzogenbosch and Cracow-Plasow camps were arrested. The commanders of Buchenwald and Lublin were shot. Several hundred cases were tried. Severe and most severe punishments were imposed on members of all ranks. The total number of cases examined was around 800, with one case often involving several people."

And it all happened with Himmler's full consent (*ibid.*, p. 557):

"Upon my first submission, Himmler immediately released the investigation, mercilessly dropped the former concentration-camp big-wigs who had been arrested, and ordered uncompromising action in repeated orders."

As for Höss, Hilberg wrote (p. 973):

"SS and Police Court XXII in Kassel now constituted itself into the 'SS and Police Court for Special Purposes.' Preparations were made to capture the greatest prize of all: Obersturmbannführer Höss of Auschwitz. A special commission (chief, Hauptsturmführer Drescher) was installed in the camp, and an informer in the person of Hauptscharführer Gerhard Palitzsch gave information about Höss. The commander, he said, was responsible for the pregnancy of an inmate, Eleonore Hodys, born in 1903 in Vienna. After considerable difficulties, corruption officers interrogated Hodys. But the Auschwitz campaign was doomed to failure. The suction mechanism of the camp began to work. Open threats were sent to the SS and Police court. In the camp itself, Hauptscharführer Palitzsch was discovered with a Jewish woman and thrown into a coal bunker. Höss had won."

The story is essentially based on Gerhard Wiebeck's affidavit of February 28, 1949 (NO-2330; FN 58, *ibid.*). Wiebeck was an SS judge under Judge Morgen, promoted to SS *Oberscharführer* in November 1943. In the aforementioned affidavit, he reported that, when he began to investigate Auschwitz, "Höss was in particular responsible for the extermination of the Polish intelligentsia and the mass extermination of human life [sic] in this camp," a sop to the victors which he then intensified further, as we shall see.

On the Hodys affair, he asserted:

"From an SS-Unterrführer (SS-Hauptscharführer Gerhard Pallitsch [sic]) I learned that Hoess supposedly impregnated the inmate Eleonore Hodys (born 1909 in Vienna) while in headquarters' detention at Auschwitz,^[156] and that he had her get severely mistreated, and wanted to kill her as an uncomfortable witness against him. [...]"

Hodys's interrogation could only be carried out in the fall of 1944 because she refused to testify in Auschwitz out of fear for her life. She was interrogated under oath in Munich roughly in mid-October 1944 by Dr. Morgen."

During his visit to Auschwitz on an unspecified date, Wiebeck claims to have noted

¹⁵⁶ *Kommandanturarrest*: The prison cells in the basement of Block 11 at the Auschwitz Main Camp.

"that there was a huge cloud of smoke over the camp area. When I asked what this flame meant, I was told that this cloud of smoke came from the cremated corpses, and that it was hovering over the camp for months."

On that occasion he also claims to have learned that "the gassing of inmates in Auschwitz was no secret."¹⁵⁷

There is no need to dwell on this naive propaganda: a "cloud of smoke", which was at the same time a "flame", which covered the "camp area" (Auschwitz? Birkenau? Both?) And remained there "for months." And the "gassing", not of Jews, but of "prisoners", was a well-known fact!

During the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, Wiebeck stated on October 1, 1964 (95. Session) that this alleged fact had been reported to him by SS *Unterscharführer* Theodor Gehri (Palitzsch disappears from his account). Mrs. Hodys was taken to the judge on a stretcher, because she was sick with bone tuberculosis. Höss wanted to kill her. Despite this, the woman was not killed, and in 1947 she was living in Leipzig (Langbein 1965, pp. 145f.). Wiebeck also claimed that no investigation was initiated against Höss:

"Presiding Judge: [...] Was Mr. Höss later charged with this case as well? Was he indicted for this at all?"

Witness Gerhard Wiebeck: No investigation was initiated against Mr. Höss." (Fritz Bauer..., p. 19601)

This contradicts Judge Morgen's statements, but also in part those of the detainee. In fact, she reported that there had been a "meeting with the Commander Hoss in the presence of the SS Judge Untersturmführer Wiebeck," but there was only talk of her detention in a solitary cell, not of sexual relations between her and the camp commandant (Howes, p. 59).

Furthermore, in his affidavit of February 26, 1947, Wiebeck did not mention at all his alleged interrogation of the detainee at Auschwitz.

The story of Palitzsch, who was allegedly "thrown into a coal bunker" after having been discovered with a Jewess, comes from a book by Polish investigative judge Jan Sehn, where we read (Sehn 1946b, p. 84):

"In 1943 Palitsch fell in love with a Jewess who was a prisoner, and for having relations with her was lodged in the coalhole of the XIth Block."

However, this is an obvious translation error, because the original Polish text says "*w bunkrze bloku 11*" – "in the Bunker of Block 11" (Sehn 1946a, p. 119), which was precisely the basement of this building used as the camp's prison. What matters, however, is the fact that Sehn does not cite any sources here either. According to the "perpetrators' biographies" of Auschwitz written by Aleksander Lasik, Palitzsch was arrested for embezzlement on a date after October 1943, and transferred to the SS Penal Camp in Danzig-Matzkau, and

¹⁵⁷ *Eidesstattliche Erklärung* by Gerhard Wiebeck dated February 26, 1947. NO-2331, pp. 4f. (The original document shows at the top "NO-2330," which was corrected to "NO-2331," and immediately below that "NO-2331").

from there he was perhaps sent to the front with a *Waffen SS* unit; his fate is unknown (Staatliches..., Vol. 1, p. 292).

Judge Morgen stated that, among those he had investigated, there was also
"SS Stubaf H o e s s, Kommandant Auschwitz, (ein Teil des Hoess belastenden Materials und zwar ein langer Auszug aus meiner eidlichen Vernehmung des Haefling Hoyds [sic] wurde von den Amerikanern als Propagandamaterial gegen die SS in der Schrift SS Dachau verwandt.)" (IMT, Vol. 42, p. 556)

In fact, the brochure *Dachau*, edited by Major Alfred L. Howes, G-2 Sect., 7th Army, presumably in 1945, contains a long "Statement of E.H." on pp. 46-59, where this former inmate recounts the lewd attentions of the commandant of Auschwitz towards her: "All in all we had 4 or 5 nights of sexual intercourse." The inmate became pregnant and was forced to have an abortion. She eventually was transferred from Auschwitz (Howes, p. 58).

During the Nuremberg IMT, at the hearing on August 8, 1946, defense counsel Horst Pelckmann asked Morgen if he knew the brochure in question, which was Exhibit SS-4. Morgen replied in the affirmative. The following exchange unfolded between the two (IMT, Vol. 20, p. 513):

"HERR PELCKMANN: On Page 46, there is the testimony of a Mrs. E. H. Was this testimony made before you as the investigating judge?"

MORGEN: Yes, this was a Mrs. Eleanora Hodis, a prisoner in Auschwitz; I questioned her under oath.

HERR PELCKMANN: And did you examine the article and make certain this was the evidence which the woman gave? Yes or no.

MORGEN: Yes.

HERR PELCKMANN: When was that?

MORGEN: In the fall of 1944.

HERR PELCKMANN: The testimony is against Hoess?

MORGEN: Yes.

HERR PELCKMANN: Were proceedings then instituted against Hoess?

MORGEN: Yes. The testimony was submitted to Hoess in the original.

HERR PELCKMANN: The testimony concerns conditions in Auschwitz; is that true?

MORGEN: Yes.

HERR PELCKMANN: It is not true that it concerns the situation in Dachau?

MORGEN: No."

Hilberg does not mention Morgen's statements, but instead refers only to Werner Paulmann's affidavit of July 11, 1946 (SS-64; FN 56, p. 973). Paulmann was an SS *Sturmabführer* assigned on November 1, 1942 as second judge at the SS and Police Court XXII in Kassel, and as such was a superior of Morgen. He actually stated that the camp commandants, especially those of Sachsenhausen and Auschwitz, heavily opposed the investigations and that "the court was threatened very openly by Auschwitz" (IMT, Vol. 42, p. 548), but also specified:

"The court's work would never have been carried out without the most energetic support of the following authorities:

1. Himmler. He gave practically all the necessary instructions, permissions, arrest warrants and the like. He overcame difficulties that had arisen. This was not only about prosecuting financial misconduct, but also about those against life and limb." (*ibid.*, p. 549)

In conclusion, it is possible that the Hodys affair is true – although it is not clear why Hodys's name, who according to her own statement was "detained 9 months under special arrest in Bunker 11 in the men's camp," and precisely in "*Kommandantur Arrest*" (=headquarters' detention; Howes, p. 46), does not appear in the Bunker register¹⁵⁸ – but the question really is whether "Höss had won," as Hilberg claims. What seems certain is that Höss was investigated for this matter, but the result of the investigation against him is unknown, so Hilberg's statement is purely hypothetical.

3.9.4. The Inmates' Labor Deployment

Hilberg opens the chapter headed "Labor Utilization" with these considerations:

"The primary reason for keeping up an inmate population was labor utilization, although the use of Jews for construction projects, maintenance, or industry was merely an intermediate step to be followed by killing." (p. 983)

This is refuted by the fact that, in the year 1944 alone, approximately 166,000 Jews, including the approximately 98,600 unregistered Jews sent through the Birkenau Transit Camp, were transferred from Auschwitz to other concentration camps,¹⁵⁹ for which the alleged "killing center" was therefore not "an intermediate step to be followed by killing." Hilberg continues:

"As in the case of the mobile killing operations in the East, the Jews were to be granted only a respite, or, in the ponderous words of Pohl, 'Employable Jews who are migrating to the East will have to interrupt their journey and work in war industry [Die für die Ostwanderung bestimmten arbeitsfähigen Juden werden also ihre Reise unterbrechen und Rüstungsarbeiten leisten müssen]'" (*ibid.*)

Here, Hilberg forgets one rather-relevant detail, namely that this interruption of the journey had to take place *at Auschwitz*. Let us briefly summarize the document.

¹⁵⁸ A list of names of inmates locked up in the bunker was published by Brol *et al.*

¹⁵⁹ See Mattogno 2004a, pp. 7-15. From the tables published there, a total of about 103,200 Jews result, to which have to be added at least half of seven mixed transports with a total of 8,900 deportees, for which the exact number of Jews is not indicated, thus resulting in a total of about 107,400. Since the number of non-Jewish detainees transferred from Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1944 is approximately 84,900, and the total number is approximately 250,800, the total number of Jews transferred is approximately 165,900, a figure which includes the approximately 98,600 non-registered Jews transferred from the transit camp.

On September 15, 1942, Speer and Pohl had a meeting. The day afterward, Pohl wrote a detailed report for Himmler. The discussion was organized in four points, the first of which was the "expansion of Auschwitz barracks camp resulting from the migration to the East." On this point, Pohl reported:¹⁶⁰

"In this manner Reichsminister Prof. Speer wants to swiftly ensure the deployment of initially 50,000 Jews fit to work in existing enclosed plants with existing possibilities for accommodations.

We will divert the workers required for this purpose primarily in Auschwitz from the eastern migration, so that our existing industrial facilities will not be disrupted in their performance and their setup by a continuously changing labor force.

The Jews fit for work who are slated for the eastern migration will therefore have to interrupt their journey and perform armament work."

The "migration to the East," synonymous for "evacuation of the Jews," was the deportation of the Jews to the East. In this context, the last phrase means that Jews unfit for labor destined for the "migration to the East" were not interrupting their journey – therefore they did not stop at Auschwitz – but continued their "journey" to the East (for details see Mattogno 2016, pp. 54-60). This is further confirmation that Auschwitz served as a transit camp for Jews not fit for work.

But if Auschwitz, at that time, already had been a "killing center," why were the Jews unfit for labor not simply gassed on arrival? Why were they sent on to the East?

In Subchapter 2.2. I have already documented the fact – inexplicable according to Hilberg's theory – that, between May and November 1942, at least 24 transports with Jews from Vienna were directed to Minsk, bypassing the Auschwitz Camp and passing very close by the Treblinka Camp.

Hilberg had carefully read the document in question, which in fact he correctly summarizes a few pages further along:

"On September 15, 1942, a major move was made toward the realization of these plans. Reichsminister Speer and four of his top men – Staatsrat Dr. Schieber (honorary SS-Brigadeführer), Dipl. Ing. Saur, Ministerialrat Steffen, and Ministerialrat Dr. Briese – met in conference with Pohl and Kammler. Two items were on the agenda: enlargement of the Auschwitz camp in consequence of the 'eastern migration' and 'taking over complete armament tasks of major proportions by the concentration camps.'

There was no difficulty on the first point. Speer approved the acquisition of building materials (in the amount of RM 13,700,000) to construct 300 barracks with room for 132,000 inmates at Auschwitz." (p. 996)

Hence, Hilberg's forgetfulness is not an accident.

Discussing the behavior of the SS, Hilberg asserts:

¹⁶⁰ Pohl's report to Himmler dated September 16, 1942 with the subject: "a) Armaments work b) Bomb damage." BAK, NS 19/14, pp. 131-133.

"The newly arrived transports were handled in an extremely careless manner. At times of labor shortages in Auschwitz, the camp doctor would often send almost an entire transport to the gas chamber. Such happenings infuriated the authorities in charge of camp labor allocation, WVHA D-II Chief Standartenführer Maurer and his assistant, Sommer. Two instances may be cited.

On January 27, 1943, Sommer informed Höss that 5,000 Jews from Theresienstadt were being sent to Auschwitz. He requested that the prospective workers among them be selected 'carefully' (sorgfältig zu erfassen) because they were needed by the construction department at Auschwitz and by the I. G. Farben Works there. After some delay, Schwarz sent the following statistical reply. Out of 5,022 Theresienstadt Jews, 4,092 had been gassed (gesondert untergebracht). The men had been too 'frail' (gebrechlich); the women were mostly children.

On March 3, 1943, Maurer announced that transports of skilled Jewish workers were beginning to roll from Berlin. He reminded Höss that these workers had been employed in war industry; they were consequently employable in the camp. The I. G. Farben Company was to fill its needs from these transports. To make sure that the selections would be made more carefully this time, Maurer suggested that the trains be unloaded 'not in the usual place' (at the crematorium) but, more suitably (zweckmäßigerweise), near the I. G. Farben plant. Two days later, Obersturmführer¹⁶¹ Schwarz made his reply, adopting a gruff tone. A total of 1,750 Jews had arrived from Berlin; 632 were men, the rest women and children. The average age of men selected for work was between fifty and sixty. Of the 1,118 women and children, 918 had to be subjected to 'special treatment' (SB). 'If the transports from Berlin continue to have so many women and children as well as old Jews,' he wrote, 'I don't promise myself much in the matter of labor allocation.' The following four transports did not fare much better (2,398 killed, 1,689 saved for industry)." (pp. 983f.)

The source is the already-quoted Blumental collection *Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. I, pp. 108-110, 115-117 (FN 3-5, p. 984).

Hilberg interprets or rather misrepresents these documents relying on the theory of the claimed "code language," meaning that the expressions "*gesondert untergebracht*" – which does not mean "gassed" but "lodged separately" – "S.B." (*Sonderbehandlung*, special treatment) and "*sonderbehandelt*" ("specially treated") appearing in these documents are said to be implicit references to killing.

In reality, these documents should be placed within the framework of the policy of Jewish deportations to the East, with an interruption at Auschwitz to cull manpower, as discussed earlier. Pohl's report to Himmler dated September 16, 1942 shows unequivocally that Jews unfit for labor destined for the "migration to the East" did not stop at Auschwitz, but continued their journey East.

¹⁶¹ Heinrich Schwarz, head of Department IIIa (forced labor) of the Auschwitz Camp, was an SS *Hauptsturmführer*.

On this point, Hilberg has no grounds for objection: he simply limits himself to ignoring the fact that the center for manpower collection was Auschwitz.

In the light of this document, "special treatment" consisted of the fact that Jews unfit for labor were not held back to work at the camp, and that "separate lodgings" (*Sonderunterbringung*) consisted literally of the fact that the inmates who had just arrived were not to be admitted to the camp because they would shortly continue their journey had to be kept separated from the other inmates to prevent the latter's infestation by fleas or infection with contagious diseases. This is explicitly shown by Bischoff's letter to the WVHA dated June 4, 1943 relating to the design of the *Zentralsauna* (*Bauwerk* 32), the central disinfection, disinfestation and bathing facility of the Birkenau Camp, where we read:¹⁶²

"The large dressing and undressing rooms are absolutely necessary, since those coming in from an entire transport (approx. 2000), which mostly arrive at night, must be locked up in one room until the next morning. Having the arrivals wait in the fully occupied camp is out of the question due to the danger of transmission of lice."

For this reason, the practice of "separate lodgings" also applied to inmates who were to be released or transferred out of the camp, when they formed part of the category "preparation for transport," after having been disinfested (Mattoigno 2016b, pp. 117f.).

The British intercepted and deciphered a radio message sent on October 10, 1942 by Arthur Liebehenschel, then head of the SS-WVHA Office DI, to Hans Aumeier, at the time 1st Leader of the Auschwitz Protective-Custody Camp. Here is the text:¹⁶³

"Secret! Confidentially: SS Hauptsturmführer Aumeier. In the coming week, from Monday to Thursday, a French construction committee will inspect labor installations at Auschwitz. Inspecting the camp is not planned. Special camp installations (special accommodation) are not to be shown. If possible, no shootings of prisoners attempting to escape should be carried out on outside work sites of Auschwitz. Signed Liebehenschel."

It is nothing short of extraordinary from an orthodox point of view that a "French construction committee" could safely visit the "extermination camp" in October 1942. The fact is, however, that special camp installations for special accommodation existed. This is confirmed by other documents.

A letter by Karl Bischoff to the department for labor deployment at the Auschwitz headquarters dated January 7, 1943 speaks of "special measures (accommodating the scheduled transports of Jan. 10 to 31, 1943)," for which the transport of "construction materials" was needed "for setting up the stoves" (Bartosik *et al.*, p. 235).

¹⁶² RGVA, 502-1-336, pp. 106f. For details see again Mattoigno 2016, pp. 54-60.

¹⁶³ TNA, HW 16-21. German Police Decodes Nr 3 Traffic: 10.10.42. ZIP/GPDD 262b/25.10.42, n. 33/34.

With a teletype message of January 15, 1943 to the head of Office B/V of the SS WVHA, SS *Sturmabführer* Rudolf Scheide, Karl Bischoff requested the "immediate assignment of 6 dump trucks" for construction purposes "with regard to the instant operation ordered by the Reichsführer SS – accommodation of 47,000 Jews" (*ibid.*, p. 241).

This operation is explained in the radio message sent on December 16, 1942 by the head of the Gestapo Heinrich Müller to Himmler, according to which the deportation to Auschwitz of 45,000 Jews was planned between January 11 to 31, 1943, of which 30,000 came from the Białystok District, 10,000 from the Theresienstadt Ghetto, 3,000 from the occupied Dutch territories, and 2,000 from Berlin. The document specifies (PS-1472. IMT, Vol. 27, pp. 251-253, here p. 253):

"The number of 45,000 includes the relatives (underlined) unfit for labor (old Jews – and children). If a suitable criterion is applied during the inspection of the arriving Jews at Auschwitz, at least 10,000 to 15,000 workers (underlined) will result."

It was therefore expected that these transports would contain 10,000 to 15,000 Jews fit for labor, and 30,000 to 35,000 Jews unfit for labor. Despite this, the "accommodation of 47,000 Jews" had to be arranged in Auschwitz, a figure evidently revised upwards between December 16, 1942 and January 7, 1943. In practice, all deportees had to be accommodated at the camp, both those able and those unable to work, meaning they were not slated for "gassing".

According to the *Auschwitz Chronicle*, 51,417 deportees arrived in Auschwitz from January 11 to 31 1943, of whom merely 7,653 were registered and the remaining 43,764 were allegedly gassed, which is refuted by the aforementioned documents. (For details see Mattogno 2020a, Points 62-64, pp. 145-150.)

Another exemplary case of Hilberg's unjustified interpretations is his assertion that "Maurer suggested that the trains be unloaded 'not in the usual place' (at the crematorium)." Maurer's letter in question is dated March 3, 1943 (Blumental, p. 108), but the orthodox narrative has it that the first homicidal gassing-cum-cremation in a crematorium at Birkenau (Crematorium II) presumably occurred on the night of March 13-14, 1943 (Pressac 1993, p. 73f.). And this doesn't even consider the fact that, at the time, only the so-called old ramp existed, which was located outside the Birkenau Camp near the Auschwitz railway station, so that Hilberg's assertion is even more unjustified.

On p. 986, Hilberg writes:

"In Auschwitz the DAW received the patronizing attention of Höss. From the Bauleitung it acquired two workshops and orders for doors and windows to be fitted into the gas chambers."

The source is SS *Hauptsturmführer* Mey's report dated June 11, 1942 (NO-1216; FN 11f., *ibid.*). But this document contains no reference to ordering

"doors and windows to be fitted into the gas chambers." Doors and windows are mentioned only once, but in these terms:¹⁶⁴

"Negotiations between Dr. Hohberg and the purchasing director of IG Farbe-industrie AG Auschwitz, Dr. Heinz Savelberg, showed that the capacity of the German Equipment Works for the manufacture of the doors and windows for the new hydrogenation and buna works is much too limited"

These doors and windows were therefore intended for the chemical factories under construction at Monowitz.

Hilberg's comment reveals his deplorable lack of knowledge, because on June 4, 1942, the Birkenau crematoria did not yet exist, and for the claimed mass extermination, the so-called "Bunker 1" is said to have been in operation, hence fully equipped for months already, meaning it evidently needed neither doors nor windows at that point in time. Besides, it is claimed that both alleged "bunkers" didn't even have any windows.

A few lines further down, Hilberg asserts:

"A special enterprise was ordered by Himmler for Sobibor. This camp was set aside for the disassembly of captured ammunition in order to salvage the metals and explosives. The enterprise was not going to be incorporated into the WVHA industry network, inasmuch as it was designated to work for the SS-Führungshauptamt exclusively. In the end, the projected plant was dropped altogether." (p. 986)

He adduces as reference a letter from Himmler to Pohl dated July 5, 1943 (Document NO-482, FN 13, *ibid.*). On p. 1028 Hilberg returns to the document, in completely different terms, as an exemplification of the alleged "code language":

"For camps, there were a variety of headings. When Soviet prisoners of war were awaited in the Lublin camp and in newly established Birkenau at the end of 1941, the two sites were named Kriegsgefangenenlager (PW camps), but later both received the generic label Konzentrationslager (concentration camps), Birkenau as part of Auschwitz, and by November 1943, nominally independent, as KL Au II.2 Sobibor was appropriately called a Durchgangslager (transit camp).^[165] Since it was located near the Bug, on the border of the occupied eastern territories, the designation fitted the myth of the 'eastern migration.' When Himmler proposed one day that the camp be designated a Konzentrationslager, Pohl opposed the change." (Emphases added)

His sources also include Pohl's response to Himmler dated July 15, 1943 (FN 3, *ibid.*).

In reality, Himmler never proposed "that the camp be designated a *Konzentrationslager*"; rather, he ordered that it be "converted into a *Konzentrations-*

¹⁶⁴ NO-1216, Points 4 and 6 of the report on Auschwitz.

¹⁶⁵ This essential phrase does not appear in the Italian translation, but it may be found in the German translation published in 1999 (*Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden*. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, vol. 2, p. 1029).

slager" ("in ein Konzentrationslager umzuwandeln") – an important difference. The camp was to be the site of "a disassembly facility for captured ammunition" ("eine Entlaborierungsanstalt für Beutemunition").¹⁶⁶ Pohl responded to Himmler that there was no need to transform Sobibór into a concentration camp just to build the disassembly facility.¹⁶⁷ It was not a naming issue, but a bureaucratic one, as Hilberg himself explained:

"The enterprise was not going to be incorporated into the WVHA industry network, inasmuch as it was designated to work for the SS-Führungshauptamt exclusively." (p. 986)

Hence, this has nothing to do with the alleged "code language."

Let us now consider the term "*Durchgangslager*," transit camp. Himmler's letter of July 5, 1943 is marked "*Geheime Reichssache!*," Secret State Matter. Point 1 says:

"The Sobibór transit camp in the Lublin District is to be converted into a Konzentrationslager."

Pohl's reply bears the subject "*Durchgangslager Sobibór*," a term repeated a few lines down. How can one seriously believe that Himmler and Pohl would use alleged "code language" even in internal top-secret documents?

Hilberg's psychological explanation, the alleged "process of repression," which consisted of omitting the "mention of 'killings' or 'killing installations' even in the secret correspondence in which such operations had to be reported." (p. 1090; emphasis added), has the same *historical* value as all the other Freudian explanations: none. Hilberg also fails to explain why this alleged "process of repression" did *not* apply to the reports relating to the activities of the *Einsatzgruppen*, in which the "killings" are mentioned very explicitly.

As for the alleged "myth of 'eastern migration,'" fitting with the fact that the camp "was located near the Bug," I remind the reader of the report by the district chief of Puławy to the governor of the Lublin District dated May 13, 1942, cited earlier (Section 2.3.4.), according to which 16,822 Jews had been "expelled from the Puławy District beyond the Bug" between May 6 and 12, 1942.

In a long and pedantic description of the organization of the I.G.-Farbenindustrie trust, Hilberg writes:

"About 35,000 inmates passed through Buna[= the Monowitz Subcamp]. At least 25,000 died." (p. 996)

In his Footnote 44 on p. 996, he refers to a witness who mentioned the figure of 35,000 inmates, but the figure of 25,000 deaths is completely unfounded. From an arithmetic point of view, this could result if we consider the 10,000 inmates who, according to Höss and as quoted by Hilberg in the same footnote, constituted the average strength of the camp, as "survivors" (35,000 – 10,000 =

¹⁶⁶ Letter of Himmler to Pohl dated July 5, 1943. NO-482.

¹⁶⁷ Letter of Pohl to Himmler dated July 15, 1943. NO-482.

25,000), but this makes no sense, so that the origin of this figure remains inexplicable. At any rate, it is enormously exaggerated. Documents show instead that a total of 1,625 inmates died at the Monowitz Camp (Makowski, p. 137).

Hilberg continues, stating:

"The life expectancy of a Jewish inmate at I. G. Auschwitz was three or four months, while in the outlying coal mines it was about one month." (p. 996)

His first source is an affidavit by Dr. Berthold Epstein of March 3, 1947 (NI-5847, FN 45, *ibid.*). This witness stated (NI-5847, p. 1):

"The average working ability of an inmate worker working at I.G. Buna Auschwitz was 3-4 months,"

specifying that

"After about 3-4 months, the inmate was a 'Muselmann', meaning unable to work, and was transferred to Auschwitz. It was clear to everyone in the camp what danger this entailed: the gassing in one of the crematoria."

Hence, Epstein was referring to the ability to work, not to life expectancy, and the fate of prisoners who became unable to work was not taken for granted, because in Epstein's opinion, based not on first-hand experience but necessarily on rumors, the "danger" of "gassing" loomed.¹⁶⁸ The description of the Monowitz camp hospital by de Benedetti and Levi summarized earlier is sufficient refutation for Epstein's testimonial whims.

If this tale were to be taken seriously, it would follow that within one year the entire inmate population of the Monowitz Camp would have turned over three or four times, i.e. the number of dead would be three or four times the average occupancy. As I just pointed out, Hilberg mentions an average occupancy of 10,000 inmates in his Footnote 44, so in one year there would have been 30,000-40,000 new arrivals and as many deaths. In the same footnote, Hilberg states that the register of the Monowitz Hospital contains 15,684 admissions between June 7, 1943 and June 19, 1944 concerning 8,244 distinct individuals, of whom "some having been delivered to the hut more than once"; about 6,800 of them had been Jews, 632 of whom died in hospital (less than 10%) and "1,336 were sent to Birkenau (Auschwitz II) to be gassed". Therefore, those allegedly gassed within a year were less than 20%. However, that those transferred to Auschwitz and Birkenau were gassed there is an unfounded story.

3.9.5. Medical Experiments

The brief chapter on the "Medical Experiments" which Hilberg inserts into pages 1002-1013 generally does not have any direct connection with the "killing centers." In fact, medical experiments were also carried out in camps –

¹⁶⁸ I have discussed Epstein's black-propaganda activities in Mattogno 2020b, pp. 290-295.

such as Dachau, Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen – which he does not consider to have been “extermination centers” at all. But there is an aspect to the matter which requires discussion. Hilberg puts it this way:

“These were all physicians who made use of human guinea pigs. But some went one step further, carrying out experiments that were no longer characterized by any desire to help patients. These experiments had an altogether different direction, for they were identified with Nazi aims. In these activities one may glimpse an attempt to widen the destruction process.” (p. 1006)

This category basically included experiments in sterilization, performed by Drs. Carl Clauberg and Horst Schumann, which Hilberg describes in detail on more than four pages. At the end, he concludes:

“All these experiments, which consumed many hundreds of victims, led to nothing. Not one of the rivals succeeded.” (p. 1011)

Therefore, no mass-sterilization procedure was ever implemented.¹⁶⁹

No more than a few hundred inmates were ever subjected to all these other experiments carried out at Auschwitz. For example, 125 during pharmaceuticals experimentation, a few dozen during experiments involving toxic substances, 115 for the collection of skeletons, and 20 in research experiments concerning tuberculosis (Strzelecka, pp. 441, 444f.).

We may therefore hypothesize that no more than about 2,000 inmates were subjected to experimentation at Auschwitz. In the other camps, the order of magnitude was similar or even less. For example, at Dachau, 200 inmates (17 of whom died) were subjected to an initial series of experiments on malaria, and some 1,500 inmates were subjected to all types of experiments altogether. At Buchenwald, experiments involving typhus were performed on 450 inmates, of whom 158 died (Kogon 1946, pp. 136f.). The number of inmates subjected to experimentation was therefore on the order of 5,000 at most, the majority of whom survived.

In *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders*, Hilberg returns to the topic of sterilizations at Auschwitz (Hilberg 1992, p. 67):

“To this end, thousands of Jewish women and men in Auschwitz were sterilized in medical experiments designed to find an efficient method of performing the procedure quickly and without the knowledge of the victims.” (Emphases added)

He refers to the “report of Dr. Carl Clauberg (Auschwitz) to Himmler, June 7, 1942 [recte: 1943], Nuremberg trials document NO-212” (*ibid*, FN 8, p. 281).

In this letter, introduced into evidence at the NMT’s Medical Case (NMT, Vol. 1, pp. 730-732), Clauberg asserted that his method of sterilization was “almost ready,” although not yet in use. He says nothing about the number of women sterilized with other methods at Auschwitz; the only figure mentioned regards a question which Himmler is supposed to have asked him almost a year

¹⁶⁹ The Italian edition has a translation error here, stating “*diverse centinaia di migliaia di vittime*,” “several hundreds of thousands of victims,” Hilberg 1995, p. 1031.

before, "i. e., within what timespan it would be possible to sterilize 1,000 women this way," and Clauberg's answer (NO-212, pp. 1f.), but this has nothing to do with sterilizations already performed.

The most-surprising fact about this chapter is the fact that Hilberg never wondered why this powerful medical experimentation apparatus was never used for the purpose of exterminating the Jews. I have pointed out earlier that there are two conflicting versions of how the alleged instrument of extermination – gas chambers using hydrogen cyanide – came to be invented. To devise this instrument, Himmler is said to have addressed himself simultaneously to *Reichsarzt* Grawitz and to Eichmann, but in the end, as Höss recalls, they stumbled upon it almost by accident, because one day, in the fall of 1941, a few months after allegedly having received the order to exterminate the Jews from Himmler, Höss's deputy, SS *Hauptsturmführer* Karl Fritzsche used Zyklon B "on his initiative" to kill Soviet prisoners of war (Höss 1959, p. 162). However, this anecdote has no basis in historical fact (see Mattogno 2016c). But even if we leave that aside, how can one seriously believe that the whole apparatus of SS medical experimentation was not right away mobilized for the purpose of carrying out Hitler's alleged mass-extermination order?

It is in fact known that experiments were conducted using mustard gas in the camps of Sachsenhausen and Natzweiler-Struthof, and later phosgene, starting in September 1939, to find therapeutic remedies for these aggressive chemical agents (Mitscherlich/Mielke, pp. 215, 222).

Over the course of the First World War, aggressive chemical agents of all kinds were used by both sides. The aggressive power of the various substances was indicated by the mortality product or toxicity index which it bore on the so-called Haber Scale of Toxicity, and indicated "the milligrams of toxic substance per m³ to be breathed in one minute to obtain the death of the individual." The substances considered most toxic are listed in the table overleaf.¹⁷⁰ As is made clear by this table,

"the most dangerous of the war gases, according to Haber's Rule, is phosgene, followed immediately by diphosgene." (Izzo, pp. 45f.)

At that time, Germany was at the forefront of the chemical sector, and the above data could be found in any specialist text, such as Flury's and Zernik's 1931 *Schädliche Gase, Dämpfe, Nebel, Rauch- und Staubarten*, one of the best (for Italian works see Giua and Sartori). Another precious source of information was the journal *Gasschutz und Luftschutz*, the first issue of which appeared in 1931.

Hence, can anyone seriously believe that, within the framework of Himmler's implementation of the Führer's alleged mass-extermination order – after

¹⁷⁰ Halogens, derivatives of carbon oxide, hydrogen cyanide and its derivatives, formic acid derivatives, acetic acid derivatives, acetone derivatives, sulfuric acid ethers, nitromethane derivatives, aliphatic arsines, glycol derivatives, glycerol derivatives, toluene derivatives, aromatic arsines, heterocyclic compounds; see Izzo, table "Principali aggressivi chimici" (Principal aggressive chemicals), table outside of text.

Toxicity of Poison Gases Used in WWI			
COMPOUND	TOXICITY INDEX [†]		
Phosgene	450	highly	toxic
Diphosgene	500		
Mustard gas	1,500		
Ethyl-iodo-acetate	1,500		
Chloro-picric acid	2,000		
Chloro-ethylsulfate	2,000		
Hydrogen cyanide*	1,000-4,000		
Ethyl-bromo-acetate	3,000		
Perchloro-methylmercaptan	3,000		
Chloro-acetone	3,000		
Bromo-acetone	4,000		
Bromo-xylene	6,000		
Chlorine	7,500		
Carbon monoxide	70,000	slightly	toxic

[†] according to Haber's Rule; * depending on concentration

having received Dr. Grawitz's advice to use a "rapidly acting, highly volatile gas" (as claimed by Dr. Morgen) – no one ever conducted experiments using inmates to determine the effects of the most-appropriate of the above-mentioned gases in suitably constructed gas chambers?

But this never happened – not in order to find out which substance to choose for the killings, but not even with regard to the substance eventually chosen: the SS doctors never carried out any toxicological experiments using hydrogen cyanide (or any of the other above-mentioned substances), to verify experimentally Haber's Rule on human beings. In fact, nothing was ascertained in this regard in the NMT's Medical Case or in the IG-Farben trial either. So at the end of the war, after millions of people allegedly were gassed using Zyklon B, no more was known about the toxicological characteristics of hydrogen cyanide than during the pre-war period!

This also applies to cremation, by the way: at Auschwitz, not a single cremation experiment was ever carried out to improve the technology of civilian crematory furnaces, in which the Topf Company would have been very interested for obvious reasons.

Another closely related topic is that regarding the best "methods" of the alleged extermination: gas vans, stationary gas chambers using motor exhaust, or gas chambers based on Zyklon B. In practice, to carry out Hitler's order, not only was there never any preliminary experimentation by the SS doctors concerned, but every commandant of every single "killing center" is said to have done everything off his own bat. This is true of the alleged mass cremations of the victims' corpses as well. In fact, if we follow the orthodox narrative, Himmler is said to have ordered the cremation of the bodies after his second

visit to Auschwitz, on July 17 and 18, 1942 (Piper 1994, p. 163). As a result of this order, the open-air cremation at Auschwitz of the bodies began on September 21 (Czech 1990, p. 242). In the same vein, Himmler presumably ordered SS *Standartenführer* Blobel through Gestapo Head Heinrich Müller "to destroy the mass graves in the eastern occupied territories" (p. 1042). Hilberg forgets to mention that, according to his source – Blobel's affidavit of June 18, 1947 (NO-3947; FN 102, *ibid.*) – this order is said to have been given in "June 1942."

Notwithstanding this fact, the cremation of cadavers at Chelmnó is said to have begun in the spring of 1942 (see Section 3.9.7.), at Auschwitz on September 21, 1942, at Sobibór in the summer of 1942 (Arad 1987, p. 171), at Belżec in mid-December of 1942 (*ibid.*, p. 172), and at Treblinka in March 1943! (*Ibid.*, pp. 173f.). To hide this chronological chaos in any way he can, Hilberg asserts (p. 1043):

"By 1942-43 exhumations were in progress at all of the killing centers."

He is thus constrained to proclaim a sort of anarchy in the presumed machinery of extermination:

"The machine of destruction was an aggregate; no one agency was charged with the whole operation. Even though a particular office might have exercised a supervisory ("federführende") function in the implementation of a particular measure, no single organization directed or coordinated the entire process. The engine of destruction was a sprawling, diverse. And, above all, decentralized apparatus." (p. 52)

Nevertheless, as shown by the chapter titled "Confiscations" (pp. 1013-1027), and in particular by the table summarizing "The administration of the killing center loot" (p. 1026), the machinery of confiscation and the exploitation of Jewish property was not only extremely vast, but also centralized and well-organized. It existed in the WVHA and affected all the alleged "killing centers," including Chelmnó. This part of the story was therefore an anarchy, a well-disciplined and organized anarchy – meaning no anarchy at all.

3.9.6. "Concealment" and Propaganda

In the chapter "Concealment," Hilberg describes the procedure by means of which the procedure through which the SS is said to have maintained the "secrecy" of their crimes, although what they were allegedly trying to hide was obviously an open secret, because according to Hilberg himself, everybody knew everything. This procedure consisted, above all, in "verbal camouflage":

"A standard concealment measure was verbal camouflage. The most important and possibly the most misleading term used for the killing centers collectively was the 'East.' This phrase was employed again and again during the deportations." (p. 1028)

But as we have seen, these deportations were indeed directed precisely to the East! Hilberg continues (*ibid.*):

"In Auschwitz, the architect Ertl of the Zentralbauleitung referred to a project of constructing barracks that were to hold the belongings of gassed Jews as 'Effects Barracks for Special Treatment 3 Pieces' (Effektenbarracke für Sonderbehandlung 3 Stück). He called the underground gas chambers 'special cellars' (Sonderkeller) and the surface chambers 'bath houses for special actions' (Badeanstalten für Sonderaktionen)."

Expressions such as *Sonderbehandlung* (special treatment), *durchgeschleust* (passed through, misspelled by Hilberg as *durchgeschleusst*) and *gesondert untergebracht* (lodged separately) are also said to have formed part of this "code language" (pp. 1028f.). The sources are two documents of the Auschwitz Central Construction Office as stored in a Moscow archive (FN 4f., *ibid.*).

Hilberg's list of documents related to Auschwitz containing the German term "special" ("*sonder*") in one form or another could be extended to fill an entire book. Considering the importance of the issue, all of these documents deserve to be investigated in detail, indeed. This is exactly what I have done with my already-cited study *Special Treatment in Auschwitz* (Mattogno 2016). The first, Italian, edition of this study appeared already in 2000, from which Hilberg could have learned a lot, if only he had been able to read anything besides German and English. (The first German and English editions of this study appeared only in 2003 and 2004, respectively.) I will limit my excursion here to a few essential points and direct the reader interested in learning more to said study itself.

First of all, the term "special" was used in Auschwitz mainly for two quite different topics. One concerned the entire operation of pushing Jews out of Europe and confiscating their possessions. Since this operation was distinctly different than anything else the German camp system had been set up for (imprisonment of criminals, dissidents, resistance activists, PoWs, so-called "asocial elements" etc.), anything connected with the Jews was potentially called "special". This is true for the "Effects Barracks for Special Treatment 3 Pieces" quoted by Hilberg, which were meant to store property confiscated from Jews admitted into or passed through Auschwitz (see Mattogno 2016, pp. 36-39, 62-64), as well as for "special actions," which broadly referred to the deportation of Jews in general or to individual transports of Jews sent to and processed in Auschwitz in some way (reception, selection, registration, bathing/disinfection, lodging, transfer; *ibid.*, pp. 65-95).

The second topic where the term "special" was frequently used concerned an ambitious construction program labeled "Special Construction Measures" launched mainly on the initiative of Auschwitz garrison physician Dr. Eduard Wirths in late 1942 and early 1943 in order to improve the hygienic and sanitary conditions of the camp (*ibid.*, pp. 60-62, 64f.), and to vastly improve medical care for the inmates by creating a huge hospital camp in Birkenau's Con-

struction Sector III with all kinds of medical amenities (Mattogno 2016b, pp. 61-72).

Particularly revealing is a cost estimate for a massive expansion of the Birkenau Camp dated October 29, 1942, which specifically mentions in its headline that this camp was now dedicated to "carrying out the special treatment". However, the only item in the long list of construction projects that is meant to serve "for special treatment" is a large new disinfestation facility (*BW* 32) generally nicknamed "*Zentralsauna*." While the Birkenau crematoria are also on that list, they have no particular emphasis and are not assigned to carrying out any "special treatment" (Mattogno 2016, pp. 39-42).

Hence, if we were to follow Hilberg's logic of "code language," special treatment clearly was a camouflage word in those instances for keeping the Jews deported to Auschwitz clean and healthy.

As to the term "special cellars" used in a few Auschwitz camp documents, this simply referred to the basement rooms of Crematoria II and III used for the storage of corpses (*ibid.*, pp. 102-105).

Similarly innocuous were the "bath houses for special actions" mentioned by Hilberg. On August 19, 1942, the Topf Company's head engineer Kurt Prüfer had a meeting with SS *Untersturmführer* Fritz Ertl, at the time head of the Department of Above-Ground Construction of the Central Construction Office, regarding the "expansion of the cremation installations in the PoW camp." On August 21, Ertl wrote a file memo about that meeting where he mentioned those "bathing facilities for special operations." However, these facilities had nothing to do with any of the future crematoria said to have included homicidal gas chambers. Instead, that expression referred to a briefly envisioned hygienic-sanitary structure which was never built (*ibid.*, pp. 70-76).

Fact is that not a single document contained in the vast documentation about Auschwitz has a "*sonder*" term of any kind that even hints at a homicidal activity, let alone spells it out expressly; quite to the contrary: in most cases, the context proves that "*sonder*" meant innocuous or even favorable treatments.

The situation is a little more complex when we look at the use of terms such as "special treatment" outside the narrow confines of the Auschwitz Camp. In general, "*Sonderbehandlung*" was a bureaucratic term which, depending on the circumstances and context, could refer either to killing or to favorable treatment, as in Document PS-660, in which the "special treatment of non-Polish minorities" refers to exemption from deportation and the lifting of certain restrictions on their living conditions.¹⁷¹ Another, better-known case of "special treatment" is the one mentioned by Ernst Kaltenbrunner during the Nuremberg IMT, in which political VIPs were detained in two luxurious hotels with food rations nine times larger than those granted to the general German population,

¹⁷¹ "Die Frage der Behandlung der Bevölkerung der ehemaligen polnischen Gebiete nach rassenpolitischen Gesichtspunkten." November 25, 1939, PS-660, p. 25.

including champagne and other amenities (IMT, Vol. 11, pp. 338f.). "Special treatment" was also the preferential treatment of Germanizable Ukrainians, who were hired as household helpers in Germany (PS-025); the gentler handling of eastern populations compared to harsh regimens of military and police requirements (PS-1024); releases from imprisonment (PS-1193); the consideration given for supplying the Balts and White Russians with food (EC-126), as well as financial support by the Reich government for the Evangelical-Lutheran Church.¹⁷²

Concentration-camp regulations stipulated that "prisoners of honor" (*Ehrenhäftlinge*) had to be "treated in a special way" (*besonders behandelt*), that is, they enjoyed wide privileges compared to other inmates.¹⁷³

The term "passed through" (*durchgeschleust*) appears in the Korherr Report referring to the Jewish inmates who were made to pass through the camps of the General Government and the Warthegau (NO-5194, p. 9). This word can be considered a "cryptonym" only if it is assumed *a priori* that these Jews were not deported to the East, but instead sent to "killing centers."

Hilberg then goes on to discuss the second procedure, intended to maintain "secrecy":

"Next to verbal camouflage it was most important to close the mouths of the inner circle; hence all camp personnel, especially top personnel, were sworn to silence." (p. 1029)

He adds, however:

"Not all the participants could keep the burden of their knowledge to themselves." (*ibid.*)

He cites testimonies the reliability of which cannot be verified, such as the statement attributed to Frieda Jörg, or, if they can be verified, are found to be false, such as the various Gerstein statements, who "blew the whistle" with Göran von Otter (see Mattogno 2021, pp. 138-144; 1998, pp. 67f.). Hilberg also refers to documents which he misrepresents, such as the circular letter from SS *Sturmbannführer* Günther dated April 29, 1943, in which the "disturbing remarks" about the deportation of Jews merely referred to "the place and nature of their future utilization" or to "their intended quarters" at Auschwitz (pp. 1029f.).

Hilberg then writes (p. 1030):

"Closely related to the oath of silence was the control of visitors. Occasionally high officials of the Reich or of the party would arrive for 'inspections.' The concentration camp administration was especially touchy about these visits. On November 3, 1943, Glücks ordered that the guests were not to be shown the brothels and the crematoria; neither was there to be any talk about these installations. In case anyone did happen to notice the smoking chimneys, he was

¹⁷² Mallmann *et al.*, p. 89, which is *Ereignismeldung* No. 156 of January 16, 1942.

¹⁷³ GARF. NTN, 131, p. 183.

given the standard explanation that the crematorium was burning corpses that resulted from epidemics."

