JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE THIRD REICH
Jewish Emigration from the Third Reich

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Introduction

Current historical writings dealing with matters related to the Third Reich paint a bleak picture. But such historiography has little to do with actual historical events. This applies especially to writings that deal with the Jewish ethnic group. The emigration of Jews from Germany is an example of such historical distortion.

To this day there are still accounts of the Jewish emigration that depict it as some kind of clandestine operation – as if the Jews who wished to leave Germany had to sneak over the borders in defiance of the German authorities, leaving all their possessions and wealth behind. Or as if certain avenues out of Germany were ‘inside knowledge’ not available to all Jews. In other accounts the emphasis is on Germany offering exit visas for a high price. There is no limit either to the inventive powers or to the mendacity of their authors.

The truth is that the emigration was encouraged by the German authorities, and frequently occurred under constantly rising inducements. The anti-Jewish legislation of the Third Reich is an undisputed fact in this emigration story. Likewise, the psychological pressure that Jews in Germany came to experience after 1933 is not trivialized here; it was often tragic for individuals and families. But this tragedy has already entered the public consciousness through countless publications, in radio and television programs. We needn’t recapitulate them here.
However, contrary to numerous eyewitness or autobiographical accounts, the following needs to be insisted on: Emigration was not some kind of wild flight, but rather a lawfully determined and regulated matter.

The purpose of this work is to elucidate the emigration process in law and policy, thereby correcting the traditionally received picture of Jewish emigration from Germany.

German and Jewish authorities worked closely together on this emigration. Jews interested in emigrating received detailed advice and offers of help from both sides. The accounts of Jews fleeing Germany in secret by night across some border are untenable. On the contrary, the German government was interested in getting rid of its Jews. It would have been quite counterproductive for them to deter such emigration.
1. The Jewish “Declaration of War”

After Adolf Hitler was elected Reich chancellor on January 30, 1933, and the subsequent assumption of power by the National Socialist party, the majority of Germany’s 500,000 Jews did not anticipate any significant change in their situation.

At most they expected temporary hindrances in one area or the other, but not exclusion from public life, let alone expulsion from Germany. Thus only politically or

*March 24, 1933: Jewish call for boycotting Germany after Hitler’s assumption of office.*
economic motivated individuals packed their bags and resettled in a foreign country, most of them believing that sooner or later they would return to Germany.

On March 24, 1933, two months after the National Socialists took power, “World Jewry,” as it referred to itself, declared war on Germany.¹ As World Jewry did not have its own state, it used the power at its disposal, namely

¹ There was actually a whole series of such declarations of war, c.f. Hartmut Stern: Jüdische Kriegserklärungen an Deutschland.
its influence on the world economy, to impose a world-wide boycott of Germany.

After this spectacular declaration, which appeared in the London Daily Express, it should have been obvious to World Jewry, and also to Jews living in Germany, that there would be consequences. No country in the world with any self-respect – and Germany at that time regarded itself quite favorably – can ignore such a challenge. And in fact the boycott hit Germany at its weakest point in time.

The economic situation was catastrophic. Over 6 million unemployed, countless bankrupt enterprises, a prostrate economic system posed for the new German government an almost unanswerable challenge and seemingly insoluble problems. On top of all that, the foreign boycott of its goods should have dealt Germany a death blow. That it did not, that on the contrary Germany’s economy recovered with astounding rapidity, thereby setting an example for other countries, was due entirely to the genius of its leadership. This is confirmed not only by contemporary reports, but also by recent studies devoted to presenting the facts. Of these, the two chapters devoted to Germany’s economic recovery in Rainer Zitelmann’s Hitler are most instructive.2

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2 Rainer Zitelmann: Hitler. Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, in particular Chapters IV and V.
2. Jews in Germany

One of the consequences that flowed from the antagonistic attitude of so-called World Jewry was the German government’s endeavor to remove its Jewish residents, to encourage them to emigrate.

For the German Jews this was a tragic development: Regardless of the fact that “World Jewry” had declared war on Germany, for hundreds of thousands of them Germany was home. Many of them had lived in Germany for generations. At first emigration was not a feasible alternative, and for a long time many could not take that decisive step.

Among the German Jews there were numerous groups and sub-groups, representing a multitude of differing political opinions. Besides purely religious organizations, there flourished very diverse associations, often with opposing viewpoints on various questions.

The four largest Jewish organizations were:

1. The Central Union of German Citizens of Jewish Faith (Central-Verein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens, hereinafter CV), which was formed in 1893. Later the organization was renamed the Central Union of Jews in Germany. Membership numbered about 10,000. Its political voice was the C.V.-Zeitung.

2. The Zionist Union of Germany (Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland, hereinafter ZVfD), founded
in 1897, with up to 10,000 members. It published the *Jüdische Rundschau* (*Jewish Review*).

In 1925 this Zionist Union split, and the New Zionist Movement arose (*Neu-Zionistische Bewegung*); they also called themselves the Revisionists or State Zionists (*Staatszionisten*). The name State Zionists indicated their desire for a Jewish state. The founder and leader of the Revisionists was Vladimir Jabotinsky. His deputy in Germany was Georg Kareski.

3. The Reich Federation of Jewish Soldiers (*Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldaten*, hereinafter *RjF*) was founded in 1919 and had about 10,000 members. It published a newspaper, *Der Schild* (*The Shield*).

4. The Union of National German Jews (*Verband Nationaldeutscher Juden*, hereinafter *VNJ*) was founded in 1921, and had about 10,000 members. Its newspaper was the *Nationaldeutsche Jude* (*National German Jew*).

In order to represent Jewish interests more effectively an umbrella organization was formed, the Reich Deputies of German Jews (*Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden*, *RV*). In 1939 it changed its name to the Reich Association of Jews in Germany (*Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland*). The *VNJ*, however, refused to join this umbrella organization.

In spite of these differences, two basic directions emerge: one in which Germanism was the top priority and Judaism was a religious matter; the other in which a consciousness of belonging to a separate, Jewish nation was combined with the Jewish religion. The second of these two groups comprised the Zionists, who were a minority among German Jews but in time became the most influential force.
The majority of Germany’s Jews had been settled there for over a century. The Jewish Edict of 1812 eliminated all legal restrictions and gave Jews the same political rights as other Germans. Many of them thus saw themselves as Germans, not aliens. In the first few years after 1933, this attachment to Germany led not only to declarations of support for their German fatherland and the National Socialist movement, but also to open antagonism toward the Zionists, with growing fervor who pressed for emigration.

At first even the Zionist Jüdische Rundschau of April 13, 1933, declared:

“The German people must know that the historical ties of centuries cannot simply be severed.”

A little later, on August 29, 1933, the same newspaper wrote:

“We believe that the German Jews must find their place and their integration in this state, and we hope that it will occur in harmony with the basic principles of the new state.”

Even after the ‘Nuremberg Laws,’ on September 9, 1935, the Jüdische Rundschau wrote that it was now the task of Jews to develop their special status within the German people in a positive way.
Several quotations that document how closely Jewish citizens identified with Germany in those years follow below. This is not to suggest that the majority of Jews did not adopt an attitude of distrust or rejection of the National Socialist government. But there were other points of view as well, that are generally suppressed today.

The first article of the constitution of Union of National German Jews (VNJ) states:

“The VNJ is an organization of Germans of Jewish ancestry who publicly declare that they feel their heritage is the German spirit and German culture, so that they can only feel and think as Germans.”

Dr. Max Naumann, the chairman of the VNJ, had published numerous essays about the Jewish question a decade earlier, in 1920 and 1924, *i.e.*, long before the rise of National Socialism. He took the following position in these writings: He differentiates between “German Jews” and “foreign Jews”, stating:

“The German Jews belong to the German people, the foreign Jews scattered to the winds are a people without a country – even the English Palestine is not their country and will never be their country.”

He defines the foreign Jews as a group marked by:

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3 Ref. in Herrmann, p. 74.
“the fanatical attachment to backwardness […] through the madness of being a community of the chosen and a problem for others.”

He considers the Zionists to be among “foreign Jews”. Here again, he distinguishes between two groups. The “honest and upright thinking Zionists” are those who recognize their difference and are prepared to live in Germany as foreigners, if need be under legal constraints as aliens. But those who neither belong to the “German Jews” nor to the conscious Zionists, are:4

“the remainder that deserves to perish. It is better that a few rootless perish than that hundreds of thousands of people who know where they belong, perish – our German people must not perish.”

It is possible to claim that this was one man’s opinion, but Dr. Naumann was re-elected chairman of the Union of National German Jews year after year. That would not have been possible had the Union sought to distance itself from Dr. Naumann’s views. So it is fair to assume that there was

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a group of Jews who shared this extreme view of their Jew-

As noted above, the Union of National German Jews refused to join the organization that comprised the other major Jewish groups. Its members felt so German that they saw no need to join a Jewish umbrella organization.

Even more radical was the attitude of a German national youth group, the Black Banner. It dissolved itself in 1934 after a number of its members left Judaism in order, as the official declaration states, to demonstrate “complete separation from Judaism in every form.”

These national German Jews expressed a number of positive opinions about Germanism and National Socialism as well.

In 1931 the magazine Der Nationaldeutsche Jude posed the question: “Can Jews Be National Socialists?,” and the answer was a unanimous yes. In its January 1931 issue, the magazine wrote:

“Did not we Jews shed our blood on the battlefields for Germany? Was not a Jew the president of the first German Parliament in the Paulskirche? Was not the founder of the conservative party a Jew? Whom do the parties thank for having adopted the rallying cry for a united Fatherland, its creation and its organization? The Jews! Who was the first precisely and clearly to formulate the demands that today are the main points of

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5 Herrmann, p. 41.

6 This is an error. The president of the first German parliament in the Frankfurt Paulskirche was Heinrich Freiherr von Gaggern. He belonged to an old aristocratic family from Rügen which goes back to the 13th century. Most probably the writer of this article mixed up Gaggern with Martin Eduard von Simson, a converted Jew who in 1871 was the first president of the Reichstag; see Meinhardt.
In May 1933, after Hitler assumed power, the same magazine wrote in a special edition:

“The Germany of the future is faced with completely new tasks, which can only be solved by a nation renewed at its foundation. To create this nation in the form of a national community that has never before existed in Germany’s history, is the major and, if properly undertaken, truly liberating task of the national leader.”

In 1934 VNJ’s Dr. Max Naumann declared: 7

“We have placed the well-being of the German peoples and the Fatherland, to which we feel inextricably linked, above our own well-being. That is why we welcomed the January 1933 national uprising, this in spite of the hardships it brought for us, but we saw in it the only means with which to overcome the damage wrought by un-German elements during those 14 tragic years.”

An orthodox rabbi from Ansbach wrote in the same year: 8

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7 Ref. Herrmann, p. 22.
“I reject the teachings of Marxism from a Jewish viewpoint and profess National Socialism, naturally without its anti-Semitic components. Without this anti-Semitism National Socialism would find its most devoted adherents amongst the orthodox Jews.”

As stated earlier, these views were not that of the Jewish majority, but they were expressed in the media – an attitude, by the way, that the National Socialists did not appreciate. They did not want any support for their ideas from Jewish citizens; they wanted the Jews to disappear from Germany.

The National Socialist attitude corresponded in principle to the Zionist position. They wished to establish a nationalistic Judaism and thus opposed any inner Jewish attachment to anything German. But they approved of National Socialism because they shared its basic tenet: devotion to one’s own people and state.

In December 1935 George Kareski, the chairman of the German State Zionists, was interviewed on the Nuremberg Laws by Goebbels’s magazine Der Angriff. His views on how various questions arising from the legislation had been dealt with were quite positive. Kareski said that the Nuremberg Laws fulfilled old Jewish demands. For example, the separation of German and Jewish nationality, the establishment of schools for Jewish students only, nurturing and supporting a specific Jewish culture, and above all the state prohibition of mixed marriages, which in any case Jewish law did not permit.  