This order by Glücks was directed at *all* concentration camps (and not exclusively to the "killing centers"), and also mentioned the brothels: does that mean that these also were some sort of weapon of mass destruction of the Jews?

For this final anecdote to make sense, meaning to have been a camouflaging lie, it is necessary to assume that the crematoria at Birkenau exclusively cremated the bodies of gassing victims. No Holocaust historian of any color would maintain such an absurdity, all the less because documents exist which explicitly mention the conveyance to the crematoria of bodies of registered inmates who had died of natural causes (including typhus; see Mattogno 2004b, pp. 279-283).

In this specific case, Hilberg refers to Wilhelm Steffler's affidavit of January 28, 1948 (NI-13953). He points out that "Steffler was Ministerialrat in charge of raw materials of the Office of the Four-Year Plan. He visited Auschwitz with a party that included Krauch and Körner. Affidavit by Dr. Karl Rühmer of February 7, 1947. NO-1931" (FN 16, p. 1030).

In the more-important works of Holocaust literature, these two documents are cited only by Hilberg. Why he would quote Rühmer in this context is unclear, since he was not part of the group that visited Auschwitz. In this context, however, Hilberg omitted two even-more-important testimonies.

At the IG-Farben Trial, during the interrogation at the afternoon hearing of January 14, 1948, Carl Krauch, the main defendant and former chairman of the board of directors of the I.G. Farbenindustrie trust, reported that, once in the summer of 1943, he had visited the industrial plants near Monowitz and then the Auschwitz Camp. On the way to the camp, he took a wrong turn and found himself near a very tall chimney, which did not smoke. Walter Dürrfeld, a co-defendant of his, told him that it was probably the chimney of a crematorium, but when Krauch accurately described it, it was established that it was the chimney of a super-phosphate plant no longer in use. But then Krauch was asked, how did Dürrfeld explain the presence of a crematorium in Auschwitz? He replied:¹⁷⁴

"Dürrfeld said, 'You must take into account that this camp is constantly filled with 100 to 120 thousand human beings. A city of 100 to 120 thousand people has a crematory of the same size for people who died there; this is just the same as they have in any other city.' Besides that he told me that in the Auschwitz concentration camp very serious typhus epidemics had broken out, which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people who were then burned in this way."

During the afternoon hearing of April 19, 1948, Dürrfeld reported that he had participated in the aforementioned visit to Auschwitz in the summer of 1943

¹⁷⁴ United States Military Tribunals Nürnberg. Case No. 6, Tribunal VI, U.S. vs Carl Krauch *et al.* Vol. 16, Transcripts (English), pp. 5242, 5246f.

together with Krauch, which, however, did not include Birkenau ("I am quite certain that I was never in Birkenau").

In the summer of 1944, while passing north of the Auschwitz Camp, towards Neuberun and Kattowitz, he noticed a peculiar smell. His chauffeur told him that it came from bodies being burned. Dürrfeld then consulted the commander of the Monowitz Camp, SS *Hauptsturmführer* Heinrich Schwarz, who "admitted frankly that the odor came from cremating of bodies. He explained this with the high mortality rate in the camp resulting from the typhus epidemics which had actually never come to an end and other epidemics which had come in from the east."¹⁷⁵

It is therefore legitimate to doubt whether the statements that Hilberg justifies with reference to Steffler are really attributable to him, but even if that were the case, he would still have abusively generalized a single testimony contradicted by two others.

Hilberg then relates an anecdote by a passer-by about the Belzec Camp which is said to date back to August 31, 1942. At Rawa Ruska (a town less than 30 km from Belzec), a non-commissioned officer asked a policeman where a convoy of Jews was headed: "To Belzec. And then? Poison (*Gift*)" (p. 1031). In the source quoted by Hilberg we read (Rothfels 1959, p. 334):

"I asked: 'How far will they still go?' He then: 'To Belcec.' 'And then?' 'Poison.' I asked: 'Gas?' He shrugged. Then he also said: 'In the beginning, I think they always shot them.'"

The follow-up to this story takes place on the train from Rawa-Ruska to Chełm. Hilberg summarizes it as follows (*ibid.*):

"The woman was going to point out Belzec on the way. 'Now it comes [Jetzt kommt es schon].' A strong sweetish smell greeted them. 'They are stinking already [Die stinken ja schon],' said the woman. 'Oh nonsense, that is the gas [Ach Quatsch, das ist ja das Gas]' her husband explained."

In his source, we actually read (Rothfels 1959, p. 334):

"When the woman called out 'now it's coming', all you could see was a high hedge of pine trees. A strong, sweet smell was clearly noticeable. 'They are stinking already,' said the woman. 'Oh nonsense, that's the gas,' laughed the railway policeman. In the meantime – we had driven about 200 meters – the sweet smell had turned into a pungent smell of burning. 'This is from the crematorium,' said the policeman."

But, as Hilberg well knew, there was never a crematorium at Belzec and – according to Holocaust historiography – the burning of bodies only began in December 1942. Furthermore, the gas allegedly used – engine exhaust – did not smell sweet and couldn't have been smelled at a distance anyway, and if the smell had emanated from thousands of rotting corpses, the intense, disgusting smell of rotting flesh would never have been mistaken as "sweet."

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, pp. 11777f., 11780, 11782f.

The same source also reports this other little fairy tale on the presumed extermination technique employed at Bełżec, which Hilberg ignored (*ibid.*, p. 335):

"When asked how the Jews were being killed, the policeman replied: 'They are told that they have to be deloused, and then they have to take off their clothes, and then they come into a room where a heat wave is first let in, and there is already a small dose of the gas in it. That is enough for anesthesia. The rest follows then afterwards. And then they are burned straight away.'"

During the war, rumors like this circulated everywhere. At Bełżec even more fantastic extermination methods were bandied about: electrical shocks in many variants (floors consisting of an electrified metal plate; exposed electrical wires coming out of the floor and walls; an electrified basin full of water equipped with an elevator which lifted the bodies and carried them to the "crematorium"; electrical furnaces; underground rooms – accessed by trains through a tunnel – supplied with flooring that functioned as an enormous freight elevator lowering the victims into an underlying electrocution tank; a cremation plate using high-voltage current for cremation; depletion of oxygen by means of a vacuum pump; trains of death with floors sprinkled with quicklime; not to mention the "human-soap factory," etc.; see Mattogno 2016g, pp. 9-34).

Hilberg passes over these testimonies in complete silence, which contradicts his theory of gassings using the exhaust gas from a Diesel motor; he conceals even the fact that the electrocution version was officially sanctioned at the Nuremberg IMT during the hearing of February 19, 1946 (IMT, Vol. 7, pp. 576f.; cf. Mattogno 2016g, pp. 35f.). He even seeks to shore up his theory by citing an irrelevant post-war testimony in his chapter on the deportations:

"Sometimes the information spilling out of the camps was quite specific. In the Lublin District the council chairman of the Zamosc Ghetto, Mieczyslaw Garfinkel, was a recipient of such news. During the early spring of 1942 he heard that the Jews of Lublin were being transported in crowded trains to Belzec and that the empty cars were being returned after each trip for more victims. [...] After a few more days, two or three Jewish strangers who had escaped from Belzec told him about gassings in barracks. [...] The next day, the thirteen-year-old son of one of the council functionaries (Wolsztajn) came back from the camp. The boy had seen the naked people and had heard an SS man make a speech to them. Hiding, still clothed, in a ditch, the young Wolsztajn had crawled out under the barbed wire with the secret of Belzec." (p. 514)

This testimony is in fact so irrelevant that one of the greatest orthodox experts on Bełżec, Israeli scholar Yitzhak Arad, never even mentions Garfinkel at all. Yet still, Hilberg refers to Garfinkel's oral testimony of October 5, 1945, which is included in the trial documentation of the Munich Bełżec Trial (FN 46, *ibid.*).

The witness stated that he had heard alarming news about Bełżec "in the middle of March 1942"; since the camp was opened only on March 17, it is

clear that this dating appeared excessively early even to Hilberg, who changed the dating to a more general "during early spring 1942".

Garfinkel further stated that, "towards the end of March," "two or three" Jews unknown to him showed up telling him that they had fled from the camp and that the Jews there "were poisoned with gas in the aforementioned shacks," with reference to "several wooden shacks" located there.

As for Wolsztajn's son, Garfinkel reports that he came to him on Monday April 13, 1942 "very early" and told him that on Sunday, evidently the day before, he had been deported to Bełżec; there he managed to hide in a "cesspool," where he remained until evening. He saw that people were pushed "into the barracks," from which no one came out. After some time, naked corpses were pulled out from the other side of "the barracks" and loaded onto carts. During the night, he crawled "under the barbed wire" and, with the help of Gypsies, reached Zamość.¹⁷⁶

According to all the maps drawn by witnesses after the war, there was no cesspool anywhere in the Bełżec Camp. Any such cesspool had to be in the vicinity of the latrines, but, if we are to believe the camp map of May 1942 as published by the "Aktion Reinhard Camps" website,¹⁷⁷ the only latrine of the camp was in the sector reserved for Jewish service personnel, far away from the alleged gassing barracks. On the other hand, if this cesspool was used for the excrement of hundreds of people working at that camp, such a pool must have been several meters deep, and it is not explained how the boy could see what was happening around him while hiding therein. It is not even clear whether the alleged gassing took place in one or more barracks, because the text uses both the plural and the singular. According to Garfinkel's narrative, the camp was "a heavily guarded area surrounded by several rows of barbed wire." Despite this, escapes were evidently the order of the day. Finally, Zamość is located 42 km north of Bełżec (by road). The boy therefore fled from Bełżec during the night, and the next morning, "very early", he presented himself in Zamość, not to his father, who had not been deported, but to Garfinkel!

This is another example of Hilberg's total lack of interest in verifying the reliability of the testimonies he cited.

On p. 1203, Hilberg writes that the *New York Times* of November 26, 1942 had reported the news that "in Belzec they [the Jews] were being subjected to death by electric current," but only to conclude that, in the press, "accurate statements" regarding the alleged extermination had gotten "mixed with the rumors of electrocutions and soap making." But if it had been so easy to obtain these "accurate statements" since mid-March 1942, why did the most-unlikely stories circulate during the war and afterwards as summarized above? And why was the electrocution story accepted by the Soviets during the Nuremberg IMT

¹⁷⁶ ZStL, 208AR-Z 252/59, Vol. VI, pp. 1100-1103.

¹⁷⁷ Online at <http://www.deathcamps.org/belzec/pic/bmap18.jpg>.

as an "accurate statement"? According to his custom, Hilberg does not even touch the problem.

Hilberg's petty anecdotes do not end here. He goes on to write:

"One railroad man, observing the fences and guard posts of Auschwitz I on one side of the tracks and of Auschwitz II on the other, concluded that he was in the midst of it all (mitten drin)" (p. 1031)

It is not easy to understand why he attributes to this phrase, uttered by a certain Willy Hilse on December 9, 1964 (FN 21, *ibid.*), an importance such as to require even the quotation of the German text. In another book, Hilberg elaborated a little more on this testimony (Hilberg 1981, p. 96):

"A railroad worker (Hilse), who had been transferred to this station [Auschwitz], realized that his post was 'in the middle', that is, in the center of the camp. Fences and watchtowers were erected on both sides of the tracks. The chimneys could be seen from the moving train; at night they could be seen from a distance of about twenty kilometers. Barthelmäß, another railroad worker, testified that this was an indication of the 'public' burning of the corpses."

From the context it is clear that the chimneys were belching massive flames, and precisely for this reason they could be seen at night from almost 20 kilometers away, so Hilberg indirectly endorses this fairy tale. But he also does it explicitly when writing of "flames belching from the chimneys" with reference to Birkenau (p. 1038).

Soon afterwards, Hilberg regales us with this anecdote (p. 1031; also in Hilberg 1981, p. 96):

"Another railroad functionary noticed that his apartment was filled with a sweetish odor, and the windows were covered with a bluish film."

In this case as well (this is another testimony from 1964 of the just-mentioned Barthelmäß), it is impossible to understand how this is related to the alleged exterminations. The story of the "sweetish odor" emanating from the cremations, like the "crystals" of Zyklon B, was very widespread and is even mentioned in Filip Müller's book, where he speaks of a "sweetish smell."¹⁷⁸

On p. 1063, Hilberg presents another anecdote on Auschwitz, based on the inevitable "oral testimony," this time from 1969 (FN 11, *ibid.*):

"A railroad man in Krakow, responsible for scheduling death trains, recalls that he was told by his immediate superior to run the transports whenever they were requested by the SS."

This, too, is arrant nonsense. Auschwitz was the crossroads of three main railway lines managed by the *Generaldirektion der Ostbahn in Krakau* (General Eastern Railways Management in Krakow): Line No. 149 (Oderberg-Dzieditz-Auschwitz-Trzebinia-Krakow and back, in which express trains to and from Vienna and Warsaw ran, some of which also stopped at Auschwitz); Line No. 146d (Kattowitz-Auschwitz and back) and Line No. 532e (Krakow-Auschwitz

¹⁷⁸ Müller 1979a, p. 214; the English translation has here only "sickly smell" 1979b, p. 134.

and back; Generaldirektion..., p. 8). Each of these lines had a specific timetable for rail traffic,¹⁷⁹ and they were obviously drawn up in coordination with the traffic of the other lines. If the claim of Hilberg's witness were true, it inevitably would have thrown the entire rail system gravitating around Auschwitz into utter chaos.

Hilberg closes his "Concealment" chapter by exposing the false rumors of soap made of human fat (pp. 1032f.), almost as if to suggest that all the testimonies cited by him with regard to the "killing centers" are equally unreliable; as if he were saying that these are all baseless rumors which culminated in the false rumor of human soap – another Freudian slip, no doubt.

3.9.7. The "Extermination Operations"

In the chapter titled "The 'Conveyor Belt,'" Hilberg uncritically reports other anecdotal extracts. Already the title itself is misleading, because he justified it in this way:

"Although there were breakdowns and mishaps in this system, it was perfected to a degree that justified its characterization by an SS doctor as a conveyor belt (am laufenden Band)" (p. 1034)

By this expression, he implies that the alleged extermination process was organized "with a series of precise orders", starting with the "notification of the camp that a transport was arriving." The source cited by Hilberg is an affidavit by Friedrich Entress of April 14, 1947, NO-2363 (FN 31, *ibid.*). But the witness was referring solely to the crematoria at Birkenau:

"Next to the gas chambers there were the cremation furnaces, so that the crematoria could carry out the extermination of the inmates non-stop."

This German expression used – "*am laufenden Band*" – literally means "on a conveyor belt," meaning non-stop, without interruption, continuously and applied only to the final step of the claimed extermination process and only to Birkenau. This testimony, therefore, does not at all justify Hilberg's general "conveyor-belt" argument.

Pages 1034-1938 contain insignificant anecdotes taken from testimonies and claims based on them, including this one on page 1038:

"At Birkenau, illusion was the rule. It was not always simple or possible, inasmuch as at least some of the deportees had observed the sign Auschwitz as the train passed through the railway yards, or had seen flames belching from the chimneys, or had smelled the strange, sickening odor of crematoria."

The source for the first assertion, the one relating to the railway "sign Auschwitz", is: "Elie Wiesel, *Night* (New York, 1969), p. 36" (FN 73, *ibid.*). The sense is that the inmates already knew that Auschwitz was a "killing center,"

¹⁷⁹ Generaldirektion..., pp. 68, 54 and 104, with the related train timetables; reproduced in Mattogno 2019, Docs 50a, 50b, 50c, pp. 654-656.

therefore, when they saw the sign, they could no longer be fooled. However, this is explicitly refuted by Wiesel's account (2006, p. 27):

"But we were pulling into a station. Someone near a window read to us: 'Auschwitz.' Nobody had ever heard that name."

Primo Levi, whom Hilberg cites on page 1040 (FN 83), was similarly ignorant on his arrival (Levi, p. 17):

"We learned our destination with relief. Auschwitz: a name without significance, then and for us; but it should correspond to some place on this earth."

Hilberg moreover forgets that a few pages earlier he had cited the testimony of a deportee who commented on the Auschwitz sign as well as on "the shouts and whistles of command" that he heard: "We did not know their meaning" (p. 1034).

The absurd report of the flaming chimneys (see Mattogno 2004c; Mattogno/Deana, Vol. 1, pp. 375-379) was taken from Olga Lengyel's fairy-tale book *Five Chimneys* (FN 74, p. 1038), in which the author compiles every single one of the most nonsensical propaganda yarns circulating immediately after the war, among them that of "a red brick building," where "[g]reat flames belched from the chimney" (Lengyel, pp. 25f.). She also reports that a French doctor from the *Sonderkommando*, Dr. Pasche, had supplied her with a number of victims gassed between May and July 16, 1944: 1,314,000 (*ibid.*, p. 66) – in less than three months, more than what Hilberg attributed to the entire existence of the camp: 1,000,000! (p. 1320)

And here is her description of the crematoria of Birkenau, obtained by herself, we must presume, always from first-hand observation (Lengyel, p. 65.):

"Of the four crematory units at Birkenau, two were huge and consumed enormous numbers of bodies. The other two were smaller. Each unit consisted of an oven, a vast hall, and' a gas chamber.

Above each rose a high chimney, which was usually fed by nine fires. The four ovens at Birkenau were heated by a total of thirty fires. Each oven had large openings. That is, there were 120 openings, into each of which three corpses could be placed at one time. That meant they could dispose of 360 corpses per operation. That was only the beginning of the Nazi 'Production Schedule.'

Three hundred and sixty corpses every half hour, which was all the time it took to reduce human flesh to ashes, made 720 per hour, or 17,280 corpses per twenty-four hour shift. And the ovens, with murderous efficiency, functioned day and night.

However, one must also reckon the death pits, which could destroy another 8,000 cadavers a day. In round numbers, about 24,000 corpses were handled each day. An admirable production record—one that speaks well for German industry."

The cremation capacity of 17,280 bodies in 24 hours is pure fantasy, while the description of the furnaces' structure was plagiarized from the well-known Vrba-Wetzler Report, whose data are no less distorted with the claim that there

were nine four-muffle furnaces arranged in a semi-circle around the chimney in each of Crematoria II and III at Birkenau, while in reality there were five three-muffle furnaces arranged in a straight line along the longitudinal axis of the furnace room. Lengyel misnamed the nine furnaces of the Vrba-Wetzler Report as nine "fires." According to her, all four crematoria had a total of 30 of these "fires", with 120 "openings" (=muffles) altogether, hence four muffles per furnace, just as Wetzler and Vrba had claimed erroneously, although the total number of 120 muffles is Lengyel's creation (see Mattogno 2021a, pp. 385-387).

It is truly noteworthy that Hilberg's fame as a scholar rests on him relying on such spurious sources.

Hilberg goes on to recount the legendary rebellion of a "transport that had come in from Belsen" (p. 1039), which is linked to the edifying fable of the Jewish woman who disarmed *and shot* SS man Schillinger, killing him in the process. The sources are Höss and Müller (FN 78, p. 1039). I have discussed this tall tale elsewhere in detail (Mattogno 2020, pp. 312-316), which I summarize here. Höss reported that various transports from Belsen reached Auschwitz requiring particular precautions, because the deportees could have been informed of the fate awaiting them. Hilberg summarized Höss's narrative of the event, although according to Höss there was one single SS victim, who was *stabbed to death* (NO-1210). Höss does not mention any SS victim wounded by a firearm, nor does he mention the name Schillinger. In reality, the *Auschwitz Chronicle* records only one transport from the Bergen-Belsen Camp, which allegedly arrived at Auschwitz on October 23 1943, and here Danuta Czech duly inserts the above-mentioned little story (Czech 1961, pp. 72f.; 1990, p. 513). I say "allegedly" because no existing document attests to the historic reality of this transport. Furthermore, the death of SS *Unterscharführer* Josef Schillinger is not mentioned in any of the later garrison orders, which also reported on SS deaths at the camp, as in the case of the three victims of the presumed "*Sonderkommando*" revolt of October 1944, SS *Unterscharführer* Rudolf Erler, Willi Freese and Josef Purke.¹⁸⁰

Müller does nothing but copy and imaginatively expand Höss's account and the entry it created in the first German edition of the *Chronicle* (Müller 1979b, 81-89).

Hilberg continues with more anecdotes. The first involves Primo Levi:

"A young intellectual from Italy, who was in an Auschwitz hospital because of a swollen foot, was told by a gentile Polish inmate: 'Du Jude, kaputt. Du schnell Krematorium fertig' [*You Jew, finished. You soon ready for crematorium*]" (p. 1040)

This refers to Primo Levi, although he was in the Monowitz inmate hospital (*Krankenbau*), not Auschwitz (Levi, p. 59). On the next page, Levi describes life at the hospital as follows (*ibid.*, pp. 60f.):

¹⁸⁰ Frei *et al.*, p. 499. *Standortbefehl* No. 26/44 of October 12, 1944.

"Life at the K-Be is a life of limbo. Material hardships are relatively few, apart from hunger and the suffering inherent to the disease. It is not cold, you do not work, and, unless you commit some serious fault, you are not beaten. The alarm clock is set to four, even for the sick; you have to make your bed and wash yourself, but there is no rush or strictness. At half past five they distribute the bread, and you can cut it comfortably into thin slices, and eat lying down calmly; then you can go back to sleep, until the distribution of the broth at noon. Until about 4pm is Mittagsruhe, afternoon rest; at this time, there is often the medical examination and administration of medicine; you have to get off the bunks, take off your shirt and queue in front of the doctor. Even the evening ration is distributed in the beds; after which, at 9:00 pm, all the lights go out, except the veiled bulb of the night guard, and it is silent."

Primo Levi spent three weeks at the inmates' hospital, from March 30 until April 20, 1944.¹⁸¹ Sounds truly like an effort at exterminating the Jews, doesn't it?

On that same page, a few lines down, Hilberg wastes another few lines on one of his anecdotes:

"A nineteen-year-old girl asked the Auschwitz women's camp commander, Hössler, to excuse her. He replied, 'You have lived long enough. Come, my child, come.'" (p. 1040)

The source is Helene Klein's testimony at the Belsen Trial (FN 85, *ibid.*). The witness recounted that, over the course of a selection which took place in January 1944, she "was chosen for the gas chamber," but before SS *Obersturmführer* Franz Hössler had taken her registration number, she tried hiding from him. A little later, she approached him and begged him to spare her; the latter, who evidently hadn't noticed anything, replied as reported by Hilberg (Phillips, p. 128). This fairy tale is so implausible that it was justly considered "a pure invention" by the defense attorney, the British Major Andrew S. Munro (*ibid.*, p. 129).

On p. 1048, Hilberg supplies another striking example of his surprising credulity:

"Another party had to clean out eighteen-inch deposits of fat in the chimneys."

He has taken this absurdity from the story of a certain Irene Schwarz, "a survivor" (FN 19, *ibid.*). In reality, in a cremation furnace, the adipose tissue of corpses is the combustible substance which burns first and best, without leaving any solid deposit, but merely combustion gases (mainly carbon dioxide and water).

The account of the presumed extermination procedure at Auschwitz, which Hilberg discusses on pages 1041f. is a perfect example of his operational method, which consists of extrapolating from cherry-picked phrases of otherwise contradictory and at-times-absurd testimonies in order to create an appar-

¹⁸¹ APMO, D-AuIII-5/1, register of the *Häftlingskrankenbau* of Auschwitz III-Monowitz, p. 360, serial number 21669.

ently coherent, yet fictitious overall picture, seemingly supported by many testimonies:

"When the Auschwitz victims filed into the gas chamber, they discovered that the imitation showers did not work.⁹¹ Outside, a central switch was pulled to turn off the lights,⁹² and a Red Cross car drove up with the Zyklon.⁹³ An SS man, wearing a gas mask fitted with a special filter, lifted the glass shutter over the lattice and emptied one can after another into the gas chamber. Although the lethal dose was one milligram per kilogram of body weight and the effect was supposed to be rapid, dampness could retard the speed with which the gas was spreading.⁹⁴ Untersturmführer Grabner, political officer of the camp, stood ready with stopwatch in hand.⁹⁵" (p. 1041)

This is followed by a long description of what allegedly transpired inside the gas chamber, which I shall examine in part below.

In these few lines, Hilberg relies on five eyewitnesses and one judge: Judge Jan Sehn, FN 91; Miklós Nyiszli, FN 92; Charles S. Bendel, FN 93; Rudolf Höss and Filip Müller, FN 94; and Perry [recte: Pery] S. Broad, FN 95. In addition, these extrapolated claims at times refer to a context other than that implied by Hilberg. For instance, Sehn did not say that "they discovered that the imitation showers did not work," but simply asserted, "from which water never poured" (Sehn 1946b, p. 85). The assertion that "Grabner [...] stood ready with stopwatch in hand" is quite misleading, because Broad was referring to the *only* presumed homicidal gassing which he claims to have observed, from a distance, in July 1942 at Crematorium I of the Auschwitz Main Camp, which he described in an essay dated July 13, 1945, a fragment of which he quoted in his affidavit of December 14, 1945, which in turn was cited by Hilberg. This fragment reads: "after 2 more minutes, Grabner lowers his watch" (NI-11397, p. 2). From this simple phrase, Hilberg deduces that Grabner normally timed the duration of the alleged gassings with a stopwatch *in the crematoria at Birkenau*. And where did Hilberg read about the "glass shutter over the lattice"? This is a real mystery. None of the two witnesses cited by him ever mention this. The "lethal dose" for hydrogen cyanide "one milligram per kilogram of body weight" is taken from Document NI-9912 (his FN 102, p. 951); but as Jan Sehn remarked (Sehn 1946b, p. 86):

*"Hydrogen cyanide (HCN or HCN) is extremely poisonous. A man is poisoned by inhaling air containing no more than 0.12 mg of it per litre (i.e. · 0012 per cent)."*¹⁸²

Hilberg does not even wonder about the reasons for such different data. The lethal dose of 1 mg/kg refers to poisoning *by ingestion*, whereas we are talking about *gassings* at Auschwitz, which is a different matter requiring different units.

Equally misleading is the assertion that "dampness could retard the speed with which the gas was spreading." Actually, dampness could reduce the speed

¹⁸² Note: A liter of air is 1200 mg; 0.12 mg is 0.01%, not 0.0012%

with which the gas was *evaporating* from the carrier material (gypsum), if moisture condensed on it, a scenario quite likely for the damp, unheated underground morgues of the Crematoria II and III during any weather (see Rudolf 2020, pp. 237-239). But once the hydrogen cyanide had evaporated, moisture in the air would not stop the gas from spreading. In his affidavit of May 20, 1946, Rudolf Höss asserted that, in case of cold and wet weather, it was necessary to add two or three additional cans of Zyklon B for the alleged gas-sings (NI-034). Müller said the following about this (Müller 1979b, p. 116):

"It was a fact established by experience that whenever Zyclon B crystals came into contact with water or were exposed to humidity the gas was prevented from taking full effect."

Hence, Hilberg's witnesses did not mention the "the speed with which the gas was spreading."

The speciousness of Hilberg's method of operation is particularly obvious in these two phrases:

"Outside, a central switch was pulled to turn off the lights [witness Nyiszli], and a Red Cross car drove up with the Zyklon [witness Bendel]."

But Miklos Nyiszli's testimony contains both claims (NI-11710, pp. 3f.):

"According to my personal observations [...] I know that the doors were closed and the light was extinguished centrally, as soon as the mass of people was in the gas chambers. At this time a blackpainted red-cross car arrived. An SS officer and an SDG alighted from the car. They held 4 green enameled cans in their hands"

What need was there to take the second statement from Bendel's testimony? To impress the reader while at the same time hiding that the narratives told by Nyiszli and Bendel are both at the same time physically impossible, absurd and mutually exclusive? (See Mattogno 2020b for details, esp. pp. 304-333).

Hilberg continues his account of the extermination procedure at Auschwitz as follows (pp. 1041f.):

"As the first pellets sublimated on the floor of the chamber, the victims began to scream. To escape from the rising gas, the stronger knocked down the weaker, stepping on prostrate victims in order to prolong their own lives by reaching gas-free layers of air. The agony lasted for about two minutes, and as the shrieking subsided, the dying people slumped over. Within fifteen minutes (sometimes five), everyone in the gas chamber was dead."

The gas was now allowed to escape, and after about half an hour, the door was opened. The bodies were found in tower-like heaps, some in sitting or half-sitting positions, children and older people at the bottom. Where the gas had been introduced, there was an empty area from which the victims had backed away, and pressed against the door were the bodies of men who in terror had tried to break out. The corpses were pink in color, with green spots. Some had foam on the lips, others bled through the nose. Excrement and urine covered some of the bodies, and in some pregnant women the birth process had started. The

Jewish work parties (Sonderkommandos), wearing gas masks, dragged out the bodies near the door to clear a path and hosed down the dead, at the same time soaking the pockets of poison gas remaining between the bodies. Then the Sonderkommandos had to pry the corpses apart."

Hilberg refers to Müller book, to Nyiszli's affidavit dated October 8, 1947 (NI-11710), to Broad's affidavit dated December 14, 1945 (NI-11397), to Höss affidavit dated April 5, 1946 (PS-3868) and to Jan Sehn's already-mentioned book (FN 96, p. 1042). The principal structure of the tale is taken from Nyiszli's affidavit and from Müller's book, though. First Nyiszli (NI-11710, p. 4):

"Since the gas granules fell on the floor, the gas developed first in the lower layers of air and then gradually rose higher. This is how I explain that after the termination of the gassing the corpses were not scattered out in the room but were lying in tower-shaped piles. The stronger ones probably threw the weaker ones down, climbed on those lying below in order to prolong their life by reaching [air] layers still free of gas. This way women, children, and the elderly usually ended up lying at the bottom."

The year before, Nyiszli had published a book with his Auschwitz memoirs (Nyiszli 1946), which were published in English translation in 1961, both of which were inexplicably ignored by Hilberg. In this book, Nyiszli had written that Zyklon B was "chlorine in granular form" ("*Cyclon, vagy Chlór szemcsés formája*"; 1946, p. 35). Because chlorine is 2.49 times heavier than air, he invented the story that the gas filled the alleged gas chambers from the bottom up, as water would (*ibid.*, p. 36; Mattogno 2020b, p. 41):

"The bodies do not lie all over the length and breadth of the room but rather in a single, story-high heap. The explanation for this is that the fallen gas granules first permeate the air layer above the concrete floor with their deadly vapors and only gradually saturate the higher layers of air in the room. This forces the unfortunate victims to trample each other, to climb over one another. In the higher layers the gas thus reaches them later."

But, as noted by Georges Wellers:

"A second notable property of this acid is its density in its gaseous state: 0.95 compared to air. In other words, hydrocyanic acid vapors are lighter than air and thus rise in the atmosphere." (Wellers 1993, p. 207)

Hence, if anything, precisely the opposite scenario of what Nyiszli claimed would unfold. But since the difference in density is marginal, hydrogen cyanide actually fills any space evenly. The scenario described by Nyiszli is therefore completely invented.

As I have documented elsewhere (Mattogno 1986; 2021b, pp. 56-77), Müller impudently plagiarized Nyiszli's book by way of the first German translation published by the Munich *Quick* magazine in 1961 under the title "*Auschwitz. Tagebuch eines Lagerarztes*" ("Auschwitz: Diary of a Camp Doctor"),

lifting the fictitious gassing scene almost down to the letter (Müller 1979a, pp. 185f.; 1979b, pp. 116-118).

Hilberg also took his description of the gassing victims from Müller, but Müller, the "witness," in turn plagiarized it from the so-called Gerstein Report (Mattogno 2021b, 65-67). Layers of plagiarism!

Hilberg therefore describes a purely imaginary scene, even adding his own invented details to it when stating that the gassing victims "were pink in color, with green spots," while his source merely asserts that "[m]any had turned blue" (Müller 1979b, p. 117). In this context, the color pink is mentioned only by Nyiszli, but not in reference to the gassing victims, but rather to Zyklon B: "Zyklon-B in granular form with pink-lilac color" (NI-11710, p. 4).

No-less-imaginative, Müller speaks of "blue-violet Zyklon-B crystals"¹⁸³ During the pre-war years, Zyklon B's inert carrier material consisted of diatomaceous earth (*Diagrieß*), "a reddish-brown granular mass," which was gradually replaced during the 1930s by "small bluish cubes (Erco)" made of gypsum (NI-9912). Hilberg repeats the story of the "crystals" like a parrot, without ever wondering what Zyklon B was really made of.

He adds another feature he made up when he claims that, with jets of water, they eliminated the "*soaking the pockets of poison gas* remaining between the bodies"; his source, by contrast, says (Müller 1979b, p. 117):

"When some room had been made behind the door, the corpses were hosed down. This served to neutralize any gas crystals still lying about, but mainly it was intended to clean the dead bodies."

As for Müller, in another study I examined his various declarations in appropriate detail, showing that, in his testimony during the Polish show trial against the former staff of the Auschwitz Camp (on December 11, 1947),¹⁸⁴ he did not mention at all his alleged activities as a member of the so-called "Sonderkommando" at the Birkenau crematoria. In his 1946 declaration published by Kraus and Schön/Kulka (1946; 1957; 1966), Müller mentioned it, but his narration, which barely covers half of his text, contains only a series of imaginative anecdotes, such as, for example, cutting the flesh off inmates who had been shot to death in order to cultivate bacteria, or systematically bleeding to death young women to gain their blood for German military hospitals, or SS *Haupt-scharführer* Otto Moll throwing small Jewish children into "boiling human fat"! Only in his 1979 book of memoirs did Müller focus the majority of his text – some 75% – on events relating to the Birkenau crematoria: from 0% to 75%: a staggering literary development! (See Mattogno 2016e, pp. 36-52.)

As mentioned earlier, Müller's story is full of details plagiarized from other authors, such as Nyiszli, Gerstein and Kraus/Kulka.

Even though he claims to have worked in the Birkenau crematoria for many months, his flawed description of the furnaces and how they were operated

¹⁸³ Müller 1979a, p. 111; the English translation gives no color here, 1979b, p. 71.

¹⁸⁴ APMO, *Proces zalogi* (Auschwitz camp garrison trial), Vol. VII, pp. 1-4.

clearly shows that he had no first-hand experience at all. Regarding the cremation capacity he assigns to these furnaces, he simply repeats technically impossible propaganda claims. The same is true for his stories about outdoor cremation pits and his elaborate tale of boiling human fat allegedly recovered from those pits. His claims in this regard are absurd, technically impossible and above all refuted by Allied air photos taken over Birkenau during the war.

Furthermore, many camp events he claims to have witnessed – from certain deportation trains arriving at Auschwitz at specific dates to a fire he claims to have caused in the Main Camp's crematorium – are refuted by the extant documentation. (For details see Mattogno 2021b, pp. 13-131)

In other words, the entire story narrated by Müller is completely invented. In the light of this fact, Hilberg's opinion of Müller's book, voiced by him during the Zündel Trial, sounds pathetic:

"I regard it as rather accurate, yes. I have been through this book page by page, and I am hard-put to find any error, any material significant error in this book. It is remarkable." (District Court, p. 1138; Rudolf 2020a, p. 200)

When asked by lawyer Christie whether he considered it "an accurate historical account," Hilberg answered in the affirmative (*ibid.*, p. 1138/p. 200). Soon thereafter, Hilberg called Müller "a remarkable, accurate, reliable person" (*ibid.*, p. 1159/p. 203). Was this ignorance? Sloppiness? Dishonesty?

Let us return to our examination of Hilberg's book. After speaking of Gestapo Müller's already-mentioned alleged order of June 1942 to Blobel "to destroy the mass graves in the eastern occupied territories" (p. 1042), Hilberg continued as follows:

"Blobel and his 'Kommando 1005' also moved into Kulmhof to investigate what could be done with the graves there. He constructed funeral pyres and primitive ovens, and even tried explosives." (pp. 1042f.)

Blobel's presumed experimentation at Chełmno was completely unknown to investigating judge Władysław Bednarz, who, in his report about the findings of his investigation, wrote only (Bednarz 1946a, Vol. I, p. 115):

"Two crematoria were built in the spring of 1942, after which all the bodies were cremated (including the bodies which had previously been buried)."

Hilberg cites this source, although in a different context, in FN 16 on p. 929. Immediately after the passage which I have cited above, Bednarz says:

"There are no details on the furnaces, because the examining magistrate could not find any witnesses who were in the forest in 1942 or 1943. Those who lived nearby only observed smoking chimneys inside the fences. The furnaces were blown up by the camp authorities on 7 April 1943. Nevertheless, two new furnaces were built in 1944, when they took over the camp activities."

He also supplies a description and dimensions (*ibid.*). Hilberg was therefore well aware that – according to Judge Bednarz – two crematoria had been built at Chełmno in the *spring* of 1942 – without any intervention on Blobel's part

whatsoever, who claimed to have received his order only in June 1942! Hilberg avoids mentioning this contradiction.

In this context, Hilberg mentions a "bone-crushing machine (*Knochenmühle*)" (p. 1043), which was actually a ball mill used in road construction, a topic that I have discussed elsewhere, to which I refer the interested reader.¹⁸⁵

At this point, I shall examine the end of Hilberg's narration:

"When Höss visited Kulmhof, Blobel promised the Auschwitz commander that he would send him a mill 'for solid substances.' Höss, however, preferred to destroy his bone material with hammers." (p. 1043)

The source is Höss's affidavit of March 14, 1946 (FN 107, *ibid.*). In it, the former commandant of Auschwitz declared (NO-1210):

"After cleaning out the pits, the remaining ashes were crushed. This happened on a cement slab where inmates pulverized the remaining bones with wooden pounders"

This text was later plagiarized by Müller, who enriched it by inventing the dimensions of the claimed cement slab (Müller 1979b, p. 133):

"In this connection Moll had thought up a new technique to expedite the removal of ashes. He ordered an area next to the pits adjoining crematorium 5 and measuring about 60 metres by 15 metres to be concreted; on this surface the ashes were crushed to a fine powder before their final disposal."

There is no documentary trace or physical trace of this cemented surface, which should have had a surface area more-extensive than the footprint of Crematorium V, in the vicinity of which it should have been located; nor is there any trace of it in the aerial photographs of Birkenau taken in 1944 (see Mattogno 2016d).

What Hilberg says regarding these photographs demonstrates once again his shocking sloppiness:

"No one analyzed these pictures at the time to discover what was revealed in their corners: the gas chambers." (p. 1214)

As if an analysis of aerial photographs showing the Birkenau crematoria's exterior could reveal the presumed presence of gas chambers located *inside* the buildings!

3.9.8. Open-Air Cremations

On this topic, Hilberg writes:

"Anticipating these developments, the Auschwitz specialist in charge of body disposal, Hauptscharführer Moll – a man described as a sadist with indefatigable energy – directed the digging of eight or nine pits more than forty yards in length, eight yards wide, and six feet deep." (p. 1044)

¹⁸⁵ Mattogno 2018, pp. 481-484; see also Schwensen 2013.

Hilberg's source here is Müller's book (FN 114f., *ibid.*). According to this witness, two pits measuring 40 to 50 meters long, 8 meters wide and 2 meters deep were dug in the northern courtyard of Crematorium V in early May 1944, followed by another three in mid-May, in addition to four pits – presumably with the same dimensions – near the so-called "*Bunker V*," so that there were a total of nine pits (Müller 1979b, pp. 130, 133). But if we examine the other sources Hilberg quotes in this chapter, and beyond that other witnesses who testified in this regard, we see that the claims about these pits do not match.

Judge Jan Sehn (Hilberg's FN 120) says in this regard that "so six huge pits were dug beside crematorium V" (Sehn 1946b, p. 88). Charles S. Bendel spoke of three with the dimensions 12 m × 6 m × 1.5 m (Phillips, p. 131); Henryk Tauber mentioned four in one testimony, five in another; Stanisław Jankowski claimed two pits of 20 m × 2 m × 2 m; Szlama Dragon had five pits of 25 m × 6 m × 3 m; Miklos Nyiszli had two pits of 50 m × 6 m × 3 m; Dov Paisikovic claimed two pits of 30 m × 6 m or 10 m; and so it goes on (see Mattogno 2016d, p. 28).

In this context, Hilberg does not shy away from uncritically repeating the absurd story of collected human fat:

"On the bottom of the pits the human fat was collected and poured back into the fire with buckets to hasten the cremations." (p. 1044)

O, Sancta Simplicitas! This nonsense was bandied about by witnesses such as Rudolf Höss (Hilberg's source, FN 116; Höss 1959, p. 168) and Filip Müller (1979b, pp. 130-132). I have dealt with this in detail elsewhere, to which I direct the reader (Mattogno 2014; 2021b, pp. 126-129). It suffices here to say that the corpses are not said to have been lying like steaks in frying pans where their fat could accumulate, but rather in raging blazes of huge proportions. Under such circumstances, any fat exuding from any corpse would have burned off instantly where it surfaced. Assuming anything else is sheer madness.

Incredibly, Hilberg also bruited the grim tale of children being burned alive (p. 1044):

"Survivors report that children were sometimes tossed alive into the inferno."

It was mentioned by two witnesses (Gisella Perl and the inevitable Filip Müller; FN 117, *ibid.*), which for Hilberg evidently was a guarantee of its historical veracity!

The witness Werner Krumme is quoted in Hilberg's Footnote 118 as a source for the following claim:

"The rotten remains were cleaned up once in a while with flame throwers." (p. 1044)

However, in Krumme's affidavit of September 23, 1945, we read instead (NO-1933, p. 4):

"A large pit was dug in the vicinity of the crematoria, into which a considerable number of bodies was thrown. The special troop had to stack up the corpses

and the wood, then gasoline and heating oil was poured over it. At times they even needed to use flame-throwers to accelerate the process."

As we can see, there is no trace of "rotten remains were cleaned up once in a while with flame throwers," but merely speculation on how the claimed cremation process was kick-started, and Krumme spoke only of "a large pit," not several. Krumme also stated that "great tarps were hung around the cremation site so that the flames could not be seen from far away," but Hilberg assures us:

"From the Katowice direction the fires of Auschwitz were visible from a distance of twelve miles." (p. 1032)

Pery Broad, who obviously possessed much-more-acute eyesight, was able to see these same fires at a distance of 30 km, and he claimed ten cremation pits to boot in his affidavit of October 20, 1947 (NI-11984, Point 6):

"There were some 10 large burning sites in the vicinity of Birkenau, where 200-1,000 people were burned each time. The glare of these fire sites was still visible within a radius of at least 30 kilometers. The unmistakable odor of burnt flesh was perceptible at the same distance."

In an affidavit of October 24, 1947, Heinrich Schuster, by contrast, contented himself with just two "gigantic funeral pyres" whose glare was visible at a distance of 20 km (NI-11862, p. 9):

"Near crematoria III and IV, therefore, 2 gigantic funeral pyres were erected, on which mountains of gassed inmates were burned the whole time. The fire and the smoke could be seen 20 kilometres away."

3.10. Hans Frank and the "Killing Centers"

Hilberg writes:

"Lublin was evacuated more hurriedly. At the end of July 1944, a Red Army salient overtook the camp, and with it huge stores of Aktion Reinhardt. The discoveries made by the Soviets in Lublin were immediately publicized in the world press, to the great consternation of Generalgouverneur Frank. The frightened Frank immediately accused Koppe, the former Higher SS and Police Leader in the Wartheland, who had replaced Krüger in the Generalgouvernement. 'Now we know' Frank said, 'you cannot deny that.' Koppe replied that he knew absolutely nothing about these things and that apparently it was a matter between Heinrich Himmler and the camp authorities. 'But already in 1941' said Frank, 'I heard of such plans, and I spoke about them.' Well then, the Higher SS and Police Leader replied, that was Frank's business, and he, Koppe, could not be expected to worry about it." (pp. 1045f.)

To be precise, the Soviets reached the Lublin-Majdanek Camp on July 23, 1944. When quoting his source – Hans Frank's deposition at Nuremberg (FN

12, p. 1046), Hilberg omitted the prelude to the passage he summarized, which is absolutely necessary to understand what Frank was talking about.

Asked by his defense lawyer Alfred Seidl when he heard about Majdanek for the first time, Frank replied (IMT, Vol. 12, pp. 17):

"I heard the name Maidanek for the first time in 1944 from foreign reports."

Frank knew, however, that a large concentration camp was to be built near Lublin in 1941 with workshops for the production of clothing, shoes and linen for the *Waffen SS*. He had heard something about the fate of the Jews "through enemy broadcasts and enemy and neutral papers," therefore he attempted to investigate:

"In answer to my repeated questions as to what happened to the Jews who were deported, I was always told they were to be sent to the East, to be assembled, and put to work there. But, the stench seemed to penetrate the walls, and therefore I persisted in my investigations as to what was going on. Once a report came to me that there was something going on near Belzec. I went to Belzec the next day. Globocznik showed me an enormous ditch which he was having made as a protective wall and on which many thousands of workers, apparently Jews, were engaged. I spoke to some of them, asked them where they came from, how long they had been there, and he told me, that is, Globocznik, 'They are working here now, and when they are through – they come from the Reich, or somewhere from France – they will be sent further east.' I did not make any further inquiries in that same area.

The rumor, however, that the Jews were being killed in the manner which is now known to the entire world would not be silenced." (ibid., p. 18)

When Frank expressed the desire to visit the SS workshops near Lublin, he was informed that it would require a special permit from Himmler; he requested it, but the Reichsführer SS asked him not to visit the camp, Then:

"On 7 February 1944 I succeeded in being received by Adolf Hitler personally – I might add that throughout the war he received me three times only. In the presence of Bormann I put the question to him: 'My Führer, rumors about, the extermination of the Jews will not be silenced. They are heard everywhere. No one is allowed in anywhere. Once I paid a surprise visit to Auschwitz in order to see the camp, but I was told that there was an epidemic in the camp and my car was diverted before I got there. Tell me, My Führer, is there anything in it?' The Führer said, 'You can very well imagine that there are executions going on – of insurgents. Apart from that I do not know anything. Why don't you speak to Heinrich Himmler about it?' And I said, 'Well, Himmler made a speech to us in Kraków and declared in front of all the people whom I had officially called to the meeting that these rumors about the systematic extermination of the Jews were false; the Jews were merely being brought to the East.' Thereupon the Führer said, 'Then you must believe that.'