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8 Ref. Herrmann, p. 3.
The Kareski interview aroused controversy in Jewish circles, but Kareski received support from orthodox Jews and even more so from Zionist groups.
3. Emigration

For the Zionists the only viable future was in their own country, the former Palestine. But even for them it was unimaginable that all Jews would leave Germany. They wanted to win over the younger Jews for emigration so that they could do the heavy work in Palestine. In order to bring this about they realized that working together with the National Socialists was the only course for their organizations. And that is what happened. Over the following years an ever-closer positive relationship with the National Socialists developed among those Jews who wished to immigrate to Palestine.

German institutions were desirous of completing the emigration as quickly as possible. As noted earlier, the Jewish groups and organizations realized the imperative of emigration only gradually.

There were three Jewish emigration agencies which had operated in Berlin (among other places) since the beginning of the century.

The *Hilfsverein für deutsche Juden* was responsible for emigration to all parts of the world except Palestine. It maintained agents in foreign countries who investigated the possibilities of immigration and settlement, *i.e.*, accommodating German Jews and establishing contact with local Jewish organizations, thereby making it easier for the immigrants to settle in.
The Palestine Office (Palästinaamt) concerned itself with the “Aliyah” – literally: ascending – meaning the ascent to Jerusalem, synonymous with immigration to Palestine. Its ‘clients’ were above all young Jews who were suitable for the hard physical labor that settlement in Palestine brought with it.

A third institution was the Main Office for Jewish Migration Welfare (Hauptstelle für jüdische Wanderfürsorge). Initially this agency concerned itself with Jews who were traveling in Germany. Later this organization concerned itself with caring for and resettling non-German Jews.  

The National Socialist government attempted to promote the emigration of its unwanted Jewish citizens. Two principal agreements were used by the state to regulate emigration: the “Haavara” and the “Rublee-Wohlthat.” The Haavara Agreement was in force from 1933 until 1941 and concerned emigration to Palestine. This agreement is now

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10 This relief organization was founded in 1901, and in 1904 it established its migration section. In 1917 the headquarters for Jewish Travelers Aid was established; the Palästinaamt der Zionistischen Vereinigung für Deutschland was established during the 1920s.
regularly mentioned in the relevant literature. In 1972 the former director of the Haavara Agreement, Werner Feilchenfeld, self-published a brochure which has obviously not been read by most people who write about the Haavara; otherwise they might not write so much nonsense about it.

The Rublee-Wohlthat agreement, on the other hand, generally falls under the historical blackout.\textsuperscript{11}

It covered the majority of emigrating Jews, all those who did not go to Palestine, but to other European countries or overseas countries. That was about two-thirds of all migrants. Unfortunately this agreement operated for only eight months; then war broke out and regulated emigration came to a stop. We note this point here because it makes clear the intentions of the German government, which were far removed from the ‘extermination of the Jews’.

\textsuperscript{11} The original English text has been published only in: I. Weckert, \textit{Flashpoint (Feuerzeichen)}, pp. 145–148. A German translation is found in \textit{Feuerzeichen}, pp. 275–281.
First issue of the newspaper Die Welt (The World) of October 15, 1897, central organ of the Zionist movement. Since Herzl's appeal to establish a "Jewish State", emigration of the Jews was advocated with fervor by the Jews. Herzl's program has changed Judaism decisively. With this idea, the foundation of Zionism was created.
4. Haavara

4.1. Origin and Activities

Already in February 1933 Palestinian representatives of the citrus-growing company Hanotea Ltd. approached the German government to explore ways of realizing their mutual interests: for the Germans, the emigration of Jews; for the Jewish Palestinians, the immigration of Jews. The Jewish side attempted to get advantageous emigration conditions that would benefit Palestine. The German authorities accepted the Jewish proposals, and in May 1933 the first accords on economic policy were signed. These formed the basis of the Haavara Agreement. The word Haavara (Haavara, with emphasis on the last syllable) is Hebrew for ‘transfer,’ i.e., to transport/transfer, in this case the transfer of wealth and goods. It is by this Hebrew name that the agreement became known in German files. ¹²

The Haavara provided for the following arrangement: Jews who wished to migrate to Palestine could deposit their money into one or more accounts of Jewish banks in Germany. They could make such deposits even if they re-

remained in Germany in the foreseeable future, i.e., even if they had merely the intention of emigrating from Germany. They could then use this money for the benefit of any Jewish settlers already in Palestine, or they could invest the money in Palestine. They were also able to pay their medical insurance out of this money, up to ten years in advance. German Jews thereby received rights that German Reich citizens did not enjoy. Feilchenfeld wrote:  

“Preparations for a home in Palestine for those still in Germany were a breakthrough as regards the currency controls prohibition that applied to Germans investing overseas.”

A traveler’s credit agreement, in cooperation with a travel agency in Tel Aviv, was built into the Haavara Agreement; it enabled prospective German Jews to journey to Palestine to find out what opportunities the country offered. They paid their expenses in Reichsmarks, and in Palestine received vouchers for all incurred costs. This as well was an exceptional provision: Due to strict foreign currency

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13 Feilchenfeld, p. 48.
regulations, it was almost impossible for Germans to travel outside of Germany. The tours organized by the KdF (Kraft durch Freude) [Strength through Joy, an organization which offered affordable cruises to German workers and their families—ed.]) were settled by clearances.

Once ready to emigrate, individuals received from their German bank, according to the exchange value, the minimum amount of foreign currency needed, 1000 Palestine pounds (the value of the Palestine pound was equal to that of the English pound sterling).

The Israeli historian Avraham Barkai has stressed that, given the prevailing foreign currency regulations, this allocation of foreign currency exclusively to emigrating Jewish citizens was a marked exception.14

Upon entering Palestine, the Jews from Germany had to show their money. A study of some years ago interpreted the 1000 pounds required for entry as payment for an entry visa.15 This is complete nonsense. The money was theirs, and they were only required to present it in order to demonstrate that they were able to support themselves and to create a new life so as not to burden the Jewish community in Palestine.

The rest of their money remained at their disposal in their Haavara account. Upon migrating they could take their complete household with them, including equipment and instruments needed for establishing themselves in their professions. All German citizens who decided to emigrate from

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14 Vom Boycott zur “Entjudung,” p. 63.
15 Kroh, David Kämpft, p. 24. This work is full of inaccuracies and distortions. The entire treatment of emigration is full of false assertions; e.g., p. 28: “The National Socialists made their expulsion pay,” or, immigrants to Palestine had to pay the Reich flight tax and exchange currency at a fantastic rate. Both are untrue.
Germany had to pay a “Reich flight tax” (Reichsfluchtsteuer), something the Jews who left Germany under Haavara did not.

The Haavara accounts also paid for goods imported from Germany by Palestinian traders and merchants. In Palestine the immigrants received the equivalent in homes, land, citrus orchards, or the full amount in cash. A supplementary agreement enabled merchants from Egypt, Syria and Iraq to finance imports from Germany through Haavara.\(^\text{16}\)

Additional rules and special privileges benefited the immigrant Jews from Germany in Palestine, among them that all social security and pension payments could be transferred without deductions.\(^\text{17}\)

Jews living in Palestine could also make payments to friends in Germany through Haavara: \(^\text{18}\)

“The sponsor paid the equivalent value in Palestinian currency at a discounted rate to the Haavara in favor of the recipient in Germany. The recipient of such support then received the equivalent in Reichsmarks through the Paltreu\(^\text{19}\) in Berlin. This system of a clearing house in private hands for payments of benefits to Germany developed in 1937 into a world-wide organization. Its task was to organize the relief payments from all over the world, and to use the accumulated foreign currency for the transfer of Jewish capital to Palestine.”

\(^{16}\) Feilchenfeld, pp. 54f.

\(^{17}\) Ibidem, p. 49

\(^{18}\) Ibidem, pp. 61f.

\(^{19}\) The “Paltreu” was a kind of sister organization of the Haavara. Its task was to enable the transfer of assets beyond the limits imposed on the Haavara. Both Haavara and Paltreu were controlled by Jews.
Another form of clearing is recounted by adviser to the Reichsbank Walther Utermöhle, former director of the center for currency control in the Reich Ministry of Economics:20

“This enabled a clearing between emigrating Jews and [...] from overseas returning Germans. For example, if a German could not sell his house or business [because of the boycott in a foreign country] but found a Jew in Germany who had similar assets, then permission to exchange was given where neither side made an unfair gain.”

Besides the official regulations that applied to the Jews, there was a number of cases that were regulated through the Haavara to the advantage of the emigrants.

The Haavara was beneficial to those Jews unable to raise the one thousand pounds required in order to go to Palestine. The Haavara enabled them to obtain loans repayable years later.21 For these individuals the normal transfer fees were reduced by 50 percent, thereby enabling virtually

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21 Adler-Rudel, pp. 102f.
every Jew in Germany who desired to go to Palestine to emigrate.

Insofar as the basic tenor of the Haavara Agreement reflected the German government’s encouragement for Jews to emigrate, it also encouraged some Germans to actions that verged on the illegal. Rolf Vogel, the former Jewish journalist and publisher of the Deutschlandberichte, which aimed at promoting German-Jewish understanding, reports the following:22

“Numerous individual actions of support were not legal, especially in cases where Jews did not wish to go to Palestine and could not be helped in any other way. It so happened that Jews sold their businesses and then lost their proceeds because they could not transfer them. To prevent this loss, government officials offered Jewish proprietors not emigration, but rather the opportunity to represent their own business overseas. By receiving high commissions and the proceeds from sales as representatives of their own firms, Jewish businessmen got back most of their lost money.

Another transfer trick, also conducted with the knowledge and good will of the foreign-currency bureaucrats, was the transfer of money through the courts: A person left at the court an envelope marked ‘My last will.’ The person then migrated, and after a few months would make a request to the local judiciary to have his envelope containing money and shares forwarded on to him from Germany.

Money could be transferred just as smoothly by an advertisement in the paper. For example, a Jew in Zürich would place an advertisement in the Völkischer Beo-

22 Vogel, Ein Stempel hat gefehlt, pp. 48f.
bachter: ‘Representative required’. He would then have someone in Germany send envelopes filled with money or shares to the Völkischer Beobachter, which then collected and forwarded them on to Zurich.”

In some respects the Haavara assisted in developing German exports, though this was not a primary factor, despite what one reads occasionally today.  

Altogether one should not exaggerate the consequences of the agreement for the German economy. The consumption of goods by a community of 200,000 to 300,000 people – and the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) was no larger than that – which was also limited to certain goods, was not in a position to lend a country of sixty million any essential export help. Furthermore, there was no foreign currency flow to be gained by selling to Palestine; payment was in German money from the Haavara accounts. Even Feilchenfeld stressed that the export activity of the Haavara offered no significant advantage for Germany, because “Haavara brought Germany no gains in foreign exchange.” (p. 29).

For Palestine the Haavara brought untold advantages. In the brochure published by Feilchenfeld, Dr. Ludwig Pin- ner, a former member of Haavara Society, is tireless in sing- ing the praises of the agreement:  

“Until the beginning of the 1930s Palestine was an agricultural country with a primitive level of development.”

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23 E.g. F. Nicosia, Hitler und der Zionismus, p. 83 writes:  
“The fear of a German decline in goods on the international market, and thus the Middle East market, influenced the German government in its decision to sign the Haavara Transfer Agree- ment with the Zionist representatives in summer 1933.”

24 Feilchenfeld, pages as indicated.
It was only the immigrants from Germany that

“altered the economic structure and the social composition of the ‘Yishuv’ and contributed significantly to its development. Under their influence and participation industrial output doubled, technology modernized, and slowly the choice and quality of manufactured goods reached a European standard.” (p. 107)

“The activity of the German Jews as industrialists and investors was decisive for the development of the ‘Yishuv’ out of its pre-industrial and pre-capitalist stage.” (p. 102)

“[Their influence] on the development of Jewish Palestine was found not only in the economic and social sphere; it was also marked in the cultural, scientific and artistic spheres. The modernization of hospitals, made possible by the Transfer, made Palestine one of the most renowned medical centers.” (p. 106)

“The commitment of these people in research and teaching institutions, in business and administration, in public life and in the defense organizations was immeasurably important for the preparation of the ‘Yishuv’ for the fateful task that stood before them.” (p. 108)

The money of the ‘capitalists,’ who thanks to the Haavara could migrate to Palestine practically unhindered, also made migration to Palestine possible for workers. Dr.
Georg Landauer, the director of the German section of the Jewish Agency and a member of the board of directors of the Haavara, stated in an interview with the *Jüdische Rundschau* of February 18, 1936:

“Palestine as a developing country can absorb new immigrants looking for work proportionate to the inflowing capital and entrepreneurial spirit that creates new jobs.”

But there was the fear that wealthy Jews would go elsewhere with their capital and that only poor Jews would come to Palestine. Landauer warned:

“It is not possible to have worker immigrants without the immigration of employers.”

### 4.2. Opposition to the Haavara

#### 4.2.1. …on the Jewish side

Although the Haavara Agreement was advantageous for both the Jews and for Palestine, opposition to it was significant. The behind-the-scenes battles are described in detail by Edwin Black in his book *The Transfer Agreement*. The fact that there was an agreement between the Third Reich and the Zionists to the advantage of Israel seems to him incomprehensible and unpardonable, and he accuses the Jewish agencies involved of “Nazi collaboration”. Black’s attitude is all the more inexplicable because he is convinced that all Jews who remained in Germany became victims of the ‘Holocaust’.

Jewish organizations around the world complained of their own people’s violation of the boycott against Germany. The welfare of the German Jews who migrated to Pales-
tine meant little to them; they regarded the betrayal of general Jewish interests as far more important.

There were problems in Palestine as well. The Haavara’s monopoly on importing German goods aroused envy among Palestinian traders, who saw their own existence threatened. This was especially the case with nascent Jewish industries in Palestine, which strove to sell their own goods and revolted against the cheaper and better-quality products from Germany. The Haavara finally had to yield to the demands of the Jewish entrepreneurs in Palestine, and stopped importing certain goods, thus guaranteeing the protection of “Tozeret Haaretz” (products made in Israel). Enterprising businessmen exploited this dispensation to their own advantage. There were cases in which an enterprise obtained a factory through Haavara, then used the “Tozeret Haaretz” protection for its own manufactured goods. As a result the demand for imported goods and the transfer of money on the Haavara accounts declined.\(^{25}\)

On November 12, 1935 the *Jüdische Rundschau* bemoaned this lack of solidarity with the immigrant Jews from Germany:

\(^{25}\) Feilchenfeld, p. 54.
“The transfer question is of financial importance for the emigration of Jews from Germany to Palestine, as well as for the transfer of money into the Jewish funds. Without this capital transfer it is almost impossible to emigrate in style […] That this matter regularly comes up in public discussion in Palestine may be due partly to a lack of knowledge of the real factors, and partly due to those who wish to eliminate the competition that Haavara generates out of economic or other motives.”

4.2.2. …on the German side

The Haavara Agreement was also not universally welcomed by Germans. It was of course quite a burden on the German foreign exchange market, and there were also political disadvantages. The German consul general in Jerusalem, Hans Döhle, emphasized in a March 22, 1937, study that through the Haavara Agreement the German government had “subordinated all considerations that are decisive in advancing German interests in other countries” to the “facilitation of Jewish emigration from Germany and the settlement of immigrant Jews in Palestine.” The strengthening of the Jewish economy “that we made possible through facilitating the transplanting of German-Jewish industrial firms to Palestine” necessarily worked against Germany on the world market. Döhle stressed that “the opposition of the Palestinian Jews to Germanism is manifested at every opportunity.”

Great Britain felt itself disadvantaged in its Palestinian mandate by the import of German goods and began to attack Germany in its press. According to Döhle’s study, the

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26 In: Vogel, pp. 110f.
negative imbalance of the Haavara Agreement was as follows:

1. Through export of goods with no foreign currency inflow.
2. Building up the Jewish economy builds anti-German Jewish influence in Palestine.
3. Direction of German imports to Palestine through the Jewish Agency without regard for German mercantile interests.
4. Anger among the local Arab and German businessmen, who can only trade with Germany through the Jewish Agency.
5. Anger of the British Mandate administration, threatened by the German competition.

If one recalls that Döhle witnessed anti-German incidents and was aware how much the country owed to German immigrants, his critical assessment was not unjustified. Palestine was like the animal that bites the hand that feeds it. The hostility of the Jews toward Germany expressed itself on many different levels. For example, during a Purim procession\footnote{Purim: The biblical book of Esther relates a historically unverifiable tale. Esther, the Jewish wife of the Persian king, discovers a plan to exterminate the Jews of Persia, to be carried out by Haman, a court official. The Persian king, Artaxerxes, is not opposed to this plan. Esther formulates a plan to save her people. On the occasion of a banquet, Esther seduces Haman and is then found by the king in a compromising situation. She informs the king that Haman has raped her. Now the king’s anger turns against Haman, who is hanged. Esther succeeds in convincing the king to give the Jews free rein against their opponents.

“In all provinces of King Artaxerxes the Jews came together in the cities and attacked all those who had planned the downfall of the Jews. No one could stand against them; all peoples feared them.” (Esther 9.2)} Germany was depicted as a poisonous-green
fire-breathing dragon covered with swastikas, and a placard demanded “Tozeret Haaretz” protection and a boycott of German goods.\(^{28}\)

In spite of it all, Adolf Hitler decided repeatedly that emigration of Jews was to be supported with all means and that a suspension of the Haavara Agreement was out of the question.

The transfer of assets through the Haavara remained possible even after the war began, through neutral countries. These connections broke down only after December 1941, following America’s entry into the war.

Winding up the Haavara in Germany was entrusted to two Jewish banks, Warburg in Hamburg and Wassermann in Berlin. At the end of the war there was still Haavara money in the accounts, which had been frozen by the German government as enemy funds; after 1945 the money was paid out in full to the owners.\(^{29}\)

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The Bible reports that in just two days 75,000 people were murdered by the Jews. As already stated, history offers no foundation for this. According to one theology textbook (Preuß/Berger, Bibelkunde, p. 118):

“Judaism found in the book of Esther a narrative of wish-fulfillment, of things lacking in the Jews’ actual circumstances.”

In memory of this pogrom of revenge (Why revenge? Nothing had happened to the Jews!), the Purim festival arose and is celebrated to this day in February/March as a joyous occasion in a carnival atmosphere.

\(^{28}\) Mildenstein in: Der Angriff, November 1, 1934.

\(^{29}\) Feilchenfeld, p. 71.
5. Emigration and the SS

Besides the Reich Economic Ministry, it was paradoxically the SS and its agencies that supported and encouraged the emigration of the Jews.

The SS took it upon itself to influence German Jewish policy from the very beginning. It suggested mass emigration but warned against putting pressure on those Jews who felt German first, then Jewish. In those Jews it was necessary first to awaken a Jewish consciousness and a Jewish self-image. This was to take place through Jewish cultural organizations. Only a Jew who had become conscious of his identity would be prepared to leave Germany and to immigrate to a future Jewish homeland.  

It was under such auspices that the SS and Gestapo conducted all supportive and protective measures involving Jewish institutions. As strange as it may sound, it was to the Gestapo to which many Jews turned whenever a German bureaucracy disadvantaged them or if they needed some other form of help.

For example, when during the so-called Kristallnacht in November 1938 the Jewish Emigration Center on Ber-

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30 It is surely a paradox for those who have derived their historical knowledge from the media, wherein the SS is depicted as a murderous Third Reich gang, with chief responsibility for the Jewish ‘Holocaust’.

Leopold Edler von Mildenstein, who later headed the Jewish section of the SS, published a kind of propaganda tract for migration to Palestine as early as 1934. In that year Mildenstein traveled to Palestine and remained there for

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32 Nicosia, p. 244.
half a year. His travelogue titled “Ein Nazi fährt nach Palästina” (A Nazi travels to Palestine) was serialized in Goebbels’s magazine Der Angriff (Sept. 26 to Oct. 9, 1934). The report is lively, vividly written, and offers an interesting picture of conditions in the British mandate and of the political currents that prevailed in Palestine in the early 1930s. It is still quite readable today. Mildenstein used the pseudonym “Lim” – the first three letters of his name, read from right to left as in Hebrew.

The SS and Gestapo participated in establishing and financing the re-training camps which in the meantime had been established by Zionist organizations all over Germany.
In these camps young Jews were to learn agricultural and trades to prepare them for the completely different life of Palestine. In part the SS even provided the land on which such camps could be established. Nicosia reproduces a map from August 1936 on which are marked 40 such establishments all across the Reich, from the farthest north (Flensburg and Gut Lobitten, Königsberg/East Prussia) to Gut Winkelhof in the south, near the Swiss border (see illustration).\textsuperscript{33}

Such re-training camps were established even in Austria, the former Ostmark, after its annexation. Adolf Eichmann, the director of the Vienna Hauptamt für jüdische Auswanderung (Main Office for Jewish Emigration) actively supported this program. Later, in concert with the Mossad, he vigorously supported illegal Jewish emigration. Occasionally, SS units escorted Jewish emigration groups

\textsuperscript{33} Nicosia, Third Reich …, p. 217. Only in the original English edition. In the German translation there is only a blank page. Nicosia cites as his source a document from the National Archive, USA: NA T-175/411, 2935451.
across the border, and ensured that they crossed unhindered. Hannah Arendt was of the opinion that Eichmann’s comment before the Jerusalem Tribunal in 1960 – that he had saved hundreds of thousands of Jewish lives by such measures – was factual, even though it was met with scornful laughter in court.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{34} Arendt, p. 56; Kimche, pp. 17, 30. There is no evidence to support Kimche’s contention that emigrating Jews had to pay to get out. This appears to be the sort of imaginary assertion without which it is not possible for Jews to write books that deal with such topics.
6. The Rublee-Wohlthat Agreement

The Haavara Agreement specifically dealt with migration to Palestine. The second state-regulated process was the Rublee-Wohlthat agreement, which concerned itself with immigration to other countries, the goal of the majority of emigrating Jews. Just as did Palestine, other countries also required proof of the immigrant’s financial self-sufficiency, which caused considerable problems for Germany. The German Reichsbank was forced to provide large amounts of

Myron Taylor gives a speech during the international conference on Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany in Evian-les-Bains, France. Next to him is James Grover McDonald.
already-scarce foreign currency for this emigration. Many countries refused to accept Jewish immigrants as well.

This topic was addressed at the international refugee conference in the summer of 1938 at the French health resort Evian-les-Bains on Lake Geneva. Representatives from 32 countries met there at the Hotel Royal from July 6–15 to discuss how German Jews could be helped. All the conference participants were united: They condemned the prevailing anti-Semitism in Germany, they were most empathetic toward the poor Jews who had been expelled from their homes, they agreed on resolutions that places must be found where the Jews could accommodated – but every single speaker emphasized that unfortunately his country was not in a position to help by taking in a larger number of immigrants.

The only result to come out of the conference was the establishment of an “Intergovernmental Committee” based in London. Its president was a lawyer from New York, George Rublee.

From the outset Rublee tried to establish contact with the German government. This endeavor, which was supported by the German ambassador in London, Herbert von Dirksen, and the director of the political section of the Foreign Ministry, Ernst Woermann, was successfully sabotaged.
for months on end by the state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Ernst von Weizsäcker, father of postwar German President Richard von Weizsäcker.

Weizsäcker let Rublee understand that he should not hope for any kind of cooperation from the German side. He repeatedly rejected any attempts from other diplomats to put Rublee in contact with German authorities. He even forbade the German embassy in London to respond in any way to Rublee’s attempts to make contact, or so much as to mention them in Berlin. He inquired of the British chargé d’affaires in Berlin whether Rublee was Aryan. When Rublee wanted to travel to Berlin of his own accord,
Weizsäcker bluntly rejected his request because to his mind it was of no value.35

Finally Hitler learned of Weizsäcker’s unauthorized conduct and immediately summoned Reichsbank President Schacht to his office. He authorized Schacht to work out a financial plan that would enable Germany’s remaining Jews to emigrate. Schacht developed a proposal, and in mid-December 1938 Hitler dispatched him to London for a discussion with Rublee and other individuals.