When in 1944 I got the first details from the foreign press about the things which were going on, my first question was to the SS Obergruppenführer

Koppe, who had replaced Krüger. 'Now we know,' I said, 'you cannot deny that.'" (*ibid.*, pp. 18f.; emphasis added)

Shortly beforehand, in reply to the question of his defense attorney whether he had ever participated in any manner in the extermination of the Jews, Frank replied (*ibid.*, p. 13):

"I say 'yes;' and the reason why I say 'yes' is because, having lived through the 5 months of this trial, and particularly after having heard the testimony of the witness Hoess, my conscience does not allow me to throw the responsibility solely on these minor people. I myself have never installed an extermination camp for Jews, or promoted the existence of such camps; but if Adolf Hitler personally has laid that dreadful responsibility on his people, then it is mine too, for we have fought against Jewry for years; and we have indulged in the most horrible utterances – my own diary bears witness against me. Therefore, it is no more than my duty to answer your question in this connection with 'yes.' A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany will not have been erased." (Emphasis added)

Therefore, all of Frank's knowledge of the alleged "killing centers" in the General Government was derived from the Allied press and from the "evidence" presented at Nuremberg! Moreover, his diary contained simple "utterances," which, although "horrible," are unsupported by facts.

The following, by contrast, is Hilberg's explanation (p. 1148):

"My own diary bears witness against me," said Frank as he surveyed the situation and saw that he was doomed. The crushing written evidence was reinforced by oral testimony from former subordinates of the defendants [...]"

If we follow Frank's testimony, not even Koppe knew anything about the "killing center" of Majdanek, and this also applies to Secretary of State Bühler, who, in a meeting on September 15, 1944 as cited by Hilberg as an additional source (FN 12, p. 1046), declared that "über diese Angelegenheit der Regierung des Generalgouvernements nichts bekannt sei" "the government of the Government General knew nothing about this matter" (PS-2233. IMT, Vol. 29, p. 720).

But Hilberg, who considers Frank one of the principal architects of the "destruction of the Jews" (see, for example, pp. 501-503), has nothing to say about this singular contradiction; on the contrary, he hushes it up entirely. But he does not hesitate to extrapolate two passages from the text which I have set forth above (p. 1030). I reproduce it and insert my comments.

"Frank, the Generalgouverneur of Poland, was extremely anxious to get details about killing centers."

This presupposes that he already knew of the existence of these centers, while he only wished to ascertain whether the rumors corresponded to reality.

"Once, he got a report 'that there was something going on near Belzec'; he went there the next day. Globocnik showed him how Jews were working on an

enormous ditch. When Frank asked what would happen to the Jews, he got the standard answer: they would be sent farther east."

The text cited speaks of "many thousands" of Jews excavating "an enormous ditch" "as a protective wall." The event refers to the second half of 1940. In the month of June, in fact, the supreme command of the Wehrmacht launched "Project Otto," which consisted of digging a huge anti-tank ditch between the Bug and San rivers on the German-Soviet borders, and in road construction. Bełżec was the main camp in the program, with ten subordinate forced-labor camps employing a total of approximately 15,000 Jews. The 4,331 Jews working at Bełżec were released in October 1940.¹⁸⁶

Hilberg was perfectly well aware of these things, as results from what he wrote on p. 256:

"In the course of further planning the Himmler line was trimmed a bit. The ditch was confined to the Bug-San gap, a stretch of territory without a river to hold up a Red advance. The project required the employment not of millions of Jews, as originally envisaged, but only of a few thousand. Labor camps were set up at Bełżec, Plaszów and a few other locations. By October 1940 the project was nearing its end."

Three pages later, Hilberg adds:

"In October 1940 the Bełżec labor camp was broken up. Thousands of Jews were to be sent elsewhere." (p. 259)

Let us return to Hilberg's narration (pp. 1030f.):

"Frank made another attempt. He expressed to Himmler the wish to pay a visit to Lublin, and Himmler urged him not to go there. Finally, Frank tried to spring a surprise visit to Auschwitz. His car was stopped and diverted with the explanation that there was an epidemic in the camp."

Hilberg recounts these episodes in the chapter on "Concealment," as testimony to the fact that not even Frank was permitted to visit the "killing centers." In reality, there was nothing secret at Auschwitz. At least 20 civilian companies with hundreds of workers worked in Birkenau Camp. The relatives of the SS men employed at Auschwitz could visit them and spend a few weeks with them, on the condition that they obtained a "residence permit." For example, Garrison Order No. 16/43 of April 22, 1943 lists 18 of them (Frei *et al.*, pp. 258f.). In total, there is documentary proof of approximately 270 visits.¹⁸⁷

It is also known that serious epidemics were indeed raging at Auschwitz, which were escalating in July 1942, leading to a complete camp lock-down. This implied a wide variety of restrictions, including the following, issued on July 23, 1942 with Garrison Order No. 19/42 (*ibid.*, p. 156):

¹⁸⁶ See Mattogno 2016g, pp. 97-99. The use of these Jews in "Project Otto" is also mentioned in documents published in one of Hilberg's principal sources: Berenstein *et al.*, pp. 217-222.

¹⁸⁷ On the legend of the "terrible secret" of Auschwitz, see Mattogno 2019, pp. 568-583; see also Rudolf/Böhm 2020.

"External visits for departments should be avoided or, if urgent, processed in the Waffen-SS building."

This order also affected visitors traveling to Auschwitz for service-related reasons. Hence, if Frank attempted to visit the camp during an epidemic for non-service-related reasons, and even more so if doing a "surprise visit," that is, without even advance notice, there is nothing suspicious about the fact that he was prevented from accessing the camp according to the above-mentioned order.

3.11. The Order to "Stop Gassings"

Hilberg writes (p. 1046):

"By November 1944, Himmler decided that for practical purposes the Jewish question had been solved. On the twenty-fifth of that month he ordered the dismantling of the killing installations."

The source is Kurt Becher's affidavit dated March 8, 1946 (PS-3762; FN 13, *ibid.*). That affidavit indicates, however, that Himmler's alleged order was issued some time between mid-September and mid-October, and moreover that it was *written*. The witness in fact declared (IMT, Vol. 33, pp. 68):

"Between the middle of September and the middle of October 1944 I caused the Reichsführer SS Himmler to issue the following order, which I received in two originals, one each for SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and Pohl, and a copy for myself:

'By this order, which becomes immediately effective, I forbid any extermination of Jews and order that, on the contrary, care should be given to weak and sick persons. I hold you' – and here Kaltenbrunner and Pohl were meant – 'personally responsible even if this order should not be strictly adhered to by subordinate offices.'"

But at least after 1983, Hilberg no longer believed in any *written* order to start exterminations, nor in any *written* order to end the exterminations, neither one of which, incidentally, has ever been found. In both the 1985 and the 2003 edition of his book, he confirms (p. 1062; p. 996 in the 1985 edition):

"Hitler himself may never have signed an order to kill the Jews. On the other hand, there are records of his utterances in the form of comments, questions, or 'wishes'. What he actually meant, or whether he really meant it, might have been a matter of tone as well as of language." (emphasis added).

Thus, the *Führerbefehl* is now reduced to a matter of the exegesis of Hitler's utterances, comments, questions or "wishes"!

Himmler's supposed order relating to the dismantling of the alleged extermination installations at Birkenau of November 25, 1944 is taken from Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*. But the most surprising thing is that Czech also

refers to Becher's affidavit!¹⁸⁸ The date, which is completely invented, serves to justify the alleged gassings which were allegedly committed after mid-October 1944 – or after the alleged "end gassings" order anyway, which is said to have been effective immediately. Czech listed those post-order gassings diligently (1964, pp. 78-88).

The question was also discussed during the Zündel Trial. Defense attorney Doug Christie read the English translation of Becher's affidavit out before the court, and asked Hilberg to explain why he had changed the alleged Himmler order to November 1944, while the document speaks of the period between mid-September and mid-October: was this perhaps an error? Here are Hilberg's answer and the exchange that ensued (A: Hilberg; Q: defense lawyer D. Christie; District Court, pp. 865f./Rudolf 2020a, pp. 151f.):

"A. Not necessarily, because Becher does not recollect precisely when he acted. He said that sometime between the middle of September and the middle of October he approached Himmler. He was successful in convincing Himmler. That doesn't mean that Himmler carried out the order, gave the order the next day.

Q. With the greatest respect, sir, it doesn't say, 'approached Himmler'. It says, 'induced Himmler'.

A. Induced, fine. Induced Himmler.

Q. That, in effect, means he accomplished the objective of giving his order. Is that right?

A. Well, it doesn't mean he got the order on the precise date.

Q. So you know when the precise order was?

A. No, I wouldn't say that I know very precisely. I would say that it is November, because I do believe, knowing how long it takes for orders to be written, to be filtered down and to be carried out, that the great likelihood was for the order to have been given in November – not September or October, particularly because gassings were going on in Auschwitz in October. And here we would be implying gassings going on despite specific orders [to the contrary] already having been received."

Hilberg's assertion that "Becher does not recollect precisely when he acted" was fallacious, because the context of Becher's statements shows rather clearly that Himmler wrote the alleged order immediately, two originals and a copy of which Becher received. When interrogated on March 27, 1946 about this, here is what Becher explicitly declared:¹⁸⁹

"The order, in its present form, was dictated by Himmler in my presence. He dictated it to his secretary, Miss Meinert."

¹⁸⁸ Czech explicitly cites as a source the IMT protocol (Vol. 11, p. 370 of the German edition, pp. 334f. of the US edition), which reproduces/translates the wording of the document, as well as the document itself, PS-3762, "Affidavit" by Kurt Becher, published in IMT, Vol. 33, pp. 68-70. Czech 1964, FN 125, p. 89; 1990, p. 754.

¹⁸⁹ NARA, RG 238, M1270, OCCPAC. Interrogation Records Prepared for War Crimes Proceedings at Nuremberg 1945-1947, Kurt Becher, p. 13.

Christie then went on to Hilberg's assertion regarding the "dismantling of the killing installations." Hilberg declared that in this regard he should have included "one or two other sources." This is the dialogue that followed (District Court, p. 873/Rudolf 2020a, p. 153):

Q. Was there another source?

A. Yes. There were several other sources, and one of these was from a man who also talked to Becher and got that information.

Q. So you have some other source that didn't talk to Himmler but talked to Becher.

A. Yes. That's correct.

Q. Oh, I see. That wasn't referred to in your book at all.

A. That wasn't referred to, no."

Hilberg does not refer to this source even in the last edition of his work, simply because it does not exist. The only source is in fact Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*, which, as mentioned earlier, also exclusively relies on Becher's affidavit.

Having moved the alleged "stop order" from early fall to November 1944, Hilberg had no qualms including a gassing story that is questionable already for chronological reasons: On page 1040, Hilberg reports the following anecdote taken from a book by Ella Lingens-Reiner:

"In the fall of 1944, 2,000 Jewish women were packed into Block 25, which had room for 500. They were kept there for ten days. Soup cauldrons were pushed through a gap in the door by the fire guard. At the end of ten days, 700 were dead. The rest were gassed."

In view of the fact that gassings shouldn't have occurred anymore after the "stop order," it would have behooved Hilberg to check the reliability of his source, rather than uncritically repeating every splotch of ink he finds on any scrap heap supporting his preconceived notions. In this case, Hilberg should have been aware that there is no trace of this alleged extermination in Danuta Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*.

When writing his text on pages 1053f., Hilberg evidently completely forgot that just a few pages earlier he had written about a "stop order", because there he claims that, in February 1945, "[i]n Theresienstadt, Obersturmführer [=lieutenant] Rahm was involved in a last attempt to resume the destruction process," building "gas-tight" rooms, which the inmates watching this immediately interpreted as homicidal "gas chambers."¹⁹⁰ Therefore, Hilberg was prepared to believe that a mere lieutenant, on his own initiative and in open violation of Himmler's order to end mass gassings, built homicidal gas chambers at Theresienstadt to "resume the destruction process" as late as February 1945!

¹⁹⁰ Deposition of Adolf Engelstein at the Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem, 45th Hearing, May 18, 1961; State of Israel, Vol. 2, p. 815; source indicated by Hilberg, FN 45, p. 1054.

3.12. The Death Toll in Poland

It is now an undisputed fact that the fateful number of six million victims is only of purely symbolic and kabbalistic value (see Dalton 2020, pp. 53-73; Hedesheimer 2018; Weintraub). This is so well-accepted that Hilberg, notwithstanding all his efforts, arrives at his figure of 5,100,000 victims only with very great difficulty (pp. 1320f.), a good 3,000,000 of whom are said to have died in Poland. In this chapter, I shall examine the manner in which Hilberg arrives at that figure.

In his related discussion, he introduces an "Official Polish estimate of Jewish population as of August 1939" amounting to 3,351,000 Jews (p. 1313). The figure is not supported by any reference. Earlier in his book, he mentions the figure of 3,300,000 Jews in September 1939, here as well without any source (p. 189). On page 1128, he publishes a table with Jewish population losses of various countries, according to which Poland is said to have had a Jewish population of 3,350,000 persons in 1939. The source, even if not explicitly indicated, is no doubt the *Report of the Anglo-American Committee* mentioned in his table footer, as has also been confirmed by Reitlinger (1953, p. 497):

"The starting point of the Anglo-American Committee's assessment is a figure of 3,351,000 Jews in Poland in 1939."

He comments (*ibid.*, pp. 497f.):

"This is not a census figure but an allegedly official estimate. The last Polish census on December 9th, 1931, showed 2,732,600 'racial' Jews, an increase of 622,000 in the past ten years. Assuming the same prodigious rate of increase, a figure of 3,250,000 Jews would not be impossible in September, 1939, but it is doubtful whether such a figure allows enough for emigration."

Frank Golczewski reports these diverging figures for the Jewish population of Poland on August 31, 1939 (Benz, p. 419):

- according to Seraphim: 2,719,000
- according to Krakowski: 3,163,000
- according to Kulisher/Proudfoot: 2,845,000
- according to Dąbrowska, Waszak, Grynberg: 2,642,000.

The difference between the lowest figure listed above and Hilberg's figure is already 709,000!

Hilberg moreover writes that "[a]bout 150,000 to 200,000 Jews fled from this area, particularly to the interior of the Soviet Union" (p. 1310), but Reitlinger concluded: "thus the flight from Poland into Russia may have been in the neighborhood of 700,000 when all these sources are considered" (1953, p. 498).

In September 1942, the *Daily News Bulletin* of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency published a report according to which the Joint Distribution Commit-

tee had provided medical treatment "for 600,000 Polish Jewish refugees in desperate circumstances in Asiatic Russia."¹⁹¹

A British paper titled "*Postal & Telegraph Censorship. Report on Jewry*" of October 21, 1942 relating to the period January-June 1942 says that the Joint Distribution Committee

*"launched a program to help the 600,000 Jews in Russia by co-ordinating its efforts with those of the Polish Government-in-Exile. For this the J.D.C. budget calls for \$ 100,000 a month for the first months of 1942. We are at this moment buying \$ 50,000 worth of medical supplies, which will be consigned to the Polish Embassy at Kuibyshev."*¹⁹²

The reference was undoubtedly to the city located in the Novosibirsk oblast, in Asian Russia, near the border with Kazakhstan, about 600 km north-east of Astana, an area never reached by German forces.

On December 30, 1944, the American ambassador to Moscow, William Averell Harriman, sent a report ("Paraphrase of telegram received") containing detailed information on Polish Jews in Russia to the State Department in Washington. The number of these Jews was estimated at 250,000, of which 80% had Russian passports; the others were stateless. About 70% were young people between 18 and 35 years old, which arose from the fact that young people were more ready to undertake the evacuation ordered by the Soviet authorities in the years 1939-1940, but also

"by the fact that mortality has been much higher among the very young and the very old due to hardships to which all of them have been subjected since they arrived in the Soviet Union, where hardships have been great."

These Jews were still allowed to consider themselves Poles, but they had little cultural contact and no organized contact with Soviet Jews. As to their future fate, Harriman wrote:

"Still obscure remains the prospects for the return of Polish Jews to Poland. The Soviet authorities have not shown themselves to be willing to let these people leave,"

apart from some exceptions.¹⁹³

It is difficult to believe that 350,000 Jews had died in a couple of years, so it is likely that the figure of 250,000 only referred to Jews in European Russia, probably Moscow.

In the summary of survivors on p. 1313, Hilberg mentions:

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| 1. Reported registration of survivors on Polish soil in 1945: | 55,000 |
| 2. Repatriations from USSR: | 185,000 |
| 3. Displaced persons in Germany, Austria, Italy, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, in 1946: | over 100,000 |

¹⁹¹ *Daily News Bulletin*, Vol. 23, No. 215, September 15, 1942, pp. 1f.

¹⁹² TNA, FO-371-32681, p. 62 (p. 19 of the report).

¹⁹³ FDRL, Box 7, WR 0143, 000735-000737.

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| 4. Polish Jews in military forces, 1945: | ca. 15,000 |
| 5. Emigrants to Palestine and other areas, 1939-44: | over 15,000 |
| 6. Survivors in Polish areas annexed by USSR: | thousands |
| 7. Refugees remaining in prewar territory of USSR: | thousands |
| 8. Victims of Soviet deportations: | thousands |
| 9. War casualties: | thousands |

And this is his comment (p. 1313):

"Although accuracy is difficult to achieve even in postwar counts, these numbers are small enough to suggest that the survivors, and the dead from non-Holocaust causes, could not have been more than about 400,000. Thus, the overall picture is that of a toll approaching three million."

In practice, he subtracts the alleged total number of survivors (355,000) from the alleged population total in 1939 (3,351,000). But a statistical report from the Institute of Jewish Affairs in 1945 estimated the number of Polish Jewish survivors at between 475,000 and 525,000, 80,000 of whom lived in Poland, 20,000 had emigrated, and 350,000-400,000 were displaced.¹⁹⁴

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency's *Bulletin* of August 17, 1945 stated:¹⁹⁵

"In addition to the 80,000 Jews now in Poland, the transfer of at least 150,000 Polish Jews from Russian territory to Poland will start next month, the delegation revealed."

A few days earlier, the *Bulletin* had reported the presence of 20,000 Polish and German Jews in Shanghai.¹⁹⁶

"More than 20,000 Jewish refugees from Germany and Poland interned by the Japanese in Hongkew section of Shanghai will be liberated as soon as the surrender of Japan is announced, it was stated here today by leaders of Jewish relief organizations."

It follows that there were at least $(475,000 + 150,000 =) 625,000$ survivors, to which must be added the $(600,000 - 150,000 =) 450,000$ who were in Asian Russia in 1942, therefore at least 1,075,000. If therefore in 1939 the Polish Jews were 2,845,000, according to the evaluation of Kulisher and Proudfoot as quoted by Golczewski, the death toll was at most 1,770,000.

Hilberg attempts to give a numerical account of the death toll:

"Polish Jewry as a whole lost more than 500,000 people in the ghettos, well over 700,000 in shootings, and up to 1,700,000 in camps." (p. 1312)

In his "definitive" 1985 edition, the numbers were little bit different:

¹⁹⁴ Institute...., p. 4, Table II, "Jewish Survivors in European Countries under Axis Domination According to the Present Residence."

¹⁹⁵ JTA, August 17, 1945, "J.D.C. Legalized in Warsaw; 150,000 Jews Will Be Repatriated from Russia to Poland".

¹⁹⁶ JTA, August 14, 1945, "20,000 Jewish Refugees, Interned in Shanghai, Will Be Liberated by Japan's Surrender".

"Polish Jewry as a whole lost more than 500,000 people in the ghettos, well over 600,000 in shootings, and over 1,800,000 in camps." (p. 1212)

I will discuss the reason for the increase in the number of those shot by 100,000 (and for the reduction of the camp victims by 100,000) in Subchapter 5.4.

On p. 274, he writes:

"In absolute figures the long lasting Łódź Ghetto, with a cumulative population (including new arrivals and births) of about 200,000, had more than 45,000 dead. The Warsaw Ghetto, with around 470,000 inhabitants over the period from the end of 1940 to the end of the mass deportations in September 1942, buried 83,000 people. The two ghettos contained less than a fourth of the Polish Jews, and although there were communities with attrition rates lower than those of Łódź and Warsaw, the impact of ghettoization in any locality was but a matter of time."

In a footnote, Hilberg explains:

"SS-Statistician [Richard] Korherr calculated a Jewish population deficit, not attributable to deportations, of 334,673 for the incorporated territories (including Białystok) and 427,920 for the Generalgouvernement (including Galicia) from the time these areas had been seized to December 31, 1942. Korherr to Himmler, April 19, 1943, NO-5193. In effect, these figures may be translated into three-quarters of a million victims, including a half million dead prior to and during the period of ghettoization, and most of the remainder killed in ghetto-clearing operations, particularly in Galicia, Lublin, and Białystok." (FN 339, *ibid.*)

As I have noted in Subchapter 1.2, in the Korherr Report, the figures of 334,673 and 427,920 refer not only to the "excess mortality," as Hilberg would have us believe, but to "emigration" as well, a fact moreover confirmed by Hilberg himself, when he writes in open contradiction to himself:

"Korherr had no count for 'emigration' and 'excess mortality,' and he could not separate the two concepts when he calculated their combined totals as 334,673 for the incorporated territories and 427,920 for the Generalgouvernement. [...] The addition of 334,673 and 427,920, which is 762,593, may therefore be taken as an indication of a real deficit for the two regions as a whole, but not as the unqualified measure of deaths from privation. About 150,000 to 200,000 Jews fled from this area, particularly to the interior of the Soviet Union." (p. 1310)

As already pointed out, that latter figure of Jews fled into the USSR is certainly too low. But then, how can Hilberg claim that "these figures may be translated into three-quarters of a million victims" based on these same data?

Assuming the same mortality rate as in the Łódź Ghetto – 22.5%¹⁹⁷ – for the 762,593 Jews mentioned by Korherr, then approximately 171,600 of them

¹⁹⁷ The actual percentage was much higher, because a large proportion of the population of the ghetto was deported; but this is true for all the ghettos.

would have died and approximately 591,000 would have emigrated. Either way Hilberg's estimate of the mortality in the ghettos is highly inconsistent and without basis in historical fact.

The situation is no better regarding the 700,000 people allegedly shot. Hilberg mentions specific figures for people shot, adding up to a total of 154,622 Jews, plus various "many thousands" (p. 1311f.). To arrive at the above mentioned 700,000, he adds (*ibid.*):

"On December 29, 1942, Himmler reported to Hitler that from August to November 363,211 Jews had been 'executed' in the Ukraine, South Russia, and the Bialystok District. There is little doubt that the large majority of these victims had lived in the Volhynian portion of the Generalbezirk Volhynia-Podolia."

but the total is $(154,622 + 363,211 =) 517,833$.

The document in question, already cited by Hilberg on p. 407, bears the subject "Reports to the Führer about the struggle against gangs." The document is known as "Report No. 51" on "Russia South, Ukraine, Bialystok," regarding the "Success in fighting gangs from Sept. 1 to Dec. 1, 1942."¹⁹⁸ The report contains three categories of persons: "bandits," "gang helpers and gang suspects" and "defectors"; the second lists 16,553 arrests, 14,257 executions and 363,211 "Executed Jews." Hilberg never mentions the context of the document at all, in particular, the that these Jews were shot, not just as Jews, but as "supporters of gangs suspected of gang membership." The subject line of the report clearly states that the Jews concerned were Russian Jews, but according to Hilberg they mostly lived in a region which belonged to Poland at the beginning of the war, so that "the large majority of these victims" consisted of Polish Jews, who, as we have seen, brought the total of persons shot up to approximately 517,833.

Nevertheless, in the case of the Soviet Union, Hilberg writes about the list of victims of the "Einsatzgruppen operations" (p. 1315):

"Old Soviet portion of 363,211 Jews killed in 1942 in Bialystok District, Ukraine, and south Russia: thousands"

In practice, he counted these 363,211 twice, considering them once as Polish Jews and then again as Russian Jews. Furthermore, as I have shown elsewhere, no more than 12-13% of these alleged shootings are actually documented (Mattogno 2018, pp. 242-251).

Assuming the data set forth above, the cases of Poland and Russia alone show a number of at least $(591,000 \text{ emigrants} + 363,211 \text{ double counts} =)$ some 954,000 fictitious victims, who should be subtracted from the 3,700,000 victims claimed by Hilberg for these two countries (p. 1321).

¹⁹⁸ BAK, NS19/291.

This shows in general how unreliable the statistics of Jewish losses actually are, and, in particular, the inconsistency of the data cited by Hilberg, not to mention his method, which is anything but flawless.

4. Hilberg's Testimony at the 1985 Zündel Trial

4.1. Summary of the Testimony

In the stenographic transcript of the trial, Hilberg's deposition covers over 600 pages. In this chapter, I shall only occupy myself with a few of the problems discussed which are closely related with everything I said above with reference to his work. First, however, it is conducive to show a general picture of Hilberg's testimony. To do this, I shall avail myself of the masterful summary prepared by Robert Faurisson, who acted as an advisor to defense attorney Doug Christie during the trial (Faurisson 1999, pp. 955-957):

"He stumbled starting with the first question. Mr. Christie informed him that he intended to read out a list of concentration camps so that the witness could say how many he had examined and how many times. It turned out that he had never even examined a single one, neither prior to the publication of the first edition of his major work in 1961, nor after this date, and not even in the 'definitive' edition in 1985. Since he started researching the Holocaust in 1948, Hilberg had therefore earned a reputation as the world's first and foremost historian in his specific field of research, without ever having examined a single concentration camp, not one single time in 37 years. He only visited two camps, Auschwitz and Treblinka, in 1979: 'One day at Treblinka and perhaps a half day at Auschwitz and half a day at Birkenau': what is more, it was on occasion of ceremonies. He had never been curious to inspect the locations, nor, once at the spot, the Auschwitz archives. He had never visited the sites referred to as 'gas chambers'. Having been asked to supply a few explanations of the plans for the crematoria, photographs, graphics, he refused, declaring:

'If you start to show me blueprints of buildings, photographs, diagrams, I do not have the same competence [in this area] as for written documents.'

He estimated at over a million the number of Jews who died at Auschwitz and 'perhaps three hundred thousand' as the number of non-Jews, but did not explain how he arrived at this estimate, nor why the Poles and Soviets arrived at a total of four million, the figure inscribed on the monument at Birkenau [at the time].

Mr. Christie questioned him then on the camps which are said to have contained homicidal gas chambers. He rattled off the names of these camps, asking him each time whether this camp had possessed one or more of these gas chambers. The response should have been easy for this eminent specialist, but here, as well, Hilberg lost his footing. Next to camps 'with' and camps 'with-

out' gas chamber, he created, in the disaster of his improvisations, two more categories of camp: those which 'may' have had a gas chamber (Dachau, Flossenbürg, Neuengamme, Sachsenhausen) and those which had had a 'very small gas chamber' (for example, Struthof-Natzweiler in Alsace), so small that one wondered whether it was even worth talking about it; he did not reveal his criteria of distinction between these four categories of camp. He was asked whether he was aware of any expert report establishing whether or not a certain room had really been a gas chamber. Hilberg turned a deaf ear to the question, then squirmed around and supplied a host of inappropriate answers. His dilatory manoeuvres became so obvious that Judge Locke, generally so quick to assist the prosecution, felt himself obliged to intervene, requesting an answer. Only then did Hilberg, having run out of places to hide, reply that he was not aware of any report of this kind. These are 14 pages of transcript (pp. 968-981) between the moment in which this embarrassing question was asked and the moment in which he finally answered it.

Did he know of any autopsy report showing that any concentration-camp inmate had died as the result of poisoning with poison gas? The answer, here again, was 'No'.

Since Hilberg, on the other hand, accorded such importance to testimony, he was questioned as to the testimony of Kurt Gerstein. He attempted to say that, in his book, he had not used the confessions of this SS officer. To which Christie replied that, in *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Gerstein's name appears twenty-three times, and Document PS-1553 of that same Gerstein was quoted on ten occasions. Then, a few fragments of these confessions, in different forms, were read out to the jury. Hilberg finished by agreeing that certain parts of these confessions by Gerstein were 'pure nonsense.'

The same scenario with the 'confessions' of Rudolf Höss. Hilberg, prostrate, had to admit at one point: 'It's terrible,' which, in context, meant: 'It's indefensible.' As for the most important of the 'confessions' signed by Höss (Document NO-1210 [recte: PS-3868]), Hilberg acknowledged that we are dealing with a man who made a deposition in a language (English) other than his own (German), a deposition with totally unacceptable contents, 'a deposition which seems to have been a summary of things that he had said or which he could have said or which he thought he had said, by someone who had thrown in front of him a summary that he had signed, which is **unfortunate**.' With regards to the fact that, according to this 'confession,' two million five hundred thousand persons had been gassed at Auschwitz, Hilberg went so far as to say, that this was

'an clearly unverified, grossly exaggerated figure that may have become well-known and widely publicized following the erroneous conclusions of a Soviet-Polish commission of inquiry into Auschwitz.'

Perceiving that he was being forced to throw off all the ballast, he had no problem with admitting, along with Doug Christie, that 'historians' like William L. Shirer had no value, so to speak."

On this occasion, Christie read out a passage from William Shirer's book *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* containing a grotesque distortion of Lammers' statements at Nuremberg:¹⁹⁹

"Thus Hans Lammers, the bullheaded chief of the Reich Chancellery, when pressed on the witness stand replied: 'I knew that a Führer order was transmitted by Goering to Heydrich... This order was called 'Final Solution of the Jewish Problem.'"

In reality, Lammers stated on April 9, 1946 when cross-examined by Col. Pokrovsky, deputy prosecutor for the Soviet Union (IMT, Vol. 11, pp. 141):

"I only knew that a Führer order was transmitted by Reich Marshal Göring to Heydrich, who was at that time head of the RSHA. [...] This order was called, 'Final Solution of the Jewish Problem,' but no one knew what it dealt with or what the term meant. In the period which followed I made several efforts to clarify the real meaning of the term 'final solution' and what was to happen. I attempted yesterday to explain this question, but I was not allowed to say all I wanted."

Lammers then repeated what he had asserted the day before, that is, "there were rumors about Jews being killed," which he attempted to verify, but after his investigations, the rumors continued. He then turned to Hitler and Himmler who spoke only of evacuations (*ibid.*, pp. 141f.; see Subchapter 1.5.).

Hence, Lammers's reference to a "Führer order" transmitted by Göring to Heydrich concerned Göring's letter dated July 31, 1941, already cited several times, which had nothing to do with any extermination of Jews.

Let us return to Professor Faurisson's summary of the Toronto trial (Faurisson 1999, pp. 957f.):

"[Hilberg] was asked about his opinion of Filip Müller's testimony, author of Three Years in an Auschwitz Gas Chamber [= Auschwitz Inferno]. Passages of the purest anti-Nazi sex shop nonsense were read out before the court and Mr. Christie showed the jury, thanks to an analysis by the Italian revisionist Carlo Mattogno, that F. Müller or his ghostwriter, Helmut Freitag, had simply committed plagiarism by taking an entire episode, almost word for word, from Doctor at Auschwitz [= Auschwitz: A Doctor's Eyewitness Account], this notorious forgery signed by Miklos Nyiszli. At this point, Hilberg suddenly changed tactics: he feigned emotion and pathetically declared that Müller's testimony was too shocking for anyone to be able to doubt his sincerity. But everything sounded false in this new Hilberg who had, until that moment, responded with a monotonous tone and with the caution of a cat who is afraid of the fire. D. Christie thought it useless to continue."

Faurisson then discusses the question of the alleged Hitler order, which I will cover in the next chapter.

¹⁹⁹ Shirer 1960, p. 965; District Court, pp. 1205f./Rudolf 2020a, p. 211; unless noted otherwise, subsequent page numbers in the text are from there following the pattern [District Court]/[Rudolf 2020a]

4.2. The Alleged Hitler Extermination Order

In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that Hitler's first extermination order cited by Hilberg has no basis in historical-documentary fact. Let us go on to the second such alleged order.

In 1983, Hilberg, at Avery Fisher Hall, discussed a theory in open contradiction with that which he had advocated in his book (see de Wan):

"But what began in 1941 was a process of destruction [of the Jews] not planned in advance, not organized centrally by any agency. There was no blueprint and there was no budget for destructive measures. They [these measures] were taken step by step, one step at a time. Thus came about not so much a plan being carried out, but an incredible meeting of minds, a consensus mind reading by a far-flung [German] bureaucracy."

Defense attorney Douglas Christie read out these words to Hilberg, who confirmed them, but declared that they did not exclude the existence of an extermination order (pp. 846f./149).

Q. Was there an order, or wasn't there?

A. I believe that there was a Hitler order.

Q. Okay.

A. Professor Krowslich (ph)^[200] believes this. Others believe that there was not.

Q. So it's an article of faith based upon your opinion?

A. No, it is not an article of faith at all. It is a conclusion. One can come down one way on it, or the other.

Q. Because there is no evidence to prove one side or the other. Right?

A. There may be evidence, but there is a question in this case of what is sufficient evidence.

Q. One order was given in the spring of 1941 is what you said in your book.

A. That is one man's opinion – mine." (pp. 849f./149)

Christie then turned to page 177 of Hilberg's book (the 1961 edition):

"Q. 'Shortly after the mobile operations had begun in the occupied Soviet territories, Hitler handed down his second order.' Now, where is his second order?"

A. The problem with that particular order is the same as it is with the first. It is oral.

Q. It is oral.

A. And there are people who say, no, it was not one order at all. It was a series of orders that were given to various people at various times.

Q. Mm-hmmm.

A. This is a matter for dispute and for argument among historians, and for this purpose one has meetings and second editions of books, too.

Q. I see. So you have to correct that statement in your second edition. Right?

²⁰⁰ Probably Helmut Krausnick.

A. No, I am not saying that I have to correct this statement, but there are corrections in the second edition, of course." (pp. 851f./150; emphasis added)

In the rest of the cross-examination, Christie asked Hilberg if he could produce any proof of the existence of the second Hitler order, and he mentioned Göring's letter to Heydrich dated July 31, 1941. Defense attorney Christie objected that the German document spoke of "resettlement" (English translation of the German term "*Evakuierung*") of Jews to the East, to which Hilberg replied:

"A. Well, the term 're-settlement' became the word used throughout the correspondence in World War II in German records to refer to the process of deporting people to killing centres. In short, this was to be distinguished from bringing the killers to the victims. Here the victims are being brought to the killers.

Q. Well, that is your interpretation of —

A. That was my interpretation, and it still is now.

Q. But it wasn't an order or a letter from Hitler at all.

A. No, it is not.

Q. But it says here, 'Hitler handed down his second order'. Correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. That could be a little misleading, couldn't it?

A. Yes, it could be misleading, and for that reason we write second editions." (pp. 854f./150)

Under pressure from Christie, Hilberg maintained the reality of Hitler's Jewish extermination order in the spring of 1941, which, as I have shown earlier, is absolutely unfounded. As to the second order, he declared that there was "a divided opinion on whether there was one or whether there were several orders," but only a couple of German historians asserted that "there was no need for a Hitler order" (pp. 858/150f.). Personally, however, as we have seen earlier, he believed that such an order really existed in oral form, and that there was no need to make corrections on this point in his work. Improvising clumsily, Hilberg attributed the verbal character of the alleged order to the fact that Göring's letter of July 31, 1941 had been "written at the behest of Adolph Hitler" (pp. 855/150). Hence, Hilberg based the historical reality of it on the simply distortion of a mere word from a document referring to the Madagascar Project! He even went so far as to assert that written documents exist which demonstrate the existence of the alleged Hitler order (pp. 1203/211):

"A. It's not the Hitler order that exists in the form of a document, because that appears to have been oral, but there are documents that state that there was a Hitler order.

Q. Yeah. There are testimonies of the people —

A. No, no, no. There are documents. I repeat, there are documents. Even in the Wannsee Conference you will find reference to that."

Hilberg then stated this singular theory as follows (pp. 1204/211):

"A. It includes a reference insofar as Heydrich speaks of the evolution of the policy arriving at the final solution and makes specific reference to Hitler in that connection."

In this regard, Faurisson notes (Faurisson 1999, pp. 960f.):

"Shortly after the trial, I discovered that Hilberg had committed perjury. In January 1985, under oath, in the presence of the judge and jury, he had had the effrontery to assert that, in the new edition of his book, still being printed, he maintained the existence of these Hitler orders, of which he had just admitted that no 'trace' existed. Well, he lied. In this new edition, the preface to which is dated September 1984 (Hilberg gave his deposition under oath in January 1985) any mention of a Hitler order is systematically deleted; his colleague and friend Christopher Browning noticed this in a review titled 'The Revised Hilberg':

'In the new edition [the 1985 edition], all references in the text to a Hitler decision or Hitler order for the 'Final Solution' [understood by Browning as equivalent to 'extermination'] were systematically deleted. Buried at the bottom of a single footnote stands the solitary reference: 'Chronology and circumstances point to a decision before the summer [of 1941] ended'. In the new edition, decisions were not made and orders were not given.'²⁰¹

This is serious. It shows that, to be sure of obtaining the conviction of Ernst Zündel (whose theory was, in particular, that no such Hitler order – or any order by anybody else – to exterminate the Jews ever existed), a university professor was not been afraid to resort to lies and to perjury."

And this was Hilberg's fifth perjury!

Seven years later, this already-uncertain picture was even fuzzier. Hilberg was now completely renouncing Hitler's "order", replacing it with elaborations about a "decision," which then faded in his hands into a no-less-elusive "will" (Hilberg 1992, p. 16):

"Yet the decision was not a simple one, and it was not written and signed like the euthanasia order or the directive to invade the USSR. There is no particular moment or day that can be identified as the turning point in the interplay between preparations of scheming functionaries and Hitler's own utterances. We may assume a period of irresolution, followed by his cryptic intimations and predictions. We may also surmise that finally he articulated the unmistakable words that even his SS and Police chief Heinrich Himmler called frightful. The words were not recorded, but they were alluded or referred to over and over. They were used repeatedly to counter arguments put forward by German and non-German authorities for exemptions or delay. The final solution was not evadable; it was the Führer's will." (Emphases added)

This confirms that for Hilberg the *Führerbefehl*, the Führer order, was really an *article of faith* based on his opinion.

²⁰¹ The source indicated by Faurisson is: *Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual*, 1986, p. 294.

Hilberg sealed this nebulous disquisition with a sort of "confession" by the Führer (*ibid.*, p. 19):

"He killed himself on that day after writing a testament in which he left no doubt that it was he who had prophesied the end of Jewry and that the Jews had indeed atoned for their sins."

The reference Hilberg cites is "Hitler's political testament, April 29, 1945, Nuremberg trials document PS-3569" (*ibid.*, p. 272, FN 47). This document says (PS-3569, p. 3; IMT, Vol. 41, p. 549):

"But I also have left no doubt that, if the peoples of Europe are seen once more only as stock portfolios of these international conspirators in money and finance, then that very people will be held responsible which is the actual culprit for this murderous struggle: Jewry! I have further left no one in the dark that this time not only millions of children of Europeans of the Aryan peoples will starve to death, not only millions of grown men will suffer death, and not only hundreds of thousands of women and children will be burned and bombed to death in the cities, without he who is the actual culprit having to atone for his guilt, although by more humane means."

These "more humane means" refer to the cessation of the Jewish role in Europe mentioned in Hitler's "prophecies," to which this text clearly alludes; precisely this is what explains Hilberg's cautious omission. This is how Hilberg interpreted Hitler's testament in his main work (p. 1083):

"At the conclusion of the destruction process, Hitler remarked in his testament that the Jewish 'criminals'^[202] had 'atoned' for their 'guilt' by 'humane means.' The 'humaneness' of the destruction process was an important factor in its success. It must be emphasized, of course, that this 'humaneness' was evolved not for the benefit of the victims but for the welfare of the perpetrators."

Hilberg distorts the meaning of the text, first of all, by eliminating the comparative, which deprives the text of its meaning: In his conflict with the Jews, Hitler used the term "more humane means" as compared to the means employed against European men, women and children – this referred in particular to the British bombing of Dresden. He then further distorts this meaning through a bit of trickery which moreover clashes with Hilberg's theory of sadism as an essential component of the alleged extermination process. On pp. 1076f., Hilberg extends this phantasmagorical decision to exterminate the Jews even to the Polish, Russian and Gypsy populations:

"When that attempt [of the judiciary to conserve its jurisdiction in Jewish affairs] was finally given up, Justice Minister Thierack wrote to his friend Bormann: 'I intend to turn over criminal jurisdiction against Poles, Russians, Jews, and Gypsies to the Reichsführer-SS. In doing so, I base myself on the

²⁰² In his translation of Hitler's testament, Hilberg mistranslated "*Schuldige*" = "the guilty one"/"culprit" as "criminals"; p. 1057.

principle that the administration of justice can make only a small contribution to the extermination of these peoples.''' (Emphasis added)

Here he mentions Document NG-558, "Thierack to Bormann, October 13, 1942" (FN 73, p. 1077). The passage cited by him is rendered as follows in NMT, Vol. 3, page 675:

"With a view to freeing the German people of Poles, Russians, Jews, and gypsies, and with a view to making the eastern territories incorporated into the Reich available for settlements of German nationals, I intend to turn over criminal proceedings against Poles, Russians, Jews, and gypsies to the Reich Leader SS. In so doing I work on the principle that the administration of justice can only make a small contribution to the extermination of members of these ethnicities. Undoubtedly the administration of justice pronounces very severe sentences on such persons, but that is not enough to constitute a material contribution toward the realization of the above-mentioned aim. Nor does it make sense to keep such persons in German prisons and penitentiaries for years, even if they are utilized as workers for war purposes, as is done today on a large scale." (NG-558)

There is no doubt that these intentions were part of the directive agreed upon by Thierack in his meeting with Himmler of September 18, 1942 concerning the

"Delivery of asocial elements from the implementation of a sentence to the Reichsführer SS for extermination through labor" (PS-654),

but there is a great difference between the extermination of "these peoples", as Hilberg wrote, and the extermination of "members of these ethnicities", who were individual "persons" against whom penal measures were implemented. This is just one of Hilberg's innumerable quotations out of context, amounting to egregious distortion of the source.

I conclude this chapter with a more-complete quotation from Browning's opinion on the second, 1985 edition of Hilberg's *opus magnum* as mentioned by Robert Faurisson (Browning 2007, pp. 14f.):

"The second edition appeared at the height of the intentionalist-functionalist controversy. While he did not address or even acknowledge that historiographical controversy explicitly, he was clearly affected by it.

All references to Hitler's decisions and orders for the 'Final Solution' disappeared from the second edition – with one exception. Buried in a single footnote stood the solitary reference: 'Chronology and circumstances point to a Hitler decision before the summer [of 1941] ended.' [...] In the second edition, decisions were not taken and orders were not given; rather, Hitler prophesied, commented, and wished. Within the bureaucracy ideas crystallized, thinking converged, and atmosphere and expectation facilitated individual initiative."

In the interview he gave to film director Claude Lanzmann in January 1979,²⁰³ Hilberg showed that he had completely abandoned the *Führerbefehl* theory, expressing an openly functionalist position:

"[...] that one cannot find a specific document, a specific plan, outline or blueprint which states: 'Now the Jews will be killed.' Everything is left to influence from general words. [...]"

The very wording Final Solution or total solution, or territorial solution leaves something to the bureaucrat [sic] that he must infer." (p. 45)

"It was an authorisation to invent, it was an authorization to begin something that was not as yet capable of being put into words." (p. 46)

The idea of extermination was practically born in the bureaucracy from a radicalization of the measures adopted against the Jews:

"The plan, the outline, the goal emerges from the steps as they are being taken. There is a sense of direction, you see, there is a sense that one is going in every [sic] more drastic steps towards something unprecedented." (p. 47)

As early as March 1941, the *Einsatzgruppen* had been given the task of "the killing of the Jews, as many as possible" (p. 73), which began to take place on June 22, 1941, so that "the Final Solution has begun for the area East, East of German dominated Europe as of June 22nd" (p. 74). Hilberg lays out his opinion as follows:

"And this operation, which in a few months resulted in the death of at least a half million Jews, was the opening. At this point however, there is as yet no clear... clear idea of what to do with the Jews in the Rest of Europe. Now, as of June 22, 1941, there simply is no document that can fairly be described an order to annihilate the Jews of Europe." (p. 75)

"What we do not have for the Final Solution is a written document signed by Hitler himself. So all of these Führer directives, Führer wishes, Führer orders, are inferred from things that he must have said. Perhaps he said them to Göring, perhaps he said them to Himmler, perhaps he said them to someone else. Evidently, he s[a]id them several times and in several contexts, but not necessarily clearly." (p. 76)

The system, according to Hilberg, was not based on "prescriptions", on orders, but on the "understandings" of Hitler's words:

"We now know that prescriptions can be written and ignored. Prescriptions are useless if they are not followed. But understandings, once they exist, can utilize any words, spoken or even unspoken, to achieve a goal. And those people had an understanding of what they were supposed to do." (ibid.)

The "Final Solution" was therefore "the product of everybody, and it could not possibly have been manufactured by a single person", therefore there was no extermination order; one can only say that the situation was "ripe" (p. 77).

²⁰³ Claude Lanzmann, transcript of the interview with Raul Hilberg, *Shoah*, Part 1, online: <https://archive.org/details/ClaudeLanzmannInterviewWithRaulHilbergShoahPart1> (last accessed on April 20, 2021). Subsequent page numbers in the text from there unless indicated otherwise.