After the war Schacht described this so as to suggest that the plan and the trip to England had been his idea, which he had had to convince Hitler to adopt. Contemporary documents prove otherwise. After his return from London, an article written on his initiative appeared in the Berliner Zeitung of December 19, 1938:

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35 Compare with Weizsäcker’s own account: in ADAP, Serie D, Bd. V.:

“27.7.1938: The American Ambassador spoke with me today […] on whether we might not in any way support the Evin Committee […] I said he need not be hopeful about it.” (Doc. 641, p. 754).

“18.10.1938: The British Ambassador delivered to me the attached memorandum, which the intergovernmental committee […] is dealing with. In this memorandum – as during the past two months – it is suggested that the London-based director of the committee, the American Rublee, and his colleague Mr. Pell, come to Berlin and begin talks […]. I advised the Ambassador – as I did last summer – that a trip by Mr. Rublee to Germany is, according to my personal view, of no value.” (Doc. 645, p. 758.)

“7.11.1938: The British chargé d’affaires asked me again today in matters Rublee. I explained to him, […] ‘the matter needs time. […] I asked in what percentage was Rublee Aryan […]’” (Doc. 648, p. 761)

C.f. Documents 646, 647, 662. Further rejections from Weizsäcker and the AA are cited in Vogel, pp. 180–228.
“Schacht Discussion in London, the Purpose of the Trip.”

The Foreign Ministry was annoyed at this and Weizsäcker was given the task of getting an explanation from Schacht. This occurred in a telephone conversation on December 20, 1938, about which Weizsäcker wrote a memo. It states that Weizsäcker had asked Schacht whether he had received an order from the Führer, and whether he, Schacht, had initiated the newspaper report:

“President Schacht unhesitatingly admitted that the article came from him. It concerned a command from the Führer, which he, the president, had executed within the prescribed framework in London. The Führer requests a report after return. He, Schacht, has now made an appointment to report to the Führer within the next two days, and then will also call upon the Reich minister [Ribbentrop] to give a report. He will not comment further on the matter until he has reported to the Führer.”

Schacht’s later recollection of his activities at this stage of his career was obviously influenced by subsequent historical events. His version and what the documents reveal are quite different.

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36 ADAP Series D, Bd. V, pp. 768f, Doc. 655.
In any case, in 1938 the Schacht Plan was adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee as a basis for discussion. In January 1939 Rublee was invited to Berlin independently of the Foreign Ministry. There he discussed matters first with Schacht, then with Göring’s ministerial director Helmut Wohlthat. Within four weeks the Rublee-Wohlthat Agreement had been reached.

The basic idea of the agreement was: By establishing trust funds which would comprise 25 percent of the wealth belonging to Jews in Germany, Jewish emigration would be financed through foreign loans. Each emigrant would, in addition to receiving the requisite amount of cash for entry (Vorzeigegeld), receive a minimum amount of capital necessary to establish himself. About 150,000 able-bodied Jews were marked for emigration, and their next of kin were to follow later. The Intergovernmental Committee would concern itself with which countries Jews could migrate to. All Jews over 45 were to be able to remain in Germany and be protected from discrimination. Residential and work restrictions for these Jews were to be lifted.

The text of the memorandum on the Rublee-Wohlthat Agreement was an official contract. Rublee wrote it up after his return to London, and sent it to Wohlthat. Weizsäcker
hesitated to sign it, because the Foreign Ministry had not been involved in the negotiations – something he himself had prevented.

Therefore it was Hermann Göring who presented the text to Adolf Hitler, who wholeheartedly assented to it. For his part, Rublee passed the text to the Intergovernmental Committee, made up of the representatives of 30 countries. The committee gave Rublee the task of informing Wohlthat that these countries had taken note of the agreement with interest, and that they would do everything to facilitate the emigration of Jews from Germany on its terms.

In practice this support proved less than promised, but that was not the fault of the agreement or of its German initiators.

After successfully concluding the negotiations, the 72-year-old Rublee resigned from his post as director of the Intergovernmental Committee.

In England a finance company was founded with start-up capital of one million dollars. In the United States, Jewish bankers pledged to raise enough capital to guarantee the realization of every settlement project. The new director of the Intergovernmental Committee, Sir Herbert Emerson, was convinced that the emigration of Jews had been secured and that it would be completed in three to five years’ time.38

In January 1939 the Reich Center for Jewish Emigration was founded in Berlin. Its work was based on the Rublee-Wohlthat agreement. It cooperated closely with the Reich Jewish Association in order to simplify the emigration process.

37 “Signing of Agreement with Mr. Rublee is out of the question,” ADAP Series D, Bd. 5, Doc.662.
38 Vogel, pp. 252f.
The process began slowly, because most countries refused to take in Jewish immigrants. But at least the Rublee-Wohlthat agreement had removed the financial barriers. Of this period, Rublee later wrote:39

“The Germans fulfilled all their obligations [...] In the months between my departure from Germany and the outbreak of war few, if any, Jewish persecutions occurred in Germany. Some left, and the rest had it easier in Germany. I received quite a number of letters from Germany wherein [...] Jews [...] thanked me for what I had done for them.”

With the outbreak of war, hopes of finding countries to which to emigrate diminished. The Royal Navy blocked the previously used sea routes, and Palestine was practically closed to immigration because the British had severely tightened the requirements for entry.

Emigration routes then went overland, for example through Greece and Turkey. On 18 and 21 June 1940 the *Jüdische Nachrichtenblatt* revealed an adventurous route: “Via Yokohama to America.” A map showed the new travel routes: Berlin – Warsaw – Moscow – Chita – Shanghai – Yokohama – San Francisco/Los Angeles. From there on either in an easterly direction to Chicago – New York, or south to Mexico – Panama – Santiago de Chile. The German government offered Jews with valid visas a route through occupied France to Spain and Portugal, from where they could then travel to their destination by ship.40

That Jewish emigration continued even after the war began was principally due to, first, the international connections of the Jews, and second, to the assistance of the Ger-

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40 *Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt*, December 10, 1940.
man bureaucracies, and finally, to an organization that was later to play a completely different role, the *Mossad le Ali-yah Bet*. 
Letter by Reinhard Heydrich of January 30, 1939, to the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding formation of the “Reich Center for Jewish Emigration”
7. The Mossad le Aliyah Bet

*Mossad le Aliyah Bet* literally means ‘Office for the Second Immigration,’ which referred to the illegal immigration to Palestine. It was out of this organization that later the Israeli secret service, Mossad, developed. Jews from Palestine founded it in Paris in 1937 in response to Britain’s Palestine policies. The British were then issuing only a limited number of immigration certificates to Palestine – fewer, in any case, than the number of Jews seeking entry.

The British classified prospective immigrants according to wealth, profession, and class; the certificates were distributed in these individual categories in numbers that reflected the desirability of immigration from each categories. Anyone who did not fit into a category considered essential by the mandatory administration would not be granted a visa.

The following immigration categories were valid from 1932 to 1945:

**Category A:** Persons with their own capital:
- A1: Capitalists possessing £P1000 (Palestine pounds)
- A2: Professionals with £P500, so long as the economic situation warranted their immigration.
- A3: Craftsmen with at least £P 250.
A4: Pensioners with a minimum income of £P4 per month.\(^{41}\)

A5: Persons with work skills scarce in Palestine, with a minimum capital of £P500.

Category B: Persons with a secure income:

B1: Orphans under 16 years of age whose keep was guaranteed by public bodies.

B2: Clergymen.

B3: Students and pupils whose keep was guaranteed until their entry into the work force.

Category C: Work certificates for workers between 18 and 35 years. The number of these certificates was audited by the Palestinian authority twice a year.

Category D: This category was reserved for wives, children and parents of Jews living in Palestine, as long as the residents could show that they were able to support their relatives.

Finally, there was the category Jugendalija (Youth Aliyah) for youths between the ages of 15 and 17 years.\(^{42}\)

Jewish leaders were understandably furious at Jews being categorized on the basis of their economic value. The Palestinian Mandate entrusted to Britain on July 24, 1922, called for the British to support and to simplify Jewish immigration, while safeguarding the rights of other peoples in the country. Hence from the inception of the restrictive measures, the Zionists attempted to find ways around them,

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\(^{41}\) This minimal sum indicates the purchasing power the British Pound Sterling had at that time.

and to send Jewish transports to Palestine illegally, in the eyes of the British.

On May 17, 1939, the British published a new White Paper, which tightened the immigration regulations anew.

In reaction to these events, in 1937 the Mossad began to establish offices in all the European countries, and sought immediate contact with agencies in Berlin, in particular with the SS and the Gestapo. Thus began a lively collaboration between the Gestapo and the Mossad.

As befitted their attitude towards Jewish emigration, the SS and the Gestapo were helpful towards the Mossad agents in many ways. In December 1938 Himmler ordered that Jewish prisoners in concentration camps who desired to emigrate should be released. Additionally, Mossad agents were permitted to enter the camps to recruit Jews willing to go to Palestine in illegal migration ships. Nothing stood in the way of the release of such inmates. Kimche writes:

“Since he [Pino, the Mossad delegate] guaranteed the Gestapo that he would provide for their immediate emigration, Pino was in a position to get a large number of young Jews out of the concentration camps. A signed form from him sufficed to effect their release.” (p. 30)

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43 “The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has lifted restrictions on Jews who intend to emigrate.” Circular of December 8, 1938, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA), R58/276, Bl. 165. A number of similar orders can be found in further volumes of documents as late as 1942.
Since direct travel to Palestine was illegal, the emigrants needed visas from other countries, for example, from immigration authorities in ports that the ships would stop at on the way to Palestine. The Gestapo became involved in this as well as in the chartering of suitable ships, even covering part of the costs. In 1939 a number of ships arrived in Palestine, bringing thousands of illegal immigrants to the country.\(^4^4\)

The cooperation between the Mossad and the Gestapo did not end with the outbreak of the war; indeed, it grew even stronger. Emigration papers were often made out for other countries, and the emigrants instructed not to reveal anything about their final destination. Without such help from the SS and the Gestapo and without the tacit acquiescence of the German authorities, the Mossad could not have done its work.

In the summer of 1939, an operation was planned that would have to shipped 10,000 Jews from German ports in a single convoy to Palestine. Before the ships could sail, however, war broke out and the English blocked the Channel.

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\(^4^4\) More details are offered in Kimche’s book, though it contains some factual errors. Interesting details are also found in the essay by Ball-Kaduri, who, like Kimche, is not always accurate.
8. Irgun Proposals

Two years later, in summer 1941, the 1939 plan was revisited by Abraham Stern, one of the leaders of the Irgun, the Jewish anti-British resistance and freedom organization. He offered to help the Germans in their battle against England, and suggested that Germany immediately begin to ship out 10,000 Jews in return. He was of the opinion that the German ships could break through the English blockade and bring the Jews to Palestine. Once they had arrived there, the English would not be able return them.

45 The full name reads: “Irgun Zevai Leumi” = national military organization. Since September 1940 Abraham Stern had dissociated himself from the “Irgun” and established his own group, “Lechi” (”Lochamei Cherut Israel” = fighters for Israel’s freedom). But in the first few months after the separation, he continued to use the former name because he saw himself as the legitimate representative of the Irgun.

46 Katz, pp. 85f.
Whether this suggestion ever reached the right address is questionable, because the agents sent out by Stern were later imprisoned in Syria. In any case, Berlin had to regard breaking the blockade hopeless. A convoy of ships full of civilians, especially women and children, had little chance of reaching Palestine unscathed. The German government could not assume responsibility for such an enterprise.
This was Stern’s second attempt at establishing contact with the German government. Half a year earlier, in January 1941, Irgun had offered in a letter to fight for Germany against England,\textsuperscript{47} in particular through sabotage and spying in Palestine. In return they demanded “that the […] national aspirations of the Israeli freedom movement be recognized by the German Reich,” and the establishment of a Jewish brigade:\textsuperscript{48}

“[…]military training and organization of Jewish manpower in Europe, under the leadership and command of the NMO, in military units that would play a combat role in the conquest of Palestine, should that become a front.”