Given the premises, Hilberg embarked on a rather-imaginative historical reconstruction. With the letter of July 31, 1941, Göring authorized Heydrich "to undertake all necessary preparations [...] for a comprehensive solution of the Jewish question", which, as I recall, referred to the Madagascar Project, but for Hilberg this meant:

"Let us take the Jews first off the Reich, off the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, and let us ship them out into the area which is now the scene of operations of the Einsatzgruppen, because there we have our eingearbeitete [trained] Einsatzgruppen who already know what to do, and that which they have done to the Lithuanian Jews, the Russian Jews, they can also do to the new transports, which we will send them." So the first thought indeed is to send the Jews to Riga, to Minsk and to Kaunas." (p. 80)

In this context, Hilberg mentions the alleged execution of the 5,000 Jews of the Reich and the Protectorate on November 25 and 29, 1941 (p. 81), which I dealt with earlier. He stated later:

"But in 1940, in 1941, that was the period of experimentation. And that was the point at which transports seemed to be moving almost aimlessly, just in a rather general direction: the East. Now of course, for Heydrich in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, it is clear what the East means in the narrow sense. It means the area in which he has his Einsatzgruppen who are already killing Jews in Russia." (p. 88)

That these Jews were transferred to the above-mentioned locations for the purpose of extermination is blatantly false, as I have demonstrated in detail earlier. Moreover, on July 3, 1942, Report No. 10 of the "Reports from the occupied eastern territories" states in the section "Evacuation of Jews from the Reich" that the 25,103 Jews of the Reich deported to Riga in 25 transports from November 17, 1941 to January 6, 1942 were still there.²⁰⁴ For Hilberg, however,

"the Final Solution has now encompassed not only Jews found in the territories East of the line which existed on June 22 [1941], but already it has become European. Already it has taken victims from the West. And this is the beginning of... in November, the end of November. But – it is not yet the point at which this idea is accepted or acceptable. The people in the East, the Gebietskommissare [territorial commissars], the Stadtkommissare [municipal commissars], the people in charge of these ruined cities cannot... cannot understand what is happening. And they have a vision of tens of thousands of Jews, of hundreds of thousands of Jews arriving to these ruins for them to do the job, and they protested. They protested from White Russia and perhaps from other places." (p. 81)

Faced with this problem, the bureaucrats

²⁰⁴ RGVA, 500-1-775, p. 233.

"have to invent something else. And the first thing of course that they invent is still provided by that same office, the Reichs Security Main Office, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. That's the gas van." (p. 81)

Hence the opening of the Chelmno Camp in December 1941 (p. 87).

This historical figure, which goes back, it is worth remembering, to 1979, is in total contrast with what Hilberg declared during the Zündel trial and wrote in 1985, but it is also intrinsically contradictory. On the one hand, he actually claimed that tens, even hundreds of thousands of Western Jews were sent to the eastern territories to be shot by the *Einsatzgruppen*, a rather simple task, as he puts it, since these units had already killed "at least a half million Jews" within a few months. On the other hand, however, these Jews were not shot, but had to be welcomed by the local bureaucrats who, not knowing what to do, invented the gas vans! This notion is both historically false and also logistically impossible, for how was some gas van that could hold a few tens of people at a time supposed to dispose of hundreds of thousands of Jews?

4.3. Hilberg's Method

In the summary reproduced above, Prof. Faurisson refers to Hilberg's concessions regarding the low credibility of various elements of Gerstein's and Höss's testimonies. At this point I shall examine in greater depth the question from another point of view, that of the manner in which Hilberg dealt with these testimonies in particular, and testimonies in general.

While cross-examined by Doug Christie, Hilberg declared about Gerstein:

"A. All right. I would be very, very careful in the use of certain statements, that I would put Gerstein's statement as one that one must be most careful about. Parts are corroborated; others are pure nonsense."

Q. You would take parts that are, in your view, credible.

A. Yes.

Q. And leave out the parts that, in your view, were incredible.

A. That's a fair assessment, yeah." (pp. 904/158)

Christie then questioned Hilberg on Gerstein's well-known statement regarding the crowding together of 700-800 persons into a gas chamber measuring 25 square meters, which would result in a density of 28-32 persons per square meter. Hilberg replies:

"Q. But I am asking you whether, as a commonsense principle, if you meet somebody that tells you that between twenty-eight and thirty-two people can be packed into one square meter, 1.8 meters high, that that person is either a fool or is a liar? Would you agree with me?"

A. Well, on this particular datum I would be very careful, because Gerstein, apparently, was a very exciteable [excitable] person. He was capable of all

kinds of statements which he, indeed, made not only in the affidavit but its context.

Q. He wasn't totally sane.

A. I am not a judge of sanity, but I would be careful about what he said." (pp. 905/159)

Hilberg later added:

"A. It's very hard to characterize the man, because he was capable, in his excitement, of adding imagination to fact." (pp. 906/159)

As to Gerstein's claim of 700-800 persons in a gas chamber measuring 25 square meters, Hilberg justified himself, asserting:

"He may have said it three times as far as I know, but I didn't use that statement." (pp. 907/159)

He declared that Gerstein was above all an important witness of the existence of the extermination camp at Bełżec, and added:

"Beyond that I realized, of course, clearly, what sort of person this was from the context of the language he used, and did not rely upon any statements that appeared to me, either imaginative or exaggerated. I did not use them.

Q. In fact, in your book, in your use of his statement, you eliminated all such ridiculous parts.

A. Well, I eliminated anything that seemed not to be plausible or credible, certainly." (pp. 920f./161)

Later, in his 1992 book *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders*, Hilberg explained what did not seem plausible or credible to him in the Gerstein statement:

"In these recollections, there are errors in rendering ranks and names, and there is an account, based on a fictitious story told to him, of a visit by Hitler to Lublin, complete with a conversation that was supposed to have taken place between Hitler and the SS and Police Leader in the Lublin District, Odilo Globocnik." (Hilberg 1992, p. 221)

Are we to believe, therefore, that all the absurdities with which this imaginary statement is teeming in addition to what Christie mentioned – such as, for example, the pile of shoes at Bełżec and clothes at Treblinka 35-40 meters high; the collection of something like 400,000-800,000 tons of garments taken from the killed victims by August 1942, which would amount to some 60,000 to 120,000 railway freight cars full; the extermination capacity of 35,000 persons per day for the camps at Bełżec, Treblinka and Majdanek; the 20 million gassing victims at Bełżec and Treblinka, etc. (see Mattogno 2021, pp. 91-144) – were perfectly plausible and believable for Hilberg?

During cross-examination, Hilberg later explained his peculiar method:

"Yes, but I quoted only those portions of his statement that seem to be credible, and I made no use of those that were not. [...]"

If a statement contains ten points, be they numbered or not, and I decide that two or three of them are credible, are correct, are plausible, I will make use of them. If I decide others are not so, I will not make use of them." (pp. 927/162)

He then made a sort of disquisition of his method of extrapolation:

"I explained to you what I mean by 'out of context'. Out of context means the use of words by an author in such a way as to render the meaning he intended differently from the way that he intended it to be. That, to me, means out of context. It means to leave out qualifications. It means to leave out ifs, buts, however; but if a person makes a statement which can easily be segmented into ten different assertions or twelve different assertions or twenty different assertions and I find that ten are credible and ten are not credible, or that five are credible and fifteen are not credible, if I happen to choose those, which I find to be confirmed by others, which I find to be plausible in the light of events as I know them, then I'm not taking these statements out of context, of what he [the person in the hypothesis] is saying." (pp. 945/166)

Hilberg confirmed this, his, method, also in the discussion of the testimony of Rudolf Höss:

"Q. So you leave out parts of testimony that you consider ridiculous, and you keep what you consider credible. Right?"

A. I plead guilty.

Q. Well, that process of selective perception was inclined to convince your readers that this man, Hoess, was a credible witness, wasn't it?"

A. He was credible in some respects. In fact, in most respects, under most circumstances in which he made statements." (pp. 1096/192)

In this case there was the aggravating factor of the torture well-known to have been inflicted on Höss by the British, of which Hilberg knew nothing, just as he knew nothing of the following rather strange fact, to say the least:

"Q. Are you aware of the fact that upon his initial capture a statement was written for him in English, in handwriting, by a person other than him, and he signed it?"

A. Now, that I don't know." (p. 1088/191)

The lawyer then referred to Höss's statement of March 16, 1946, where we read:²⁰⁵

"I personally arranged on orders received from Himmler in May 1941 the gassing of two million persons between June/July 1941 and the end of 1943 which time I was commandant of Auschwitz."

And one need not be an expert graphologist to note the great difference between the handwriting of the text and that of the signature and rank of Höss, particularly obvious in the word "Auschwitz" as written in an unknown English hand, and as signed by Höss. This declaration dates the presumed Himmler

²⁰⁵ Russell 1954, page outside text between pp. 180 and 181. See Mattogno 2020, pp. 32f., and Doc. 8, p. 369.

order to May 1941, lets the presumed extermination at Auschwitz begin in June-July 1941, and mentions two million gassing victims by the end of 1943: three assertions, three absurdities.

Even the affidavit of April 5, 1946 (PS-3868), mentioned several times already, was drawn up in English and was simply signed by Höss.²⁰⁶

Over the course of the cross-examination, another more-than-questionable method of Hilberg's emerged which takes as a criterion for the truthfulness of a claimed event the number of testimonies that claim it. He in fact declared that he accepted as true certain facts in a testimony "Insofar as they confirmed other information or were confirmed by other information" (pp. 1103f./194) the "other information" being other testimonies. Hilberg also mentioned a couple of examples of the application of this method. He noted that "The Schillinger episode is recorded in a number of accounts." (pp. 1140/200). In reply to Christie's question whether he believed the story of the flaming chimneys, Hilberg replies:

"Let me simply say that there are many accounts of substantially similar nature of the same phenomenon, not only by survivors, but by persons and in the vicinity of Auschwitz." (pp. 1160/203)

There is no need to dwell on the aberration of such a method, which, for example, would have led Hilberg to endorse the Soviet fairy tale of four million victims at Auschwitz, since there are "many" similar tales in this regard!

Hilberg openly declared that his "specialization is the gassing of Jews" (pp. 897/157). But he had never inspected any presumed extermination camp. His first and only visit to Auschwitz and Treblinka was *not* in fact dictated by the historical interest of the places, but occurred during ceremonies. He in fact remained one day at Treblinka and perhaps half a day at Auschwitz and half a day at Birkenau (pp. 771-774/139). He justified himself asserting that he had "studied the documents" (pp. 775/139), but neither in the "definitive," 1985 edition nor in the last, 2003 edition of his book does he even mention any documents from the Auschwitz archives. The documents studied by him by the time of his cross-examination were a poor lot, for the most part: "aerial photographs," "contemporaneous documents about the lethality of the gas that was employed," "filters for gas masks," things which were, according to him, "all connected with gas chambers" (pp. 969f./170); moreover "railway materials [documents]," "correspondence pertaining to the construction of gas chambers," which is a false assertion if we are speaking of *homicidal* gas chambers, and "correspondence about the delivery of gas" (pp. 1240f./217f.).

Hence, I have to agree with Robert Faurisson's characterization of Hilberg as

"a man lost in the fog of his ideas, a sort of theologian who has built himself a mental universe in which the materiality of things had no place; he was simply

²⁰⁶ Mattogno 2020, pp. 65-69; Doc. 10, pp. 374-376.

too aloof a professor, a 'paper historian' like Vidal-Naquet." (Faurisson 1999, pp. 954f.)

5. Hilberg on the *Führer* Order during the 1980s

5.1. The Paris Conference

Between June 29 and July 2, 1982, the *École des Hautes Études en sciences sociales* and the Sorbonne held an important international conference at Paris on the theme of "Nazi Germany and the Jewish Genocide." The related documents were published in 1985 in a volume with the same title. An English translation appeared in 1989 containing only 15 of the original 23 contributions (Furet). Hilberg also participated at the conference with two presentations: "The Bureaucracy of Annihilation" (Furet, pp. 119-133)²⁰⁷ and "The Statistics" (pp. 155-171).

5.1.1. Intentionalists and Functionalists

The conference was organized to curb the progress of revisionist historiography, as admitted by French historian François Furet, one of the organizers, without mincing his words (pp. viif.):

"Our initial idea was quite simple. We knew that it was time, even high time, almost forty years after World War II, to collect in a single volume what specialists had discovered about one of the most tragic episodes of that war: the genocide of the Jews by the Nazis. Like many others, I had been surprised and shocked by the efforts of small partisan groups to cast doubt upon the veracity of the facts, or to banalize their import. But indignation does not constitute knowledge: it may even be an obstacle to knowledge, like prejudgment of materials or partisanship. Therefore, it was necessary to let some people speak who had devoted their principal efforts to historical research on nazism, World War II, and the 'final solution of the Jewish problem.' As the professional jargon puts it, the time had come for summing up the 'state of the question.' Hence, the initiative of a colloquium organized by the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) at the beginning of July 1982."

Israeli historian Saul Friedländer stressed:

²⁰⁷ All subsequent page numbers in the text from Furet, unless stated otherwise. Assuming that Hilberg and other anglophone contributors submitted their original English texts for the publication of the English version of this book, I quote from the English edition whenever possible rather than translate from the French of École....

"Since the end of the 1960s, the historiography of National Socialism at this level, in the Federal Republic [of Germany] in particular but in other Western countries too, has tended to adopt [École..., p. 20: se divise – implicitement ou explicitement – en = is divided – implicitly or explicitly – into] two opposite positions: 'intentionalism' and 'functionalism.'

For the intentionalists there is a direct relationship between ideology, planning, and policy decisions in the Third Reich. As for the absolute centrality of the supreme leader, Adolf Hitler, it is obvious to such a degree that Klaus Hildebrand claims: 'One should not talk about National Socialism, but of Hitlerism.' The functionalist position, on the other hand, implies that there is no necessary relationship between the ideological basis and the political initiatives of the Nazis. It holds that decisions are functionally linked to each other and to a given state of the political context, that through the constant interaction of various semiautonomous agencies the role of the supreme decision-maker may sometimes be quite limited, and that his decisions often take on the aspect of planned policy only from the vantage of hindsight. We have the image of a system in which every crucial decision depends on the will of Adolf Hitler on the one hand, and that of a more or less anarchic polycracy on the other hand.

The opposition between these two theses appears with particular clarity in terms of their interpretations of Nazi policies toward the Jews." (pp. 11f.)

While the intentionalist position asserts the "continuity between the ideology of the 1920s and the final extermination" (p. 12), the functionalist position, which presents contrasting aspects, maintains that "the Nazi system was to a great extent chaotic, and major decisions were often the result of the most-diverse pressures, without any imperative central planning, forecasting, or clear orders given from the top" (p. 14).

In his paper presented at the Paris conference, of which the article published in the later book is a revised version, Friedländer noted that both positions are basically unfounded (Friedländer, p. 419):

"Neither the theory of the inexorable continuity and of a plan for the total extermination of the Jews before the attack on the USSR, nor that of the discontinuity and improvisation can actually be demonstrated with the present state of the sources: this is the conclusion arrived at by Krausnick and Wilhelm at the end of their monumental study of the Einsatzgruppen. It is also the only conclusion which seems plausible to us at this stage."

He then delineated a "picture of the acquisitions of historiography" on the Holocaust, where he admitted (*ibid.*, p. 420):

"The question of the date when the total physical extermination of the Jews was decided upon, as well as the problem of the development of the plan for the 'final solution' remain unresolved."

The reworked text which appears in the book about that conference does not contain this frank admission of the vacuity of the related historiographical dis-

cussion, but the fundamental problem of the extermination order is also depicted as unresolved (p. 14):

"No historian today believes that such an order was issued in writing. In its oral form it could have been either a clear instruction passed on to Goring or Himmler, or, more probably, a broad hint understood by everybody."

Martin Broszat's interpretation was rather more radical (École..., p. 23):

"there was never a comprehensive order concerning the extermination of the Jews."

In the English edition, this was toned down to (pp. 16f.):

"Broszat believes that such an order probably never existed."

As for Friedländer, he attempted a synthesis between the two opposing positions: recognizing on the one hand that functionalism "in many ways fits better within the mainstream of modern historiography" than intentionalism, yet sustaining on the other hand that, in Jewish policy, no important decision was made without Hitler knowing about it (p. 18). But his conclusion that "the existence of an overall plan for the extermination of the Jews of Europe, by the fall of 1941, can hardly be questioned any longer" (p. 26) was a mere conjecture, just like those of his colleagues.

Eberhard Jäckel supports the radical intentionalist theory, according to which Hitler was hell-bent at implementing a bloody solution to the Jewish question since the 1920s. He started from the analysis of the fundamental step of "Hitler's first political document," a letter to his friend Adolf Gemlich dated September 16, 1919:²⁰⁸

"Anti-Semitism for purely emotional reasons will find its ultimate expression in the form of pogroms. Anti-Semitism of reason, however, must lead to the systematic legal fight against and elimination of the privileges of the Jew, which he has in contrast to the other strangers living between us (aliens legislation). Its ultimate goal, however, must inevitably be the removal of the Jews above all."

Jäckel commented on this passage as follows (École..., p. 102):

²⁰⁸ École..., p. 101; Jäckel's contribution is not included in Furet. The text cited here was translated from the original German text in Deuerlein, p. 204. The French translation of this text contains a crude error: the translator correctly renders "*Beseitigung*" as "*élimination*," but repeatedly translates "*Entfernung*," which means "removal," as "*élimination*." The phrase "*muss unverrückbar die Entfernung der Juden überhaupt sein*" does not mean "must immutably be the elimination of the Jews in general," but "must immutably be the removal of the Jews above all." These tricks allow the translator to insinuate the idea of a "general elimination of the Jews," completely distorting the actual meaning. For the sake of consistency, the translator always renders the noun "*Entfernung*" (removal) and the verb "*entfernen*" (remove) as "*élimination*" and "*éliminer*," beginning with the very title of E. Jäckel's paper: "*L'élimination des Juifs dans le programme de Hitler*." Hilberg shifts the goal posts in his 1992 book *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders*, in which he interprets the term "*Entfernung*" as the "ambiguous, yet total removal, disappearance, or elimination of the Jews" (p. 5), with each term moving away from the actual meaning (removal) to one close to "extermination" (elimination)!

"What measures did Hitler propose? It is obvious that this is the most important question. Neither pogrom nor excess. It was necessary to proceed in a legal and programmed manner. Hitler distinguished two phases. First of all, it was necessary to subject the Jews to the foreigner legislation, to withdraw their civil rights, to treat them for what they really were: foreigners. Then, eliminate them altogether. Hitler did not clarify this concept of elimination, which was repeated incessantly since then. What can be said at least is that he wanted their emigration or expulsion out of Germany; but it is not excluded that he already thought of their extermination."

This hypothesis is allegedly confirmed by *Mein Kampf*, in which Jäckel found "a frankly monstrous radicalization of measures recommended in the fight against the Jews" (*ibid.*, p. 108):

"The elimination of the Jews demanded until then – while partly conserving the term elimination, annihilation – became the extirpation of the Jews and, quite openly, their physical liquidation, their killing. Even if Hitler had previously imagined this solution, perhaps unconsciously, he proclaimed it here publicly for the first time."

The theory advocated by Jäckel was refuted by another conference participant, Karl A. Schleunes. In his paper on the "Nazi policy towards the Jews" between 1933 and 1939, he discussed the same argument. At the beginning, he summarized the intentionalist theory (p. 55):

"Did Hitler know, when he became chancellor in 1933, what he hoped to accomplish concerning the Jewish question? Was Auschwitz the product of such a clearly conceived design? Or did Hitler, as some suggest, have his objectives defined even before 1933? As early as 1919, after all, before joining the German Workers' Party, Hitler had communicated to one of his superiors his views on the Jewish problem and his belief that a 'rational anti-Semitism' must have as its fixed goal the 'removal of the Jews altogether.' By 1924, when he wrote Mein Kampf, he was clearly in possession of a full-blown racist Weltanschauung [world view] that had anti-Semitism as its centerpiece. Even the gassing of Jews is mentioned in Mein Kampf. If, during the world war, Hitler wrote, Germany had placed 'twelve or fifteen thousand... Hebrew corrupters of the people under poisonous gas,' so they might have suffered at home what hundreds of thousands of German soldiers endured on the battlefield, the sacrifices at the front 'would not have been in vain.'

The view that Hitler knew from the outset, possibly as early as 1919, what the outline of a Jewish policy should be, has been most fully and persuasively argued by Lucy Dawidowicz, principally in her book The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 (1975). To support her case she cites Hitler's 1919 letter,^[209] appropriate passages from Mein Kampf, and numerous other references Hitler made to Jews before he was made chancellor. Each one of these utterances, she argues, 'prefigures the political realities of the German dictatorship under

²⁰⁹ The just-mentioned letter to Gemlich. Lucy Dawidowicz correctly translates "Entfernung" as "removal"; Dawidowicz 1979, p. 43.

Hitler... 'When these prefigurations are placed in light of Hitler's subsequent warning on January 30, 1939, that if Jews should 'succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war,' the result would be 'the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe,' the argument that the 'Final Solution' was the inevitable culmination of a grand design becomes all the more persuasive."

Schleunes, by contrast, maintained that an intention or a project to exterminate the Jews never existed, neither in the 1920s, nor even in the period from 1933 to 1939:

"Did Hitler, or anyone else in the Nazi leadership, know in January 1933, or even before then, what the objectives of a Jewish policy should be? The evidence suggests that he did not, and that no one else did either." (p. 56)

Anti-Jewish rhetoric undoubtedly constituted the central theme of Nazi propaganda from the very beginning.

"[...] but in 1933, to say nothing of 1919 or 1925, no one yet imagined where that energy might lead."

In reference to the first six years of Hitler's rule, one cannot speak of a Nazi Jewish policy. Instead, one must speak of many Jewish policies, no one of them truly official, no one of them coordinated with the others, and many of them pursued in contradiction to each of the others. Not until 1939, in the aftermath of difficulties produced by the Reichskristallnacht [the November 1938 pogroms], is there brought into Jewish policy a measure of coordination that reflects clearly the intervention of Adolf Hitler. Until then Jewish policy had been the object of extraordinary contention within the Nazi leadership, the object of internal power struggles that resembled nothing so much as they did jungle warfare. It was a warfare in which the fittest prevailed. By 1939 that had proved to be Heinrich Himmler and his various police agencies, particularly the SS and its SD adjunct." (p. 56)

This multiplicity of policies depended on the fact that

"When the Nazis did come to power some eight months later, Jewish policy did not receive the immediate priority that ideological considerations might lead one to suspect." (p. 58)

In these early years, Hitler's action was solely restrictive and indicative:

"A solution to the Jewish problem in the sense of there being mounted a concentrated and centrally coordinated policy did not yet have a sufficiently high priority for Hitler to place someone clearly in charge; neither did he contribute specific ideas as to what a solution might actually entail." (p. 62)

The consistent policy which took shape in 1939 aimed at the emigration and expulsion of the Jews from Germany. Starting in 1934, the SS, in a "Report on the Jewish Question," had proposed organizing the mass emigration of the Jews out of Germany. The idea was also put forward of encouraging Zionist sentiments among the Jews in order to induce them to leave.

"The SS was not to gain full control over Jewish emigration (and therefore over Jewish policy) until 1939 when Hitler commissioned it to organize the emigration of Jews from the entire Reich." (p. 64)

This assignment was the consequence of the success achieved by the SS in Austria, in particular by Adolf Eichmann, who, in the months following the *Anschluss*, organized the emigration of almost one quarter of the Austrian Jews.

"It is the emergence of Eichmann as an important figure in Jewish policy that provides some of the most persuasive evidence that the Final Solution was not the result of a long-standing grand design." (p. 64)

In the light of this policy of emigration, Schleunes concluded, Hitler's menacing expressions during 1938 and 1939 must be interpreted in a purely metaphorical sense:

"There was a great deal of talk in late 1938 and early 1939 about a solution to the Jewish problem being imminent. 'The problem will soon be solved,' Hitler told South Africa's minister for defense, Oswald Pirow, on November 24, 1938. To Czech Foreign Minister Frantisek Chvalkovsky a few weeks later, he said: 'We are going to destroy the Jews.'^[210] They are not going to get away with what they did on 9 November 1918. The day of reckoning has come.' And on January 30, 1939, he made his forecast to the Reichstag that war, if it should come, would lead to 'the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.' Did Hitler mean actual physical annihilation? Probably not yet, although the viciousness of his rhetoric certainly served to bring that day nearer. Eberhard Jäckel has pointed out that Hitler did not mean physical killing every time he used the word 'extermination.' There is a wealth of evidence to indicate that throughout 1939 the Nazis still saw a Germany rendered judenrein ('cleansed of Jews') by emigration as their vision of a solution to the Jewish problem. On January 24, 1939, one week before Hitler's much quoted Reichstag speech, Göring had commissioned Reinhard Heydrich to coordinate the accelerated emigration of Jews from Germany. Heydrich had been at the meeting in the Aviation Ministry following the Kristallnacht and used the opportunity to boast about the successes Eichmann had achieved in organizing emigration from Austria. Eichmann's techniques were now to be employed also in Germany. From within the SS, Heydrich appointed Gestapo official Heinrich Müller to direct the new Central Office for Jewish Emigration. Offices similar to the one Eichmann had established in Vienna were to be created in Berlin, Breslau, Frankfurt, and Hamburg." (pp. 68f.)

Emigration policy, Schleunes notes, was continued even after the outbreak of the war, although with ever-decreasing success, until the military situation forced its abandonment:

²¹⁰ The German text is "*Bei uns werden sie vernichtet*," meaning "With us [at home=in Germany], they [the Jews] are annihilated." See Chapter 1.4.

"Emigration schemes that had been unable to keep pace with Hitler's peacetime acquisitions fell apart almost completely with the outbreak of war in September 1939. The war was larger than Hitler had anticipated, involving an unexpected front in the west, as well as one to the east. One more emigration scheme, the so-called Madagascar Plan, did briefly dominate Jewish policy in the period immediately following the outbreak of war. Originating in the Foreign Office, the plan called for the settling of Jews from Nazi-controlled Europe in this French protectorate. Briefly stated, the scheme called for France to cede Madagascar, thereby making it available for Jewish immigration. The settlement in turn was to be financed by Jewish assets the Nazis would seize in Europe. Himmler and Heydrich found the idea acceptable because Madagascar was to be governed by the SS. Nothing came of the plan. The war virtually precluded its success or that of any other emigration scheme. Not only was the war larger than expected, but it also transformed dramatically the nature of the Jewish problem. The conquest of Poland brought at least 3 million Jews into the Nazi orbit. Their emigration or expulsion, Rosenberg's grandiose visions notwithstanding, was out of the question." (p. 69)

5.1.2. The Extermination Order

Uwe Dietrich Adam examined National-Socialist Jewish policy from September 1939 to June 1941, a period which "may be considered as that of the escalation towards the 'Final Solution.'" He nevertheless made it immediately clear that

"the chronological placing of an order to carry out the 'Final Solution' constitutes a classic [École..., p. 177: non résolu = unsolved] dating problem in both German and world history." (p. 84)

As to the origins of the "Final Solution," Adam sided decisively against the radical intentionalist theory maintained by Jäckel, declaring himself in accord "with the overwhelming majority of historians that an order to wipe out the Jews under German control, in whatever form it may have taken, was not given or even planned until the beginning of the war" (p. 85). Since "it has not been possible so far to give documentary proof of such an order" and it is improbable that any such order will ever be found in the future,

"the job is left to the historian to determine a more accurate date for such an order through interpretation. Since this is being done by different methods and hypotheses, we have a considerable range of opinion as to the time at which a decision of Hitler's could have been given. One estimate places the conception of the 'Final Solution' in the time of Landsberg (Jäckel, Dawidowicz), others fix the time as March 1941 (Krausnick) or July 1941 (Wilbert [sic; Hilberg], Browning), and another indicates late autumn 1941 (Adam, Broszat).

Neither the legislative nor the administrative steps taken by the Third Reich itself against the Jews may be considered appropriate means of answering the question as to the possible date for an extermination order. But if one is famil-

iar with the institutional structure of the Reich after the war broke out, knowing which steps were taken narrows down the possibilities for interpretation and even provides grounds for the elimination of certain dates or the confirmation of other ones with a greater degree of certainty." (Emphasis added; p. 85)

At the outbreak of the war, the Jewish question, which was formulated in the Party program and by the primary protagonists of racial legislation, was resolved.

"If it is possible to summarize most of the measures in a general Nazi Party policy against the Jews, we find one dominant and repeated goal: the separation of 'Aryans' and Jews. That political and racial target of party ideology – the elimination of the Jews from the German Volkskörper – was achieved in 1938." (p. 86)

After the beginning of the hostilities, Nazi policy with regard to the Jews aimed at consolidating this separation, but:

"Shortsighted considerations, offices which thought themselves powerful enough to force through an issue, an accidental or intentional utterance by Hitler – these and other imponderables formed and characterized the anti-Jewish policy to a large degree. The lack of unity and the erratic shifts in this legislation were influenced not least of all by the fact that there existed no central authority able to coordinate, administer, or direct all the anti-Jewish measures." (p. 93)

The Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) continued the pre-war policy of emigration during this period.

"Before the beginning of the war, the Security Service (SD) in particular argued vehemently for a 'solution to the Jewish question' by emigration and even obtained Hitler's approval in February 1938. The establishment of the Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung (Central Agency for Jewish Emigration) in January 1939 gave Heydrich a voice in the determination of Jewish policy on the ministerial level. Heydrich pushed the emigration plans of the SD quickly and had his first substantial success in July 1939 when he founded the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland (Reich Association of Jews in Germany). Because the Reichsvereinigung was subordinate to the RSHA, he not only succeeded in gaining control over the important Jewish cultural associations, but also became the ultimate authority in all financial and organizational questions of Jewish emigration." (pp. 93f.)

But the RSHA had not taken into consideration "the anarchic structure of the Third Reich," which created obstacles in the way of Jewish emigration, and did not permit it to "achieve Eichmann's stupefying emigration figures" for Vienna and Prague for Germany as well.

"After the outbreak of the war, we may assume that the policy of the RSHA was in accord with Hitler's intentions to produce a 'judenreines Deutschland' (Germany purified of Jews) as quickly as possible." (p. 94)

The RSHA attempted to solve the pressing emigration problem.

"It is true that the emigration fee increased steadily, but at the same time the RSHA worked to weaken the regulation on currency. Contrary to all legal restrictions, the RSHA even permitted the employment of Jews in agriculture 'in order to facilitate the emigration of Jews and to give them a professional education.'

The RSHA was also able to weaken or abolish a large number of special tax and currency-limitation regulations for the Jews. In December 1940 it succeeded in convincing the Reichswirtschaftsminister to throw all his regulations overboard and to direct his currency and revenue offices and to speed up financial procedures in all emigration cases.

The general purpose of solving the 'Jewish question' was still visible in May 1941 when the RSHA tried to obtain a general emigration clause from Göring, an order^[211] which later was often interpreted incorrectly because of its content and its wording. Göring directed all institutions to facilitate the emigration of Jews from the Reich, including the Protectorate, as far as possible, even during the war. On the other hand, the emigration of Jews from Belgium and France was to be prevented because of the 'final solution doubtlessly coming.' This deceptive term 'final solution' was interpreted by later generations of historians as meaning physical destruction, but at that time it meant only the emigration of Jews to Madagascar.

Not until August 1941 onward was the net around the Jews drawn tighter. The RSHA imposed an emigration prohibition on able-bodied Jews.^[212] At the end of August 1941, Eichmann extended the order to all Jews in the areas occupied by Germany. On October 23, 1941, the RSHA informed all police authorities and the SD of Himmler's order to prohibit the emigration of Jews during the war, without exception." (pp. 94f.)

Adam's paper ends like this, without specifying what the "net" consisted of.

Christopher R. Browning addressed the specific theme of the decision concerning the Final Solution. Above all, he stressed the essential divergences of opinion dividing the two Holocaust interpretations at the time:

"The decision concerning the Final Solution has been the subject of a wide variety of historical interpretations. The major differences emerge over two related questions: first, the nature of the decision-making process, with particular focus on the role of Hitler and his ideology; and second, the timing of the decision. Such a variety of interpretations warns us, as Martin Broszat has correctly pointed out, that any thesis concerning the origins of the Final Solution is a matter of probability not certainty." (Emphasis added; p. 96)

Browning then sets forth a summary picture of the essential disagreements:

"According to Dawidowicz, conception of the Final Solution preceded implementation by twenty-two years; according to Broszat, conception emerged from practice – the act of sporadically killing groups of Jews gave birth to the idea

²¹¹ W. Schellenberg's letter dated May 20, 1941. NG-3104.

²¹² Eichmann's order regarded men "fit for military service" (*wehrrfähige*) and was obviously intended to prevent supplying the enemy with potential soldiers. Walk 1981, Margin No. 227, p. 347.

of systematically killing all Jews. A wide variety of interpretations flourishes between these distant poles. For example, Eberhard Jäckel argues that the idea of murdering the Jews crystallized in Hitler's mind around 1924. Emphasizing Hitler's threatening statements of the late 1930s, Karl Dietrich Bracher assumes that the intention was there by then. Andreas Hillgruber and Klaus Hildebrand assert the primacy of ideological causation but do not offer a specific date. Others, not all of them functionalists, have focused on 1941, though within that year a number of possible turning points have been suggested. Léon Poliakov has urged early 1941 as most plausible, and Robert Kempner and Helmut Krausnick have argued for a Hitler decision in the spring, connected with preparations for the invasion of Russia. Raul Hilberg has argued for a summer date, when the mass murder put into practice in Russia beckoned as a European-wide solution available to victorious Germany. Uwe Dietrich Adam supports a fall decision, when the stalled military offensive precluded a 'territorial solution' through mass expulsion into Russia. And Sebastian Haffner, certainly no functionalist, argues for early December, when the first premonition of eventual military defeat caused Hitler to seek an irreversible victory over the Jews.

Why can such diversity of interpretation over the nature and timing of the decision for the Final Solution flourish?" (p. 98)

Browning explains this diversity with a subjective reason – the different perspectives from which the intentionalists and functionalists view things – and an objective reason, which is actually the real reason:

"A second reason for such diversity of interpretation is the lack of documentation. There are no written records of what transpired among Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich concerning the Final Solution, and none of them survived to testify after the war. Therefore, the decision-making process at the center must be reconstructed by the historian, who extrapolates from events, documents, and testimony originating outside the inner circle. Like the man in Plato's cave, he sees only the reflection and shadows, but not reality. This hazardous process of extrapolation and reconstruction inevitably invites a wide variety of conclusions." (Emphases added; p. 99)

Browning repeatedly insisted on the near-total absence of documents as to the origins of the decision concerning the "Final Solution":

"Despite all that is known of German preparations for the invasion of Russia, however, specific documentation concerning the intended fate of the Russian Jews is lacking. Conclusions must be drawn from postwar testimony, circumstantial evidence, and scattered references in later documents." (p. 102)

"If the decision to murder the Jews of Russia had been taken before the invasion, precisely how and when this decision was reached remains obscure. It is not possible to determine if the initiative was Hitler's or came from someone else, such as Heydrich. Moreover, it is not possible to determine if Hitler's mind was already set by March, when he made clear to the military that the Russian war would not be a conventional war, or if the degree of military com-

pliance tempted him subsequently to expand the circle of intended victims beyond the 'Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia.' The scant documentation does not permit a definitive answer to these questions, merely informed speculation." (Emphases added; p. 103)

"Precisely how and when Heydrich and his immediate superior, Himmler, became aware of their new task, is not and probably never will be known." (p. 106)

And finally:

*"There was no written order for the Final Solution nor any explicit reference to a verbal order other than the assertions of Himmler and Heydrich that they were acting with the *führer's* approval."* (Emphases added; p. 117)

Browning noted that "the relationship between Hitler's anti-Semitism and the origin of the Final Solution still remains controversial" (p. 100). Nevertheless, the intentionalist theory is clearly refuted by the emigration policy implemented by the National Socialists with regard to the Jews until the fall of 1941:

"The assumption of Nazi Jewish policy as the premeditated and logical consequence of Hitler's anti-Semitism cannot be easily reconciled with his actual behavior in the years before 1941. For example, Hitler's views of the Jews as the 'November criminals' who caused Germany's defeat in World War I was as fervently held as any of his anti-Jewish allegations. Indeed, the oft-cited passage from Mein Kampf lamenting that twelve or fifteen thousand Jews had not been gassed during the war makes far more sense in the context of the stab-in-the-back legend than as a prophecy or intimation of the Final Solution. The 'logical' consequence of the thesis of the Jew as wartime traitor should have been a 'preventive' massacre of German Jewry before the western offensive or at least before the attack on Russia.

In actual practice Nazi Jewish policy sought a judenrein Germany by facilitating and often coercing Jewish emigration. In order to reserve the limited emigration opportunities for German Jews, the Nazis opposed Jewish emigration from elsewhere on the continent. This policy continued until the fall of 1941, when the Nazis prohibited Jewish emigration from Germany and for the first time justified the blocking of Jewish emigration from other countries in terms of preventing their escape from the German grasp.^[213] The efforts of the Nazi Jewish experts to facilitate Jewish emigration both before and during the war, as well as their plans for massive resettlement, were not merely tolerated but encouraged by Hitler. It is difficult to reconcile the assumption of a long-held intention to murder the Jews with this behavior. If Hitler knew he was going to murder the Jews, then he was supporting a policy that 'favored' German Jews over other European Jews and 'rescued' from death many of those he held most responsible for Germany's earlier defeat.

²¹³ According to the Wannsee Protocol, Himmler prohibited Jewish emigration "in consideration of the dangers of emigration during the war and in view of the possibilities of the East." See Subchapter 1.2.

It has been argued that Hitler was merely awaiting the opportune moment to realize his murderous intentions. Not only does that not explain the pursuit of a contradictory policy of emigration in the meantime, it also does not explain the long delay. If Hitler was merely awaiting the outbreak of conflict to pursue his 'war against the Jews,' why were the millions of Polish Jews in his hands since the fall of 1939 granted a thirty-month 'stay of execution'? They were subjected to sporadic massacre and murderous living conditions but not to systematic extermination until 1942." (pp. 100f.)

"In short, the practice of Nazi Jewish policy until 1941 does not support the thesis of a long-held, fixed intention to murder the European Jews.

Hitler's anti-Semitism is more plausibly seen as the stimulant or spur to a continuous search for an increasingly radical solution to the Jewish question rather than as the source of a logically deduced and long-established 'blueprint' for extermination." (p. 101)

For his part, Browning maintains the following theory:

"The intention of systematically murdering the European Jews was not fixed in Hitler's mind before the war, but crystallized in 1941 after previous solutions proved unworkable and the imminent attack upon Russia raised the prospect of yet another vast increase in the number of Jews within the growing German empire. The Final Solution emerged out of a series of decisions taken that year. In the spring Hitler ordered preparations for the murder of the Russian Jews who would fall into German hands during the coming invasion. That summer, confident of military victory, Hitler instigated the preparation of a plan to extend the killing process to European Jews. In October, although military expectations had not been realized, Hitler approved the rough outline of that plan, involving deportation to killing centers that used poison gas." (pp. 96f.)

But even this reconstruction was purely conjectural. Apart from that, Browning declared that this presumed decision could not fit into a general plan of Jewish extermination:

"This did not, however, immediately alter German policy toward the Jews on the rest of the continent. Emigration, expulsion, and plans for future resettlement still held sway. In the fall of 1940 Jews from Baden, the Palatinate, and Luxembourg were expelled to unoccupied France, as were Jews from Vienna to Poland in early 1941. In February 1941, Heydrich was still speaking of 'sending them [the Jews] off to whatever country will be chosen later on.' And the Foreign Office continued to cooperate with the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office) to block Jewish emigration from other countries, so as to monopolize the limited emigration possibilities for Jews from Germany. This policy was reaffirmed as late as May 20, 1941, in a circular signed by Walter Schellenberg, chief of security in the occupied territories, forbidding Jewish emigration from Belgium and France. The old policy of emigration, expulsion, and postwar resettlement was officially dismantled only gradually. In July 1941 the RSHA informed the Foreign Office that no further expulsions to France were intended. In October Jewish emigration from Germany was forbidden. In February 1942

the Foreign Office formally cancelled the Madagascar Plan. Thus, the preparations for the murderous assault upon the Russian Jews did not have immediate repercussions on Nazi Jewish policy elsewhere." (p. 104)

Notwithstanding the above, it never even occurred to Browning to consider whether his conjecture of an order to massacre the Russian Jews itself was without basis in fact; on the contrary:

"The emergence of the Final Solution for the European Jews was a separate process resulting from a separate decision." (p. 104)

But since not even that presumed decision either is supported by any documentary evidence, here the field remained open for the most-disparate conjectures as well, summarized by Browning as follows:

"Hilberg opted for a date no later than July 1941; Uwe Dietrich Adam has argued for a point between September and November; Sebastian Haffner has suggested December; and Martin Broszat has challenged the whole notion of a comprehensive decision on a particular date, and has argued instead for a gradual and unconscious process of escalation." (p. 105)

As to the presumed extermination order, Browning's own position was as follows:

"In July 1941, after Nazi armies had torn through Russian border defenses, encircled huge numbers of Russian troops, and raced two thirds the distance to Moscow, he [Hitler] approved the drawing up of a plan for the mass murder of European Jewry. And in October 1941, with the great encirclement victory of Vyasma and Bryansk and a brief rekindled hope for a final triumph before Winter, he approved the Final Solution." (Browning 1992, p. 27)

This is yet another conjecture based on no documentary evidence at all.

5.1.3. Hilberg's Contribution

At the Paris conference, Hilberg presented two papers which, although fitting into the section "The Extermination," were only of marginal import compared to the central theme as presented by Uwe Dietrich Adam on "The Gas Chambers" (pp. 134-154).

Equipped with a minimum of critical sense, the latter dealt with issues which were then addressed, albeit uncritically, by Hilberg in the "definitive," 1985 edition of his work, in particular with regard to the Bełżec Camp. For example, Adam noted:

"It is rather unlikely that the Jews in the first convoys were all exterminated with bottled gas, as Joseph Oberhauser, Wirth's assistant, stated (Rückerl, op. cit., p. 136), even though [École..., p. 258: de même que = just as] the indications of the number of victims are inexact. However, it is certain that the tribunal reached a false conclusion when they stated that Bełżec 'used Zyklon B during the first weeks, and later, for reasons of economy, diesel motor exhaust gas.'" (FN 72, p. 352)

"The Munich assize court's indications on the 'output' of Belzec were certainly false. [...] The assertion by Kogon (op. cit., p. 185) that the newer gas chambers were able to kill 4,000 persons at once, is not documentable [École..., p. 258: pas défendable = not defensible]." (FN 81, p. 353)

"Kogon, op. cit., p. 171, erroneously placed this episode in the first period of Belzec's functioning. Gerstein's indications about the number of victims killed at Belzec are so unlikely that even the uninitiated might immediately recognize it: Gerstein speaks of 700 to 800 persons gassed in an area of 25 square miles [sic, an embarrassing translation error; École..., p. 260: 25 m² = 25 square meters, not miles!]." (FN 85, p. 353)

Yet nevertheless and incredibly so, for Adam "But an error [sic] of this type, on the contrary, reinforces the credibility and good faith of the witness"! (*Ibid.*)

Adam moreover established the number of presumed gassing victims at Auschwitz, without any references, at between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 persons (p. 151). The editor added a footnote which referred to the well-known article by Georges Wellers titled "An Attempt to Determine the Auschwitz Camp's Death Toll" (Wellers 1983), according to which "the number of persons gassed at Auschwitz has been raised to at least 1,334,700, of whom 1,323,000 were Jews" (FN 108, p. 354), but Hilberg adduced the figure of one million Jews in his work (1985, p. 1318; 2003, p. 1320), without any justification and without ever even citing Wellers's article, which back in 1985 was the most-important study on the number of the presumed gassing victims at Auschwitz.

In an appendix to the volume of conference papers, a 1982 article by Jean-Claude Pressac is reprinted, albeit with the changed titled "Design and Realization of Crematoria IV and V of Auschwitz-Birkenau." It is accompanied by numerous photographs and documents and with archive references to the Auschwitz Museum (École..., pp. 539-584; not included in Furet). In the "definitive," 1985 edition of his book, Hilberg does not mention this study and was never assiduous enough to visit this archive, of which he knows nothing.

In contrast to Adam's paper, the two papers presented by Hilberg dealt with secondary topics – the bureaucracy of the alleged extermination and the death statistics – which are in no specific way relevant to the present study.

5.2. The Stuttgart Conference

5.2.1. The Problems Discussed

The problem of the origins of the decision concerning the "Final Solution," which remained unsolved at the Paris conference, was taken up and examined again at a conference in Stuttgart, southwest Germany, which was held between May 3 and 5, 1984 on the topic of "The Murder of the Jews during the Second World War. Genesis of the Decision and Realization." The related pa-

pers were published the following year in a volume of the same title (*Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Entschlußbildung und Verwirklichung*).

Eberhard Jäckel explained the "principal task" in very clear terms:

"How, when and where, and possibly by whom, was the decision or decisions developed to kill the European Jews in which sequence and in which manner? The question could also be put in simpler terms: how did it come to the realization of the murder of the European Jews during the Second World War?" (Jäckel/Rohwer, 1985, p. 11)²¹⁴

The response to this question was "controversial" particularly because "the situation of the sources [was] unfavorable" (p. 12). This was the result of a series of reasons which Jäckel summarized as follows:

"The operation was strictly secret. Therefore, as little as possible was written down about it. A lot was negotiated only verbally, particularly on the highest command levels. From the few relevant documents, many were probably destroyed before the end of the war. In those which survived, [we] often encounter camouflage terms, which make an understanding even more difficult. Furthermore, many of the persons directly involved were dead before they could be interrogated. Naturally, most survivors responded evasively. But even those who were ready to make statements were often not interrogated with sufficient precision, because the interrogating officials were not interested in details which historians would like to know today. Many witnesses were then executed and took their secrets with them." (p. 12)

In addition, the controversial nature of how the decision was made results from the fact "that the process, despite an undeniable determination, revealed at least initially a lack of uniformity and planning, that it was moreover marked by confusions and improvisations" (p. 12). Four organizations were involved in the extermination operations, and their relations were characterized by "conflicts of jurisdiction and rivalry" (p. 13).

Hence, no documents or reliable testimonies existed on the decision and the sequence of the presumed extermination – and they still don't exist today – thus triggering the controversy between intentionalists and functionalists as it surfaced at the Paris conference. Eberhard Kolb formulated with great clarity the two basic questions that were the main focus of this controversy:

"1) Was the 'Final Solution' the realization of an long-established plan which, as the final stage, provided for the physical extermination of the European Jews from the very beginning?

2) Was there an explicit Hitler order – if not written, then at least verbal – to kill not only the Jews who lived in Eastern Europe, but all the Jews in the German realm of influence, and when was this order issued?" (p. 61)

²¹⁴ All subsequent page numbers in the text from there, unless stated otherwise.

Kolb then reviewed the answers supplied by Holocaust historiography up until the year of the conference:

"If I see it correctly, the majority of the studies today tend to place a big question mark on the concept of National Socialist Jewish policies having developed systematically and proceeded along one single line – from anti-Semitic slogans of agitation of the 'time of struggle' through the anti-Jewish measures of the years 1933-1939 up until the organized mass murder starting in 1941. Instead, at the center of the controversy is currently the question whether (and when) Hitler issued an explicit extermination order.

Until the 1970s, this question was answered almost unanimously in the affirmative. Of course, a written extermination order by Hitler has not been handed down, and one may well assume that such a written order never existed. Nevertheless, an explicit 'Führer order' in the form of a verbal instruction by Hitler to Himmler was seen certainly as the indispensable prerequisite for the murder operations initiated in 1941.

However, there was no full agreement on the date when this Führer order was issued: According to Raul Hilberg's opinion (1961), Hitler gave the general extermination order 'in early summer' of 1941; Helmut Krausnick (1965) dated such an order to 'March 1941 at the latest'; Uwe Dietrich Adam (1972) to a moment 'between September and November 1941'; according to Andreas Hillgruber (1972), Hitler's decision in July 1941 was made in connection with the supposedly already achieved triumph over the Soviet Union and the intended expansion to the East.

Contrary to this, Martin Broszat (1977) doubted that an explicit general extermination order by Hitler ever existed at all. According to Broszat, the physical extermination of the European Jews was not systematically planned and prepared well in advance, not initiated by one single act of decision and one single secret order by Hitler; instead, the 'program' of exterminating the Jews developed gradually in an institutional and factual sense 'from individual operations' until the spring of 1942, and attained a determining character following the setup of the extermination camps in Poland (between December 1941 and July 1942). Broszat opines that, although such an interpretation cannot be documented with absolute certainty, it is more likely than the assumption of a comprehensive secret order to exterminate the Jews in the summer of 1941. Broszat adds: 'If our interpretation assumes that the extermination of the Jews was 'improvised' in such a way, was not planned long in advance and not initiated by a single secret order, then this implies that the responsibility and initiative of the killing operations were not solely down to Hitler, Himmler or Heydrich. But this does not exonerate Hitler at all.'

Broszat's interpretive model of the genesis of the murder plan was later radicalized by Hans Mommsen (1983). Like Broszat, Mommsen is explicitly of the opinion that no 'formal order' by Hitler on the 'Final Solution' ever existed, not even in verbal form. But Mommsen moreover postulates an extraordinarily passive Hitler role in the conceptualization and execution of the murder plan: Hitler let Himmler and his henchmen have their way. 'As already before 1939,

he felt himself invested with responsibility by the Party and SS apparatus, which took literally that which for Hitler represented the 'great historical perspective'. Although Hitler was the ideological and political originator of the Final Solution, 'their implementation from a seemingly Utopian program into an actually adopted strategy was the result of self-created problems on the one hand, and the ambition of Himmler Heinrich and his satraps on the other hand'.

However, the majority of scholars still hold the opinion that the decisive initiative for the murder of the European Jews came from Hitler, and happened in the form of an extermination order issued verbally. Although Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm (1981) admits that there is no proof that the order for the general extermination of the Jews was issued already before the Russian campaign in 1941, he nevertheless rejects the theory of an 'improvised radicalization' of the persecution of the Jews, finally culminating in the systematic killing and emphasizes: without Hitler's trend-setting function and without his consent, all the partial activities leading to the program of the Final Solution would not have been possible.

In explicit contestation with Broszat's interpretation, Christopher Browning (1981) reached the conclusion that Hitler ordered the preparation of an extermination plan in the summer of 1941; the basic features of this murder plan based on this order were approved by Hitler 'in October or November 1941'.

Gerald Fleming (1982) notes that the fateful turning point in the Jewish policy of the Third Reich took place 'in the summer of 1941': At that point, Hitler ordered the extermination of the European Jews, and at the same time decreed that the murder operations had to be carried out with the strictest camouflaging and in the greatest possible secrecy.

Wolfgang Scheffler (1982) stresses emphatically that all essential decisions on the implementation of the mass extermination were taken between March and November 1941. When implementing the Holocaust, however, Hitler and Himmler depended on the given circumstances: 'As cohesive as the extermination program presented itself at the end, the approaches to implement it, as they developed between August and October-November 1941, were very diverse.' Even so, Scheffler continues, the events prove 'that little more than one month or at most three months elapsed between Hitler's decision and the implementation which rapidly became apparent'.

Finally, the more recent statements shall be pointed out. Shlomo Aronson (1984) reached the conclusion that Hitler decided to kill the European Jews 'in the late fall of 1941' due to the coincidence of several factors. Saul Friedländer also opines that the existence of a general extermination plan in the fall of 1941 can no longer be in doubt; Hitler must have approved this extermination plan 'at some time in the summer of 1941.'" (Emphases added; pp. 61-63)

When it comes to its self-imposed objective, the Stuttgart conference completely failed in its objective. Far from reconciling the controversy between intentionalists and functionalists, the discussions during conferences, from which no new information emerged, accentuated it, revealing the inconsistency of

both interpretations in all their varied nuances, as they are both without documentary support and based on mere conjecture. On one single point all participants agreed: a written extermination order never existed.

However, with regard to the existence of a verbal Hitler order, intentionalists and functionalists repeated their opposing positions. The intentionalists examined the genesis of the alleged verbal order in relation to the Führer orders from the summer of 1941 regarding the *Einsatzgruppen*, and in relation to "Operation Reinhardt" and to Auschwitz.

Only Jäckel continued to maintain the extreme theory that Hitler's intention to exterminate the Jews dates back to 1919 (p. 189).

Helmuth Krausnick concerned himself specifically with "existing testimonies and circumstantial evidence as to the possible issuance of an order to shoot the Jews" (pp. 90f.). In this regard, he admits:

"With regards to the questions relating to when, where, by whom and for which circle of persons such an order was transmitted to the Einsatzgruppen, the depositions made after the war do not – or at least no longer – agree."

He added:

"More important than the question who transmitted the murder order is indubitably the question of whether and when it was issued, and to what circle of persons." (p. 91)

Some leaders of the *Einsatzkommandos* asserted that the general killing order was issued "between the end of July and the end of August" of 1941, while others said it was issued "before 22 June 1941" (p. 91), with which Krausnick agreed.

Even Alfred Streim stressed that

"While there is no doubt as to the existence of the verbal 'Führer order', until today, and notwithstanding the systematic clarification of the crimes of the Einsatzgruppen, it has not been possible to clarify conclusively who, in what time period, at which place has transmitted the order to exterminate all Jews to the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen and to the commanders of the Einsatzkommandos or Sonderkommandos." (p. 107)

The question remained unsolved because "after all this the question is still unclear who transmitted the 'Führer order' to the Einsatzgruppen" (p. 115).

In contrast to Krausnick, Streim asserted that "the related order was probably issued only several weeks after the beginning of the campaign in Russia" (p. 112). As to its character, Streim advocated the theory of an "indeterminate order," which was also adopted by other conference participants:

"After all this it is worth noting that the general order of extermination to the Einsatzgruppen was not issued as a cohesive decree at any definite place, at any definite time – as has been assumed so far; instead, several individual orders were issued which, taken together, produced in the end that which we understand, in our language today, as the 'Führer order' [...]" (p. 117)

Browning went much further, declaring that Himmler and Heydrich knew perfectly well what Hitler expected of them, so that, regarding the extermination order, "Hitler did not necessarily have to express himself in such an explicit way." A simple "nod of the head" could have sufficed (p. 186).

Czesław Madajczyk, by contrast, asserted from the audience that the decision as to the fate of the Jews of the Soviet Union was taken "probably between March and May 1941" (p. 202), while Hillgruber added "that the systematic killing of the Jews on Soviet territory to be conquered was a done deal by March 1941 at the latest" (p. 188).

Yehuda Bauer reached the conclusion that "initially a clearly worded order to exterminate the Jewish population completely did not exist" (p. 170). It was issued in the summer of 1941 (p. 166), and even had a written "version":

"Göring's letter should therefore have been unequivocally considered a version of the Führer order. [...]"

Hence, the opinion that we do not have a written Führer order must be revised in part. We do have one version of the Führer order" (p. 172)

In his report on Auschwitz, Bauer maintained "that Auschwitz and the mass murder in the Soviet Union happened simultaneously" (p. 178), and "that Auschwitz was considered as part of the plan for the Final Solution already since the summer of 1941" (p. 169), for which he was sharply criticized by Madajczyk, Rückerl and Hilberg in the subsequent discussion (pp. 174-177).

The functionalists maintain their position just as rigidly. Karl Schleunes asserted that the genesis of the decision of the presumed extermination was "chaotic," like the period of the terror during the French Revolution, or the initial phase of the Bolshevik Revolution. Hitler spoke seriously of the creation of an Aryan national community, but did not know how to obtain it.

"It was clear that a solution of the Jewish question was needed to this end, but it was not clear how the question was to be resolved. It must have been equally unclear initially that the solution would be extremely radical." (p. 80)

This solution was the "cumulative radicalization" of the conflict of authorities among various National-Socialist agencies, all of which wished to contribute to purging the German National-Socialist communities with the aim of achieving the ideal of racial purity (p. 81).

Mommsen spoke of "a self-induced automatism which, in the end, admits no solution other than total liquidation," stating that "nevertheless this process can be explained only to a small degree by Hitler's direct intervention," stating:

"I am decidedly opposed to equating classic ideological, meaning radical anti-Semitic statements by Hitler and others, which aimed at the extermination of the German Jews, with the implementation of this visionary objective in a specific policy. The first statement about the extermination of the Jews in the event of a war dates back to 1933, when the German Reich and Hitler were heaven knows how comparatively far removed from getting into such a position. Re-

ardless of what Hitler thought in this regard, it is clear that German public opinion and also the officials of the regime which did not hold a particularly radical view were already accustomed to this rhetoric to such a degree that they interpreted it essentially as a rhetorical supplement to the Jewish policy of disempowerment and emigration. Therefore, from these public declarations by Hitler, Rosenberg and others, one cannot arrive at the conclusion that anybody who wished to know should have deduced from all this automatically that a policy of final solution was imminent or unfolding." (pp. 192f.)

Mommsen said he was convinced that "after this initial thrust, which occurred in connection with the *Kommissarbefehl*, no other formal act by Hitler was required to put the 'Final Solution' in motion," and added:

"We have no material as to whether Hitler expressed himself concretely in any way internally on the systematic extermination of the Jews." (p. 193)

Broszat added during the discussion:

"Also regarding the extermination of the Jews, Hitler was not absolutely necessary as the leader, as the one who put the related activities in motion with his decision. The determination of many others was sufficient for the murderous measures. This determination was widespread above all within the sphere of the Security Police and the territorial commanders in the East. But Hitler was needed as the charismatic leader, and for the possibility of invoking him, so that the measures resulting from such determination could indeed become the effective policy of the regime. Only the possibility of invoking Hitler permitted conferring upon criminal killing measures the 'holiness' of an ideological policy backed by the charismatic *Führer*. But for this there was no need for an order, a nod by Hitler was sufficient for this, so to speak. From my point of view this means: Hitler was indispensable for the overall process of the extermination of the Jews, but not necessarily as the acting leader, but rather as the indispensable legitimizing authority." (p. 211)

For these scholars, it was not only illusory to speak of a specific order, but also of a systematic plan of extermination. Mommsen declared in this regard:

"We should free ourselves from the illusion that the Final Solution of the European Jewish Question or of the worldwide Jewish Question was ever systematically discussed in the highest leadership circle." (p. 67)

Broszat asserted that the historical conception of National-Socialist policies aiming from the beginning at the extermination of the Jews is unsustainable:

"That is too one-dimensional and lacks sufficient historical authenticity." (p. 179)

Even with regard to the motivation of the presumed decision, irremediable disagreements emerged at the Stuttgart conference. Broszat asserted

"that Hitler, in the spring and summer of 1941 due to pressure from several Gauleiters and the General Governor, had promised as generously as it was reckless that their territories would be made free of Jews within a short time –

promises which were at that time obviously made in connection with the preparation for, or the unfolding of, the war on Russia, but were still based on the expectation that this war would be concluded successfully by the beginning of the winter, and that unlimited possibilities, so to speak, would emerge to expell the Jews into a very distant territory, beyond the German empire of the East. When this proved a fatal error, but the deportation program was already prepared and underway in the Reich, confusions and interim solutions occurred in the fall of 1941, as repeatedly mentioned before, but as their result also the terrible consequence that no other 'way out' but further killing programs seemed possible. This led first to 'Operation Reinhard,' with the aim of eliminating primarily the Polish Jews, then, with the large-scale plant of Auschwitz-Birkenau as technical prerequisite, to the mass extermination of the German and European Jews as well." (pp. 183f.)

Browning was decisively opposed to Broszat's theory:

"This means that the final impetus for the unleashing of the Final Solution did not result from the difficulties of resettling Jews to Russia after the military successes or from the overcrowding of the ghettos. The impetus resulted instead from the euphoria of the victory in the summer of 1941. The enormous victories during the first few months of the Russian campaign enabled the prospect that soon all of Europe would be at the disposal of the National Socialists. In reality, the Final Solution was then implemented under very different conditions, that is, during military setbacks and later during imminent defeat. But the National-Socialist system could not turn back. Once placed in motion, the killing program developed its own thrust." (p. 186)

In the following years, the controversy over the "Führer order" remained unsolved. The new conjectures by Christian Gerlach, accepted by many historians, according to which Hitler is said to have announced his "fundamental decision" during the meeting with the Gauleiters on December 12, 1941, and Browning's speculations about Eichmann's statements have no greater consistency than the previous ones (see Mattogno/Kues/Graf, pp. 257-263).

5.2.2. Hilberg's Contribution

Hilberg's chosen topic for his conference paper was "Operation Reinhard" (pp. 125-136). Referring to the development of the presumed extermination process, he immediately started by saying that "[m]uch, in this regard, will always remain in the dark," since the related decisions and initiatives were taken "verbally" (p. 125). As to the presumed extermination order, Hilberg, like other conference participants, formulated mere conjectures without any documentary support:

"During that summer [1941], Hitler must have issued an unequivocal order to Himmler for the physical extermination of the Jewish people. In any case, that is what Himmler conveyed to various persons, among them Heydrich, who communicated it in turn to the head of the Gestapo, Heinrich Müller, and to

Eichmann. Among them was also Höss, the sinister Auschwitz commandant, and as a third person no doubt the SS and police leader in the Lublin District, Odilo Globocnik, who was put in charge of Operation Reinhard." (p. 126)

During the subsequent discussion, Jäckel opposed Hilberg's conjecture based on another conjecture:

"I only have one short question on the dating, Mr. Hilberg. Why do you assume that Hitler's order of which you have spoken must have been issued only after July 31? After all, we know that Himmler was at Lublin on July 20 and 21, and spoke with Globocnik on that occasion. I have always assumed that Globocnik's instruction by Himmler must have occurred on one of these two days." (p. 137)

In his paper on "Operation Reinhard," Hilberg explained that there were three death camps: Belżec, Sobibór and Treblinka, but "[f]or none of these has it been possible so far to find a site map" (p. 127). Moreover, "[w]hen planning, they improvised somewhat and saved a lot," and these camps were built "under primitive conditions" (p. 127). All three camps were without cremation furnaces (p. 129). He also admitted that the organizational phase of "Operation Reinhard" may raise various questions:

"Why three camps and not just one? Why were they built one after the other, first Belżec, then Sobibór and finally Treblinka? Why were there only three gas chambers to start with, if later they were not enough? One could be inclined to answer that the designers were not aware of the entire extent of their task, that they proceeded by groping towards their objective but did not have it in view. This is not entirely inconceivable, but it is certainly not the whole explanation, and perhaps not even the most important. In brief, we are dealing with a difficult administrative problem.

The Third Reich had no specific or central authority, nor budget item for a 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question.'" (p. 129)

But this was a simple conjecture to attempt to explain away the above-mentioned contradictions.

The "demonstrative" structure of his paper regarding the presumed extermination camps is, in summary, that which appears in his "definitive" work of 1985, but with a concession to mythical "plans of gassing installation" (p. 128), which were obviously never found, and which he openly refutes in the his opus magnum by asserting:

"Information about the number and size of gas chambers in each camp rests not on documentation but on recollection of witnesses." (1985, FN 43, p. 879; 2003, FN 44, p. 937)

In an interview published in the French daily newspaper *Le Monde* in 1994 (Weil), Hilberg repeated that the presumed destruction of the European Jews was implemented "without financing, centralization or planning" and, with regard to "Operation Reinhard" asserted:

"The real problem lies in asking how they succeeded in committing such a monstrous crime with so little human and material resources. Let us consider the killing centers: only 92 German soldiers worked at Treblinka, Sobibór and Belżec, plus a few hundred Ukrainians. 92 Germans in occupied Poland succeeded in killing almost one and a half million Jews in those three extermination centers." (Hilberg 1995, pp. XIII, XV)

But such a concept is in open contradiction with the canonical orthodox concept of Operation Reinhardt,²¹⁵ which is said to have had a central authority (Globocnik), and which was supposedly centralized and planned. Perhaps for this reason Hilberg renounced in his opus magnum the widespread view held among orthodox historians that the term "Operation Reinhardt" was inspired by the name of Reinhardt Heydrich.

Above, I reported the question of defense attorney Douglas Christie to Hilberg whether the existence of Hitler's presumed extermination order was an article of faith based on his opinion. He replied that it was not an article of faith at all, but a conclusion. The findings of the Paris conference and the Stuttgart conference show, on the contrary, that it was in fact an article of faith based on a personal opinion, or a personal opinion assumed as an article of faith.

Just another Hilberg perjury.

Hilberg appeared to have been a functionalist, even a radical functionalist, a supporter of a "telepathic" theory of the genesis of the presumed "process of destruction." The interview with Lanzmann in 1979, hence before the two aforementioned conferences, leaves no doubt in this regard. It is a fact, however, that he was a crypto-intentionalist, a proponent of a sort of metaphysics of history in which the extermination of the Jews was preordained centuries ago as "the culmination of a cyclical trend" (Hilberg 2003 [from here on], p. 5), in which the Germans were predestined for the extermination of the Jews:

"The idea of killing the Jews had its shrouded beginnings in the far-distant past. There is a hint of killing in Martin Luther's long speech against the Jews. Luther likened the Jews to the obstinate Egyptian Pharaoh of the Old Testament: 'Moses,' said Luther, 'could improve Pharaoh neither with plagues nor with miracles, neither with threats nor with prayers; he had to let him drown in the sea.' In the nineteenth century the suggestion of total destruction emerged, in more precise and definite form, in a speech which Deputy Ahlwardt made to the Reichstag. Ahlwardt said that the Jews, like Thugs, were a criminal sea that had to be 'exterminated.'" (pp. 409f.)

These "historical parallels" constituted for Hilberg "precedents of the destruction process" (p. 29). In fact, the "destructive path charted in past centuries was an interrupted path" (p. 10). The "cyclical trend" to what was preordained was carried out in three stages:

²¹⁵ On the question of the origins and significance of *Aktion Reinhardt*, see Graf/Kues/Mattogno, pp. 236-250.

"Since the fourth century after Christ there have been three anti-Jewish policies: conversion, expulsion, and annihilation. The second appeared as an alternative to the first, and the third emerged as an alternative to the second." (pp. 4f.)

The third phase, that of the presumed National-Socialist annihilation, reproduced this theological pattern in turn, since Hilberg considered "definition," "expropriation" and "concentration" as stages of the "destruction process" (pp. 51), which, in his work, becomes a sort of impersonal automatism which proceeded as a self-fulfilling prophecy:

"The destruction of the Jews was thus no accident. When in the early days of 1933 the first civil servant wrote the first definition of "non-Aryan" into a civil service ordinance, the fate of European Jewry was sealed." (p. 1118)

These meta-historical fixations are better suited to a theologian than a historian, and this fully justifies Faurisson's concomitant opinion regarding Hilberg.

And this was, in his view, the first political act of this alleged destruction process:

"All the same, in 1933 the party men seized the opportunity to launch a campaign of violence against individual Jews and to proclaim an anti-Jewish boycott. This time there were serious repercussions in foreign countries. A boycott movement was started against German exports and was supported by Jews and non-Jews alike. By March 27, 1933, Vice-Chancellor Papen was forced to write a letter to the Board of Trade for German-American Commerce, in which he pointed out that the number of 'excesses' against Americans was 'less than a dozen,' that hundreds of thousands of Jews remained unmolested, that the big Jewish publishing houses were still in business, that there was no St. Bartholomew Night, and so on." (p. 33)

In a footnote (FN 13, *ibid.*) Hilberg refers to the following sources: Documents D-635, L-198 and RC-49, in addition to the *New York Times* of March 29, 1933.

Document L-198 is a report from General Consul George S. Messersmith dated "Berlin, Germany, 14 March 1933," bearing as its subject "Molestation of American citizens domiciled or temporarily in Berlin, by persons wearing the uniform of a political party." This was a reference to ten persons, nine of whom were Jews, who had addressed themselves to the consulate for assaults or acts of harassment. The report says that Hitler had ordered the cessation of these acts against individual persons, while Goebbels was inciting people.²¹⁶ Document D-635 is a radio message from von Papen to the German-American Chamber of Commerce dated March 25 [not 27], 1933, saying, as Hilberg reports, that there were fewer than a dozen cases of physical assaults, and that they had ceased after Hitler's declaration of March 12 (IMT, Vol. 35, pp. 230-232). Also the third document, RC-49, as Hilberg informs us in the above-mentioned footnote, regards the harassment of U.S. citizens.

²¹⁶ The document has been published in *Nazi Conspiracy...*, Vol. 7, pp. 1026-1034.

The question of the boycott is completely different. In this regard, Hilberg reverses the succession of the events, presenting as a prior cause of the events that which was in reality a subsequent effect. On March 24, 1933, the British daily newspaper *Daily Express*, directed by the Jewish journalist Ralph David Blumenfeld, published a front-page article headlined "Judea Declares War on Germany" with the subtitle "Jews of all the World Unite. Boycott German Goods." A photomontage showed Hitler facing elderly Jews.

The German reaction was not long in coming. On March 29, a "Central Defense Committee against the Jewish Atrocity and Boycott Agitation" was created, presided over by Julius Streicher,²¹⁷ which called for a half-day counter-boycott of Jewish businesses on Saturday, April 1.²¹⁸ On March 31, 1933, Streicher published an article in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, in which he made explicit reference to the title from the *Daily Express*.²¹⁹

"And in order to make the awakening Germany, the Germany of Adolf Hitler, collapse into itself already in the early stages, the race fellows of the Jews living in Germany are conducting shameless boycott agitation against German products abroad. 'Don't Buy German Goods!' howls the Jewish press gang unto the peoples. And: 'Judea Declares War on Germany!'"

Hilberg does not mention either of these documents, but invokes a *New York Times* article dated March 29, 1933, p. 8, which describes a proclamation of the National-Socialist party at Munich a few days before for the boycott of Jewish goods and businesses as a measure of reprisal for the defamatory campaign against Germany, but Hilberg does not mention anything about this anti-German boycott.

5.3. Hilberg's Article in *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp*

In the context of the present study, it is also useful to examine Hilberg's short contribution to the compendium published in 1994 titled *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp*, which had evidently only been requested of him on an honorary basis (Gutman/Berenbaum pp. 81-92). The article is rather mediocre and provides nothing new in terms of information. At the time, Hilberg had still not bothered to read up on the Auschwitz Camp. Instead, he adduces the usual obsolete sources: Höss, Morgen, Entress, without mentioning a single document from the archives of the Auschwitz Museum. His only historiographical update consists in references to Jean-Claude Pressac's first book (Pressac 1989), although he cites it only for absolutely tangential reasons, without understanding its disruptive nature for the tenets of past historiog-

²¹⁷ PS-2156. IMT, Vol. 29, pp. 268-269.

²¹⁸ PS-2154. *Ibid.*, pp. 266-268.

²¹⁹ PS-2410. IMT, Vol. 30, p. 344.

raphy, but he does not mention Pressac's second book, published in 1993, although he mentions the 1989 German edition of Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*. There is no other reference to expert literature.

In his discussion of the history of Auschwitz as portrayed in Höss's memoirs, Hilberg proves not overly scrupulous, as in his book.

He claims that the first gassing with Zyklon B was carried out at Auschwitz "in the early days of September 1941," and that, "once the gassing had taken place, however, Höss saw it as the answer to his Jewish problem" (Gutman/Berenbaum, pp. 84), that is, he decided to use Zyklon B for the alleged mass gassing of the Jews. Hilberg adds:

"Not long after Himmler had commissioned Höss to carry out the killing operation, Eichmann came to Auschwitz, and at the end of November Höss reciprocated by attending a conference in Eichmann's office. The talk there was about railroads and arrangements for trains." (Gutman/Berenbaum pp. 83)

But the passage from Höss's memoirs cited by Hilberg reads:

"I could not find out when a start was to be made, and Eichmann had not yet discovered a suitable kind of gas." (Höss 1959, p. 207)

Therefore, Eichmann had not yet succeeded in finding the appropriate gas, which Höss had supposedly identified two months earlier and had decided to use subsequently. Hilberg also claims that the presumed "Bunker 2" "did not become operational until the end of June" (Gutman/Berenbaum, pp. 85), but Höss's memoirs to which he refers do not mention any month.

"As of the summer of 1942, four crematoria were planned for Birkenau. By then, there was also a major revision in the planning: the crematoria were to have gas chambers." (*ibid.*, pp. 87)

At this point Hilbert refers to page 98 of Pressac's above-mentioned 1989 book, which mentions four crematoria at Birkenau, but does not say that they were to contain gas chambers.

Still referring to Pressac's 1989 book (pp. 204f.), Hilberg cites as follows the file memo written by SS *Untersturmführer* Fritz Ertl on August 21, 1942:

"At a construction conference that month about the next crematorium, the decision was to 'wait for the result of ongoing negotiations with the Reich Security Main Office [Eichmann] about the allocation of contingents,' that is to say, contingents of Jews." (Gutman/Berenbaum, p. 87)

Hilberg makes an enormous mistake here, because the "allocation of contingents" mentioned in the document was simply the allocation of construction materials, which at the time depended on the related office (*Kontingentsstelle*) of the Plenipotentiary for Construction of Reich Ministry Speer in the district of Armaments Inspection Sector VIII with headquarters in Breslau, which was subordinate to the General Plenipotentiary for Regulation of the Construction Industry, an office held by Speer and headquartered in Berlin (see Mattogno 2015, pp. 27-30).

Precisely in this 1994 collective project dedicated entirely to Auschwitz, Hilberg repeats another gross error which he already made in his 1985 "definitive" edition (and repeated in the 2003 edition), although by 1994 he could have and should have known better: With reference to the Jews, he asserts that "at the end of 1942, only 1,412 were still alive in the camp" (Gutman/Berenbaum, p. 87), a variant of the assertion examined in Chapter 3.9.2. that, at the end of 1942, "Auschwitz had obtained 5,849 registered Jewish inmates up to the same date; 4,436 had died" (see here on p. 165), so that the survivors amounted to precisely 1,412.²²⁰ I have already explained that the Korherr Report explicitly declares that the figure relating to Auschwitz and Lublin only considered Jews *not* included in the "evacuation action," and that, according to Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*, the total number of Jews registered at Auschwitz exceeded 58,000 (the Korherr Report speaks only of admissions). The most surprising thing is that Hilberg lists the Jewish transports to Auschwitz by country of departure up to December 31, 1942, and obtains a total of 175,000 Jews: but then, how could he seriously believe that only 1,412 of them were still alive on such a date?

Hilberg moreover asserts that "possibly 30,000 Jews were transferred to other camps for war work" in 1944 (p. 89), while the number of Jews documentarily attested to, for 1944 alone, as I have explained above, is approximately 166,000.

5.4. The 2003 Edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*

The last edition of Hilberg's work, the "ultimately definitive" one, appeared 18 years after the "definitive" one of 1985. In these long years, orthodox Holocaust literature expanded robustly, but without being able to provide "proof" of existence of "extermination centers" for Jews; at most, alleged "traces" were adduced.

In the field of Holocaust historiography, the most-important event between 1985 and 2003 was the opening of the Soviet archives, which immediately attracted the attention of historians. The first to access it, in 1990, was Gerald Fleming, who is not exactly a prominent character, followed by many others, including Jean-Claude Pressac and also the present writer, who visited the archives several times between 1995 and 2001 together with Jürgen Graf and the late Russell Granata.

Hilberg, however, whom the mainstream viewed as the most distinguished expert in Holocaustology after the publication of the "definitive" edition of his work, eschewed these archives. In his sanctimonious arrogance, he evidently did not feel any historical curiosity to know what those files contained. He

²²⁰ The difference between 5,849 and 4,436 is 1,413, but in the Korherr Report, one inmate is listed as having been released.

waited for the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington (USHMM) to microfilm the documentation concerning the Auschwitz Central Construction Office, which he drew upon in the 2003 edition, as I will explain immediately.

Compared to the 1985 edition, Chapter 9 concerning the "Killing Center Operations" was enhanced in the 2003 edition with various additions, now covering pages 921-1058. The most-extensive enhancement concerns Auschwitz, reviewed by Hilberg in the light of the documents of the just-mentioned Auschwitz Central Construction Office. However, instead of taking the information from the source, meaning the microfilms at the USHMM, the structure of his "criminal-trace" argumentation relating to the "gas chambers" was simply appropriated from the two books by Jean-Claude Pressac (1989, 1993), but also from the contributions by Pressac, Robert Jan van Pelt and Franciszek Piper in the just-mentioned 1994 collective work *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp* (Gutman/Berenbaum; FN 58, p. 941; Table 9-4, p. 949). Pressac is cited repeatedly, but only as a source for the documents he reproduced (FN 59, p. 942; FN 76-80, p. 945; FN 82, p. 946; FN 88, p. 948; Table 9-4, p. 949). Hilberg paid no attention to the revolutionary character of the French researcher's arguments, which shook the foundations of Polish Auschwitz historiography as conjured up during the Warsaw and Krakow Trials, but also Hilberg's own concept. In fact, Pressac affirmed that the Birkenau crematoria had neither been conceived nor built from the start as instruments of extermination, but as sanitary installations which were gradually transformed into means of extermination starting only toward the end of 1942 (1993, pp. 53f.):

"The procedures and discussions during these two days, when the construction of the four crematoria at Birkenau was finally decided upon, which were then planned without homicidal gas chambers, can be summed up as follows: although Crematorium II served as a catalyst for the choice of Auschwitz in the liquidation of the Jews, it is not directly linked to this extermination, but is considered as an incidental supplementary means; Crematorium III was only planned as a complement to Crematorium II in order to cope with a camp occupancy of 200,000 inmates, and was 'criminalized' only for the needs of the SS bureaucracy; Crematoria IV and V, of quick-fix design, are directly connected to Bunker 1 and 2, and even if their initial arrangement is not criminal (without gas chamber), their purpose was criminal, because they were placed at the end of a process of death, in which they participate."

Without in any way explaining his departure from Pressac, Hilberg states to the contrary:

"Four massive buildings containing gas chambers and crematoria were erected in Birkenau. They were to be the answer to Himmler's admonition that more and more transports would arrive in Auschwitz." (p. 944)

Meaning that the four crematoria were planned and built as extermination tools for the expected Jewish transports.

Another aspect of Pressac's thesis in total conflict with that of Hilberg, and which Hilberg totally ignored, is the dating of Höss's alleged meeting with Himmler in Berlin, which Pressac postponed by a year "to the beginning of June 1942."²²¹

After the publication of Karin Orth's 1999 article "Rudolf Höss and the Final Solution of the Jewish Question. Three Arguments against Dating It to the Summer of 1941," no serious historian believed that this summons took place in the summer of 1941. In Hilberg's arrogance, however, he remained firmly attached to the Auschwitz commandant's anachronistic dating:

"Höss recalled that in the summer of 1941 he was summoned to Berlin by Heinrich Himmler himself. In a few spare words, Himmler told him of Hitler's decision to annihilate the Jews." (p. 940)

Since Höss explicitly stated in the documents cited by Hilberg that the claimed meeting had taken place in June 1941,²²² Hilberg's dating of the *Führerbefehl* which he inferred based on statements by Eichmann – before the end of the summer of 1941, but "two or three months after the June 22 German assault on the USSR," hence in August-September (see Subchapter 1.6.) – is not only unfounded but also contradictory.

In the same way, Hilberg clung to the witness Höss, whom he cited no less than 33 times, heedless of all the further contradictions resulting from this.

When writing about Himmler's visit to Auschwitz on July 17 and 18, 1942 as described by Höss, Hilberg recalls the order of the *Reichsführer* SS "that Jews incapable of work were to be annihilated ruthlessly" (p. 942),²²³ which further complicates the matter, because if we follow Höss, the alleged extermination order of 1941 originally concerned *all* Jews without exception ("all Jews without exception," Höss 1959, p. 146), but then (Höss does not say when or on what occasion) Himmler changed it in the sense that those fit for labor were to be made available to the armaments industry ("those capable of work were to [...] employed in the armaments industry," *ibid.*). This implies that the Jews unfit for work had to be exterminated already on the basis of the order of summer 1941: but then what is the meaning of the order of July 1942? The only possible sense would require that Himmler had revoked the initial extermination order also encompassing Jews fit for labor, but that he then reinstated it in July 1942!

As for the documentation of the Central Construction Office, it is mentioned by Hilberg for peripheral aspects of the history of Auschwitz, clearly not on the basis of any systematic research. His usage of these sources gives the impression that he had come across some more-or-less-random documents,

²²¹ Pressac 1993, p. 41; in the German edition, that date was shifted to "early 1942" (1994, p. 51) evidently because someone pointed out that otherwise claims about mass gassings of Jews in "Bunker 1" near the Birkenau Camp since early 1942 could not be explained.

²²² NO-1210; PS-3868;

²²³ "The Jews who are unfit for work are to be destroyed with the same ruthlessness." Höss 1959, p. 238.

around which he built superficial fragments of the camp's history, sometimes even distorting their meaning. For example, on pages pp. 944f. he writes:

"By February 27, 1942, however, the Jewish transports were in the offing. That day, Oberführer Kammler visited the camp and decided that the five furnaces should be installed."

He backs this up with his Footnote 76, where he refers to an order by the Auschwitz Construction Office to the Topf Company of October 22, 1941 for the supply of five triple-muffle furnaces, then claims that, "[l]acking exact word,²²⁴ the Zentralbauleitung placed an order orally for only two ovens on February 12, 1942," but that "the oral order was rescinded and the original one was reinstated" after Kammler's visit.

In reality, as I have illustrated extensively elsewhere (Mattogno/Deana, Vol. 1, pp. 228f.), the five triple-muffle furnaces were destined for the new crematorium, but this was initially planned to be built at the Auschwitz Main Camp. Initially, the Birkenau Camp was to be equipped with two "cremation halls" which each were to contain one triple-muffle furnace of a simplified design. The cost estimate of February 12, 1942 refers precisely to these plants. On February 27, when Kammler formalized the already-taken decision to move the new crematorium (the future Crematorium II) to Birkenau rather than to build the two "cremation halls" there, the order for the two triple-muffle furnaces, which had become superfluous, was consequently canceled.

Another misrepresentation of the documents appears on p. 948, where Hilberg writes:

"The status of Auschwitz as a focal point was underscored in a report by Bischoff to Kammler on January 27, 1943."

This refers to the "implementation of the special operation" at Birkenau. In this context, Hilberg notes that Bischoff referred to a *Führerbefehl* which decreed that the construction of the camp be carried out in a particularly accelerated manner, and Hilberg concludes by asserting that "[t]wo days later," Bischoff informed Kammler that Crematorium II "was now ready but for minor construction details."

Hilberg was unaware that there are three different drafts of the document he cites. The other two talk about "implementation of the special treatment" and "implementation of the special construction measures," which had nothing to do with either exterminations or "gas chambers."²²⁵

The aforementioned *Führerbefehl* did not concern merely crematoria, much less primarily, as Hilberg suggests, but also 518 barracks of various types, railway branches, water-drainage systems, roads and even a "large-scale disin-

²²⁴ Hilberg may suggest here that the Construction Office was reluctant to order all five furnaces at once due to not having received clear orders in this regard, but he forgets that he correctly observed in the same footnote that the order for those five furnaces had already been placed in October 1941.

²²⁵ See Mattogno 2016, Chapter II.6. "'Special Treatment' and the New Function of the PoW Camp," pp. 52-54.

festation facility," the *Zentralsauna*, which in the detailed cost estimate of the "POW Camp Auschwitz" of October 26-29, 1942 is listed as "Disinfestation facility 1. for special treatment" (the second facility was "for the guard troop").²²⁶

If we apply Hilberg's logic here, it follows that the *Zentralsauna*, the largest disinfection and disinfestation plant in Birkenau, being a "disinfestation facility" meant for "special treatment," had to be an extermination facility! Or put differently: If the term "special treatment," like "special operation," was a "euphemism" to indicate killings, how can it be explained that a disinfestation and disinfection system was necessary to carry it out?

Although in the 18 years that elapsed between the penultimate and the last edition of his book, no document emerged that confirmed his claims about the "category of potency" of the imaginary Zyklon types C, D, E, F. Yet still, Hilberg repeated this nonsense together with the clarification that Zyklon B was used in "gas chambers" to kill human beings (p. 955; p. 889 in 1985; see Subchapter 3.7.).

On page 957 (p. 892 in 1985), Hilberg also repeats the story of Globocnik's visit to Auschwitz in 1942, knowing full well that Czech's *Auschwitz Chronicle*, which he cited extensively in his 2003 edition, makes no mention of it. To support his claim, he cites Höss, yet misrepresents what he said in order to hide an anachronism, as shown earlier (see p. 144). As also shown earlier (p. 126), Hilberg removed all references to Höss's alleged visit to Treblinka in the 2003 edition. In the 1985 edition, Hilberg writes on p. 882 about Höss's visit to Treblinka in order to learn about the extermination method adopted there by Globocnik (see p. 125), yet ten pages later in the same 1985 edition we read that Globocnik visited Auschwitz in 1942 in order to learn "the new method" (Zyklon B) for his camp, including Treblinka!

The death tolls of the various camps changed as follows from 1985 to 2003 (p. 958; pp. 968f. in the 1985 edition):

- Bełżec dropped from 550,000 to 434,508 by virtue of the well-known telegram by Hermann Höfle of January 11, 1943 (see here on p. 116);
- Sobibór drops from 200,000 to 150,000;
- Treblinka rises from 750,000 to 800,000;
- Auschwitz remains at 1,000,000, Kulmhof at 150,000, and Lublin-Majdanek at 50,000.

For the last five camps, Hilberg gives no explanation.

The decrease in victims is therefore approximately 115,500: how does this figure affect the total death toll? In the 1985 edition, the total figure of 5,100,000 victims was divided up as follows: 800,000 (ghettos) + 1,300,000 (outdoor executions) + 3,000,000 (camps) = 5,100,000 (p. 1318). The figure of 3,000,000 includes 2,700,000 victims of the "extermination camps."

²²⁶ VHA, Fond OT31(2)/8, with reference to BW 16a; see Mattogno 2016, Chapter II.3. "'Special Treatment' and 'Disinfestation Facility,'" pp. 39-42, and Docs. 11f., pp. 131-133.

In the 2003 edition, despite the decrease of 115,500 victims, the total is still 5,100,000. How is that possible? With a sleight of hand. Hilberg decreased the victims of "death camps" by 100,000, which thus fell to 2,600,000, but at the same time he increased by 100,000 those of "outdoor executions", which rose to 1,400,000! (pp. 1320f.). It is clear that he did not want to go below 5,000,000 victims and that the resulting figure of 4,985,000 was too "reductionist". This is just another egregious indictment of the integrity of this historian.

The changes made to the chapter under discussion are entirely superficial and limited to a few additions and a few cuts; the argumentative and "demonstrative" structure remained practically unchanged. However, these changes at times lead to a jarring picture, like an old dress patched up with new pieces of cloth.

Hilberg's use of witnesses, many of them unknown and insignificant, in an attempt to prove the veracity of claims on the basis of their words, remains as excessive as in the previous edition. He cites about a hundred witnesses, seventy of whom made their statements in affidavits, declarations or during interrogations. To give an idea, I list the names of these witnesses in alphabetical order (with no guarantee of completeness; those with an asterisk are mentioned several times):

Amend	Hogman	Milch*	Schmelter*
Bachman	Höss*	Möckel	Schuler
Becher	Illgner	Morgen*	Schulhof
Becker	Jäger	Murr*	Schwarz
Blobel	Jung	Nyiszli*	Steffler
Boutbien	Kirsz	Orlik	Struss*
Broad*	Klempfner*	Paulmann*	Suchomel
Burger	Krumme	Peters	Tauboeck
Entress	Krumpe	Pohl*	Ter Meer*
Epstein	Krzepicki	Puhl	Thoms*
Falkenhahn	Küpper	Rajzmann	van den Straaten
Faust	Langer	Reder	Wagner
Fehling	Levy	Reelitz	Wiebeck
Fischer	Liebhäuser	Roeder	Wied*
Frank	Lorent	Rum	Wilhelm*
Frank-Fahle	Lörner*	Ruppert	Wisliceny
Friedman	Luthal	Salomon*	Wolf
Gerstein	Mandelbaum	Santo	
Haeni	Mangold	Scheide	
Harbaum	Mehrbach	Schluch	

To these we must add the trial testimonies by the following witnesses:

Ansel	Barthelmäss*	Dürrfeld	Erman
Auerbach	Bendel	Eichmann	Frank (Hans)

Franz	Klein	Michalsen	Stefaniuk
Fuchs	Kogon	Morgen	Struss
Göring	Koppe	Mrugowski	Wiernik*
Hilse	Kozak*	Obalek	Zaun
Kallmeyer*	Kramer	Oberhauser*	
Klein	Lasker	Pfannenstiel	

The work still teems with spurious and insignificant sources that serve to apodictically "prove" the most multifarious claims usually with insignificant anecdotes. Gisella Perl (*I Was a Doctor in Auschwitz*) is mentioned at least ten times, Ella Lingens-Reiner (*Prisoners of Fear*) six times, Olga Lengyel (*Five Chimneys*) six times. There is also a reference to *Playing for Time* by Fania Fenelon (FN 81, p. 977). In addition to these former inmates and Höss, Hilberg's most-important source for Auschwitz is Filip Müller, mentioned seventeen times. Kurt Gerstein is summoned five times as a witness, three for the statement of April 26, 1945 (PS-1553), falsely presented, as already pointed out, as an "affidavit" (FN 8, p. 1028; FN 101, p. 1042), the other as a "declaration" (FN 89, p. 1041); the other two references are to the statement of May 4, 1945 as published by Rothfels (1953).

Among Hilberg's obsolete sources we must mention Filip Friedman's propaganda work *This Was Oswiecim*, and also Jan Sehn's article-turned-book *Concentration and Extermination Camp at Oświęcim*: After the works by Pressac, van Pelt and Piper, it makes no sense anymore for orthodox scholars to quote Sehn's outdated book in support of their claims.

In the 18 years after 1985, Hilberg had the opportunity and the time for a profound reworking of the central aspects of his work, which instead remained practically unchanged both regarding its argumentative structure and the type of sources used to shore up this historiographic house of cards.

Conclusion

The chapter on the "killing centers," as I noted in the Introduction, represents the quintessence of *The Destruction of the European Jews*, at which the entire work aims as its ultimate objective, based upon which the book justifies itself and finds its reason for being. It is not by chance that Hilberg pretended to be an expert on the gassing of Jews. However, in this fundamental area of his specialization, he himself has never made any efforts at documentary research. He has never taken the trouble to search for any possible documents relating to the "killing centers" on the spot, in Poland, and he never felt sufficient motivation to visit the essential archives, such as the Auschwitz Museum or major archives such as the Lublin-Majdanek Museum or the Stutthof Museum; nor did he inspect the places concerned: rather, he simply supplied a pale reflection of the Holocaust literature existing at one time.