This letter was obviously sent at the same time that two of Stern’s agents arrived to see Werner Otto von Hentig in Beirut. Hentig was an advisor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; at the beginning of 1941 he was on an official visit to what was then the French mandate of Lebanon. The conversation must have been similar in content to the letter, because Hentig wrote:

“\textit{In Beirut I took up residence in the ‘Hotel Monopol.’ […] The most extraordinary delegation came from Palestine itself. The leader, a handsome young officer type, offered to work together with the National Socialists against their own people, especially the orthodox Zionists, if Hitler would agree to an independent Jewish Palestine.}” (p. 338f.)

“I could only respond to the Jewish delegation that the offer of cooperation and the conditions stated could

\textsuperscript{47} According to Brenner, p. 267, it was Stern who authorized the communication.

\textsuperscript{48} For the full text of this historic document see the Appendix.
never be accepted out of consideration for our Arab friends and our general principles.” (p. 399)

The Irgun letter, written in German, arrived safely in Germany, but whether a German reaction followed cannot be ascertained from the files.

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49 A copy of this letter is found in the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn (PA/AA), Nr. E 234152-234158.
First attempt at making contact by Abraham Stern of the Irgun with the German government for the purpose of cooperation, made by a letter sent to the German embassy in Turkey on January 11, 1941 – here the accompanying letter. The complete text of the proposal is reprinted in the Appendix.
9. Conclusion

The illegal immigration to Palestine continued even after the war ended, until the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, because the British kept Palestine’s borders closed to Jews. In the decade from 1938 to 1948, over a hundred thousand Jews migrated to Palestine illegally.\textsuperscript{50}

The total number of Jews who left Germany (and Austria) after 1933 cannot be ascertained statistically, because there was no counting at the points of departure or at the points of arrival. Estimates vary from 100,000 and 537,000, a discrepancy that reflects the unreliability of those figures.\textsuperscript{51}

In actual fact, all figures – with one exception – remain guesswork, and refer to different groups and times. There are no reliable figures that embrace Jewish emigration as a whole. Some authors construe it as confined to emigration from Germany within its pre-1938 borders. Others add Austria to their calculations. Some wish to focus exclusively on the years from 1933 to 1939, although it is clear that emigration continued after outbreak of war, and that illegal emigration to Palestine accelerated in 1938.

\textsuperscript{50} Nicosia, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{51} Rosenstock attempts to shed some light on this confusion by focusing on the imponderables, to make clear that all figures must remain speculations.
There is only one figure that derives from an official German source that, however, is rejected by all establishment authors because it seems too high. Interestingly, this figure appears in a document that is otherwise highly regarded, thanks to its use in proving the German plan for “Jewish extermination”: the “Wannsee Protocol.” All information in this document is judged credible and convincing, except for its emigration statistics.

On page 4 of the Protocol the following figures are given:

“from the assumption of power until the October 31, 1941, deadline, altogether around 537,000 Jews emigrated.”

“From January 30, 1933, from the old Reich, about 360,000
From March 15, 1938, from the Ostmark (Austria), about 147,000
From March 15, 1939, from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, about 30,000.”

We shall not question the authenticity of the Protocols here, nor comment on the significance of the meeting at the Wannsee villa, which has recently received a different interpretation. What is important here is to point out once again the tendency of establishment historiography arbitrarily to designate certain parts of a document as authentic, while rejecting other portions as inauthentic. As for our investigation, we stand by our statement that exact emigration figures are not available.

About a quarter to a third of the emigrants went to Palestine, a third to European countries and the rest overseas, especially to North and South America.

The Haavara, as stated at the beginning, is occasionally mentioned in specialized publications, but seldom in the
public media. The Rublee-Wohlthat agreement is practically unknown. Most Germans are certainly extensively informed about the ‘Holocaust,’ but have scarcely heard of the emigration plan that enabled the large majority of German Jews to depart unmolested. This is apparently one of the “truths undesirable for national pedagogy,” as Walter Hofer once formulated it.

The historian’s task will always be to swim against the stream and to help discover truths with which to bring the past into clearer focus.
Über die Nachteile, die eine solche Auswanderungsforcierung mit sich brachte, waren sich alle Stellen im klaren. Sie mußten jedoch ange- sights des Fehlens anderer Lösungsmöglichkeiten vorerst in Kauf genommen werden.

Die Auswanderungsarbeiten waren in der Folgezeit nicht nur ein deutsches Problem, sondern auch ein Problem, mit dem sich die Behörden der Ziel- bzw. Einwandererländer zu befassen hatten. Die finanziellen Schwierigkeiten, wie Erhöhung der Vorzeige- und Landungsgelder seitens der verschiedenen ausländischen Regierungen, fehlende Schiffsplätze, laufend verschärfte Einwanderungsbeschränkungen oder - sperren, erschwerten die Auswanderungsbestrebungen außerordentlich. Trotz dieser Schwierigkeiten wurden seit der Machtübernahme bis zum Stichtag 31.10.1941 insgesamt rund 537.000 Juden zur Auswanderung gebracht. Davon

vom 30.1.1933 aus dem Altreich rd. 360.000
vom 15.3.1938 aus der Ostmark rd. 147.000
vom 15.3.1939 aus dem Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren rd. 30.000.

All the offices realized the drawbacks of such enforced accelerated emigration. For the time being they had, however, tolerated it on account of the lack of other possible solutions of the problem.

The work concerned with emigration was, later on, not only a German problem, but also a problem with which the authorities of the countries to which the flow of emigrants was being directed would have to deal. Financial difficulties, such as the demands by various foreign governments for increasing sums of money to be presented at the time of the landing, the lack of shipping space, increasing restriction of entry permits, or the cancelling of such, increased extraordinarily the difficulties of emigration. In spite of these difficulties, 537,000 Jews were sent out of the country between the takeover of power and the deadline of 31 October 1941. Of these

starting Jan. 30, 1933, from Germany proper ca. 360,000
starting March 15, 1938, from Austria ca. 147,000
starting March 15, 1939, from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia ca. 30,000

The Jews themselves, or their Jewish political organizations, financed the emigration. In order to avoid that impoverised Jews be left behind, the principle was followed that wealthy Jews have to finance the emigration of poor Jews; this was arranged by imposing a suitable tax, *i.e.*, an emigration tax, which was used for financial arrangements in connection with the emigration of poor Jews and was imposed according to income.
Appendix

Irgun ’s Offer to Cooperate

The main thrust of the National Military Organization (NMO) in Palestine’s (Irgun Zevai Leumi) proposal for solving the Jewish question in Europe, and for actively participating on Germany ’s side in the war.

“Germany’s leading National Socialist statesmen have in comments and speeches more than once emphasized that a New Order in Europe requires a radical solution of the Jewish question through evacuation (‘Judenreines Europa’).

The evacuation of the Jewish masses from Europe is a prerequisite for solving the Jewish question, which is possible only by resettling these masses in the homeland of the Jewish people, Palestine, and by establishing the Jewish State in its historic boundaries.

To solve the Jewish problem in this way and once and for all to liberate the Jewish people is the aim of the political activity and the ongoing struggle of the Israeli freedom movement, the National Military Organization in Palestine (Irgun Zevai Leumi).

The NMO, which knows full well the good will of the Reich government and its authorities toward Zionist
activity in Germany and toward Zionist emigration plans, is of the opinion that

1. a commonality of interest could exist between the interests of a new order in Europe according to the German concept, and the true national aspirations of the Jewish people as they are embodied by the NMO;

2. cooperation between the new Germany and a renewed folkish-national Jewry would be possible; and

3. the establishment of the historic Jewish state on a national and totalitarian basis, bound by treaty with the German Reich, would be in the interest of maintaining and strengthening Germany’s future position as a power in the Near East.

Proceeding from these considerations, the NMO in Palestine, under the condition that the above-mentioned national aspirations of the Israeli freedom movement be recognized by the German Reich, offers to actively take part in the war on Germany’s side.

This offer by the NMO, which could include activity in the military, political and information fields in Palestine and, after certain organizational preparations, outside Palestine, would be linked with the military training and organization of Jewish manpower in Europe, under the leadership and command of the NMO, in military units that would play a combat role in the conquest of Palestine, should that become a front.

The indirect participation of the Israeli freedom movement in the New Order in Europe, already in the preparatory stage, in connection with a positive-radical solution of the European Jewish problem in the sense of the above-mentioned national aspirations of the Jewish
people, would extraordinarily strengthen the moral basis of the New Order in the eyes of all humanity.\footnote{52}

The cooperation of the Israeli Freedom Movement would be in line with the last speech given by Chancellor Mr Hitler, that he would employ any combination and coalition in order to isolate and beat England.”

\footnote{52 This rather complicated sentence, put in clearer language, states: German Jewish politics, \textit{i.e.}, the expulsion of Jews from Germany, is possibly immoral in the eyes of the world. It would gain moral justification if through this expulsion a Jewish state came into being. The results justify the means, or: What isn’t permitted for the Germans is welcome support for Jewish nationalists in their battle, and therefore justified.}
A Brief Overview of the Origins, Nature and Activity of the NMO in Palestine

The NMO arose in part out of the Jewish self-defense force in Palestine and the Revisionist movement (New Zionist Organization), with which the NMO remained in a loose union facilitated by Vladimir Jabotinsky until his death.

The pro-British attitude of the revisionist organization in Palestine made a renewal of the union impossible, and resulted in a split in the fall of that year.

The aim of the NMO is to establish the Jewish state within its historic borders.

In contrast to all other Zionist movements, the NMO rejects infiltration of the colony as the only means of achieving occupation and gradual settlement of the Fatherland, and proclaims as its motto that struggle and sacrifice are the only true means by which to conquer and liberate Palestine.
Through its militant character and its anti-British attitude, and because of the constant persecution of the British administration, the NMO was forced to conduct its political activities and the military training of its members in secret.

The NMO, whose terrorist activity had already begun in the fall of 1936, gained prominence in the summer of 1939, after the British White Paper was published, through its intensified terrorist attacks and sabotage of British property. At that time the press of virtually the entire world reported and discussed this activity, as well as the [NMO’s] daily clandestine radio broadcasts. Until the outbreak of war, the NMO maintained independent political offices in Warsaw, Paris, London, Geneva, and New York.

The Warsaw office was mainly concerned with the military organization and training of the national Zionist youth. It was in close contact with the Jewish masses, which, especially in Poland, enthusiastically followed the NMO’s struggle in Palestine and supported it in every way possible. Two newspapers published by the NMO appeared in Warsaw: *Die Tat* and *Jerozalima wseljona*.

The Warsaw office also maintained close contact with the pre-war Polish government and with military circles that regarded the aims of the NMO with interest and favor. Hence, in 1939, groups of NMO members traveled from Palestine to Poland, where they were quartered in barracks and their military training perfected under Polish officers.

Negotiations between the NMO and the Polish government in Warsaw aimed at actualizing and concretizing their assistance were terminated due to the outbreak of the war. Documentation of this will be easy to find in the archives of the pre-war Polish government.

In its worldview and structure the NMO is closely related to the European totalitarian movements.
The ruthless defense measures of the British administration, the Arabs, and the Jewish socialists have at no time sufficed to weaken or to paralyze the NMO’s fighting ability.
Affidavit by Dr. Ernst Marcus, Manager of Paltreu

The following affidavit on the emigration policy of the German government under Hitler was written in 1946 by the German Jew and lawyer Dr. jur. Ernst Marcus, who between 1933 and 1939 was the deputy chairman of the Paltreu (Palästina Treuhandstelle zur Beratung deutscher Juden G.m.b.H.; Palestine Escrow Agency for Counseling German Jews, Ltd.). This agency financed the emigration of German Jews to Palestine by offsetting the costs with German exports. As such, Marcus had close contacts within the German Departments of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, to the German industry and to various Zionist organizations. In 1939 he emigrated to Palestine, but in 1951 he returned to Germany.

The following text is a translation of a document existing as a carbon copy on thin copying paper, making text typed on the reverse shine through. Page three is not a copy but an original, though, and was obviously written with a different typewriter without umlauts. Whether the text is authentic remains to be verified. Page 11 of this document was typed on twice, with a line shift. One line was typed over completely, making it illegible.

Caution is advised when Dr. Marcus comments on issues beyond his immediate realm of experiences. In some cases his views are clearly wrong, as noted in footnotes.