The framework of his description of the camps at Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka is taken from the 1977 book by Adalbert Rückerl *NS-Ver-nichtungslager im Spiegel deutscher Strafprozesse*, which is a mere summary of the trials against former staff members of these camps staged up to this year in what was then West Germany – cited by Hilberg at least 40 times. The only noticeable change for the 2003 edition in this regard was the addition of a few references to Arad's 1987 book *Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka*.²²⁷

As mentioned earlier, Hilberg's treatment of the Auschwitz Camp is the one topic that saw major revisions for the 2003 edition. Disregarding bare testimonies, while his discussion of that camp in the 1985 edition was based essentially on Jan Sehn's book *Concentration and Extermination Camp at Oświęcim (Auschwitz-Birkenau)*, his source base expanded slightly in the 2003 edition to also encompass works by French historian Jean-Claude Pressac and Polish historian Franciszek Piper,²²⁸ without, however, dropping Filip Friedman's crassly propagandistic book *This Was Oswiecim*. In this chapter, Hilberg almost completely abstains from quoting indispensable sources such as Kogon *et alia's* *Nazi Mass Murder. A Documentary History of the Use of Poison Gas*,²²⁹ Georges Wellers's *Les chambres à gaz ont existé. Des documents, des témoignages, des chiffres*, Buszko's *Auschwitz. Nazi Extermination Camp*, or

²²⁷ FN 98, p. 982; FN 101, p. 983; FN 17, p. 1017;

²²⁸ FN 58, p. 941; Table 9-4, p. 949; Table 9-8, p. 959.

²²⁹ He quotes the German 1983 edition once, but only as an add-on to Rückerl's 1977 book: FN 41, p. 937.

the numerous books by Hermann Langbein. The 2003 edition also would have profited from using van Pelt's 2002 book *The Case for Auschwitz*, but that may have been released after Hilberg wrapped up the new edition. The most incredible fact is that Hilberg made no reference to the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, staged between December 1963 and August 1965, two summaries of which would have been easily available to him (Langbein 1965 and Naumann 1965).

Incredibly, in his chapter dedicated to "The Trials," which begins on page 1142, Hilberg mentions neither the Höss Trial (March 11-29, 1947), of which a summary in English was accessible to him as published in the series *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals*,²³⁰ nor the trial against the former members of the Auschwitz camp garrison (November 25 to December 16, 1947), nor the Auschwitz Trial held in Frankfurt am Main!

In his discussion of the "killing centers," Hilberg relies essentially not on documentary sources, but on secondary literature of the Orthodoxy, and even that with many gaps.

As for the testimonies, the first observation that needs to be made is that he accepts or at any rate presents all testimonies confirming his preconceived notion up front as truthful, thanks above all to his habit of extrapolating from the perceived (or more-often misrepresented) context. During the Zündel Trial, he declared candidly that his method in dealing with the testimonies consisted of distinguishing the reliable and truthful parts from the unreliable and untruthful parts, and in quoting the first parts "out of context" while passing over the second parts in silence, without informing the reader of the latter's existence, and without having any objective criteria to distinguish "reliable" from "unreliable" and "truthful" from "untruthful." In this way, he creates a purely illusory concordance of testimonies consisting of individual elements extracted from various testimonies which – if seen in their entirety – are not only mutually contradictory, but which are also unreliable and untruthful in more parts than Hilberg is able to perceive or willing to admit, which invalidates their value.

Hilberg's method is obviously fraudulent, since it is contrived to make the reader believe that testimonies are truthful or convergent while sweeping all their contradictions, falsehoods and absurdities under the rug. A pair of Hilberg's imitators, Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, have enshrined a decalogue of historiographic methods, in which Point 2 reads:

"2. *Has this source made other claims that were clearly exaggerated? If an individual is known to have stretched the facts before, it obviously undermines his or her credibility.*" (Shermer/Grobman, pp. 248)

This principle undermines the credibility of *all* the witnesses adduced by Hilberg. This applies in particular to Gerstein and Höss, for whose testimonies Hilberg explicitly admitted the presence of elements during the Zündel Trial

²³⁰ United Nations...; he cites this source in other contexts, for example: on Zyklon B: Table 9-5, p. 953; on medical experiments in Auschwitz (Höss Trial!): FN 34, p. 1011; on Bergen-Belsen: FN 47, p. 1054; on alist of wanted German war criminals: FN 90, p. 1162.

which are untrue or not believable. And the method of extrapolation also undermines the credibility of Hilberg himself.

As correctly noted by Gie van den Berghe, Hilberg "considers events sufficiently proved if one eyewitness mentioned them." Thus, he essentially tried to replace documents – which he didn't know or ignored – by individual testimonies, which are always refuted point by point by documents, where they exist, such as, for example, with regard to the hygienic installations at the Lublin-Majdanek and Auschwitz Camps.

Another criterion used by Hilberg to consider an event sufficiently proven is literary repetition: if two or more witnesses describe the same event, it became reality in Hilberg's mind. But, of course, the repetition of a lie or an error does not transform it into truth, and therefore this cannot be a criterion of truthfulness. And in fact, several witnesses have declared, in mutual agreement with one another, the extermination of four million persons at Auschwitz to be the truth – but does this repetition make it true?

Thanks to this bogus criterion of truthfulness, Hilberg feels authorized to present any testimonial fairy tale as historical truth, such as the one according to which "the human fat escaping from the burning bodies was poured back into the flames to speed the cremations" (p. 1016).

Hilberg moreover adduces a series of insignificant, sometimes actually anonymous witnesses ("a policeman," "a railway worker") which he places, incredibly, on the same level of authority as important witnesses: they all contribute in the same way in creating his narrative tissue.

The fundamental witnesses on Auschwitz mentioned by Hilberg – apart from Höss – are Ella Lingens-Reiner, Gisella Perl and Olga Lengyel, cited a total of over twenty times all together. These witnesses are so important that Robert Jan van Pelt, in his ponderous 2002 book on Auschwitz, never even mentions any of them. The principal witness cited by Hilberg at least fifteen times, Filip Müller – referred to by Hilberg himself as "a remarkable, accurate, reliable person" – was a phantasmagorical plagiarist. Charles Sigismund Bendel, by contrast, was a common imposter, just like Miklos Nyiszli, of whose book *Auschwitz. A Doctor's Eyewitness Account* Hilberg seems to have been ignorant, although that is hard to believe.

Hilberg's credulity appears even more surprising if compared to that of Gerald Reitlinger, who on occasion exhibited at least a partially critical attitude with regard to "survivor narratives" (Reitlinger, pp. 537).

Hilberg's method regarding documents is no less aberrant. It is based on three undemonstrated up-front assumptions:

1. Hitler issued an extermination order.
2. "Killing centers" existed.
3. A "code language" was used.

Consequently, his reasoning is based on a closed circular argument, in which the presumed Hitler order and the "euphemisms" which are said to appear in

German documents "demonstrate" the reality of the "killing centers," and the "killing centers" "demonstrate" the reality of the Hitler order and the "euphemisms"! This is particularly blatant in his manipulation of German documents containing the term "*Endlösung*," which, due to the mere presence of this term, are presented up front as a plethora of "proofs" for the presumed National-Socialist plan to exterminate the Jews, or even as "proof" of the existence of a Hitler extermination order!

In this way he practices a systematic misrepresentation of the documents, accompanied by omissions of important documents and of important parts of documents he cites, by mistranslations and sometimes by outright lies, even going as far as committing perjury, which he did during the Zündel Trial at least six times.

This extraordinary lack of critical sense also extends to orthodox Holocaust historiography in general and has transformed itself into a sort of historical authoritarianism which permits no discussion. Hilberg presents his notions regarding the genesis of the presumed extermination of the Jews in an apodictic manner, not as conjectures among other conjectures, but as established facts, as undisputed certainties, without the slightest mention of the debates which broke out among Holocaust historians on this topic precisely at the beginning of the 1980s, and in which he had personally participated. He never mentions the conflicting interpretations of his colleagues, but by citing and misrepresenting cherry-picked documentary and testimonial sources, he wishes to accredit his own interpretation as unique and authoritative. Emboldened by the bulk of his work and his references, Hilberg poses as an authority above the contesting parties, but in those debates his colleagues did not recognize any particular authority on his part and treated his opinions like those of any other historian. His position among historians was never really the top level.

Ultimately, Hilberg's description of the "process of destruction" of the European Jews in the "definitive" as well as in the last edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*, and above all in his Chapter IX on the "Killing Center Operations," is characterized by carelessness and credulity in the gathering of sources as well as speciousness and bad faith in their use. As a result, his description is without sound foundation and historically inconsistent.

Such inconsistency was quietly recognized by orthodox Holocaust historiography in the 2011 anthology *New Studies on National-Socialist Mass Killings with Poison Gas*. In a book over 400 pages long, Hilberg is mentioned only three times, and in absolutely marginal contexts to boot.²³¹

²³¹ Morsch/Perz; see my book-length review: Mattogno 2016a.

Appendix

The Opponents

Raul Hilberg, born in Austria on June 2, 1926, emigrated to the USA in 1939. He died while in Paris on August 4, 2007. He held a B.A. in political science, M.A. and Ph.D. in Public Law and Administration (1955). He was an instructor at the University of Vermont, later professor of international relations, US foreign policy, and the Holocaust.

Books (English, where available; first and current editions):

- *The Destruction of the European Jews* (1961, 2003)
- *Documents of Destruction: Germany and Jewry, 1933-1945* (1971)
- *Sonderzüge nach Auschwitz* (1981, 1987)
- *The Holocaust Today* (1988)
- *Gehorsam oder Initiative?* (1991)
- *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders* (1992)
- *Unerbetene Erinnerung* (1994, 2008)
- *L'insurrection du ghetto de Varsovie* (with others, 1994)
- *The Politics of Memory* (1996)
- *Auf den Trümmern der Geschichte* (1999)
- *German & Jew* (2001)
- *Sources of Holocaust Research* (2001)



Carlo Mattogno, born in Italy on May 13, 1951. He studied classical languages and philosophy, oriental and religious studies. He has been an independent historian and author since 1983.

Books (English, where available; first and current editions):

- *La Risiera di San Sabba: Un falso grossolano* (1985)
- *Il rapporto Gerstein: Anatomia di un falso* (1985)
- *Il mito dello sterminio ebraico* (1985)
- *Auschwitz: due false testimonianze* (1986)
- *Auschwitz: un caso di plagio* (1986)



- *Wellers e i "gasati" di Auschwitz* (1987)
- *Auschwitz: le "confessioni" di Höss* (1987)
- *"Medico ad Auschwitz": Anatomia di un falso* (1988)
- *Come si falsifica la storia: Saul Friedländer e il "rapporto" Gerstein* (1988)
- *La soluzione finale: Problemi e polemiche* (1991)
- *Auschwitz: The First Gassing* (1992, 2016)
- *Auschwitz: The End of a Legend* (1994)
- *Auschwitz Holocaust Revisionist Jean-Claude Pressac* (1995)
- *My Banned Holocaust Interview* (1996)
- *Olocausto: Dilettanti allo sbaraglio* (1996)
- *Concentration Camp Majdanek* (with Jürgen Graf, 1996, 2016)
- *L' "irritante questione" delle camere a gas* (1998)
- *Concentration Camp Stutthof* (with Jürgen Graf, 1999, 2016)
- *Special Treatment in Auschwitz* (2000, 2016)
- *Olocausto: Dilettanti a convegno* (2002)
- *Treblinka* (with Jürgen Graf, 2002, 2020)
- *Auschwitz: trasferimenti e finte gasazioni* (2004)
- *Il numero dei morti di Auschwitz: Vecchie e nuove imposture* (2004)
- *I Gasprüfer di Auschwitz: Analisi storico-tecnica di una "prova definitiva"* (2004)
- *Auschwitz: Trasferimenti e finte gasazioni* (2004)
- *Auschwitz: Nuove controversie e nuove fantasie storiche* (2004)
- *Belzec* (2004)
- *Debunking the Bunkers of Auschwitz* (2004, 2016)
- *Olocausto: dilettanti nel web* (2005)
- *The Central Construction Office of the Waffen-SS and Police Auschwitz* (2005, 2015)
- *Auschwitz: Open-Air Incinerations* (2005, 2016)
- *Auschwitz Lies* (with Germar Rudolf, 2005, 2017)
- *Auschwitz: Crematorium I* (2005, 2016)
- *Ritorno dalla luna di miele ad Auschwitz* (2006)
- *Un nuovo libro olocaustico su Belžec e la sua fonte* (2007)
- *La deportazione degli Ebrei ungheresi del maggio-luglio 1944* (2007)
- *"Azione Reinhard" e "Azione 1005"* (2008)
- *Il dottor Mengele e i gemelli di Auschwitz* (2008; English in Mattogno 2020b)
- *Hitler e il nemico di razza: Il nazionalsocialismo e la questione ebraica* (2009)
- *Sobibór* (with Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues, 2010, 2020)
- *The Real Case for Auschwitz* (2010, 2019)
- *Chelmno* (2011, 2017)
- *The "Extermination Camps" of "Aktion Reinhardt"* (with Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues, 2013, 2015)

- *I verbali degli interrogatori sovietici degli ingegneri della Topf* (2014)
 - *Inside the Gas Chambers* (2014, 2016)
 - *The Cremation Furnaces of Auschwitz* (with Franco Deana, 2015)
 - *Deliveries of Coke, Wood and Zyklon B to Auschwitz* (2015, 2021)
 - *Till Bastian, Auschwitz und die "Auschwitz-Lüge"* (2016)
 - *Healthcare in Auschwitz* (2016)
 - *Bungled: "Debunking Holocaust Denial Theories"* (2016, 2017)
 - *Bungled: "Denying History"* (2016, 2017)
 - *Curated Lies* (2016, 2020)
 - *"La verità sulle camere a gas"? Anatomia della "testimonianza unica" di Shlomo Venezia* (2017)
 - *I Leichenkeller dei crematori di Birkenau* (with Giuseppe Poggi, 2017)
 - *Commandant of Auschwitz* (2017, 2020)
 - *Auschwitz: A Three-Quarter Century of Propaganda* (2018)
 - *An Auschwitz Doctor's Eyewitness Account* (with Miklós Nyiszli, 2018, 2020)
 - *Auschwitz: Trasporti, Forza, Mortalità* (2019)
 - *The Einsatzgruppen* (2019)
 - *Le farneticazioni di Robert Jan van Pelt sui forni crematori di Auschwitz-Birkenau* (2020)
 - *The Making of the Auschwitz Myth* (2020, 2021)
 - *Rudolf Reder versus Kurt Gerstein* (2021)
 - *Sonderkommando Auschwitz I* (2021)
 - *Bungled: "The Destruction of the European Jews"* (2018, 2021)
 - *Mis-Chronicling Auschwitz* (2021, in translation)
 - *The "Operation Reinhardt" Camps* (2021, in translation)
 - *Sonderkommando Auschwitz II* (2021, in translation)
 - *The Auschwitz Chronicle* (in writing)
- ...and more to come...

Archive Abbreviations

- AGK: *Archiwum Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu – Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej* (Archive of the Central Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes against the Polish People – National Memorial), Warsaw
- AMS: *Archiwum Muzeum Stutthof* (Archive of the Stutthof Museum), Sztutowo (Stutthof)
- APMM: *Archiwum Państwowego Muzeum na Majdanku* (Archive of the Majdanek State Museum), Lublin
- APMO: *Archiwum Państwowego Muzeum w Oświęcimiu* (Archive of the Auschwitz State Museum), Auschwitz
- BAK: *Bundesarchiv Koblenz* (German Federal Archives, Coblenz), Coblenz
- CDJC: *Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine*, Paris
- DALO: *Derzhavny arkhiv Lvivskoyi oblasti* (State Archive of the Lvov Oblast), Lvov (Lviv)
- GARF: *Gosudarstvennyy arkhiv Rossiyskoi Federatsii* (State Archive of the Russian Federation), Moscow
- GFHA *Ghetto Fighters House Archives*, Kibbutz Lohamei Haghetat, Israel
- IfZ *Archives of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte*, Munich
- IMT *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Nuremberg, 1947*
- ISR: *Istituto piemontese per la storia della Resistenza e della società contemporanea "Giorgio Agosti"* (Piedmontese Institute for the History of the Resistance and of Contemporary Society), Turin
- LST: *Slovenský Národný Archív*, Slovakian National Archive, Bratislava
- NA: *National Archives*, Washington D.C.
- NARA: *National Archives and Records Administration*, Washington D.C.
- NARB: *Narodny Arkhiv Respubliki Belarus* (National Archive of the Republic of Belarus), Minsk
- NMT *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Nuremberg, October 1946 – April 1949.*
- PA: *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts* (Political Archive of the Foreign Office), Berlin
- RGVA: *Rossiysky gosudarstvenny voyenny arkhiv* (Russian State Military (War) Archive), Moscow
- TNA *The National Archives*, Kew Richmond, Great Britain, formerly *Public Record Office*
- WAPL: *Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie* (Provincial State Archive of Lublin), Lublin
- ZStL *Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen für die Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen* (Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes), Ludwigsburg, Germany

Bibliography

- *Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale. Le Saint Siège et les victimes de la guerre.* Libreria Editrice Vaticana, City of the Vatican, 1975.
- Adler, Hans Günther 1958, *Der Kampf gegen die "Endlösung der Judenfrage."* Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst, Bonn, 1958.
- Adler, Hans Günther 1958a, *Die Verheimlichte Wahrheit. Theresienstädter Dokumente.* Buchdruckerei Eugen Göbel, Tübingen, 1958.
- Alvarez, Santiago, *The Gas Vans: A Critical Study*, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2016 (©2011).
- Angrick, Andrej, Peter Klein, *The "Final Solution" in Riga: Exploitation and Annihilation, 1941-1944.* Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford, 2009
- Arad, Yitzhak 1982, *Ghetto in Flames: The Struggle and Destruction of the Jews in Vilna in the Holocaust*, Holocaust Library, New York, 1982.
- Arad, Yitzhak 1987, *Bełżec, Sobibór, Treblinka. The Operation Reinhard Death Camps.* Indiana University Press, Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1987.
- Aschenauer, Rudolf (ed.), *Ich, Adolf Eichmann. Ein historischer Zeugenbericht.* Druffel-Verlag, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1980.
- Auswärtiges Amt 1951 (ed.), *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945. Serie D (1937-1945). Band IV, Die Nachwirkungen von München. Oktober 1938-März 1939.* Göttingen, 1951.
- Auswärtiges Amt 1953 (ed.), *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945. Serie D (1937-1945). Band V. Polen, Südosteuropa, Lateinamerika, Klein- und Mittelstaaten, Juni 1937-März 1939.* Bundesdruckerei Baden-Baden, 1953.
- Auswärtiges Amt 1963, *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945. Serie D (1937-1945). Band X. Die Kriegsjahre. Dritter Band. 23. Juni bis 31. August 1945.* P. Keppler Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1963.
- Auswärtiges Amt 1963a, *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945. Serie E (1941-1945). Band IV. I. Oktober bis 31. Dezember 1942.* P. Keppler Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1963.
- Auswärtiges Amt 1969, *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, Serie E (1941-1945), Band I, Dezember 1941-28. Februar 1942.* Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1969.
- Auswärtiges Amt 1970, *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, Serie D (1937-1942), Band XIII.2, Die Kriegsjahre. Sechster Band. Zweiter Halbband. 15. September bis 11. Dezember 1941,* Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1970.
- Auswärtiges Amt 1974, *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, Serie E: (1941-1945), Band III, 16. Juni bis 30. September 1942.* Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1974.
- Barth, Christian, *Goebbels und die Juden*, Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, 2003.
- Bartosik, Igor, Łukasz Martyniak, Piotr Setkiewicz, *The Beginnings of the Extermination of Jews in KL Auschwitz in the Light of the Source Materials*, Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, Auschwitz 2014.
- Bednarz, Władysław 1946a, "The Extermination Camp at Chełmno (Kulmhof)," in: Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland (ed.), *German Crimes in Poland*, Warsaw, 1946, pp. 109-121.
- Bednarz, Władysław 1946b, "Obóz zagłady Chełmno," *Biuletyn Główniej Komisji Badania Zbrodni niemieckich w Polsce*, Vol. I, Poznań, 1946, pp. 145-161.
- Benz, Wolfgang (ed.), *Dimension des Völkermords: Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, Oldenburg, Munich, 1991.

- Berenstein, Tatiana, A. Eisenbach, B. Mark, A. Rutkowski (eds.), *Faschismus – Getto – Massenmord. Dokumentation über Ausrottung und Widerstand der Juden in Polen während des zweiten Weltkrieges*. Röderberg-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1960/1961.
- “Bewegtes Leben,” in: *der Spiegel*, No. 53, December 29, 1965.
- Bezwińska, Jadwiga, Danuta Czech 1973 (eds.), *KL Auschwitz in den Augen der SS*. Staatliches Museum Auschwitz, Auschwitz, 1973.
- Bezwińska, Jadwiga, Danuta Czech 1992 (eds.), *K.L. Auschwitz Seen by the SS*. Howard Fertig, New York, 1992.
- Billig, Joseph, *La solution finale de la question juive*. Klarsfeld, Paris, 1977.
- Blumental, Nachman (ed.), *Dokumenty i materiały (Documents and Materials)*, Vol. I, *Obozy (Camps)*. Łódź, 1946.
- Boberach, Heinz (ed.), *Meldungen aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938-1945*. Pawlak Verlag, Herrsching, 1984.
- Braham, Randolph L., *The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry*. Pro Arte, New York, 1963.
- Braumann, Randolph, “Das Zeugnis des Barons von Otter für den SS-Offizier Gerstein,” in: *Rheinischer Merkur*, No. 30, July 24, 1964, p. 12.
- Brol, Franciszek, Gerard Wloch, Jan Pilecki, “Das Bunkerbuch des Blocks 11, im Nazi-Konzentrationslager Auschwitz,” *Hefte von Auschwitz*, No. 1, 1959, pp. 69-85.
- Broszat, Martin 1977, “Hitler und die Genesis der ‘Endlösung’”. Aus Anlass der Thesen von David Irving,” in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1977, pp. 739-775.
- Browning, Christopher R. 1978, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office*. Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, London, 1978.
- Browning, Christopher R. 1985, *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution*. Holmes and Meier, New York, 1985.
- Browning, Christopher R. 1992, *To Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
- Browning, Christopher R. 1999, *Evidence for the Implementation of the Final Solution*, 1999; https://www.hdot.org/browning_toc/ (last accessed on April 20, 2021).
- Browning, Christopher R. 2007, “Raul Hilberg,” in: *Yad Vashem Studies*, Vol. 35. 2007, pp. 7-20.
- Buszko, Józef (ed.), *Auschwitz. Nazi Extermination Camp*. Interpress Publishers, Warsaw, 1978.
- Czech, Danuta 1959, “Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau,” in: *Hefte von Auschwitz*, Wydawnictwo Państwowego Muzeum w Oświęcimiu, No. 2, 1959.
- Czech, Danuta 1961, “Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau,” in: *Hefte von Auschwitz*, Wydawnictwo Państwowego Muzeum w Oświęcimiu, No. 4, 1961.
- Czech, Danuta 1964, “Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau,” in: *Hefte von Auschwitz*, Wydawnictwo Państwowego Muzeum w Oświęcimiu, No. 8, 1964.
- Czech, Danuta 1989, *Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz-Birkenau 1939-1945*. Rowohlt Verlag, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1989.
- Czech, Danuta 1990, *Auschwitz Chronicle, 1939-1945*. Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1990.
- Dalton, Thomas, *Debating the Holocaust. A New Look at Both Sides*. 4th ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2020.
- Daniel, Ute, Gerd Krumeich, *Frankreich und Deutschland im Krieg (18.-20. Jahrhundert): Zur Kulturgeschichte der europäischen “Erbfeindschaft”*. (Darstellung nach Kommunikatorenguppen). Ein gemeinsames Forschungsprojekt der Historischen Seminare der TU Braunschweig und der HHU Düsseldorf, gefördert von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (2001-2004); https://publikationsserver.tu-braunschweig.de/receive/dbbs_mods_00001699 (last accessed on April 20, 2021).
- Dawidowicz, Lucy, *The War against the Jews 1933-1945*. Penguin Books, London, 1979.

- Deuerlein, Ernst, "Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr," in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1959, pp. 177-227.
- De Wan, George, "The Holocaust in Perspective", *Newsday*, Long Island, New York, February 23, 1983, p. II/3
- "Die erste judenfreie Stadt im GG," in: *Lemberger Zeitung*, October 17, 1942, p. 5.
- District Court of Ontario. *Between: Her Majesty the Queen and Ernst Zündel. Before: The Honourable Judge H.R. Locke and Jury. The Court House, 351 University Ave. Toronto, Ontario. January 7, 1985 et seq.*; online: www.codoh.com/library/document/3355/.
- Długoborski, Waclaw, Franciszek Piper (eds.), *Auschwitz 1940-1945. Studien zur Geschichte des Konzentrations- und Vernichtungslagers Auschwitz*. 5 vols., Verlag des Staatlichen Museums Auschwitz-Birkenau. Oświęcim, 1999.
- Domarus, Max 1973, *Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945*. R. Löwit, Wiesbaden, 1973.
- Domarus, Max 2007, *The Essential Hitler: Speeches and Commentary*, Bolchazy-Carducci, Wauconda, Illinois, 2007.
- Dötzer, Walter, "Entkeimung, Entseuchung und Entwesung", in: Joachim Mrugowsky (ed.), *Arbeitsanweisungen für Klinik und Laboratorium des Hygiene-Institutes der Waffen-SS*, Urban & Schwarzenberg, Berlin/Vienna, 1943.
- Dziadosz, Edward, Stanisław Duszak, *Majdanek*. Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, Lublin, 1985.
- École des hautes études en sciences sociales (ed.), *L'Allemagne nazie et le génocide juif*. Gallimard, Paris, 1985.
- Engel, Štefan, Lev Haas, Bedřich Steiner, *Tragédia slovenských židov. Fotografie a dokumenty*. Dokumentačná akcia pri Úszno, Bratislava, 1949.
- Faludi, Christian (ed.), *Die "Judenaktion" 1938. Eine Dokumentation zur Radikalisierung der Judenverfolgung*. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 2003.
- Faurisson, Robert 1999, "Le procès Zündel (1985) ou "le procès de Nuremberg," in: R. Faurisson, *Écrits révisionnistes (1974-1998)*. Self-published, Vichy, 1999.
- Fénelon, Fania, *Playing for Time*, Bantam Books, New York, 1981.
- Flury, Ferdinand, Franz Zernik, *Schädliche Gase, Dämpfe, Nebel, Rauch- und Staubarten*. J. Springer, Berlin, 1931.
- Frei, Norbert, Thomas Grotum, Jan Parcer *et al.* (eds.), *Standort- und Kommandanturbefehle des Konzentrationslagers Auschwitz 1940-1945*, Institut für Zeitgeschichte/K.G. Saur, Munich, 2000.
- "French Jews Executed in Paris; Others Deported to Poland; Fined Billion Francs," in: *JTA*, December 15, 1941.
- Friedman, Filip, *This was Oświęcim: The Story of a Murder Camp*, The United Jewish Relief Appeal, London, 1946.
- Friedländer, Saul 1983, "Il dibattito storiografico sull'antisemitismo nazista e lo sterminio degli Ebrei," in: *Storia contemporanea*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, June 1983, pp. 399-422.
- Fritz Bauer Institut, Staatliches Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau (eds.), *Der Auschwitz-Prozeß*, Digitale Bibliothek, Directmedia Publishing, Berlin, 2005.
- Fröhlich, Elke (ed.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, K. G. Saur, Munich, 1987-2006.
- Furet, François, *Unanswered Questions: Nazi Germany and the Genocide of the Jews*, SchockenBooks, New York, 1989.
- Generaldirektion der Ostbahn in Krakau, *Kursbuch Polen 1942 (Generalgouvernement). Amtlicher Taschenfahrplan für das Generalgouvernement nebst Anschlußstrecken, Kraftomnibuslinien und den wichtigsten Fernverbindungen. Gültig vom 2. November 1942 an bis auf weiteres*, Verlag Josef Otto Slezak, Vienna, 1984.
- Gilbert, Martin, *Endlösung. Die Vertreibung und Vernichtung der Juden. Ein Atlas*. Rowohlt Verlag, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1995.
- Giua, Michele, *Lezioni di aggressivi chimici. Parte descrittiva e tecnologica*. Published by the R. Accademia e della Scuola di Application di Artiglieria e Genio, Turin, 1933.

- Goebbels, Joseph, "Die Juden sind schuld!", in: *Das Reich*, November 16, 1941.
- Goshen, Seev, "Eichmann und die Nisko-Aktion im Oktober 1939," in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1981, pp. 74-96.
- Graf, Jürgen 1999, *Riese auf tönernen Füßen. Raul Hilberg und sein Standardwerk über den "Holocaust."* Castle Hill Publishers, Hastings, England, 1999
- Graf, Jürgen 2015, *The Giant with Feet of Clay. Raul Hilberg and His Standard Work on the "Holocaust,"* 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2015.
- Graf, Jürgen, Thomas Kues, Carlo Mattogno, *Sobibór: Holocaust Propaganda and Reality*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2020.
- Graf, Jürgen, Carlo Mattogno, *Concentration Camp Majdanek. A Historical and Technical Study.* 3rd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2016.
- Gumkowski, Janusz, Adam Rutkowski, *Treblinka, Rada ochrony pomników walki i męczeństwa* (Council for Protection of Fight and Martyrdom Monuments), Warsaw, 1961 (unpaginated book).
- Gutman, Israel (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust.* Macmillan, New York, 1990.
- Gutman, Yisrael, Michael Berenbaum (eds.), *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp.* Indiana University Press, Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1994.
- Harwood, Richard (= Richard Verrall), *Did Six Million Really Die?*, Historical Review Press, Richmond, 1974.
- Heddesheimer, Don, *The First Holocaust: The Surprising Origin of the Six-Million Figure*, 5th ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2018.
- Hilberg, Raul 1961, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1961.
- Hilberg, Raul 1981, *Sonderzüge nach Auschwitz*, Dumjahn, Mainz, 1981
- Hilberg, Raul 1985, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, 2nd ed., Holmes & Meier, New York, 1985.
- Hilberg, Raul 1992, *Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders. The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945*, HarperCollins, New York 1992.
- Hilberg, Raul 1995, *La distruzione degli Ebrei d'Europa.* Giulio Einaudi Editore, Turin, 1995.
- Hilberg, Raul 2003, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, 3rd ed., Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 2003.
- Himmler, Heinrich, "Einige Gedanken über die Behandlung der Fremdvölkischen im Osten," in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 1957, pp. 196-198.
- Höss, Rudolf, *Commandant of Auschwitz. The Autobiography of Rudolf Hoess*, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland/New York, 1959.
- Howes, Alfred L. (ed.), *Dachau*, Society for the Prevention of World War III, New York, 1945/Benchmark Pub., Glendale, New York, 1970.
- Hubenák, Ladislav (ed.), *Riešenie židovskej otázky na Slovensku (1939-1945) (The Solution to the Jewish Question in Slovakia (1939-1945)). Dokumenty, 2. Časť.* Edícia Judaica Slovaca, Bratislava, 1994.
- Igounet, Valérie, *Histoire du négationnisme en France.* Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2000.
- Institute of Jewish Affairs. *Statistics on Jewish Casualties during Axis Domination.* New York, June 1945.
- Irving, David, *Nuremberg. The Last Battle.* Focal Point Publications, London, 1996.
- Izzo, Attilio, *Guerra chimica e difesa antigas.* Editore Ulrico Hoepli, Milan, 1935.
- Jäckel, Eberhard, Jürgen Rohwer (eds.), *Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Entschlußbildung und Verwirklichung.* Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1985.
- Jäckel, Eberhard, Peter Longerich, Julius Schoeps, Israel Gutman (eds.), *Enzyklopädie des Holocaust. Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden.* Argon Verlag, Berlin, 1993.
- Kárny, Miroslav (ed.), *Terezínská pamětní kniha (Terezín Memorial Book).* Terezínská Iniciativa, Melantrich, 1995.

- Kastner, Rudolf, *Der Kastner-Bericht über Menschenhandel in Ungarn*. Kindler Verlag, Munich, 1961.
- Kempner, Robert M., *Eichmann und Komplizen*. Europa Verlag, Zürich/Stuttgart/Vienna, 1961.
- Kermisz, Józef (ed.), *Dokumenty i materiały do dziejów okupacji niemieckiej w Polsce (Documents and Materials on the History of the German Occupation in Poland)*, Vol. II, "Akcje" i "Wysiedlenia" ("Actions" and "Evacuations"). Warsaw/Lodz/Krakow, 1946.
- Kershaw, Ian, *Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis* (Vol. 2), Penguin Books, London, 2000.
- Klarsfeld, Serge 1978 (ed.), *Le mémorial de la déportation des juifs de France*. Beate et Serge Klarsfeld, Paris, 1978.
- Klarsfeld, Serge 1983, *Vichy-Auschwitz. Le rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en France, 1942*. Fayard, Paris, 1983.
- Klarsfeld, Serge, Beate Klarsfeld (eds.), *Deutsche Dokumente 1941-1944. Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Frankreich*, self-published, Paris, 1977
- Klarsfeld, Serge, Maxime Steinberg, *Mémorial de la déportation des Juifs de Belgique*. The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, New York, 1994.
- Kogon, Eugen, *Der SS-Staat. Das System der deutsche Konzentrationslager*. Karl Alber, Munich, 1946.
- Kogon, Eugen, Hermann Langbein, Adalbert Rückerl *et al.* 1983 (eds.), *Nationalsozialistische Massentötungen durch Giftgas. Eine Dokumentation*. S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1983.
- Kogon, Eugen, Hermann Langbein, Adalbert Rückerl (eds.), *Nazi Mass Murder. A Documentary History of the Use of Poison Gas*. Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 1993.
- Konze, Eckart, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, Moshe Zimmerman, *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik*. Karl Blessing Verlag, Munich, 2010.
- Kraus, Ota, Erich Schön, *Továrna na smrt*, Čin, Prague, 1946.
- Kraus, Ota, Erich Kulka 1957, *Die Todesfabrik*, Kongress-Verlag, Berlin, 1957.
- Kraus, Ota, Erich Kulka 1966, *The Death Factory: Document on Auschwitz*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1966.
- Krausnick, Helmut, Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, *Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942*. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1981.
- Kubica, Helena, "Children and young people in the transports of Jews from Slovakia," in: *The Tragedy of the Jews of Slovakia*. Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum. Museum of the Slovak National Uprising. Oświęcim-Banská Bystrica, 2002.
- Kuras, Jan, "Sowjetische Bildfälschungen: Eine Analyse gestellter sowjetischer Fotos aus dem Lager Klooga in Estland," *Vierteljahreshefte für freie Geschichtsforschung*, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 278-283.
- Langbein, Hermann 1965, *Der Auschwitz-Prozess. Eine Dokumentation*. Europa Verlag, Vienna, 1965.
- Langbein, Hermann 1972, *Menschen in Auschwitz*, Europaverlag, Vienna 1972.
- Langbein, Hermann 2004, *People in Auschwitz*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2004.
- "Leben eines SS-Generals. Aus den Nürnberger Geständnissen des Generals der Waffen-SS Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski," in: *Aufbau*, Vol. XII, No. 34, August 23, 1946, pp. 1f.
- Lengyel, Olga, *Five Chimneys: The Story of Auschwitz*, Ziff-Davis, New York, 1947.
- Lenz, Otto, Ludwig Gassner, *Schädlingbekämpfung mit hochgiftigen Stoffen. Heft 1: Blausäure*. Verlagsbuchhandlung von Richard Schoetz, Berlin, 1934.
- Leszczyńska, Zofia, "Transporty więźnów do obozu na Majdanku" ("Inmate transports to Majdanek Camp"), in: *Zeszyty Majdanka*, No. IV, Lublin, 1969.

- Leszczyński, Julian, "Od formuły zagłady – Höppner-Chełmno n/Nerem – do "Endlösung" (On the Formula of Extermination – Höppner-Chełmno on the Ner – to the "Final Solution"), in: *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego w Polsce*, No. 1/101, Warsaw, 1977.
- Levi, Primo, *Se questo è un uomo*. Einaudi, Turin, 1984.
- Lichtenstein, Heiner, *Mit der Reichsbahn in den Tod. Massentransporte in den Holocaust 1941 bis 1945*. Bund-Verlag, Cologne, 1985.
- Lingens-Reiner, Ella, *Prisoners of Fear*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1948.
- *Majdanek. Rozprawa przed Specjalnym Sądem karnym w Lublinie (Hearing before the Special Criminal Court in Lublin)*. Spółdzielnia wydawnicza "Czytelnik," Lublin, 1945.
- Makowski, Antoni, "Organizacja, rozwój i działalność szpitala więźniarskiego w Monowicach (KL Auschwitz III)," in: *Zeszyty Oświęcimskie*. Wydawnictwo Państwowego Muzeum w Oświęcimiu, No. 15, 1974, pp. 1087-170.
- Mallmann, Klaus-Michael, Jürgen Matthäus, Martin Cüppers, Andrej Angrick (eds.), *Deutsche Berichte aus dem Osten 1942-1943*. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 2014.
- Mattogno, Carlo 1985, *Il rapporto Gerstein: Anatomia di un falso*. Sentinella d'Italia, Monfalcone, 1985.
- Mattogno, Carlo 1986, *Auschwitz: Un caso di plagio*. Editions La Sfinge, Parma, 1986.
- Mattogno, Carlo 1991, *La soluzione finale: Problemi e polemiche*. Edizioni di Ar, Padua, 1991.
- Mattogno, Carlo 1992, *Auschwitz: La prima gasazione*. Edizioni di Ar, Padua, 1992.
- Mattogno, Carlo 1994, *Auschwitz – The End of a Legend. A Critique of Jean-Claude Pressac*, Institute for Historical Review, Newport Beach, 1994.
- Mattogno, Carlo, *L' "irritante questione" delle camere a gas ovvero da Cappuccetto Rosso ad... Auschwitz. Risposta a Valentina Pisanty*. Graphos, Genoa, 1998.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2000, *"Sonderbehandlung" ad Auschwitz. Genesi e significato*. Edizioni di Ar, Padua, 2000.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2003, "Franciszek Piper and The Number of Victims of Auschwitz," *The Revisionist*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2003, pp. 393-399.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2004, "Franciszek Piper e "Die Zahl der Opfer von Auschwitz," in: *Il numero dei morti di Auschwitz. Vecchie e nuove imposture*. Effepi, Genoa, 2004.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2004a, *Auschwitz: trasferimenti e finte gasazioni. I Quaderni di Auschwitz*, Vol. 3, Effepi, Genoa, 2004.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2004b, "The Morgues of the Crematoria at Birkenau in the Light of Documents," in: *The Revisionist*, Vol. 2, No. 3, August 2004, pp. 271-294.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2004c, "Flames and Smoke from the Chimneys of Crematoria," *The Revisionist*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004, pp. 73-78.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2007, *Un nuovo libro olocaustico su Belzec e la sua fonte. Considerazioni storico-critiche*. Effepi, Genoa, 2007.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2007a, *La deportazione degli Ebrei ungheresi del maggio-luglio 1944. Un bilancio provvisorio*. Effepi, Genoa, 2007; for an English translation of an earlier version see "The Deportation of Hungarian Jews from May to July 1944", Dec. 2001; <https://codoh.com/library/document/the-deportation-of-hungarian-jews-from-may-to/en/>.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2014, "The Recovery of Human Fat in the Cremation Pits", in: *Inconvenient History*, 6(3) (2014); www.inconvenienthistory.com/6/3/3332.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2015, *The Central Construction Office of the Waffen-SS and Police Auschwitz: Organization, Responsibilities, Activities*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2015.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2016, *Special Treatment in Auschwitz: Origin and Meaning of a Term*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2016.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2016a, *Inside the Gas Chambers: The Extermination of Mainstream Holocaust Historiography*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2016.

- Mattogno, Carlo 2016b, *Healthcare in Auschwitz: Medical Care and Special Treatment of Registered Inmates*, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2016.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2016c, *Auschwitz: The First Gassing*, 3rd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield 2016.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2016d, *Auschwitz: Open-Air Incinerations*. 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, UK, 2016.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2016e, *Auschwitz: Crematorium I and the Alleged Homicidal Gassing*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield 2016.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2016f, *Debunking the Bunkers of Auschwitz. Black Propaganda versus History*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield 2016.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2016g, *Belzec: Propaganda, Testimonies, Archeological Research, and History*, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2016.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2017, *Chelmno: A German Camp in History and Propaganda*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield 2017.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2018, *The Einsatzgruppen in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Genesis, Missions and Actions*, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2018.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2019, *The Real Case for Auschwitz: Robert van Pelt's Evidence from the Irving Trial Critically Reviewed*. 3rd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2019.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2020, *Commandant of Auschwitz: Rudolf Höss, His Torture and His Forced Confessions*. 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2020.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2020a, *Curated Lies: The Auschwitz Museum's Misrepresentations, Distortions and Deceptions*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2020.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2020b, *An Auschwitz Doctor's Eyewitness Account: The Tall Tales of Dr. Mengele's Assistant Analyzed*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2020.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2021, *Rudolf Reder versus Kurt Gerstein: Two False Testimonies on the Belzec Camp Analyzed*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2021.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2021a, *The Making of the Auschwitz Myth: Auschwitz in British Intercepts, Polish Underground Reports and Postwar Testimonies (1941-1947)*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2021.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2021b, *Sonderkommando Auschwitz I: Nine Eyewitness Testimonies Analyzed*, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2021.
- Mattogno, Carlo 2021c, *Sonderkommando Auschwitz II: The False Testimonies by Henryk Tauber and Szlama Dragon*, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2021 (in preparation).
- Mattogno, Carlo, Franco Deana, *The Cremation Furnaces of Auschwitz: A Technical and Historical Study*, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2015.
- Mattogno, Carlo, Jürgen Graf, *Treblinka. Extermination Camp or Transit Camp?*, 3rd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2020.
- Mattogno, Carlo, Thomas Kues, Jürgen Graf 2015, *The "Extermination Camps" of "Aktion Reinhardt": An Analysis and Refutation of Factitious "Evidence," Deceptions and Flawed Argumentation of the "Holocaust Controversies" Bloggers*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2015.
- Mazal, Harry W., "Zyklon-B: A Brief Report on the Physical Structure and Composition," <http://phdn.org/archives/holocaust-history.org/auschwitz/zyklonb/> (undated, but probably 1998; last accessed on April 20, 2021)
- Mazon, Micael, "Il y a trente ans: La Conférence d'Evian," in: *Le Monde Juif*, No. 50, April-June 1968.
- Mencil, Tadeusz (ed.), *Majdanek 1941-1944*. Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, Lublin, 1991.
- Mendelsohn, John, Donald S. Detwiler (eds.), *The Holocaust: Selected Documents in Eighteen Volumes*. Garland, New York/London, 1982.
- Mitscherlich, Alexander, Fred Mielke (eds.), *Medizin ohne Menschlichkeit*. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1995.

- Morsch, Günter, Betrand Perz (eds.), *Neue Studien zu nationalsozialistischen Massentötungen durch Giftgas. Historische Bedeutung, technische Entwicklung, revisionistische Leugnung*. Metropolis, Berlin, 2011.
- Müller, Filip 1979a, *Sonderbehandlung. Drei Jahre in den Krematorien und Gaskammern von Auschwitz*. Verlag Steinhausen, Munich, 1979.
- Müller, Filip 1979b, *Auschwitz Inferno: The Testimony of a Sonderkommando*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London/Henley, 1979.
- Naumann, Bernd, *Auschwitz. Bericht über die Strafsache gegen Mulka u.a. vor dem Schwurgericht Frankfurt*. Athäneum Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1965.
- *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*. Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
- “NS-Prozesse: Bewegtes Leben,” in: *Der Spiegel*, No. 53, December 29, 1965, p. 26.
- Nyiszli, Miklós 1946, *Dr. Mengele boncolóorvosa voltam az auschwitz-i krematóriumban* (I Was Dr. Mengele's Anatomist Physician at the Auschwitz Crematorium). Oradea, Nagyváradi, 1946.
- Nyiszli, Miklós 1961, *Auschwitz. A Doctor's Eyewitness Account*, Fawcett Crest, New York, 1961.
- Orth, Karin, “Rudolf Höss und die ‘Endlösung der Judenfrage.’ Drei Argumente gegen deren Datierung auf den Sommer 1941”, in: *Werkstattgeschichte*, Vol. 18, November 1999, pp. 45-57.
- Perl, Gisella, *I Was a Doctor in Auschwitz*, International Universities Press, New York, 1948.
- Peters, Gerhard, *Blausäure zur Schädlingsbekämpfung. Sammlung chemischer und chemisch-technischer Vorträge*. Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1933.
- Phillips, Raymond (ed.), *Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty-Four Others (The Belsen Trial)*. William Hodge & Co., London/Edinburgh/Glasgow, 1949.
- Picker, Henry, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier*, Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, Munich, 1981.
- Piper, Franciszek 1993, *Die Zahl der Opfer von Auschwitz*, State Museum Auschwitz, Auschwitz, 1993.
- Piper, Franciszek 1994, “Gas Chambers and Crematoria,” in: Gutman/Berenbaum, pp. 157-182.
- Poliakov, Léon, “Le dossier Kurt Gerstein,” in: *Le Monde Juif*, Jan.-March 1964, No. 1 (36), pp. 4-20.
- Poliakov, Léon, Jozef Wulf, *Das dritte Reich und die Juden. Dokumente und Aufsätze*. Arani Verlag, Berlin-Grunewald, 1955.
- Pressac, Jean-Claude 1982, “Les ‘Krematorien’ IV et V de Birkenau et leurs chambres à gaz. Construction et fonctionnement,” in: *Le Monde Juif*, No. 107, July-September 1982, pp. 91-131.
- Pressac, Jean-Claude 1989, *Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers*. The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, New York, 1989.
- Pressac, Jean-Claude 1993, *Les crématoires d'Auschwitz: La machinerie du meurtre de masse*, CNRS, Paris, 1993.
- Pressac, Jean-Claude 1994, *Die Krematorien von Auschwitz: Die Technik des Massenmords*, Piper, Munich, 1994.
- Pressac, Jean-Claude 1995, “Enquête sur les camps de la mort,” in: *Historama-Histoire*, Special Edition No. 34 (1995), pp. 114-125.
- Reder, Rudolf, *Bežec*. Centralna Żydowska Komisja Historyczna przy C.K. Żydów Polskich – Oddział w Krakowie, Krakow, 1946.
- Reitlinger, Gerald, *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945*, Vallentine & Mitchell, London, 1953.
- Reuth, Ralf Georg (ed.), *Joseph Goebbels Tagebücher 1924-1945*. Piper Verlag, Munich, 2003.