Source: Yad Vashem Archive, Item ID 3549156; Record Group O.1 (Ball-Kaduri Collection), File No. 11.

On Marcus see Röder/Strauss (ed.), p. 474.
Translation

The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in the Years 1933-1939
by
Dr. ERNST MARCUS
(written in the year 1946)

I. When, with the “seizure of power” on 3 January 1933, the hour struck which made the leader of National Socialism chancellor of the German Reich, the big terrible ordeal approached, and not only for German Jewry. There seemed no doubt that, according to his program, Hitler would handle the Jewish question in a global scope and make an attempt to find a solution along his lines. What role would Zionism and Palestine play in this? Which attitude would German foreign policy, directed by Hitler, take towards the Jewish National Home in Palestine? How would the question of emigration of German Jews to Palestine be treated?

When, in the fall of 1933, I re-entered the rooms of the building at Wilhelmstrasse 75 for the first time since the fall of the Weimar Republic, the transfer agreement between the Jewish agencies in Palestine and the Ministry of Commerce had been signed by Mr. E.S. Hoofia. The transfer companies Haavara and Paltreu had been established. As their representative and as a representative of those interests of the Palestine Office which led to the creation of an appropriate organization for emigration and the continuous transfer of people and capital to Palestine, I came once more into contact with the Orient Department. The first discussions on the foreign- and economic-policy aspects of our work began where Moritz Sobernheim, as “adviser for Jewish questions,”
had peacefully dwelled for more than a decade with his large library (many of his colleagues and the old allies were still in office). When I now look back on the history of the negotiations conducted by me between 1933 and 1939, I realize how valuable the knowledge of men and relationships was that I gathered in earlier years as an expert for mandate law and as a member of the “German Committee Pro Palestine” and the “German League for the League of Nations.” It was not a new beginning but a reunion with the Foreign Office.

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I knew well its old Prussian royal and German imperial history. I had frequently met personalities from the Foreign Office during the time of the Weimar Republic. Now I had to represent interests that made it necessary to first observe which direction the Palestinian policy of the Third Reich would take. The starting points for a National Socialist policy in relation to Palestine were:

a) Already in 1933 it became clear that Palestine represented the main receiving area for the emigration of Jews from Germany as desired by Hitler;
b) The national renaissance of the Jews in Palestine could not be ignored by National Socialism, even if the developing community remained small and was insignificant as a potential enemy;
c) The more the foreign policy of the German Reich transitioned to reintroduce Germany into the great game of the powers in the Middle East, the more it had to take a stance on Arab aspirations in Palestine.

However, during the first period of Hitler's rule it turned out that German foreign policy towards Palestine was extraordinarily restrained. That restraint was not abandoned until 1936. The reasons for this may have been multifari-
ous in nature. First, Hitler tried to initially give the impression that his regime would not disrupt the continuity of German foreign policy, and especially would not work against British interests. – However, continuity of German foreign policy in the Palestinian question meant compliance with the line that had not been abandoned by the Foreign Office since the first emergence of the Palestinian issue in world politics. Wilhelm II, who for romantic reasons, as is known, did not look unfavorably upon Herzl’s proposals for Germany to become a protective power over a Jewish homeland to be established in Palestine,

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was held back by von Buelow and Marschall. Maintaining the status quo in the Arab provinces of Turkey remained a fundamental principle of the Wilhelmstrasse until 1916. One need only read the German declaration of 1917 on the Jewish developmental work in Palestine, formulated with extreme caution, which was based on Zionist negotiations in Berlin and Constantinople, to realize that Jagow did not want to deviate from Marschall. After Palestine had been separated from the Turkish realm due to the peace treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne, and after it had become a British mandate, the Foreign Office behaved passively in the Palestine question. Nothing changed even when, after the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, a German member – Councilor Kastl from the Reich Union of German Industry – was appointed to the mandate commission. Kastl, who was an economist and had hardly any interest in foreign policy, intervened little in the discussions between the commission and the mandatary power. – Although Rathenau and Stresemann, as Foreign Secretaries, made statements on
the Palestine question, they did not change the cautious, benevolent attitude towards Jewish plans in Palestine. The actual work was done in the Oriental Department under the direction of Privy Councilor Pruefer, and in the Department for Jewish Affairs, which was established during the war of 1914 and staffed with Legation Councilor Professor Moritz Sobernheim and later with Professor Eugen Mittwoch.

It is a known fact that leading personalities of German foreign policy sympathized personally with the Zionist cause, and that they expressed this sympathy in the German Committee Pro Palestine. Meetings held on the occasions of the many visits by Dr. Weizmann in Germany were attended by many German diplomats. This circle included: the Secretaries of State von Schubert and von Buelow, Freiherr von Richthofen, Earl S. Bernstorff, Dr. Diekhoff, Privy Councilor Pruefer, et al.

II. When Hitler became chancellor, and right after that Jewish emigration began with feverish rapidity, the Palestinian Unit in the Wilhelmstrasse was staffed by Legation Councilor Schmidt-Roethe. The German consul general in Jerusalem was Dr. Wolff, married to a Jewess. Legation Councilor Schmidt-Roethe, earlier active in the Reich’s consular service and by disposition conservative and patriotic, soon found himself facing acute problems mainly concerning trade, economics and foreign exchange, but they also had to be examined under aspects of foreign policy. These included mainly transfer projects of various kinds, partly brought to Berlin by Jewish negotiators from Palestine through the mediation of Consul General Wolff. The largest of these projects was the
so-called Hanotea transfer,[53] based on the offer by Pardessim[54] to Jewish emigrants from Germany, who had to deposit the requisite amount in Reichsmarks. The resulting Reichsmark accounts were to be transferred by purchasing German merchandise. While the monetary and economic issues emerging from such projects were within the jurisdiction of the Reich Department of Commerce and the Reich Office for Foreign Exchange Control, the Foreign Office was interested in the repercussions which the settlement of many German Jews had on German foreign policy, on the trade situation in Palestine and the Middle East, and on the boycott movement against German goods in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The conviction of the advisors that emigration was indispensable, and that the creation of a firm framework for this emigration was also in Germany's interest, as well as the assumption of a favorable effect on German exports to the Middle East and against the boycott, led to the endorsement of the transfer agreement between the Reich Department of Commerce and the Jewish agencies in Palestine, which had been finalized by Mr. Hofien in the fall of 1933.

This agreement was a decisive step on the path of promoting an organized Jewish emigration to Palestine, while taking along assets in the long run. As such, the radical group among the NSDAP was deprived of an opportunity to let Jewish emigration take on chaotic forms, as ultimately happened in late 1938. In addition, the agreement was based on the fact that among all coun-

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[53] A company dealing in citrus trees.
[54] Jewish cooperatives.
tries, Palestine remained the preferred destination of emigration until the outbreak of war.

Schmidt-Roethe, a smart negotiator, swift in detecting problems and energetic in expressing his opinion about them, was extremely impulsive. I remember a discussion leading to a fierce dispute in early 1934, when he insisted on his opinion – based on Jewish reports from Palestine – that the transfer primarily served to promote Marxist institutions in Palestine, and that this was politically dangerous. The dispute was carried out by him with the greatest intensity and stridency, and it took a lot of calmness and steadfastness lest such outbreaks ended in a personal conflict. But Schmidt-Roethe was fair and respected the opinions of his interlocutors. A firm word, used at the right moment, brought him back to self-control. Above all, he respected the Jewish attitude toward the situation, and our attempts to handle it. His influence on the attitude of the Office in the years 1933 and 1934 is to be regarded as favorable.

The Berlin office based its position on reports which it received from the Jerusalem Consulate General. It proved to be quite valuable that Consul General Wolff was a staunch opponent of the NSDAP. He did not even bother to deny it. When I visited him in Jerusalem in early 1934 – as arranged by the Foreign Office – he was sitting in his office at his desk, turning his back to the Führer’s portrait which had been foisted upon him, and as soon as the conversation turned to the regime, he expressed himself with unreserved clarity. Had Hitler’s portrait had ears to hear, there would have been no telling what effect the curses would have had which the Consul Gen-
eral uttered. But it was not until about the end of 1935 that Berlin decided to change its representative in Jerusalem. The cooperation of the German Consulate General was very important for the promotion of Jewish emigration to Palestine, for the transfer of capital, and for the maintenance of imports of citrus fruits from Jewish Pardess cooperatives because the Consulate had the competence to express its expert opinion on all the information underlying our plans – and a hostile representative of the Reich would have been able to do us infinite harm. But even an indifferent and bureaucratic tardiness could at times, when quick decisions were needed, delay important actions until they lost their value. All this we were spared by Wolff’s sympathetic cooperation. This cooperation was at times very far-reaching. During my stay [in Palestine] in early 1934, the final form was established for the transfer of capital, which had been set up by Haavara and Paltreu as transfer companies after the aforementioned agreement of August 1933 had been reached. During that time, hardly a telegram or a report by the consul general was sent to Berlin that had not been discussed with me. Through personal helpfulness, Wolff did everything in his power in order to compensate in his field of work for the consequences of German policy with regard to the Jewish problem. During those days, I have often warned him to be more careful with his statements to strangers about the regime. He never heeded these warnings. It was therefore not surprising that he was eventually made to resign and simply retire. His fate could easily have been much worse.

Two German personalities should be mentioned here that played an important role in Palestine affairs at that time: the old consul Timotheus Wurst, Senior of Palestine-
Germans and director of the Templar Bank, and Dr. Schnei-
der, managing director of the German Oriental Society.
Wurst belonged to the old generation of Palestine-
Germans, who are mostly descendants of the peasantry
of Swabia and who settled in Palestine as early as two
generations ago. They had remained culturally linked to
Germany without paying much attention to political de-
velopments in Germany. Wurst himself, who was al-
ready in his seventies in 1934, had never seen Germany
until 1933. In 1933 he made his first trip to Germany,
where he was mesmerized not by Berlin, but by his
southern German homeland. He had no inclination to-
ward or appreciation for National Socialism. He also
could not find any meaning in the development that had
led to Hitler, since he had neither seen Wilhelmine Ger-
many nor the Germany of the Weimar Republic. But
now the Third Reich was a fact to be reckoned with, and
the quiet house on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv Road in Tel Aviv,
hidden behind garden walls and trees, which was
Wurst’s office building, admitted a growing stream of
applicants for visas and certificates, and Wurst accom-
modated them generously. Particularly important, how-
ever, was Wurst’s position as director of the Bank of the
Templar Society. Because this bank – the only German
bank in Palestine – was the correspondent bank of the
Reichsbank, and as such it assumed various functions
within the capital transfers of the Transfer Agreement.
Thus the bank’s business suddenly took an unexpected
upturn, not only due to administering the so-called spe-
cial accounts, but also because of the important com-
mercial and currency transactions carried out or approved by
the transfer companies Haavara and Paltreu. It was primarily to Wurst’s credit that the Bank's operations with the Jewish authorities were carried out correctly and without friction. But above all, he showed impartiality and discretion, when he showed up in Berlin every year, together with Jewish and Arab representatives of the citrus-export cooperatives and farmers, in order to negotiate with the Department of Commerce issues like import quota and payment conditions for Palestinian citrus fruits to Germany. The last time he called me in my office in Berlin in 1939, he began the conversation flustered and without greetings. I sensed that something was wrong. Later he came to see me and apologized. He spoke from the rooms of the representative of the NSDAP’s foreign organization, and was therefore “under surveillance.” His dejection was sincere. He did not feel comfortable among Nazi officials.

In 1933, Dr. Schneider was a leading member of the German Oriental Society, later serving the I.G. Farben Trust in Germany, and finally president of the German Oriental Society. Since the first days under Hitler he tried to exert influence on his Palestine politics. He was a man of a different kind. As a party member belonging to the younger generation of smart businessmen and politicians who had brought the National Socialist regime to notice, he based his expert knowledge about Palestine on just one short visit in 1933. Ever since, in an attempt to assert himself, he repeatedly surfaced when in this context matters of foreign policy or economics were negotiated in Berlin. He was pretentious and scheming, and therefore quite a dangerous opponent in the Berlin milieu, which was difficult as such. Schneider was in touch
with Jewish personalities and groups in Palestine, which were partly commercial in nature. Above all, Hanotea’s transfer projects relied on him, and he represented them to the Berlin authorities. Although Schneider outwardly exhibited a friendly attitude, I have never doubted that he played a duplicitous role.

One incident from the early period of Palestine policy deserves to be mentioned for reasons of curiosity. One day – I think in February 1934 – I was called by the Foreign Office and asked by Legation Councilor Schmidt-Roethe to join an urgent meeting. Dr. Schmidt-Roethe informed me that Reich Minister Frick, who had just married, was about to embark on a cruise through the Mediterranean on a Hapag steamer, and that he intended to disembark in Palestine. The Foreign Office, which found out about this plan only recently, had vainly warned about the dangers coming with a visit to Palestine. This warning was not respected, and Frick had not changed his dispositions. He – Schmidt-Roethe – therefore decided to inform me confidentially about this in view of the importance of the matter and the serious complications that would arise for the German Jews if anything were to happen to Reich Minister Frick, and he asked me to do everything in my power to prevent an action from the Jewish side against Frick. I replied that the Office’s warning to Frick was certainly justified. For my part, I wanted to pass on this message to the Jewish Agency, which would certainly recognize the danger caused by Frick. I could not know, however, what they could or wanted to do about it, and in any case I would have to point out that my acceptance of the notice given to me
could in no way burden the Jewish side with responsibility should unpleasant events occur. After this promise had been given, I spoke first with Captain Foley of the British Embassy who in his capacity as passport officer already knew about Frick’s intended disembarkation in Palestine. The British Embassy had informed the Foreign Office immediately, and they forwarded this to the Colonial Office. From there, the high commissioner had probably been notified regarding safety measures. For my part, I then issued a special communication to the Jewish Agency abroad. When I myself arrived in Palestine shortly afterwards, I heard that Frick had gone ashore in Palestine with a tour group of the Hapag steamship Milwaukee, had made the usual sightseeing tour of the Christian holy sites, and had finally dined at the King David Hotel, when incidentally Dr. Weizmann was also having lunch with his party at another table. Frick had then left the country without incident. I sighed with relief, because an incident back then could have affected the German Jews far worse than they were affected later by the vom Rath affair. Many thousands were still in Germany who by November 1938 had already emigrated.

Legation Councilor Schmidt-Roethe was replaced by Privy Councilor Pilger as advisor for Palestine, who later was ambassador in Kabul. Pilger did not have the stormy temper of his predecessor, and none of the many conversations which

I had with him was anything but calm and orderly. He was one of those diplomats who exhibit an attitude like a public official and avoid to comment recognizably on questions put forward to them. For example, as long as
Pilger held that position, he never took the initiative in any matter relating to Palestine. However, it must be acknowledged that he handled all matters submitted to him with great objectivity and accuracy, and that he never refused to help, if he was asked. Having been particularly interested in economic issues following his inclination, Pilger was personally familiar with the economy of the Middle East, since his father-in-law was director of Siemens Orient in Cairo and played a major role among the Germans in Egypt.

III. Privy councilor Pilger finally left this office and went as an envoy to Afghanistan, and he was succeeded by a personality whose mentality was the opposite of Pilger’s: Envoy Werner Otto von Hentig. Whoever saw Pilger sit broadly and gravely, distantly and properly at his desk, talking and smiling measuredly, lost in phlegmatic calm, and who then met the new advisor – this slender, toned, lanky man with the clean-cut face, eyes flashing, his swift way to comprehend and speak, to comment briefly and passionately, to give free rein to his volcanic temperament – he knew that not merely a new advisor had made his entry into the room with the red plush furnishings and the gilded backrests of the fin de siècle, but a new spirit. It was this man who was to experience with us the fateful hours of 1938 and 1939, without us or him suspecting at the time what the management of this office would entail, when I went to see him for the first time.

Because – truly – Hentig had not been put in that position in order to deal with Jewish affairs. He had been active in foreign diplomatic services in the Netherlands and in South America before returning to the Wilhelmstrasse, and he had turned out to be an inconvenience. His criti-
cal attitude toward the Hitler regime was known. On the other hand, he had experience and skills that could not be discarded. During the First World War, he had led the German expedition to Afghanistan as a young attaché and officer, and during the last year of the war he had been an attaché at the German Embassy in Constantinople. He knew the countries and mastered the languages of the Middle East. The German Foreign Services could boast of only a few people of this kind. Already at our first meeting it became clear that not much needed to be explained to Hentig. It turned out that, while serving under Bernstorff in Constantinople, he had dealt with the Zionist issue and had participated in the pertinent negotiations. Later he had also seen and heard Weizmann in Berlin on occasion and had been deeply impressed by him, as he related. Since he himself was a man deeply permeated by the spirit of his people and the love of his nation, he seriously understood the driving forces of Zionism as an element related to his own perception. Most important, it was also the experimental, the daring aspect that attracted him, and which made the researcher in him (which he was more than a diplomat), with his urge for the adventurous and the new, a friend of our cause. [double-typed, illegible line ...] and encouraging. We talked openly to each other, got to know the world where every one of us was deeply embedded, and we knew we could trust each other. Already the second encounter led to a practical test. Because in the Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, where the Gestapo had found lodgings in the vast spaces of the former Museum of Decorative Arts, a young man had appeared, smart and quick, of the type which had
liberated themselves of sentimentality – as the gentlemen themselves frequently said – in order first to rule Germany and then the entire world. This promising young man, of whom to say more there is no room here, was still unknown at that time. He even loved to remain anonymous and considered mentioning his name in addition to his official title “Herr Kommissar” as an unauthorized insult. He later grew to become the absolute master of the Jews in Vienna and Prague, a big plunderer and mass murderer, who finally, at the end of his career, disappeared without a trace. But back then the name Eichmann did not mean anything to us yet. At the time when Hentig took office, Eichmann was also about to

introduce himself to us, and so it happened that I, on the morning of one day when I had an appointment at the Foreign Office, was ordered by phone to show up very early, as was customary, at Gestapo headquarters and to stay there until the evening. All that happened on that remarkable day yields a wealth of substance for anecdotes. Although this kind of presence at the Gestapo headquarters evidently does not exactly improve one’s life, this time even Eichmann had to endure a surprise. At 10 o’clock in the morning he had haughtily denied me permission to attend my appointment with Mr. von Hentig, for which I requested leave, and he had forced me to cancel it by phone in a rude manner following his script – but without giving a reason. In fact, he had used the incident as a welcome opportunity to make all contacts of the Reich Departments with us contingent upon his prior authorization. On the evening of the same day, however, he had become soft and polite. He knew nothing anymore about the aforementioned refusal and de-
clared that he would never do anything to interfere with my negotiations with the Reich Departments. When I visited von Hentig the next morning in order to apologize, he told me with a smile what had happened. Herr Eichmann had in turn confronted Hentig by phone, asking him how he dared to arrange a meeting with me, and had received the answer, how he dared to disturb Hentig in his official duties. The thing then went via the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, with whom Hentig immediately filed a formal complaint, to the head of the Gestapo, from whom Eichmann got a reprimand in turn. From then on, Eichmann remained distinctly polite toward me, but I knew that he would never forget my debut. No one would have dared such a clash with a member of S.D., except Hentig. For him it was nothing but a matter of course that he opposed an attack.

IV. Incidents from the years 1937 to 1939 which ought to be mentioned, because they were either characteristic as such or had substantial results, were:

– Hitler’s personal involvement in the treatment of the Palestine question,
– the “Milch conflict”
– Hentig’s attitude in September 1938
– during “the days of November 1938”

One might have thought that Hitler would have shown a personal interest in a Jewish national home in Palestine, either deciding to fight the national renaissance of the Jews in Palestine, or trying to include them in his plans to eliminate the Jews. However, until 1937 no statement by the Führer was known that hinted in one direction or the other. It was a political fact that the top German authorities not only tolerated the emigration of Jews to Pal-
estimated, but encouraged it by granting transfer opportunities and other measures. There existed also a number of statements by various government departments indicating that emigration to Palestine was preferred over emigration especially to Germany’s neighboring countries, and that the German authorities did not consider the development process in Palestine as detrimental to the interests of the Third Reich. But the Führer himself had expressly mentioned Palestine only once, in a speech he delivered in 1933. Since then he had remained completely silent on this point – which was quite unusual for Hitler. In the 1933 speech, he said roughly that England was impeding the integration of the Jews, while Germany lets them emigrate, and even gives them the £1000 required for immigrating to Palestine. It was then inferred that he was in favor of the Jews immigrating to, and integrating into, Palestine. It was then evident that the German officials of all departments and top authorities dealing with the individual cases – including the young, national socialist generation – showed no hostility against the Zionist cause. My years of experience in dealing with all kinds of civil servants involved proved to me that a commitment to the Jewish nation and its goals in Palestine, combined with an upright and frank attitude when dealing with them, commanded their respect, and that they most notably also understood the Jews’ desire for freedom and an independent existence as a nation, and observed the details with interest. On the other hand, there was a small minority

of National Socialists, consisting of outright criminals who wanted to destroy everything that could be destroyed, and of those stupid subordinate officials who
were spiteful because the matter was beyond their capacity – inclined to destroy the physical and psychological livelihoods of the Jews, however and wherever they could.

The first sign that something was going on behind the scenes could be seen right after the publication of the Peel Commission’s recommendations [7 July 1937]. Suddenly the ongoing transfer negotiations with the Reich Department of Commerce stalled, and with other authorities previously nonexistent obstacles appeared as well. Initially nothing precise could be found out about the reason. From remarks it could be inferred, however, that Hitler himself had made negative statements that spread throughout the departments. Herr von Hentig clarified this by calling me over and telling me that the reasons for the Führer’s new attitude were to be found in the fact that Hitler was worried about the proposed creation of a Jewish state in one part of Palestine as a result of the partition plan. He considered such a state as the second Vatican, which could become a spiritual center for a Jewish world conspiracy. He was encouraged in this view by Goebbels. Under such circumstances, the Führer wanted to cause difficulties for the formation of the Jewish state rather than supporting the national home with people and money by way of Jewish emigration from Germany. This statement showed that the situation was very serious. Even externally Hitler’s worries could be noticed. When Lord Halifax had come to Berlin on a special mission, Hitler asked him at the beginning of the first conversation, and to Halifax’s surprise, about the Jewish state in Palestine – a question that Halifax answering by saying: This matter is decided by the League of Nations, not by the United Kingdom. But the question
itself was symptomatic. While important issues for the relations between the powers were to be discussed, Hitler posed this question at the very beginning, and it seemed at first as if he could not be dissuaded from pursuing the matter further. Such was the situation as presented to me by Hentig. His advice was to prepare suitable material in order to prove that both the number of Jewish emigrants from Germany to Palestine as well as their financial contribution to the formation of the Jewish homeland was too small to influence the development in Palestine decisively. So I worked out a memorandum that emphasized the share of Polish Jewry in the development process in all relevant details, described the financial contribution of American Jewry, and put this in relation to the small contribution of German Jewry. This memorandum was revised by a young official of the economic section of the Foreign Office, which was under the direction of Gerhart Clodius, who later became known for his economic negotiations with the Balkan countries. I had a series of meetings with this official, during which the contents of the memorandum were discussed, and finally a “Report by the Foreign Office to Hitler“ emerged from the material provided to that office. The objective of this activity was to preserve the Jewish emigration and the transfer of capital from Germany to Palestine. The described development of the second half of 1937 relates to a period during which I was tormented day and night by the knowledge of the fateful events occurring behind the scenes. Every moment could bring the news that closed the still-open gate to Palestine, and – given the lack of emigration opportunities to other coun-
tries – condemned thousands of German Jews to remain within the borders of Germany. The daily work, however, was not to show any trace of this anguished tension neither toward the emigrating audience nor to the authorities, who were not informed about the background of the existing uncertainty relating to the emigration to Palestine.

Back then, Herr von Hentig made many an effort over many months to finally bring about a definite decision by Hitler in favor of emigration to Palestine. This should have happened when the above-mentioned report was presented in the Reich Chancellery. Then the situation should have been presented to the Führer personally. It was very instructive to see how such a move had to be prepared with Hitler. When the so-called Weimar system collapsed in Germany, many capable, non-partisan officials in Germany’s top authorities breathed a sigh of relief, because they believed they had been rescued from the wheels of an extremely cumbersome parliamentary legislative machine and the related parliamentary system of government.