- Romano, Jaža, *Jews of Yugoslavia 1941–1945. Victims of genocide and freedom fighters*; https://www.jasenovac.org/res/doc/jews_of_yugoslavia_1941_1945.pdf (last accessed on April 20, 2021); translation of *Jevreji Jugoslavije 1941-1945. Žrtve genocida i učesnici NOR*, Savez jevrejskih opština Jugoslavije, Belgrade, 1980.
- Roques, Henri, *The "Confessions" of Kurt Gerstein*, Institute for Historical Review, Costa Mesa, Calif., 1989.
- Rothfels, Hans 1953, "Augenzeugenbericht zu den Massenvergasungen," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1953, pp. 177-194.
- Rothfels, Hans 1959, "Zur 'Umsiedlung' der Juden im Generalgouvernement," in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1959, pp. 333-336.
- Rückerl, Adalbert 1971, *NS-Prozesse*. C.F.Müller Verlag, Karlsruhe, 1971.
- Rückerl, Adalbert 1979, *NS-Vernichtungslager im Spiegel deutscher Strafprozesse*. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, 1979.
- Rudolf, Germar 2020, *The Chemistry of Auschwitz. The Technology and Toxicology of Zyklon B and the Gas Chambers. A Crime-Scene Investigation*. 4th ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, , 2020.
- Rudolf, Germar 2020a (ed.), *The First Zündel Trial: The Court Transcript of the Canadian "False News" Trial of Ernst Zündel*, 1985, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield 2020.
- Rudolf, Germar, Ernst Böhm, *Garrison and Headquarters Orders of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp: A Critically Commented Selection*, Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2020.
- Russell, Edward F.L., *The Scourge of the Swastika*. Cassell & Company Ltd., London, 1954.
- Rüter, Christiaan F., Fritz Bauer, Karl Dietrich Bracher, (eds.), *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen, 1945-1966*, Univ. Press, Amsterdam, 1968-1981, Vol. XIII: Trial Nos. 410-437 (1954-1956).
- Rüter, Christiaan F., Hans H. Fuchs (eds.), *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945-1966*. Vol. XI, University Press Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 1974.
- Rutkowski, Adam, "Documents sur l'hypocrisie nazie à l'égard des Juifs de France," in: *Le Monde Juif*, No. 71, July-September 1973, pp. 24-32.
- Sartori, Mario, *Chimica delle sostanze aggressive*, Hoepli, Milan, 1933; German: *Chemie der Kampfstoffe*, F. Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig, 1935.
- Schneider, Getrude, *Journey into Terror*, Ark House, New York, 1979.
- Schramm Percy E., Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.), *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1940-1941*. Mandred Pawlak Verlagsgesellschaft, Herrsching, 1982.
- Schulte, Jan Erik, "Vom Arbeits- zum Vernichtungslager. Die Entstehungsgeschichte von Auschwitz-Birkenau 1941/42," in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2002, pp. 41-69.
- Schwensen, Klaus, "The Bone Mill of Lemberg," in: *Inconvenient History*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2013, pp. 297-332; www.inconvenienthistory.com/5/3/3220.
- Sehn, Jan 1946a, "Obóz koncentracyjny i zagłady Oświęcim" ("Auschwitz Concentration and Extermination Camp"), in: *Biuletyn Główniej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce*, Poznań, 1946.
- Sehn, Jan 1946b, *Concentration and Extermination Camp at Oświęcim (Auschwitz-Birkenau)*, Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, Warsaw, 1946.
- Seidler, Franz W., *Die Organisation Todt. Bauen für Staat und Wehrmacht 1938-1945*. 2nd ed., Bernard & Graefe, Bonn 1998.
- Sereny, Gitta, *Into that Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1974.
- Shermer, Michael, Alex Grobman, *Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It?*, University of California, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 2000; 2nd ed., 2009.
- Shirer, William L., *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1960.

- Simonov, Constantin, *The Extermination Camp*. Foreign Language Publications, Moscow, 1944.
- Smith, Bradley F., Agnes F. Peterson (eds.), *Heinrich Himmler. Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 und andere Ansprachen*. Propyläen Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1974.
- Staatliches Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau (ed.), *Die Sterbebücher von Auschwitz*, K.G. Saur, Munich 1995.
- Staatsinstitut für Angewandte Botanik, *Jahresbericht 1928*, self-published, Hamburg, 1929.
- State of Israel. Ministry of Justice. *The Trial of Adolf Eichmann. Record of Proceedings in the District Court of Jerusalem*. Jerusalem, 1993.
- Streim, Alfred, "Zur Eröffnung des allgemeinen Judenvernichtungsbefehls gegenüber den Einsatzgruppen," in: Jäckel/Rohwer, pp. 107-119
- Strzelecka, Irena, "Die Experimente," in: Długoborski/Piper 1999, Vol. 2, pp. 423-449.
- Świebicki, Henryk, "Widerstand," in: Długoborski/Piper 1999, Vol. IV.
- Thalmann, Rita, "La nuit de cristal," in: *Le Monde Juif*, No. 92, October-December 1978, pp. 147-161.
- Tregenza, Michael, "Das vergessene Lager des Holocaust," in: I. Wojak, P. Hayes (eds.), *"Arisierung" im Nationalsozialismus, Volksgemeinschaft, Raub und Gedächtnis*. Fritz Bauer Institut/Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main/New York, 2000, pp. 241-267.
- *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals*, Nuremberg, October 1946-April 1949.
- United Nations War Crimes Commission, *Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals*. London, 1947. Volume I, Case No. 4. *The Hadamar Trial. Trial of Alfons Klein and six others*; Volume VI, 1948, Case No. 38, *Trial of Obersturmbannführer Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, Commandant of the Auschwitz Camp. Supreme National Tribunal of Poland 11th-29th March, 1947*.
- van den Berghe, Gie 1990, "[The Incompleteness of a Masterpiece. Raul Hilberg and The Destruction of European Jews](#)," in: *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis*, XXI, 1990.
- van den Berghe, Gie 2001, *De uitbuiting van de holocaust* (The Exploitation of the Holocaust), Antwerp, undated, but probably 2001; in: <http://www.serendib.be/boeken/uitbuiting1.htm> (last accessed on April 20, 2021).
- van Pelt, Robert Jan, *The Case for Auschwitz. Evidence from the Irving Trial*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington/Indianapolis, 2002.
- Vogel, Rolf, *Ein Stempel hat gefehlt. Dokumente zur Emigration deutscher Juden*. Droemer Knaur, Munich/Zürich, 1977
- von Lang, Jochen (ed.), *Eichmann Interrogated. Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police*, Da Capo, New York, 1999.
- Walk, Joseph (ed.), *Das Sonderrecht für die Juden im NS-Staat*. C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, Heidelberg/Karlsruhe, 1981.
- Weckert, Ingrid 2016, *Jewish Emigration from the Third Reich*, 2nd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2016.
- Weckert, Ingrid 2018, *Auswanderung der Juden aus dem 3. Reich*, 4th ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2018.
- Weckert, Ingrid 2019, "The Gas Vans: A Critical Assessment of the Evidence," in: Germar Rudolf (ed.), *Dissecting the Holocaust*. 3rd ed., Castle Hill Publishers, Uckfield, 2019, pp. 207-235.
- Weil, Nicolas, "Raul Hilberg: la communauté voulait 'limiter les pertes'," *Le Monde*, February 25, 1994.
- Weintraub, Ben, *The Holocaust Dogma of Judaism: Keystone of the New World Order*, self-published, Washington, 1995.
- Weissmandel, Dov, *Min-hammetsar*, "Emunah", New York, 1960.
- Wellers, Georges 1980, "Encore sur le Témoignage Gerstein," in: *Le Monde Juif*, No. 97, January-March 1980, pp. 26-34.

- Wellers, Georges 1981, *Les chambres à gaz ont existé. Des documents, des témoignages, des chiffres*. Gallimard, Paris, 1981.
- Wellers, Georges 1983, "Essai de détermination du nombre de morts au camp d'Auschwitz," in: *Le Monde Juif*, No. 112, October-December 1983, pp. 127-159.
- Wellers, Georges 1993, "The Two Poison Gases," in: Kogon *et al.* 1983, pp. 203-209.
- Wiesel, Elie, *Night*. Hill & Wang, New York, 2006.
- Witte, Peter, "Zwei Entscheidungen in der 'Endlösung der Judenfrage': Deportationen nach Lodz und Vernichtung in Chelmno," in: *Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente*, Verlag Academia, Prague, 1995, pp. 469f.
- Witte, Peter, Stephen Tyas, "A New Document on the Deportation and Murder of the Jews during "Einsatz Reinhardt" 1942," in: *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, No. 3, winter 2001, pp. 468-486.
- Witte, Peter, Michael Wildt, Martina Voigt *et al.* (eds.), *Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42*, Hans Christians Verlag, Hamburg, 1999.
- Wojtczak, Stanisław, "Karny obóz pracy Treblinka I i ośrodek zagłady Treblinka II," in: *Biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce*, Vol. XXVI, Warsaw, 1975, pp. 117-185.

Index of Names

Page numbers in *italics* indicate occurrences in footnotes only.

- **A** —
 Abetz, Otto: 16, 31, 79
 Adam, Uwe Dietrich: 236, 238, 239, 242, 243, 245
 Adler, Hans Günther: 27, 53, 55
 Ahlwardt, Hermann: 252
 Ahnert, Horst: 83-85, 87
 Alvarez, Santiago: 65, 91, 92, 150
 Amend, Karl: 261
 Angrick, Andrej: 73
 Ansel, Werner: 261
 Arad, Yitzhak: 29, 66, 67, 116, 117, 182, 188, 263
 Aronson, Shlomo: 246
 Aschenauer, Rudolf: 33, 35, 62, 123
 Auerbach, Philipp: 261
 Auerswald, Heinz: 111
 Aumeier, Hans: 174
- **B** —
 Bachmann, Hans: 261
 Badenitz, Andrej: 129
 Baer, Richard: 159
 Barth, Christian: 51
 Barthelmäss, Adolf Johann: 261
 Bartosik, Igor: 174
 Bauer, Yehuda: 169, 248
 Becher, Kurt: 206-208, 261
 Becker, August: 149, 261
 Bednarz, Władysław: 108, 109, 199
 Bendel, Charles Sigismund: 129, 130, 136, 137, 195, 196, 201, 261, 265
 Benedetti, Leonardo de: 163, 178
 Benz, Wolfgang: 209
 Benzler, Felix: 88, 89, 92
 Berenbaum, Michael: 7, 254-257
 Berenstein, Tatiana: 45, 101, 110, 111, 113, 114, 205
 Bezwińska, Jadwiga: 129
 Bielfeld, Harald: 17
 Bierkamp, Walther: 122
 Bilan, Włodzimierz: 129
 Billig, Joseph: 25, 85
 Bischoff, Karl: 133, 159, 174, 175, 259
 Blobel, Paul: 69, 70, 182, 199, 200, 261
 Blumenfeld, Ralph David: 254
 Blumental, Nachman: 158, 160, 173, 175
 Boberach, Heinz: 23
 Böhm, Ernst: 205
 Böhme, Franz.: 88
 Bonnet, Georges: 26
 Bormann, Martin: 28, 30, 32, 203, 221, 222
 Bosshammer, Friedrich: 103
 Boutbien, Leon Felix: 261
 Bracher, Karl Dietrich: 239
 Bracht, Fritz: 130, 131
 Brack, Viktor: 71, 72, 115
 Braham, Randolph L.: 105
 Brand, Joel: 107
 Braumann, Randolph: 147
 Briese, Paul: 172
 Broad, Pery: 129, 195, 197, 202, 261
 Brol, Franciszek: 171
 Broszat, Martin: 75, 232, 236, 238, 242, 245, 246, 249, 250
 Browning, Christopher R.: 90-92, 220, 222, 236, 238, 239, 240-242, 246, 248, 250
 Budzyn, Tadeusz: 121
 Bühler, Josef: 44-48, 204
 Burger, Wilhelm: 161, 261
 Burzio, Giuseppe: 99
 Buszko, Józef: 263
- **C** —
 Christie, Douglas: 8, 39, 57-59, 140, 141, 199, 207, 208, 215-219, 225, 226, 228, 252
 Chvalkovsky, Frantisek: 235
 Clauberg, Carl: 179
 Cohen, E. A.: 8
 Czech, Danuta: 82, 83, 93, 127, 129, 145, 157, 165, 182, 193, 206, 207, 208, 255, 256, 260
- **D** —
 Dalton, Thomas: 209
 Daluge, Kurt: 16
 Daniel, Ute: 78
 Dannecker, Theodor: 79-82, 86, 87
 Dawidowicz, Lucy: 233, 236, 238
 de Wan, George: 218
 Deana, Franco: 192, 259
 Detwiler, Donald S.: 133
 Deuerlein, Ernst: 232
 Domarus, Max: 22, 24
 Dorsch, Xaver: 104
 Dötzer, Walter: 135, 141
 Dragon, Szlama: 129, 130, 201
 Drechsler, Otto-Heinrich: 72
 Drescher, Heinz: 168
 Dürrfeld, Walter: 186, 187, 261
 Duszak, Stanisław: 95
 Dybus, Marian: 129
 Dziadosz, Edward: 95
- **E** —
 Eberl, Irmfried: 110, 111
 Eichmann, Adolf: 12, 15, 29, 33-35, 37, 38, 48, 51, 52-55, 70-72, 80-82, 84-89, 96, 101-103, 107, 123, 126-128, 145, 180, 208, 235, 237, 238, 250, 251, 255, 258, 261
 Engelstein, Adolf: 208
 Entress, Friedrich: 129, 130, 191, 254, 261
 Epstein, Berthold: 178, 261
 Erler, Rudolf: 193
 Erman, Renée: 261
 Ertl, Fritz: 183, 184, 255
- **F** —
 Falkenhahn, Günther: 261

Faludi, Christian: 42
 Faurisson, Robert: 215, 217,
 220, 222, 225, 228, 229, 253
 Faust, Max: 261
 Fehling, Wilhelm: 261
 Fejkiel, Władysław: 129
 Fenelon, Fania: 262
 Fiala, Fritz: 101-103
 Fischer, Fritz Ernst: 261
 Fleischmann, Gisi: 96
 Fleming, Gerald: 246, 256
 Florstedt, Arthur Hermann:
 167
 Flury, Ferdinand: 180
 Frank, August: 261
 Frank, Hans: 16, 32, 44, 45,
 47, 48, 51, 122, 123, 202-
 206, 261
 Frank-Fahle, Günther: 261
 Franz, Kurt: 262
 Freese, Willi: 193
 Frei, Norbert: 141, 193, 205
 Freitag, Helmut: 217
 Friedländer, Saul: 48, 230-
 232, 246
 Friedman, Benedykt: 261
 Friedman, Filip: 262, 263
 Fritzsche, Karl: 128, 180
 Fröhlich, Elke: 49-51
 Fuchs, Erich: 262
 Fuchs, Hans H.: 90
 Furet, François: 230, 232, 243

— G —

Garfinkel, Mieczysław: 188,
 189
 Gassner, Ludwig: 145, 146
 Gehri, Theodor: 169
 Gemlich, Adolf: 232, 233
 Gerlach, Christian: 250
 Gerstein, Kurt: 114-116, 138,
 139, 142-148, 150, 185, 198,
 216, 225, 226, 243, 261,
 262, 264
 Gieclik, Zelik: 157
 Gilbert, Martin: 106
 Girs, Władysław: 129
 Guua, Michele: 180
 Glinski, Bogdan: 129
 Globocnik, Odilo: 34, 49, 50,
 110, 111, 115, 144, 145,
 146, 148, 203, 204, 226,
 251, 252, 260
 Glücks, Richard: 36, 132, 133,
 157, 167, 185, 186

Goebbels, Joseph: 13, 16, 49-
 51, 56, 78, 253
 Golczewski, Frank: 209, 211
 Göring, Hermann: 11, 12, 14,
 15, 18, 32, 35, 38, 39, 99,
 217, 219, 223, 224, 235,
 238, 248, 262
 Goshen, Seev: 12
 Grabner, Maximilian: 195
 Graebe, Hermann Friedrich
 (Gräbe): 65, 66
 Graf, Jürgen: 7, 8, 33, 38, 63,
 76, 100, 108, 113, 117, 120,
 121, 122, 146, 149, 151,
 250, 252, 256
 Granata, Russell: 256
 Grawitz, Ernst: 127, 128, 180,
 181
 Greiser, Arthur: 36, 108
 Grese, Irma: 151
 Griffiths, Peter: 141
 Grobman, Alex: 120, 264
 Grünwald, Hans Dietrich: 122
 Grynberg, Michal: 209
 Gulba, Franciszek: 129
 Gumkowski, Janusz: 111
 Günther, Rolf: 82, 145, 185
 Gutman, Israel: 7, 67, 254-257

— H —

Haber, Fritz: 180, 181
 Hackenholz, Lorenz: 150
 Haeni, Paul H.: 261
 Haffner, Sebastian: 239, 242
 Hałas, Kazimierz: 129
 Harbaum, August: 261
 Harriman, William A.: 210
 Hartl, Albert: 69, 70
 Harwood, Richard (Richard
 Verrall): 8
 Hecht, Gerhard: 12
 Heddeshimer, Don: 209

Heim, Willi: 116
 Hess, Rudolf: 45
 Heydrich, Reinhardt: 11-14,
 15, 17, 18, 32-38, 40, 41, 43-
 48, 50, 53, 55, 62, 74, 75,
 108, 132, 133, 217, 219,
 220, 224, 235-237, 239-241,
 245, 248, 250, 252
 Hilberg, Raul: *passim*
 Hildebrand, Klaus: 231, 239
 Hillgruber, Andreas: 239, 245,
 248
 Hilse, Willy: 190, 262

Himmler, Heinrich: 10, 12,
 16, 17, 24, 31, 33-36, 51, 55,
 59, 61-65, 68, 69, 74, 75, 79,
 89, 92, 94, 99, 102-104, 107,
 108, 115, 123, 124, 127,
 128, 130-133, 144, 148, 155,
 165, 166, 168, 171-173, 175-
 177, 179-181, 202, 203, 205-
 208, 212, 213, 217, 220,
 222, 223, 227, 232, 234,
 236, 238-240, 245, 246, 248,
 250, 251, 255, 257, 258
 Hirszman, Chaim: 115
 Hitler, Adolf: 11, 16-18, 21-
 28, 30-37, 44, 45, 50, 57-61,
 68, 70, 74, 78, 79, 99, 104,
 107, 110, 123, 124, 128,
 180, 181, 203, 204, 206,
 213, 217-223, 226, 231-242,
 244-254, 258, 265

Hodys, Eleonore: 168-171

Hoffmann, Josef: 157

Höfle, Hans: 50, 111-113,
 116, 260

Hogman: 261

Hohberg, Dr.: 176

Höppner, Rolf-Heinz: 29, 30,
 37

Höss, Rudolf: 33, 34, 36, 102,
 103, 109, 123-133, 135, 136,
 139, 144, 147, 148, 152,
 153, 157, 159, 166, 168-171,
 173, 175, 177, 180, 193,
 195, 196, 197, 200, 201,
 204, 216, 225, 227, 228,
 251, 254, 255, 258, 260-262,
 264, 265

Hössler, Franz: 194

Hoven, Waldemar: 166, 167

Howes, Alfred L.: 169-171

Hubenák, Ladislav: 94, 96

— I —

Igounet, Valérie: 119

Illgner, Hans: 261

Irving, David: 47, 75

Izzo, Attilio: 180

— J —

Jäckel, Eberhard: 65, 232,
 233, 235, 236, 239, 244,
 247, 251

Jacobmeyer, Wolfgang: 16,
 47, 122

Jacobsen, Hans Adolf: 60

Jäger, Karl: 74
 Jäger, Wilhelm: 261
 Jankowski, Stanisław: 129, 130, 201
 Jeckeln, Friedrich: 64
 Jodl, Alfred: 58-61
 Jörg, Frieda: 185
 Jothann, Werner: 159
 Jung, Friedrich: 261

— K —

Kallmeyer, Helmut: 71, 72, 150, 262
 Kaltenbrunner, Ernst: 184, 206
 Kammler, Hans: 104, 132, 172, 259
 Kárny, Miroslav: 77
 Karski, Jan: 116
 Kastner, Rudolf: 107, 124
 Katzmann, Fritz: 43, 116-118
 Kauffmann, Kurt: 153
 Keitel, Wilhelm: 60, 61
 Kempner, Robert M.: 80, 88, 89, 239
 Kermisz, Józef: 56, 113
 Kershaw, Jan: 78
 Kirsz, Stefan: 261
 Klarsfeld, Beate: 79
 Klarsfeld, Serge: 79, 80, 82, 85, 97, 106
 Klehr, Josef: 141
 Klein, Fritz: 262
 Klein, Helene: 194, 262
 Klein, Peter: 73
 Klempfner, Jan: 261
 Klingenfuss, Karl Otto: 81
 Kłodziński, Stanisław: 129
 Koch, Karl Otto: 95, 166, 167
 Koczorowski, Józef: 129
 Kogon, Eugen: 64, 149, 167, 179, 243, 262, 263
 Kohl, Otto: 85, 86
 Kolb, Eberhard: 244, 245
 Konze, Eckart: 16
 Koppe, Wilhelm: 37, 64, 202, 204, 262
 Korherr, Richard: 20, 42, 109, 165, 185, 212, 256
 Korkowski, J.: 129
 Körner, Paul: 186
 Kozak, Stanisław: 262
 Krakowski, Shmuel: 209
 Kramer, Josef: 262
 Krauch, Carl: 186, 187

Kraus, Ota: 198
 Krausnick, Helmut: 64, 218, 231, 236, 239, 245, 247
 Krüger, Friedrich Wilhelm: 116, 117, 202, 204
 Krumeich, Gerd: 78
 Krumme, Werner: 201, 202, 261
 Krumpe, Werner: 261
 Krzepicki, Abraham: 261
 Kubica, Helena: 97
 Kues, Thomas: 33, 38, 108, 149, 151, 250, 252
 Kula, Michał: 129
 Kulisher, Eugene: 209, 211
 Kulka, Erich (Schön): 198
 Kun, Bela: 102
 Küpper, Gustav: 261
 Kuras, Jan: 67

— L —

Lambert, Erwin: 150
 Lammers, Hans: 30-32, 217
 Langbein, Hermann: 169, 264
 Lange, Rudolf: 64, 73
 Langer, Marek: 261
 Lanzmann, Claude: 22, 223, 252
 Lasik, Aleksander: 169
 Lasker, Anita: 262
 Leibbrandt, George: 73
 Lengyel, Olga: 192, 193, 262, 265
 Lenz, Otto: 145
 Leszczyńska, Zofia: 95, 106
 Leszczyński, Julian: 30
 Levi, Primo: 163, 178, 192-194
 Levy, Robert: 261
 Lichtenstein, Heiner: 84
 Liebehenschel, Arthur: 95, 157, 174
 Liebhäuser, Christian J.: 261
 Lingens-Reiner, Ella: 208, 262, 265
 Lipski, Józef: 26
 Locke, Hugh: 216
 Lohse, Heinrich: 53, 71-73
 Lolling, Enno: 167
 Lorent, Robert: 261
 Lörner, Georg: 161, 261
 Löwenherz, Josef: 55
 Ludin, Hans: 102, 105
 Luthal, Erich: 261

Luther, Martin: 18, 19, 31, 39, 42, 48, 80, 88, 94
 Luther, Martin, reformer: 21, 252

— M —

Madajczyk, Czesław: 248
 Maedel, Walter: 20
 Maglione, Luigi: 97, 98
 Makowski, Antoni: 178
 Mallmann, Klaus-Michael: 185
 Mandelbaum, Israel M.: 261
 Mangold, Philipp: 261
 Markus, Kurt: 129
 Mattei, judge: 145, 146
 Mattogno, Carlo: 9, 10, 12, 33, 35, 38, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 76, 100, 105, 107-109, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 137, 139, 143-150, 151, 155, 157, 158-163, 171, 172, 174, 175, 178, 180, 183-186, 188, 191, 192, 193, 196-201, 205, 213, 217, 226, 227, 228, 250, 252, 255, 259, 260, 266
 Maurer, Gerhard: 106, 159, 173, 175
 Mazal, Harry W.: 134
 Mazor, Micael: 26
 Mehrbach, Hans: 261
 Mencil, Tadeusz: 106
 Mendelsohn, John: 133
 Merbach, Erich: 129
 Messersmith, George S.: 253
 Metzner, Alfred: 65
 Mey, SS Hauptsturmführer: 175
 Meyer, Alfred: 53
 Meyer, Konrad: 43
 Michalsen, Georg: 262
 Mielke, Fred: 180
 Milch, Erhard: 104, 261
 Mitscherlich, Alexander: 180
 Möckel, Karl: 261
 Moll, Otto: 151, 152, 198, 200
 Mommsen, Hans: 245, 248, 249
 Morgen, Konrad: 127, 148, 153, 155, 162, 166, 167-170, 181, 254, 261, 262
 Morsch, Günter: 266

Moyne, Lord: 107
 Mrugowski, Joachim: 139, 262
 Müller, Filip: 129, 130, 190, 193, 195-201, 217, 262, 265
 Müller, Heinrich: 80, 127, 132, 167, 175, 182, 199, 235, 250
 Munro, Andrew S.: 194
 Murr, Gustav: 261
 Mussfeldt, Erich: 122

— N —

Naumann, Bernd: 264
 Nebe, Arthur: 38
 Neufeldt, Berthold: 77
 Novak, Franz: 82
 Nyiszli, Miklos: 129, 130, 195-198, 201, 217, 261, 265

— O —

Obalek, Ludwig: 262
 Oberhauser, Josef: 114, 242, 262
 Ohlendorf, Otto: 61, 62
 Orlik, Erich: 261
 Orth, Karin: 127, 258

— P —

Paisikovic, Dov: 201
 Palitzsch, Gerhard: 168, 169
 Paulmann, Werner.: 166, 167, 170, 261
 Pelckmann, Horst: 170
 Perl, Gisella: 156, 162, 201, 262, 265
 Perz, Betrand: 266
 Peters, Gerhard: 136, 142, 143, 146, 261
 Peterson, Agnes F.: 24, 104
 Pfannenstiel, Wilhelm: 262
 Phillips, Raymond: 194, 201
 Picker, Henry: 24, 31
 Piper, Franciszek: 129, 182, 257, 262, 263
 Pirow, Oswald: 235
 Plaskura, Jozef: 129
 Pohl, Oswald: 132, 153, 159, 162, 165, 171-173, 176, 177, 206, 261
 Poliakov, Léon: 35, 124, 147, 239
 Pradel, Friedrich: 65, 92
 Präg, Werner: 16, 47, 122

Pressac, Jean-Claude: 119, 127, 129, 131, 136, 137, 162, 175, 243, 254-258, 262, 263
 Proudfoot, Malcom: 209, 211
 Prüfer, Kurt: 184
 Przeda, Marian: 129
 Puchala, Reinhold: 129
 Puhl, Emil J.: 261
 Purke, Josef: 193

— R —

Rademacher, Franz: 13, 17, 31, 80, 86-89, 92
 Rahm, Karl: 208
 Rajzmann, Samuel: 261
 Rasch, Otto: 38
 Rauff, Walter: 64, 65
 Reder, Rudolf: 112, 115, 116, 261
 Reelitz, Gerhard: 261
 Reitlinger, Gerald: 209, 265
 Reuter, Fritz: 111
 Reuth, Ralf Georg: 16, 49-51
 Ribbentrop, Joachim: 12, 13, 26, 89, 92, 102
 Roeder, Karl Adam: 261
 Rohwer, Jürgen: 244
 Romano, Jaža: 89
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: 26
 Roques, Henri: 145
 Rosenberg, Alfred: 13, 31, 40, 45, 71, 73, 79, 236, 249
 Rosin, Arnošt: 129
 Rothfels, Hans: 146, 147, 187, 262
 Röthke, Heinz: 85
 Rotta, Angelo: 97, 98, 99
 Rückerl, Adalbert: 64, 74, 114, 242, 248, 263
 Rudolf, Gernar: 8, 9, 32, 40, 57-59, 74, 133, 140, 147, 196, 199, 205, 207, 208, 217
 Rühmer, Karl: 186
 Rum: 261
 Ruppert, Friedrich Wilhelm: 155, 156, 261
 Russell, Edward F.L.: 227
 Rüter, Christiaan F.: 90, 145
 Rutkowski, Adam: 103, 111

— S —

Salomon, Jeanne Ingrid: 261
 Santo, Camill: 261

Sartori, Mario: 180
 Saur, Karl-Otto: 104, 172
 Savelberg, Heinz: 176
 Schacht, Hjalmar: 26
 Schäfer, Emanuel: 90, 92
 Scheffler, Wolfgang: 246
 Scheide, Rudolf: 175, 261
 Schellenberg, Walter: 14, 32, 238, 241
 Schillinger, Josef: 193, 228
 Schindler, Max Joseph: 122
 Schleier, Rudolf: 81
 Schlempp, Walter: 104
 Schlesinger, Paul: 97
 Schleunes, Karl A.: 233-235, 248
 Schluch, Karl: 261
 Schmauser, Ernst Heinrich: 130
 Schmelter, Fritz: 261
 Schneider, Getrude: 74
 Schramm, Percy: 60
 Schubert, Gotthard: 167
 Schuler, Erwin (Ding): 167, 261
 Schulhof, Erwin: 261
 Schulte, Jan Erik: 43
 Schumann, Horst: 179
 Schuster, Heinrich: 136, 138, 202
 Schwarcz, Ernst: 97
 Schwarz, Heinrich: 173, 187
 Schwarz, Irene: 194, 261
 Schwensen, Klaus: 200
 Sehn, Jan: 10, 137, 162, 169, 195, 197, 201, 262, 263
 Seidl, Alfred: 45-47, 203
 Seidler, Franz W.: 67
 Seiner, Johanna Sara: 157
 Seraphim, Peter-Heinz: 209
 Sereny, Gitta: 70
 Shermer, Michael: 120, 264
 Shirer, William L.: 216, 217
 Sidor, Karol: 98
 Siebert, Friedrich Wilhelm: 111
 Siegert, Rudolf: 84, 85
 Simonov, Constantin: 121
 Smith, Bradley F.: 24, 104
 Sommer, Karl: 173
 Sossenheimer, Heinrich: 136
 Speer, Albert: 104, 172, 255
 Stahlecker, Walter: 72
 Stark, Hans: 129
 Stefaniuk: 262

Steffen, Ministerialrat: 172
 Steffler, Wilhelm: 186, 187, 261
 Steinberg, Maxime: 97
 Streicher, Julius: 254
 Streim, Alfred: 62, 63, 247
 Struss, Ernst A.: 261, 262
 Strzelecka, Irena: 179
 Suchomel, Franz: 261
 Sulkowski, Edmond: 129
 Świeboki, Henryk: 163
 Szczerbowski, Adam: 129
 Szlamek: 109
 Sztojay, Döme: 42
 Szweda, Konrad: 129

— T —

Tauber, Henryk: 129, 130, 201
 Tauboeck, Karl: 261
 Ter Meer, Fritz: 261
 Tesch, Bruno: 134, 136
 Thalmann, Rita: 27
 Thierack, Otto Georg: 221, 222
 Thoma, Alfred: 31, 32
 Thomas, Maximilian: 69
 Thoms, Albert: 261
 Tondos, Władysław: 129
 Trampedach, Friedrich: 73
 Tregenza, Michael: 115
 Tuka, Vojtech: 99, 101
 Türk, Richard: 111, 112
 Turner, Harald: 91, 92
 Tyas, Stephen: 116

— U —

Ullman, Markus: 97

— V —

van den Berghe, Gie: 7, 8, 265
 van den Straaten, Raymond: 261
 van Pelt, Robert Jan: 36, 131, 257, 262, 264, 265
 Veesenmayer, Edmund: 105
 Verrall, Richard (Harwood): 8
 Vogel, Rolf: 11
 Voigt, Martina: 75
 von dem Bach-Zelewski, Erich: 64
 von Lang, Jochen: 33, 34
 von Otter, Göran: 146, 147, 185
 von Papen, Franz: 253
 von Schirmeister, Moritz: 13
 von Stülpnagel, Heinrich: 78, 79
 von Thadden, Eberhard: 101, 104, 105
 von Weizsäcker, Ernst: 26
 Vrba, Rudolf: 192

— W —

Wagner, Eduard: 61
 Wagner, Hans: 261
 Wagner, Rudolf: 158
 Walk, Joseph: 238
 Warlimont, Walter: 60
 Waszak, Stanisław: 209
 Weber, Walter: 89
 Weckert, Ingrid: 14, 92
 Wehner, Bernhard: 167
 Weil, Nicolas: 251
 Weintraub, Ben: 209
 Weirauch, Lothar: 56
 Weissmandel, Dov: 96
 Wellers, Georges: 145, 146, 197, 243, 263

Wetzel, Erhard: 12, 71, 72, 149, 150
 Wetzler, Alfred: 192
 Widmann, Albert: 65, 150
 Wiebeck, Gerhard: 168, 169, 261
 Wied, SS Hauptsturmführer: 261
 Wiernik, Yankiel: 262
 Wiesel, Elie: 191
 Wildt, Michael: 75
 Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich: 64, 231, 246
 Wilhelm, Karl Friedrich: 261
 Wirth, Christian: 147, 148, 242
 Wirths, Eduard: 159, 183
 Wisinska, Jozefa: 129
 Wisliceny, Dieter: 35, 96, 101, 102, 124, 133, 261
 Witte, Peter: 36, 75, 116
 Wohlfarth, Wilhelm: 129
 Wohlthat, Helmuth: 26
 Wojtczak, Stanisław: 111
 Wolf, Franz: 261
 Wolff, Karl: 91, 144
 Wolken, Otto: 129
 Wolsztayn: 188, 189
 Wüstinger, Erich: 135

— Z —

Zaun, Alfred: 134, 262
 Zeitschel, Carltheo: 16, 45, 79
 Zernik, Franz: 180
 Zündel, Ernst: 8, 9, 32, 39, 57, 60, 74, 133, 139, 140, 147, 199, 207, 215, 220, 225, 264, 266


HOLOCAUST HANDBOOKS

This ambitious, growing series addresses various aspects of the “Holocaust” of the WWII era. Most of them are based on decades of research from archives all over the world. They are heavily referenced. In contrast to most other works on this issue, the tomes of this series approach its topic with profound academic scrutiny and a critical attitude. Any Holocaust researcher ignoring this series will remain oblivious to some of the most important research in the field. These books are designed to both convince the common reader as well as academics. The following books have appeared so far, or are about to be released.

SECTION ONE:

General Overviews of the Holocaust

The First Holocaust. The Surprising Origin of the Six-Million Figure. By Don Heddesheimer. This compact but substantive study documents



propaganda spread prior to, during and after the FIRST World War that claimed East European Jewry was on the brink of annihilation. The magic number of suffering and dying Jews was 6 million back then as well. The book details how these Jewish fundraising operations in America raised vast sums in the name of feeding suffering Polish and Russian Jews but actually fun-

neled much of the money to Zionist and Communist groups. 5th ed., 200 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#6)

Lectures on the Holocaust. Controversial Issues Cross Examined. By Germar Rudolf.

This book first explains why “the Holocaust” is an important topic, and that it is essential to keep an open mind about it. It then tells how many mainstream scholars expressed doubts and subsequently fell from grace. Next, the physical traces and documents about the various claimed crime scenes and murder weapons are discussed. After that, the reliability of witness testimony is examined. Finally, the author argues for a free

exchange of ideas on this topic. This book gives the most-comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the critical research into the Holocaust. With its dialogue style, it is easy to read, and it can even be used as an encyclopedic compendium. 4th ed., 597 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#15)


Breaking the Spell. The Holocaust, Myth & Reality. By Nicholas Kollerstrom. In 1941, British Intelligence analysts cracked the German “Enigma” code. Hence, in 1942 and 1943, encrypted radio communications between German concentration camps and the Berlin headquarters were decrypted. The intercepted data



Pictured above are the first 50 volumes of scientific studies that comprise the series *Holocaust Handbooks*. More volumes and new editions are constantly in the works. Check www.HolocaustHandbooks.com for updates.


refutes the orthodox “Holocaust” narrative. It reveals that the Germans were desperate to reduce the death rate in their labor camps, which was caused by catastrophic typhus epidemics.







Dr. Kollerstrom, a science historian, has taken these intercepts and a wide array of mostly unchallenged corroborating evidence to show that “witness statements” supporting the human gas chamber narrative clearly clash with the available scientific data. Kollerstrom concludes that the history of the Nazi “Holocaust” has been written by the victors with ulterior motives. It is distorted, exaggerated and largely wrong. With a foreword by Prof. Dr. James Fetzner. 6th ed., 285 pages, b&w ill., bibl., index. (#31)



Debating the Holocaust. A New Look at Both Sides. By Thomas Dalton. Mainstream historians insist that there cannot be, any debate about the Holocaust. But ignoring it

does not make this controversy go away. Traditional scholars admit that there was neither a budget, a plan, nor an order for the Holocaust; that the key camps have all but vanished, and so have any human remains; that material and unequivocal documentary evidence is absent; and that there are serious problems with survivor testimonies. Dalton juxtaposes the traditional Holocaust narrative with revisionist challenges and then analyzes the mainstream’s responses to them. He reveals the weaknesses of both sides, while declaring revisionism the winner of the current state of the debate.





4th ed., 342 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#32)

The Hoax of the Twentieth Century. The Case against the Presumed Extermination of European Jewry. By Arthur R. Butz. The first writer to analyze the entire Holocaust complex in a precise scientific manner. This book exhibits the overwhelming force of arguments accumulated by the mid-1970s. Butz's two main arguments are: 1. All major entities hostile to Germany must have known what was happening to the Jews under German authority. They acted during the war as if no mass slaughter was occurring. 2. All the evidence adduced to prove any mass slaughter has a dual interpretation, while only the innocuous one can be proven to be correct. This book continues to be a major historical reference work, frequently cited by prominent personalities. This edition has numerous supplements with new information gathered over the last 35 years. 4th ed., 524 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#7)

Dissecting the Holocaust. The Growing Critique of 'Truth' and 'Memory.' Edited by Germar Rudolf. *Dissecting the Holocaust* applies state-of-the-art scientific techniques and classic methods of detection to investigate the alleged murder of millions of Jews by Germans during World War II. In 22 contributions—each of some 30 pages—the 17 authors dissect generally accepted paradigms of the “Holocaust.” It reads as excitingly as a crime novel: so many lies, forgeries and deceptions by politicians, historians and scientists are proven. This is the intellectual adventure of the 21st Century. Be part of it! 3rd ed., 635 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#1)

The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry. By Walter N. Sanning. Six Million Jews died in the Holocaust. Sanning did not take that number at face value, but thoroughly explored European population developments and shifts mainly caused by emigration as well as deportations and evacuations conducted by both Nazis and the Soviets, among other things. The book is based mainly on Jewish, Zionist and mainstream sources. It concludes that a sizeable share of the Jews found missing during local censuses after the Second World War, which were so far counted as “Holocaust victims,” had either emigrated (mainly to Israel or the U.S.) or had been deported by Stalin to Siberian labor camps. 3rd ed., foreword by A.R. Butz, epilogue by Germar Rudolf, and an update by the author containing new insights; 264

pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography (#29).

Air-Photo Evidence: World-War-Two Photos of Alleged Mass-Murder Sites Analyzed. By Germar Rudolf (editor). During World War Two both German and Allied reconnaissance aircraft took countless air photos of places of tactical and strategic interest in Europe. These photos are prime evidence for the investigation of the Holocaust. Air photos of locations like Auschwitz, Majdanek, Treblinka, Babi Yar etc. permit an insight into what did or did not happen there. The author has unearthed many pertinent photos and has thoroughly analyzed them. This book is full of air-photo reproductions and schematic drawings explaining them. According to the author, these images refute many of the atrocity claims made by witnesses in connection with events in the German sphere of influence. 6th edition; with a contribution by Carlo Mattogno. 167 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index (#27).

The Leuchter Reports: Critical Edition. By Fred Leuchter, Robert Faurisson and Germar Rudolf. Between 1988 and 1991, U.S. expert on execution technologies Fred Leuchter wrote four reports on whether the Third Reich operated homicidal gas chambers. The first on Auschwitz and Majdanek became world-famous. Based on various arguments, Leuchter concluded that the locations investigated could never have been “utilized or seriously considered to function as execution gas chambers.” The second report deals with gas-chamber claims for the camps Dachau, Mauthausen and Hartheim, while the third reviews design criteria and operation procedures of execution gas chambers in the U.S. The fourth report reviews Pressac's 1989 tome about Auschwitz. 4th ed., 252 pages, b&w illustrations. (#16)

Bungled: “The Destruction of the European Jews”. Raul Hilberg's Failure to Prove National-Socialist “Killing Centers.” By Carlo Mattogno. Raul Hilberg's magnum opus *The Destruction of the European Jews* is an orthodox standard work on the Holocaust. But how does Hilberg support his thesis that Jews were murdered *en masse*? He rips documents out of their context, distorts their content, misinterprets their meaning, and ignores entire archives. He only refers to “useful” witnesses, quotes fragments out of context, and conceals the fact that his witnesses are lying through their teeth. Lies and deceptions permeate Hil-

berg's book, 302 pages, bibliography, index. (#3)

Jewish Emigration from the Third Reich. By Ingrid Weckert. Current historical writings about the Third Reich claim state it was difficult for Jews to flee from Nazi persecution. The truth is that Jewish emigration was welcomed by the German authorities. Emigration was not some kind of wild flight, but rather a lawfully determined and regulated matter. Weckert's booklet elucidates the emigration process in law and policy. She shows that German and Jewish authorities worked closely together. Jews interested in emigrating received detailed advice and offers of help from both sides. 2nd ed., 130 pages, index. (#12)

Inside the Gas Chambers: The Extermination of Mainstream Holocaust Historiography. By Carlo Mattogno. Neither increased media propaganda or political pressure nor judicial persecution can stifle revisionism. Hence, in early 2011, the Holocaust Orthodoxy published a 400-page book (in German) claiming to refute "revisionist propaganda," trying again to prove "once and for all" that there were homicidal gas chambers at the camps of Dachau, Natzweiler, Sachsenhausen, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück, Neuengamme, Stutthof... you name them. Mattogno shows with his detailed analysis of this work of propaganda that mainstream Holocaust hagiography is beating around the bush rather than addressing revisionist research results. He exposes their myths, distortions and lies. 2nd ed., 280 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#25)






SECTION TWO: Specific non-Auschwitz Studies






The Dachau Gas Chamber. By Carlo Mattogno. This study investigates whether the alleged homicidal gas chamber at the infamous Dachau Camp could have been operational. Could these gas chambers have fulfilled their alleged function to kill people as assumed by mainstream historians? Or does the evidence point to an entirely different purpose? This study reviews witness reports and finds that many claims are nonsense or technically impossible. As many layers of confounding misunderstandings and misrepresentations are peeled away, we discover the core of what the truth was concerning the existence of these gas chambers. 154 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#49)

Treblinka: Extermination Camp or Transit Camp? By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. It is alleged that at Treblinka in East Poland between 700,000 and 3,000,000 persons were murdered in 1942 and 1943. The weapons used were said to have been stationary and/or mobile gas chambers, fast-acting or slow-acting poison gas, unslaked lime, superheated steam, electricity, Diesel-exhaust fumes etc. Holocaust historians alleged that bodies were piled as high as multi-storied buildings and burned without a trace, using little or no fuel at all. Graf and Mattogno have now analyzed the origins, logic and technical feasibility of the official version of Treblinka. On the basis of numerous documents they reveal Treblinka's true identity as a mere transit camp. 3rd ed., 384 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#8)

Belzec: Propaganda, Testimonies, Archeological Research and History. By Carlo Mattogno. Witnesses report that between 600,000 and 3 million Jews were murdered in the Belzec Camp, located in Poland. Various murder weapons are claimed to have been used: Diesel-exhaust gas; unslaked lime in trains; high voltage; vacuum chambers; etc. The corpses were incinerated on huge pyres without leaving a trace. For those who know the stories about Treblinka this sounds familiar. Thus, the author has restricted this study to the aspects which are new compared to Treblinka. In contrast to Treblinka, forensic drillings and excavations were performed at Belzec, the results of which are critically reviewed. 142 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#9)

Sobibor: Holocaust Propaganda and Reality. By Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues and Carlo Mattogno. Between 25,000 and 2 million Jews are said to have been killed in gas chambers in the Sobibór camp in Poland. The corpses were allegedly buried in mass graves and later incinerated on pyres. This book investigates these claims and shows that they are based on the selective use of contradictory eyewitness testimony. Archeological surveys of the camp are analyzed that started in 2000-2001 and carried on until 2018. The book also documents the general National-Socialist policy toward Jews, which never included a genocidal "final solution." In conclusion, Sobibór emerges not as a "pure extermination camp", but as a transit camp from where Jews were deported to the occupied eastern territories. 2nd ed., 456 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#19)





The "Operation Reinhardt" Camps Treblinka, Sobibór, Belzec. By Carlo Mattogno. This study has its first focus on witness testimonies recorded during World War II and the immediate post-war era, many of them discussed here for the first time, thus demonstrating how the myth of the "extermination camps" was created. The second part of this book brings us up to speed with the various archaeological efforts made by mainstream scholars in their attempt to prove that the myth is true. The third part compares the findings of the second part with what we ought to expect, and reveals the chasm between facts and myth. 402 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. (#28)

Chelmno: A Camp in History & Propaganda. By Carlo Mattogno. At Chelmno, huge masses of Jewish prisoners are said to have been gassed in "gas vans" or shot (claims vary from 10,000 to 1.3 million victims). This study covers the subject from every angle, undermining the orthodox claims about the camp with an overwhelmingly effective body of evidence. Eyewitness statements, gas wagons as extermination weapons, forensics reports and excavations, German documents – all come under Mattogno's scrutiny. Here are the uncensored facts about Chelmno, not the propaganda. This is a complementary volume to the book on *The Gas Vans* (#26). 2nd ed., 188 pages, indexed, illustrated, bibliography. (#23)

The Gas Vans: A Critical Investigation. By Santiago Alvarez and Pierre Marais. Did the Nazis use mobile gas chambers to exterminate 700,000 people? Are witness statements believable? Are documents genuine? Where are the murder weapons? Could they have operated as claimed? Where are the corpses? In order to get to the truth of the matter, Alvarez has scrutinized all known wartime documents and photos about this topic; he has analyzed a huge amount of witness statements as published in the literature and as presented in more than 30 trials held over the decades in Germany, Poland and Israel; and he has examined the claims made in the pertinent mainstream literature. The result of his research is mind-boggling. Note: This book and Mattogno's book on Chelmno were edited in parallel to make sure they are consistent and not repetitive. 2nd ed., 412 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#26)

The Einsatzgruppen in the Occupied Eastern Territories: Genesis, Missions and Actions. By C. Mattogno. Before invading the Soviet Union, the German authorities set up special units meant to secure the area behind the German front. Orthodox historians claim that these units called *Einsatzgruppen* primarily engaged in rounding up and mass-murdering Jews. This study sheds a critical light onto this topic by reviewing all the pertinent sources as well as material traces. It reveals on the one hand that original war-time documents do not fully support the orthodox genocidal narrative, and on the other that most post-"liberation" sources such as testimonies and forensic reports are steeped in Soviet atrocity propaganda and are thus utterly unreliable. In addition, material traces of the claimed massacres are rare due to an attitude of collusion by governments and Jewish lobby groups. 2nd ed., 2 vols., 864 pp., b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#39)

Concentration Camp Majdanek. A Historical and Technical Study. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. At war's end, the Soviets claimed that up to two million Jews were murdered at the Majdanek Camp in seven gas chambers. Over the decades, however, the Majdanek Museum reduced the death toll three times to currently 78,000, and admitted that there were "only" two gas chambers. By exhaustively researching primary sources, the authors expertly dissect and repudiate the myth of homicidal gas chambers at that camp. They also critically investigated the legend of mass executions of Jews in tank trenches and prove it groundless. Again they have produced a standard work of methodical investigation which authentic historiography cannot ignore. 3rd ed., 358 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#5)

The Neuengamme and Sachsenhausen Gas Chambers. By Carlo Mattogno. The Neuengamme Camp near Hamburg, and the Sachsenhausen Camp north of Berlin allegedly had homicidal gas chambers for the mass gassing of inmates. The evaluation of many postwar interrogation protocols on this topic exposes inconsistencies, discrepancies and contradictions. British interrogating techniques are revealed as manipulative, threatening and mendacious. Finally, technical absurdities of gas-chambers and mass-gassing claims unmask these tales as a mere regurgitation of hearsay stories from other camps, among

them foremost Auschwitz. 178 pages, b&w ill., bibliography, index. (#50)

Concentration Camp Stutthof and Its Function in National Socialist Jewish Policy. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. Orthodox historians claim that the Stutthof Camp near Danzig, East Prussia, served as a “makeshift” extermination camp in 1944, where inmates were killed in a gas chamber. Based mainly on archival resources, this study thoroughly debunks this view and shows that Stutthof was in fact a center for the organization of German forced labor toward the end of World War II. The claimed gas chamber was a mere delousing facility. 4th ed., 170 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#4)

SECTION THREE: Auschwitz Studies

The Making of the Auschwitz Myth: Auschwitz in British Intercepts, Polish Underground Reports and Post-war Testimonies (1941-1947). By Carlo Mattogno. Using messages sent by the Polish underground to London, SS radio messages sent to and from Auschwitz that were intercepted and decrypted by the British, and a plethora of witness statements made during the war and in the immediate postwar period, the author shows how exactly the myth of mass murder in Auschwitz gas chambers was created, and how it was turned subsequently into “history” by intellectually corrupt scholars who cherry-picked claims that fit into their agenda and ignored or actively covered up literally thousands of lies of “witnesses” to make their narrative look credible. 2nd edition, 514 pp., b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#41)






The Real Case of Auschwitz: Robert van Pelt's Evidence from the Irving Trial Critically Reviewed. By Carlo Mattogno. Prof. Robert van Pelt, a mainstream expert on Auschwitz, became famous when appearing as an expert during the London libel trial of David Irving against Deborah Lipstadt. From it resulted a book titled *The Case for Auschwitz*, in which van Pelt laid out his case for the existence of homicidal gas chambers at that camp. This book is a scholarly response to Prof. van Pelt—and Jean-Claude Pressac, upon whose books van Pelt's study is largely based. Mattogno lists all the evidence van Pelt adduces, and shows one by one that van Pelt misrepresented and misinterpreted every single one of them. This is a book of prime political and







scholarly importance to those looking for the truth about Auschwitz. 3rd ed., 692 pages, b&w illustrations, glossary, bibliography, index. (#22)

Auschwitz: Plain Facts: A Response to Jean-Claude Pressac. Edited by Germar Rudolf, with contributions by Serge Thion, Robert Faurisson and Carlo Mattogno. French pharmacist Jean-Claude Pressac tried to refute revisionist findings with the “technical” method. For this he was praised by the mainstream, and they proclaimed victory over the “revisionists.” In his book, Pressac's works and claims are shown to be unscientific in nature, as he never substantiates what he claims, and historically false, because he systematically misrepresents, misinterprets and misunderstands German wartime documents. 2nd ed., 226 pages, b&w illustrations, glossary bibliography, index. (#14)

Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers: An Introduction and Update. By Germar Rudolf. Pressac's 1989 oversize book of the same title was a trail blazer. Its many document reprints are valuable, but Pressac's annotations are now outdated. This book summarizes the most pertinent research results on Auschwitz gained during the past 30 years. With many references to Pressac's epic tome, it serves as an update and correction to it, whether you own an original hard copy of it, read it online, borrow it from a library, purchase a reprint, or are just interested in such a summary in general. 144 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography. (#42)

The Chemistry of Auschwitz: The Technology and Toxicology of Zyklon B and the Gas Chambers – A Crime-Scene Investigation. By Germar Rudolf. This study documents forensic research on Auschwitz, where material traces reign supreme. Most of the claimed crime scenes – the claimed homicidal gas chambers – are still accessible to forensic examination to some degree. This book addresses questions such as: How were these gas chambers configured? How did they operate? In addition, the infamous Zyklon B is examined in detail. What exactly was it? How did it kill? Did it leave traces in masonry that can be found still today? Indeed, it should have, the author concludes, but several sets of analyses show no trace of it. The author also discusses in depth similar forensic research conducted by other scholars. 4th ed., 454 pages, more than 120 color and over 100 b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#2)





Auschwitz Lies: Legends, Lies and Prejudices on the Holocaust. By Carlo Mattogno and Germar Rudolf. The fallacious research and alleged “refutation” of revisionist scholars by French biochemist G. Wellers (attacking Leuchter’s famous report, #16), Polish chemist Dr. J. Markiewicz and U.S. chemist Dr. Richard Green (taking on Rudolf’s chemical research), Dr. John Zimmerman (tackling Mattogno on cremation issues), Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman (trying to prove it all), as well as researchers Keren, McCarthy and Mazal (who turned cracks into architectural features), are exposed for what they are: blatant and easily exposed political lies created to ostracize dissident historians. 4th ed., 420 pages, b&w illustrations, index. (#18)

Auschwitz: The Central Construction Office. By Carlo Mattogno. When Russian authorities granted access to their archives in the early 1990s, the files of the Auschwitz Central Construction Office, stored in Moscow, attracted the attention of scholars researching the history of this camp. This important office was responsible for the planning and construction of the Auschwitz camp complex, including the crematories which are said to have contained the “gas chambers.” This study sheds light into this hitherto hidden aspect of this camp’s history, but also provides a deep understanding of the organization, tasks, and procedures of this office. 2nd ed., 188 pages, b&w illustrations, glossary, index. (#13)

Garrison and Headquarters Orders of the Auschwitz Camp. By Germar Rudolf and Ernst Böhm. A large number of the orders issued by the various commanders of the Auschwitz Camp have been preserved. They reveal the true nature of the camp with all its daily events. There is not a trace in them pointing at anything sinister going on. Quite to the contrary, many orders are in insurmountable contradiction to claims that prisoners were mass murdered, such as the children of SS men playing with inmates, SS men taking friends for a sight-seeing tour through the camp, or having a romantic stroll with their lovers around the camp grounds. This is a selection of the most pertinent of these orders together with comments putting them into their proper historical context. 185 pages, b&w ill., bibl., index (#34)

Special Treatment in Auschwitz: Origin and Meaning of a Term. By Carlo Mattogno. When appearing in German wartime documents, terms like

“special treatment,” “special action,” and others have been interpreted as code words for mass murder. But that is not always true. This study focuses on documents about Auschwitz, showing that, while “special” had many different meanings, not a single one meant “execution.” Hence the practice of deciphering an alleged “code language” by assigning homicidal meaning to harmless documents – a key component of mainstream historiography – is untenable. 2nd ed., 166 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#10)

Healthcare at Auschwitz. By Carlo Mattogno. In extension of the above study on *Special Treatment in Auschwitz*, this study proves the extent to which the German authorities at Auschwitz tried to provide health care for the inmates. Part 1 of this book analyzes the inmates’ living conditions and the various sanitary and medical measures implemented. It documents the vast construction efforts to build a huge inmate hospital inside the Auschwitz-Birkenau Camp. Part 2 explores what happened to registered inmates who were “selected” or subject to “special treatment” while disabled or sick. This study shows that a lot was tried to cure these inmates, especially under the aegis of Garrison Physician Dr. Wirths. Part 3 is dedicated to this very Dr. Wirths. The reality of this caring philanthropist refutes the current stereotype of SS officers. 398 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#33)

Debunking the Bunkers of Auschwitz: Black Propaganda vs. History. By Carlo Mattogno. The “bunkers” at Auschwitz-Birkenau, two former farmhouses just outside the camp’s perimeter, are claimed to have been the first homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz specifically equipped for this purpose. They supposedly went into operation during the first half of 1942, with thousands of Jews sent straight from deportation trains to these “gas chambers.” However, documents clearly show that all inmates sent to Auschwitz during that time were properly admitted to the camp. No mass murder on arrival can have happened. With the help of other wartime files as well as air photos taken by Allied reconnaissance aircraft in 1944, this study shows that these homicidal “bunkers” never existed, how the rumors about them evolved as black propaganda created by resistance groups in the camp, and how this propaganda was transformed into a false reality by “historians.” 2nd ed.,

292 pages, b&w ill., bibliography, index. (#11)

Auschwitz: The First Gassing. Rumor and Reality. By Carlo Mattogno. The first gassing in Auschwitz is claimed to have occurred on Sept. 3, 1941 in a basement. The accounts reporting it are the archetypes for all later gassing accounts. This study analyzes all available sources about this alleged event. It shows that these sources contradict each other about the event's location, date, the kind of victims and their number, and many more aspects, which makes it impossible to extract a consistent story. Original wartime documents inflict a final blow to this legend and prove without a shadow of a doubt that this legendary event never happened. 4th ed., 262 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#20)

Auschwitz: Crematorium I and the Alleged Homicidal Gasings. By Carlo Mattogno. The morgue of Crematorium I in Auschwitz is said to be the first homicidal gas chamber there. This study analyzes witness statements and hundreds of wartime documents to accurately write a history of that building. Where witnesses speak of gasings, they are either very vague or, if specific, contradict one another and are refuted by documented and material facts. The author also exposes the fraudulent attempts of mainstream historians to convert the witnesses' black propaganda into "truth" by means of selective quotes, omissions, and distortions. Mattogno proves that this building's morgue was never a homicidal gas chamber, nor could it have worked as such. 2nd ed., 152 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#21)




Auschwitz: Open-Air Incinerations. By Carlo Mattogno. In 1944, 400,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz and allegedly murdered in gas chambers. The camp crematoria were unable to cope with so many corpses. Therefore, every single day thousands of corpses are claimed to have been incinerated on huge pyres lit in trenches. The sky was filled with thick smoke, if we believe witnesses. This book examines many testimonies regarding these incinerations and establishes whether these claims were even possible. Using air photos, physical evidence and wartime documents, the author shows that these claims are fiction. A new Appendix contains 3 papers on groundwater levels and cattle mass burnings. 2nd ed., 202 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#17)




The Cremation Furnaces of Auschwitz. By Carlo Mattogno & Franco Deana. An exhaustive study of the early history and technology of cremation in general and of the cremation furnaces of Auschwitz in particular. On a vast base of technical literature, extant wartime documents and material traces, the authors establish the nature and capacity of these cremation furnaces, showing that these devices were inferior makeshift versions, and that their capacity was lower than normal. The Auschwitz crematoria were not facilities of mass destruction, but installations barely managing to handle the victims among the inmates who died of various epidemics. 2nd ed., 3 vols., 1201 pages, b&w and color illustrations (vols 2 & 3), bibliography, index, glossary. (#24)

Curated Lies: The Auschwitz Museum's Misrepresentations, Distortions and Deceptions. By Carlo Mattogno. Revisionist research results have put the Polish Auschwitz Museum under enormous pressure to answer this challenge. They've answered. This book analyzes their answer. It first exposes the many tricks and lies used by the museum to bamboozle millions of visitors every year regarding its most valued asset, the "gas chamber" in the Main Camp. Next, it reveals how the museum's historians mislead and lie through their teeth about documents in their archives. A long string of completely innocuous documents is mistranslated and misrepresented to make it look like they prove the existence of homicidal gas chambers. 2nd ed., 259 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#38)

Deliveries of Coke, Wood and Zyklon B to Auschwitz: Neither Proof Nor Trace for the Holocaust. By Carlo Mattogno. Researchers from the Auschwitz Museum tried to prove the reality of mass extermination by pointing to documents about deliveries of wood and coke as well as Zyklon B to the Auschwitz Camp. If put into the actual historical and technical context, however, as is done by this study, these documents prove the exact opposite of what those orthodox researchers claim. This study exposes the mendacious tricks with which these museum officials once more deceive the trusting public. 184 pages, b&w illust., bibl., index. (#40)

Mis-Chronicling Auschwitz. Danuta Czech's Flawed Methods, Lies and Deceptions in Her "Auschwitz Chronicle". By Carlo Mattogno. The *Auschwitz Chronicle* is a reference book for the history of the Auschwitz





Camp. It was published in 1990 by Danuta Czech, one of the Auschwitz Museum's most prolific and impactful historians. Analyzing this almost 1,000-page long tome one entry at a time, Mattogno has compiled a long list of misrepresentations, outright lies and deceptions contained in it. They all aim at creating the otherwise unsubstantiated claim that homicidal gas chambers and lethal injections were used at Auschwitz for mass-murdering inmates. This literary mega-fraud needs to be retired from the ranks of Auschwitz sources. 324 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#47)

The Real Auschwitz Chronicle. By Carlo Mattogno. Nagging is easy. We actually did a better job! That which is missing in Czech's *Chronicle* is included here: day after day of the camp's history, documents are presented showing that it could not have been an extermination camp: tens of thousands of sick and injured inmates were cared for medically with huge efforts, and the camp authorities tried hard to improve the initially catastrophic hygienic conditions. Part Two contains data on transports, camp occupancy and mortality figures. For the first time, we find out what this camp's real death toll was. 2 vols., 906 pp., b&w illustrations (Vol. 2), bibliography, index. (#48)

Politics of Slave Labor: The Fate of the Jews Deported from Hungary and the Lodz Ghetto in 1944. By Carlo Mattogno. The deportation of the Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz in May-July 1944 is said to have been the pinnacle of this camp's extermination frenzy, topped off in August of that year by the extermination of Jews deported from the Lodz Ghetto. This book gathers and explains all the evidence available on both events. In painstaking research, the author proves almost on a person-by-person level what the fate was of many of the Jews deported from Hungary or the Lodz Ghetto. He demonstrates that these Jews were deported to serve as slave laborers in the Third Reich's collapsing war economy. There is no trace of any extermination of any of these Jews. 338 pp., b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#51)

SECTION FOUR: Witness Critique

Elie Wiesel, Saint of the Holocaust: A Critical Biography. By Warren B. Rudolph. This book analyzes several of Wiesel's texts, foremost his

camp autobiography *Night*. The author proves that much of what Wiesel claims can never have happened. It shows how Zionist control has allowed Wiesel and his fellow extremists to force leaders of many nations, the U.N. and even popes to genuflect before Wiesel as symbolic acts of subordination to World Jewry, while at the same time forcing school children to submit to Holocaust brainwashing. This study also shows how parallel to this abuse of power, critical reactions to it also increased: Holocaust revisionism. While Catholics jumped on the Holocaust band wagon, the number of Jews rejecting certain aspect of the Holocaust narrative and its abuse grew as well. This first unauthorized biography of Wiesel exposes both his personal deceits and the whole myth of "the six million." 3rd ed., 458 pages, b&w illustration, bibliography, index. (#30)

Auschwitz: Eyewitness Reports and Perpetrator Confessions. By Jürgen Graf. The traditional narrative of what transpired at the infamous Auschwitz camp during WWII rests almost exclusively on witness testimony from former inmates as well as erstwhile camp officials. This study critically scrutinizes the 30 most important of these witness statements by checking them for internal coherence, and by comparing them with one another as well as with other evidence such as wartime documents, air photos, forensic research results, and material traces. The result is devastating for the traditional narrative. 372 pages, b&w illust., bibl., index. (#36)

Commandant of Auschwitz: Rudolf Höss, His Torture and His Forced Confessions. By Carlo Mattogno & Rudolf Höss. From 1940 to 1943, Rudolf Höss was the commandant of the infamous Auschwitz Camp. After the war, he was captured by the British. In the following 13 months until his execution, he made 85 depositions of various kinds in which he confessed his involvement in the "Holocaust." This study first reveals how the British tortured him to extract various "confessions." Next, all of Höss's depositions are analyzed by checking his claims for internal consistency and comparing them with established historical facts. The results are eye-opening... 2nd ed., 411 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#35)

An Auschwitz Doctor's Eyewitness Account: The Tall Tales of Dr. Mengele's Assistant Analyzed. By Miklos Nyiszli & Carlo Mattogno.

Nyiszli, a Hungarian physician, ended up at Auschwitz in 1944 as Dr. Mengele's assistant. After the war he wrote a book and several other writings describing what he claimed to have experienced. To this day some traditional historians take his accounts seriously, while others reject them as grotesque lies and exaggerations. This study presents and analyzes Nyiszli's writings and skillfully separates truth from fabulous fabrication. 2nd ed., 484 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#37)



Rudolf Reder versus Kurt Gerstein: Two False Testimonies on the Belzec Camp Analyzed. By Carlo Mattogno. Only two witnesses have ever testified substantially about the alleged Belzec Extermination Camp: The survivor Rudolf Reder and the SS officer Kurt Gerstein. Gerstein's testimonies have been a hotspot of revisionist critique for decades. It is now discredited even among orthodox historians. They use Reder's testimony to fill the void, yet his testimonies are just as absurd. This study thoroughly scrutinizes Reder's various statements, critically revisits Gerstein's various depositions, and then compares these two testimonies which are at once similar in some respects, but incompatible in others. 216 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#43)

Sonderkommando Auschwitz I: Nine Eyewitness Testimonies Analyzed. By Carlo Mattogno. The 1979 book *Auschwitz Inferno* by alleged former Auschwitz "Sonderkommando" member Filip Müller has a great influence on the perception of Auschwitz by the public and by historians. This book critically analyzes Müller's various post-war statements, which are full of exaggerations, falsehoods and plagiarized text passages. Also scrutinized are the testimonies of eight other claimed former *Sonderkommando* members: D. Paisikovic, S. Jankowski, H. Mandelbaum, L. Nagraba, J. Rosenblum, A. Pilo, D. Fliamenbaum and S. Karolinskij. 304 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#44)

Sonderkommando Auschwitz II: The False Testimonies by Henryk Tauber and Szlama Dragon. By Carlo Mattogno. Auschwitz survivor and former member of the so-called "Sonderkommando" Henryk Tauber is one of the most important witnesses about the alleged gas chambers inside the crematoria at Auschwitz, because right at the war's end, he made several extremely detailed depositions about it. The same is true for Szlama Dragon, only he claims to have worked at the so-called "bunkers" of Birkenau, two makeshift gas chambers just outside the camp perimeter. This study thoroughly scrutinizes these two key testimonies. 254 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#45)

Sonderkommando Auschwitz III: They Wept Crocodile Tears. A Critical Analysis of Late Witness Testimonies. By Carlo Mattogno. This book focuses on the critical analysis of witness testimonies on the alleged Auschwitz gas chambers recorded or published in the 1990s and early 2000s, such as J. Sackar, A. Dragon, J. Gabai, S. Chasan, L. Cohen and S. Venezia, among others. 232 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#46)

Auschwitz Engineers in Moscow: The Soviet Postwar Interrogations of the Auschwitz Cremation-Furnace Engineers. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. After the war, the Soviets arrested four leading engineers of the Topf Company. Among other things, they had planned and supervised the construction of the Auschwitz cremation furnaces and the ventilation systems of the rooms said to have served as homicidal gas chambers. Between 1946 and 1948, Soviet officials conducted numerous interrogations with them. This work analyzes them by putting them into the context of the vast documentation on these and related facilities. The appendix contains all translated interrogation protocols. 254 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#52)




For current prices and availability, and to learn more, go to www.HolocaustHandbooks.com – for example by simply scanning the QR code on the right.



Three decades of unflagging archival and forensic research by the world's most knowledgeable, courageous and prodigious Holocaust scholars have finally coalesced into a reference book that makes all this knowledge readily accessible to everyone:

HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA **uncensored and unconstrained**

Available as paperback (b&w) or hardcover (color), 634 pages, 8.5"×11"; as eBook (ePub or PDF) and eBook + audio (ePub + mp3); more than 350 illustrations in 579 entries; introduction, bibliography, index. Online at www.NukeBook.org



We all know the basics of “The Holocaust.” But what about the details? Websites and printed encyclopedias can help us there. Take the 4-volume encyclopedia by Israel’s Yad Vashem Center: *The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* (1990). For every significant crime scene, it presents a condensed narrative of Israel’s finest Holocaust scholars. However, it contains not one entry about witnesses and their stories, even though they are the foundation of our knowledge. When a murder is committed, the murder weapon and the crime’s traces are of crucial importance. Yet Yad Vashem’s encyclopedia has no entries explaining scientific findings on these matters – not one.

This is where the present encyclopedia steps in. It not only summarizes and explains the many pieces that make up the larger Holocaust picture. It also reveals the evidence that confirms or contradicts certain notions. Nearly 300 entries present the essence of important witness accounts, and they are subjected to source criticism. This enables us to decide which witness claims are credible.

For all major crime scenes, the sometimes-conflicting claims are presented. We learn how our knowledge has changed over time, and what evidence shores up the currently valid

narrative of places such as Auschwitz, Belzec, Sobibór, Treblinka, Dachau and Bergen-Belsen and many more.

Other entries discuss tools and mechanisms allegedly used for the mass murders, and how the crimes’ traces were erased, if at all. A few entries discuss toxicological issues surrounding the various lethal gases claimed to have been used.

This encyclopedia has multiple entries on some common claims about aspects of the Holocaust, including a list of “Who said it?” This way we can quickly find proof for these claims.

Finally, several entries address factors that have influenced the creation of the Holocaust narrative, and how we perceive it today. This includes entries on psychological warfare and wartime propaganda; on conditions prevailing during investigations and trials of alleged Holocaust perpetrators; on censorship against historical dissidents; on the religious dimension of the Holocaust narrative; and on motives of all sides involved in creating and spreading their diverse Holocaust narratives.

In this important volume, now with 579 entries, you will discover many astounding aspects of the Holocaust narrative that you did not even know exist.

BOOKS ON THE HOLOCAUST AND FREE SPEECH

On the next six pages, we list some of the books available from ARMREG that are not part of the series *Holocaust Handbooks*. For our current range of products, visit our web store at www.ARMREG.co.uk.

The Holocaust: An Introduction. By Thomas Dalton. The Holocaust was perhaps the greatest crime of the 20th Century. Six million Jews, we are told, died by gassing, shooting, and deprivation. But: Where did the six-million figure come from? How, exactly, did the gas chambers work? Why do we have so little physical evidence from major death camps? Why haven't we found even a fraction of the six million bodies, or their ashes? Why has there been so much media suppression and governmental censorship on this topic? In a sense, the Holocaust is the greatest murder mystery in history. It is a topic of greatest importance for the present day. Let's explore the evidence, and see where it leads. 128 pp. pb, 6"x9", ill., bibl., index.






Auschwitz: A Three-Quarter Century of Propaganda: Origins, Development and Decline of the "Gas Chamber" Propaganda Lie. By Carlo Mattogno. Wild rumors were circulating about Auschwitz during WWII: Germans testing war gases; mass murder in electrocution chambers, with gas showers or pneumatic hammers; living people sent on conveyor belts into furnaces; grease and soap made of the victims. Nothing of it was true. When the Soviets captured Auschwitz in early 1945, they reported that 4 million inmates were killed on electrocution conveyor belts discharging their load directly into furnaces. That wasn't true either. After the war, "witnesses" and "experts" added more claims: mass murder with gas bombs, gas chambers made of canvas; crematoria burning 400 million victims... Again, none of it was true. This book gives an overview of the many rumors and lies about Auschwitz today rejected as untrue, and exposes the ridiculous methods that turned some claims into "history," although they are just as untrue. 125 pp. pb, 6"x9", ill., bibl., index, b&w ill.

Auschwitz: A Judge Looks at the Evidence. By Wilhelm Stäglich. Auschwitz is the epicenter of the Holocaust, where more people are said to have been murdered than anywhere else.

The most important evidence for this claim was presented during two trials: the International Military Tribunal of 1945/46, and the German Auschwitz Trial of 1963-1965. In this book, Wilhelm Stäglich, a former German judge, reveals the incredibly scandalous way in which Allied victors and German courts bent and broke the law in order to come to politically foregone conclusions. Stäglich also exposes the superficial way in which historians are dealing with the many incongruities and discrepancies of the historical record. 3rd edition 2015, 422 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill.

Hilberg's Giant with Feet of Clay. By Jürgen Graf. Raul Hilberg's major work *The Destruction of the European Jews* is generally considered the standard work on the Holocaust. The critical reader might ask: what evidence does Hilberg provide to back his thesis that there was a German plan to exterminate Jews, to be carried out in the legendary gas chambers? And what evidence supports his estimate of 5.1 million Jewish victims? Jürgen Graf applies the methods of critical analysis to Hilberg's evidence, and examines the results in the light of revisionist historiography. The results of Graf's critical analysis are devastating for Hilberg. Graf's analysis is the first comprehensive and systematic examination of the leading spokesperson for the orthodox version of the Jewish fate during the Third Reich. 3rd edition 2022, 182 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill.

Exactitude: Festschrift for Prof. Dr. Robert Faurisson. By R.H. Countess, C. Lindtner, G. Rudolf (eds.) Faurisson probably deserves the title of the most-courageous intellectual of the 20th and the early 21st Century. With bravery and steadfastness, he challenged the dark forces of historical and political fraud with his unrelenting exposure of their lies and hoaxes surrounding the orthodox Holocaust narrative. This book describes and celebrates the man and his work dedicated to accuracy and marked by in-submission. 146 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill.



Auschwitz – Forensically Examined.

By Cyrus Cox. Modern forensic crime-scene investigations can reveal a lot about the Holocaust. There are many big tomes about this. But if you want it all in a nutshell, read this booklet. It condenses the most-important findings of Auschwitz forensics into a quick and easy read. In the first section, the forensic investigations conducted so far are reviewed. In the second section, the most-important results of these studies are summarized. The main arguments focus on two topics. The first centers around the poison allegedly used at Auschwitz for mass murder: Zyklon B. Did it leave any traces in masonry where it was used? Can it be detected to this day? The second topic deals with mass cremations. Did the crematoria of Auschwitz have the claimed huge capacity? Do air photos taken during the war confirm witness statements on huge smoking pyres? This book gives the answers, together with many references to source material and further reading. The third section reports on how the establishment has reacted to these research results. 2nd ed., 128 pp. pb., b&w ill., bibl., index.






Ulysses's Lie. By Paul Rassinier. Holocaust revisionism began with this book: Frenchman Rassinier, a pacifist and socialist, was sent first to Buchenwald Camp in 1944, then to Dora-Mittelbau. Here he reports from his own experience how the prisoners turned each other's imprisonment into hell without being forced to do so. In the second part, Rassinier analyzes the books of former fellow prisoners, and shows how they lied and distorted in order to hide their complicity. First complete English edition, including Rassinier's prologue, Albert Paraz's preface, and press reviews. 270 pp. 6"x9" pb, bibl, index.

The Second Babylonian Captivity: The Fate of the Jews in Eastern Europe since 1941. By Steffen Werner. "But if they were not murdered, where did the six million deported Jews end up?" This objection demands a well-founded response. While researching an entirely different topic, Werner stumbled upon peculiar demographic data of Belorussia. Years of research subsequently revealed more evidence which eventually allowed him to

propose: The Third Reich did indeed deport many of the Jews of Europe to Eastern Europe in order to settle them there "in the swamp." This book shows what really happened to the Jews deported to the East by the National Socialists, how they have fared since. It provides context for hitherto-obscure historical events and obviates extreme claims such as genocide and gas chambers. With a preface by Germar Rudolf. 190 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill., bibl., index

Holocaust Skepticism: 20 Questions and Answers about Holocaust Revisionism. By Germar Rudolf. This 15-page brochure introduces the novice to the concept of Holocaust revisionism, and answers 20 tough questions, among them: What does Holocaust revisionism claim? Why should I take Holocaust revisionism more seriously than the claim that the earth is flat? How about the testimonies by survivors and confessions by perpetrators? What about the pictures of corpse piles in the camps? Why does it matter how many Jews were killed by the Nazis, since even 1,000 would have been too many? ... Glossy full-color brochure. PDF file free of charge available at www.HolocaustHandbooks.com, Option "Promotion". This item is *not* copyright-protected. Hence, you can do with it whatever you want: download, post, email, print, multiply, hand out, sell... 20 pp., stapled, 8.5"x11", full-color throughout.

Bungled: "Denying the Holocaust" How Deborah Lipstadt Botched Her Attempt to Demonstrate the Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. By Germar Rudolf. With her book *Denying the Holocaust*, Deborah Lipstadt tried to show the flawed methods and extremist motives of "Holocaust deniers." This book demonstrates that Dr. Lipstadt clearly has neither understood the principles of science and scholarship, nor has she any clue about the historical topics she is writing about. She misquotes, mistranslates, misrepresents, misinterprets, and makes a plethora of wild claims without backing them up with anything. Rather than dealing thoroughly with factual arguments, Lipstadt's book is full of *ad hominem* attacks on her opponents. It is an exercise in anti-intellectual pseudo-scientific






arguments, an exhibition of ideological radicalism that rejects anything which contradicts its preset conclusions. **F for FAIL.** 2nd ed., 224 pp. pb, 6"×9", bibl., index, b&w ill.

Bungled: "Denying History". How Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman Botched Their Attempt to Refute Those Who Say the Holocaust Never Happened. By Carolus Magnus (C. Mattogno). *Skeptic Magazine* editor Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman from the Simon Wiesenthal Center wrote a book claiming to be "a thorough and thoughtful answer to all the claims of the Holocaust deniers." As this book shows, however, Shermer and Grobman completely ignored almost all the "claims" made in the more than 10,000 pages of more-recent cutting-edge revisionist archival and forensic research. Furthermore, they piled up a heap of falsifications, contortions, omissions and fallacious interpretations of the evidence. Finally, what the authors claim to have demolished is not revisionism but a ridiculous parody of it. They ignored the known unreliability of their cherry-picked selection of evidence, utilized unverified and incestuous sources, and obscured the massive body of research and all the evidence that dooms their project to failure. 162 pp. pb, 6"×9", bibl., index, b&w ill.

Bungled: "Debunking Holocaust Denial Theories". How James and Lance Morcan Botched Their Attempt to Affirm the Historicity of the Nazi Genocide. By Carolus Magnus. The novelists and movie-makers James and Lance Morcan have produced a book "to end [Holocaust] denial once and for all" by disproving "the various arguments Holocaust deniers use to try to discredit wartime records." It's a lie. First, the Morcans completely ignored the vast amount of recent scholarly studies published by revisionists; they don't even mention them. Instead, they engage in shadowboxing, creating some imaginary, bogus "revisionist" scarecrow which they then tear to pieces. In addition, their knowledge even of their own side's source material is dismal, and the way they back up their misleading or false claims is pitifully inadequate. 144 pp. pb, 6"×9", bibl., index, b&w ill.

Stalin's War of Extermination 1941-1945. By Joachim Hoffmann. A German government historian documents Stalin's murderous war against the German army and the German people. Based on the author's lifelong study of German and Russian military records, this book reveals the Red Army's grisly record of atrocities against soldiers and civilians, as ordered by Stalin. Since the 1920s, Stalin planned to invade Western Europe to initiate the "World Revolution." He prepared an attack which was unparalleled in history. The Germans noticed Stalin's aggressive intentions, but they underestimated the strength of the Red Army. What unfolded was the cruelest war in history. This book shows how Stalin and his Bolshevik henchman used unimaginable violence and atrocities to break any resistance in the Red Army and to force their unwilling soldiers to fight against the Germans. The book explains how Soviet propagandists incited their soldiers to unlimited hatred against everything German, and he gives the reader a short but extremely unpleasant glimpse into what happened when these Soviet soldiers finally reached German soil in 1945: A gigantic wave of looting, arson, rape, torture, and mass murder... **428 pp. pb, 6"×9", bibl., index, b&w ill.**

Who Started World War II: Truth for a War-Torn World. By Udo Walendy. For seven decades, mainstream historians have insisted that Germany was the main, if not the sole culprit for unleashing World War II in Europe. In the present book this myth is refuted. There is available to the public today a great number of documents on the foreign policies of the Great Powers before September 1939 as well as a wealth of literature in the form of memoirs of the persons directly involved in the decisions that led to the outbreak of World War II. Together, they made possible Walendy's present mosaic-like reconstruction of the events before the outbreak of the war in 1939. This book has been published only after an intensive study of sources, taking the greatest care to minimize speculation and inference. The present edition has been translated completely anew from the German original and has been slightly revised. 500 pp. pb, 6"×9", index, bibl., b&w ill.



The Day Amazon Murdered Free Speech. By Germar Rudolf. Amazon is the world's biggest book retailer. They dominate the U.S. and several foreign markets. Pursuant to the 1998 declaration of Amazon's founder Jeff Bezos to offer "the good, the bad and the ugly," customers once could buy every title that was in print and was legal to sell. However, in early 2017, a series of anonymous bomb threats against Jewish community centers occurred in the U.S., fueling a campaign by Jewish groups to coax Amazon into banning revisionist writings. On March 6, 2017, Amazon caved in and banned more than 100 books with dissenting viewpoints on the Holocaust. In April 2017, an Israeli Jew was arrested for having placed the fake bomb threats. But Amazon kept its new censorship policy: They next culled any literature critical of Jews or Judaism; then they enforced these bans at all its subsidiaries, such as AbeBooks and The Book Depository; then they banned books other pressure groups don't like; finally, they bullied Ingram, who has a book-distribution monopoly in the US, to enforce the same rules by banning from the entire world-wide book market all books Amazon doesn't like... 3rd ed., 158 pp. pb, 6"x9", bibl., color illustrations throughout.

The First Zündel Trial: The Transcript. In the early 1980s, Ernst Zündel, a German living in Toronto, was indicted for allegedly spreading "false news" by selling copies of Harwood's brochure *Did Six Million Really Die?*, which challenged the accuracy of the orthodox Holocaust narrative. When the case went to court in 1985, so-called Holocaust experts and "eyewitnesses" of the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz were cross-examined for the first time in history by a competent and skeptical legal team. The results were absolutely devastating for the Holocaust orthodoxy. For decades, these mind-boggling trial transcripts were hidden from public view. Now, for the first time, they have been published in print in this new book – unabridged and unedited. 820 pp. pb, 8.5"x11"





The Holocaust on Trial: The Second Trial against Ernst Zündel 1988. By Ernst Zündel. In 1988, the appeal trial of Ernst Zündel for "knowingly

spreading false news about the Holocaust" took place in Toronto. This book is introduced by a brief autobiographic summary of Zündel's early life, and an overview of the evidence introduced during the First Zündel Trial. This is followed by a detailed summary of the testimonies of all the witnesses who testified during the Second Zündel Trial. This was the most-comprehensive and -competent argument ever fought in a court of law over the Holocaust. The arguments presented have fueled revisionism like no other event before, in particular Fred Leuchter's expert report on the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Majdanek, and the testimony of British historian David Irving. Critically annotated edition with a foreword by Germar Rudolf. 410 pp. pb, 6"x9", index.

The Second Zündel Trial: Excerpts from the Transcript. By Barbara Kulaszka (ed.). In contrast to Ernst Zündel's book *The Holocaust on Trial* (see earlier description), this book focuses entirely on the Second Zündel Trial by exclusively quoting, paraphrasing and summarizing the entire trial transcript... 498 pp. pb, 8.5"x11", bibl., index, b&w ill.

Resistance Is Obligatory! By Germar Rudolf. In 2005, Rudolf, dissident publisher of revisionist literature, was kidnapped by the U.S. government and deported to Germany. There a show trial was staged. Rudolf was not permitted to defend his historical opinions. Yet he defended himself anyway: Rudolf gave a 7-day speech-proving that only the revisionists are scholarly in their approach, whereas the Holocaust orthodoxy is merely pseudo-scientific. He then explained why it is everyone's obligation to resist, without violence, a government which throws peaceful dissidents into dungeons. When Rudolf tried to publish his defence speech as a book, the public prosecutor initiated a new criminal investigation against him. After his probation time ended in 2011, he dared publish this speech anyway... 2nd ed. 2016, 378 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill.

Hunting Germar Rudolf: Essays on a Modern-Day Witch Hunt. By Germar Rudolf. German-born revisionist activist, author and publisher Germar Rudolf describes which events made



him convert from a Holocaust believer to a Holocaust skeptic, quickly rising to a leading personality within the revisionist movement. This in turn unleashed a tsunami of persecution against him: lost his job, denied his PhD exam, destruction of his family, driven into exile, slandered by the mass media, literally hunted, caught, put on a show trial where filing motions to introduce evidence is illegal under the threat of further prosecution, and finally locked up in prison for years for nothing else than his peaceful yet controversial scholarly writings. In several essays, Rudolf takes the reader on a journey through an absurd world of government and societal persecution which most of us could never even fathom actually exists in a “Western democracy”... 304 pp. pb, 6”x9”, bibl., index, b&w ill.

Love: The Pursuit of Happiness. By Germar Rudolf. Rudolf’s autobiography on the sensual and emotional aspects of his life: love, affection, romance and erotica, as well as the lack of it. It tells about his human relationships with parents, siblings, friends and girlfriends, wives and children – and with a little puppy called Daisy; about his trials and tribulations as a lover and husband, and most importantly as a father of five children. This book might assist many readers to understand themselves and to help resolve or avoid relationship conflicts. It is an account filled with both humility and humor. Ca. 230 pp. pb, 6”x9” (to appear in late 2024)




The Book of the Shulchan Aruch. By Erich Bischoff. Most people have heard of the Talmud-that compendium of Jewish laws. The Talmud, however, is vast and largely inscrutable. Fortunately, back in the mid-1500s, a Jewish rabbi created a condensed version of it: the Shulchan Aruch. A fair number of passages in it discuss non-Jews. The laws of Judaism hold Gentiles in very low regard; they can be cheated, lied to, abused, even killed, if it serves Jewish interests. Bischoff, an expert in Jewish religious law, wrote a summary and analysis of this book. He shows us many dark corners of the Jewish religion. 152 pp. pb, 6”x9”.

Hitler’s Revolution: Ideology, Social Programs, Foreign Affairs. By Richard Tedor. Defying all boycotts, Adolf

Hitler transformed Germany from a bankrupt state to the powerhouse of Europe within just four years, thus becoming Germany’s most popular leader ever. How was this possible? This study tears apart the dense web of calumny surrounding this controversial figure. It draws on nearly 200 published German sources, many from the Nazi era, as well as documents from British, U.S., and Soviet archives that describe not only what Hitler did but, more importantly, why he did it. These sources also reveal the true war objectives of the democracies – a taboo subject for orthodox historians – and the resulting world war against Germany. This book is aimed at anyone who feels that something is missing from conventional accounts. 2nd ed., 309 pp. pb, 6”x9”, index, bibl.

Hitler on the Jews. By Thomas Dalton. That Adolf Hitler spoke out against the Jews is beyond obvious. But of the thousands of books and articles written on Hitler, virtually none quotes Hitler’s exact words on the Jews. The reason for this is clear: Those in positions of influence have incentives to present a simplistic picture of Hitler as a blood-thirsty tyrant. However, Hitler’s take on the Jews is far more complex and sophisticated. In this book, for the first time, you can make up your own mind by reading nearly every idea that Hitler put forth about the Jews, in considerable detail and in full context. This is the first book ever to compile his remarks on the Jews. As you will discover, Hitler’s analysis of the Jews, though hostile, is erudite, detailed, and – surprise, surprise – largely aligns with events of recent decades. There are many lessons here for the modern-day world to learn. 200 pp. pb, 6”x9”, index, bibl.

Goebbels on the Jews. By Thomas Dalton. From the age of 26 until his death in 1945, Joseph Goebbels kept a near-daily diary. It gives us a detailed look at the attitudes of one of the highest-ranking men in Nazi Germany. Goebbels shared Hitler’s dislike of the Jews, and likewise wanted them removed from the Reich. Ultimately, Goebbels and others sought to remove the Jews completely from Europe—perhaps to the island of Madagascar. This would be the “final solution” to the Jewish Question. Nowhere in the



diary does Goebbels discuss any Hitler order to kill the Jews, nor is there any reference to extermination camps, gas chambers, or any methods of systematic mass-murder. Goebbels acknowledges that Jews did indeed die by the thousands; but the range and scope of killings evidently fall far short of the claimed figure of 6 million. This book contains, for the first time, every significant diary entry relating to the Jews or Jewish policy. Also included are partial or full transcripts of 10 major essays by Goebbels on the Jews. 274 pp. pb, 6"x9", index, bibl.

The Jewish Hand in the World Wars.

By Thomas Dalton. For many centuries, Jews have had a negative reputation in many countries. The reasons given are plentiful, but less-well-known is their involvement in war. When we examine the causal factors for wars, and look at their primary beneficiaries, we repeatedly find a Jewish presence. Throughout history, Jews have played an exceptionally active role in promoting and inciting wars. With their long-notorious influence in government, we find recurrent instances of Jews promoting hard-line stances, being uncompromising, and actively inciting people to hatred. Jewish misanthropy, rooted in Old Testament mandates, and combined with a ruthless materialism, has led them, time and again, to instigate warfare if it served their larger interests. This fact explains much about the present-day world. In this book, Thomas Dalton examines in detail the Jewish hand in the two world wars. Along the way, he dissects Jewish motives and Jewish strategies for maximizing gain amidst warfare, reaching back centuries. 2nd ed., 231 pp. pb, 6"x9", index, bibl.



Eternal Strangers: Critical Views of Jews and Judaism through the Ages.

By Thomas Dalton. It is common

knowledge that Jews have been disliked for centuries. But why? Our best hope for understanding this recurrent 'anti-Semitism' is to study the history: to look at the actual words written by prominent critics of the Jews, in context, and with an eye to any common patterns that might emerge. Such a study reveals strikingly consistent observations: Jews are seen in very negative, yet always similar terms. The persistence of such comments is remarkable and strongly suggests that the cause for such animosity resides in the Jews themselves—in their attitudes, their values, their ethnic traits and their beliefs.. This book addresses the modern-day "Jewish problem" in all its depth—something which is arguably at the root of many of the world's social, political and economic problems. 186 pp. pb, 6"x9", index, bibl.

Streicher, Rosenberg, and the Jews: The Nuremberg Transcripts.

By Thomas Dalton. Who, apart from Hitler, contrived the Nazi view on the Jews? And what were these master ideologues thinking? During the post-war International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the most-interesting men on trial regarding this question were two with a special connection to the "Jewish Question": Alfred Rosenberg and Julius Streicher. The cases against them, and their personal testimonies, examined for the first time nearly all major aspects of the Holocaust story: the "extermination" thesis, the gas chambers, the gas vans, the shootings in the East, and the "6 million." The truth of the Holocaust has been badly distorted for decades by the powers that be. Here we have the rare opportunity to hear firsthand from two prominent figures in Nazi Germany. Their voices, and their verbatim transcripts from the IMT, lend some much-needed clarity to the situation. 330 pp. pb, 6"x9", index, bibl.



For current prices and availability visit www.ARMREG.co.uk

Academic Research Media Review Education Group Ltd (ARMREG)

86-90 Paul Street, London, EC2A 4NE, UK