They were inclined to believe that now the way was free for independent and uninhibited work and quick decisions. This illusion had since disappeared. How much this was justified was shown all too clearly by the case at hand. Because according to his habit of not reading any reports, and of not committing in writing, this report could not be presented to Hitler through office channels either. Instead one had to try to get the matter submitted by persons from the leading group of the NSDAP who at that time were on good terms with Hitler, and during a “favorable moment”, i.e. at a moment when he was in an
accessible mood. Such an exertion was not exceptional at all. There was no other way to bring a matter to a definitive solution by the head of the Reich. Just as many months of difficulties ensued with all authorities concerned regarding emigration to Palestine because for reasons of trepidation they did not dare take any responsibility without a Führer decision, so the government machinery faltered in many cases. For each official, however high his rank may have been, had to fear being suddenly not just reversed but also to fall victim to an intrigue, if someone else played off connections to the highest level against him.

This situation therefore lasted until 1938, when one day Herr von Hentig phoned and asked me to come to the office, where he told me that the Führer’s decision had been positive and that nothing stood in the way of continuing emigration to Palestine. It was a very funny scene at Reich Department of Commerce, when the good news was reverentially conveyed to me a short while later about the highest decision making, for the clerks knew nothing of my activity at Wilhelmstrasse. But in fairness to these gentlemen it has to be said that they were absolutely innocent, and that they merely missed the comedy of the events surrounding their dictator.

At about the same time the Woodhead Report was released which, as is known, abandoned the Peel Commission’s partition plan, and I still remember the tone of voice with which Hentig told me on the phone that the leadership of the Reich had now been relieved of their grave worries which had arisen from the seemingly imminent establishment of a Jewish state.
V. The fateful days of Evian were approaching. The certain prospect of war was crucial for the situation of the Jews. A brief respite could save them. A catastrophe they could not survive. We worked to save what could still be saved of German Jewry. Each organization submitted their own memorandum. Secretaries of the British and American Jewish organizations sat at the conference table as economic experts, although they had neither the expertise nor did they know the means needed to implement the projects. When the old trees of Evian cast their shadows over Lake Geneva in the evening and the lights of the casino were turned on, I was overcome by pain about this desperate situation, and I could no longer laugh. Soon the attitude of “every man for himself” would put an end to all work. The course of the Evian Conference, the pressed haste with which the Jewish organizations had to present their explanations to their memoranda in just a few minutes to the Conference President Lord Wintertur, because it is needless to say that some 30 delegations could not be heard at length, was the unwinding of a tragedy, with extermination as a certain result. The gates had closed in front of us.

Within Germany, the lack of results of Evian had the consequence that the groups of the party and the Gestapo which so far had been restrained with difficulty gradually gained the upper hand over those who preferred an orderly emigration of the Jews to the outbreak of chaos within the Jewish community. The relationship between the end of Evian and November events is unmistakable. For the November events were nothing more than an attempt by the radical wing of the party to solve the Jewish
question in their own way. Auschwitz, Treblinka, etc. were then further steps.

Of the many individual episodes from the turbulent years 1936-1939, one shall be described which was very typical for the atmosphere at the Foreign Office. Until 1936 there was, as far as foreign policy came into play, calmness in the Palestine issue, and potentially existing differences between Jews and Germans in Palestine did not come to Berlin to be resolved. In Palestine itself Consul General Wolff and Consul Wurst both contributed their share to nip the threat of conflict in the bud.

This state changed quickly after Dr. Döhle had been appointed Consul General in Jerusalem in 1936, replacing Dr. Wolff. Dr. Döhle came from Paris, where he had worked for a decade at the embassy as an economic attaché. He was a former democrat, and competing with party members for the position in Jerusalem, he prevailed due to support by those who wished to have a moderate individual at a post which was at the focus of so much tension. When I met Döhle for the first time, who was introduced to me by Herr von Hentig at the hotel “Kaiserhof” in Berlin so that I could inform him about the problems of his new sphere of activity, I had the pleasant impression of an objective, especially economically interested, and in any case utterly unprejudiced man. While this impression still persisted until Döhle left Berlin, another side of his personality surfaced immediately after his arrival in Jerusalem. It seemed as if he wanted show that a “new wind” was blowing in the Consulate General, maybe due to the influence of local Nazis and the foreign organization of the NSDAP, which back then, headed by
Bohle,\textsuperscript{55} competed with the Foreign Office before it was integrated into it. For example, this could be sensed from reports resulting from his first encounters with Jewish personalities in Palestine. They reported a rude and hostile behavior. In the press this soon showed up as well. Suddenly a wire of the \textit{Völkische Beobachter} from Palestine, about which all Berlin offices laughed, described how – during a battle between Arab insurgents and British troops – all the cars stopped on the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem, except for the car of the German Consul General, which drove with a fluttering swastika flag on the hood through the combat zone. It was clear that the Consul General wished to perform a “heroic act.” Then things got more serious. The radical Nazis among the Palestine Germans and their close friends within the NSDAP’s foreign organization needed an incident. The pretext seemed given when Tel Aviv dairymen ceased purchasing products from the German agricultural settlement Wilhelma, which thus far had been sold in the market of Tel Aviv. The Consul General intervened, and the Foreign Office demanded that the transfer of emigrants be interrupted until this issue was settled. When I was informed about this matter, I replied to Herr von Hentig that the transfer agencies had no influence on the dairymen of Tel Aviv, that even any influence by the Jewish Agency would be doubtful. Moreover, this was, in my opinion, an internal matter of the mandate area of Palestine.

\textsuperscript{55} Between 1933 and 1945, Ernst Wilhelm Bohle was head of the NSDAP/AO, the NSDAP’s organization in foreign countries.
Some of the ethnic Germans involved were themselves citizens of that area. The matter could therefore hardly be dealt with in Berlin. Hentig, who had grasped the situation beforehand, then opted for a personal talk, for which Döhle and Wurst were ordered to come to Berlin. A joint meeting was held at the Foreign Office, which, in addition to yours truly, was also attended from the Jewish side by Dr. Siegfried Moses and by Dr. Senator, who happened to be in Berlin. An agreement was reached quickly – and the settlement of the matter was a textbook example of how good will can stamp out the spark that was about to ignite the powder keg. Because blowing up the powder was the desire of Döhle’s furtive men in Palestine, where there was already a Gauleiter Herr Schwarz with his promising scion who was later seconded to Berlin for special duty. Schwarz senior, small and bent, was certainly not a Siegfried figure. When he entered, decked in his party badges, and raised his arm in greeting, everyone was surprised that the party couldn’t find more imposing representatives. Schwarz preferred the poison to the sword. In the spring of 1937, Assessor Dr. Williams from the Reich Department of Commerce, accompanied by me, visited Palestine on behalf of the Department. I can attest to the fact that he worked here restless-ly, literally day and night, to deal with the economic problems entrusted to him. He was denounced by this fine Party member in a special petition to the Reich Chancellery, among other things because on the Führer’s birthday, when Sarona[56] was festooned with swastika

[56] Name of the German Templar colony in Tel Aviv, Israel, which is now a neighborhood of the city.
flags, he dared visit the Jewish Agency, and he used to stay at a Tel Aviv hotel. Williams, an indefatigable and intelligent official, but not an old party comrade, subsequently lost his position in the “foreign exchange” office at the Reich Department of Commerce.

VI. Regarding German foreign policy, the year 1937 showed all the characteristics of a transitional period from a restrained policy with evolutionary trends for the so-called policy of dynamics with revolutionary tendencies. As far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the situation had remained stable under the leadership of Neurath, and in the corridors of Wilhelmstrasse 75 and in its rooms still equipped with red plush furniture from the Kaiser era, one walked quietly and negotiated conventionally, while at the competing agency, the foreign organization in the Bendler Street, the jackboots clattered already and the “fifth column” took over. When Ribbentrop took over the Foreign Office in 1938, his staff, who had worked separately for some time, was integrated. The planned military buildup now progressed vigorously. The occupation of Austria was followed by the escalating Czech conflict. In August 1938, Germany was on the brink of war. The situation of the Jews in Germany deteriorated rapidly – especially since the Gestapo in Vienna had the opportunity, unmolested by the Berlin authorities with their restraints, to take the liquidation of the Jewish group in their own hands. Since March 1938 Herr Eichmann sat in the Rothschild Palace in Vienna and implemented his “conveyor-belt system,” of which he was inordinately proud. This system was that the applicant for a passport entered the building through the entry – not happy, but in possession of his assets. When he left the
building by the back door after a laborious walk through many rooms, his fortune was gone, but he had the passport. The Foreign Office in Berlin as well as the economic authorities opposed the Gestapo’s desire to extend this legal system to what had become the *Altreich*, the former Reich territory.

The line was clear which Herr von Hentig followed as a kind of special representative for Jewish affairs. All possible arguments that one could come up with in the field of foreign policy in order to prevent the creation of chaotic conditions in the Jewish question, as was the intention of both Party and Gestapo, were submitted over and over again to the executive. At short intervals, I had conferences in the office where the situation was discussed in detail.

At the end of September 1938, it seemed certain that war would break out. Herr von Hentig considered it inevitable as well. He observed with growing desperation how many German patriots recklessly steered the leadership into the disaster. He did not think there was a chance of success, if war should come. How grotesque the events were behind the scenes emerges from a fact which he told me. At the time of the Nuremberg Party Rally of 1938, the German ambassadors from the most important capitals who were present in Berlin, including the German envoy in Prague, received a prohibition from the Gestapo to personally approach the Führer.\(^{57}\) In their decisions, the senior leadership of the Reich was to be influenced by nobody. Under the prevailing circumstances, this meant that Hitler was not to be deflected from his will to war by any report by his diplomats.

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\(^{57}\) No doubt a grotesque and untrue rumor.
During the days of the highest tension, on September 27, 1938, I called on Herr von Hentig in order to discuss the treatment of a number of officials in the event of war, especially the possibility of emigrating to Palestine. It was about 7 o’clock in the evening. When I passed the new Reich Chancellery, which was only a few minutes’ walk away from the Foreign Office, they were working feverishly in the basement. I knew that the air-raid shelters for Hitler and his staff were being completed. In the office,

almost no one was present anymore. When I found Hentig, he was very excited. Contrary to his usual manner, he largely ignored the questions posed to him. I said nothing and waited, because I felt what was going on in him. – When he broke the silence, he revealed to me the secret of the conspiracy against Hitler, which was supposed to strike in the event of war, to spare Germany an unfortunate war.\[58\] He described how a closed circle of officers, officials and other personalities had taken the task upon themselves to eliminate the Reich leadership. They would prevail or fall. Their concern was only whether, even in case of a victorious conspiracy, which would cost a lot of blood, a sufficient number of them would still be left to form a new national leadership. I deeply sensed the passion of the emotional outbreak that had led to this revelation, and my heart was with Hentig and his friends who had the courage to take the risk.

\[58\] Here the truth comes to light: It was in fact not Hitler who strove for war – quite to the contrary – but rather the secret resistance, which aimed for war and promised to the western powers a putsch or even a popular insurrection in case of a war, thus stiffening their attitude toward justified German interests.
These were the same men who many years later, in July 1944, proceeded to act during an even more desperate situation. As Hentig ended, we were both silent, and shook hands – perhaps for the last time – with a glimmer of hope to experience the liberation. – About two days later it turned out that providence was with Hitler. The retreat of the western powers at the Munich conference on September 29 resulted in a huge success of his personal foreign policy. With this “bloodless” victory and the associated increase of the stature of Hitler's demonic person, any attempt to bring about a revolution in Germany by force had to be abandoned.\footnote{Which shows once more that and why the resistance was interested in a war.} – But no one who had not experienced the last days of September in Berlin as I did, can appreciate how moving the last few hours before and the first few hours after the Munich Conference were. There can be no doubt that at that time the Berlin population was deeply opposed to war. No enthusiasm could be sensed. Not even military parades through the streets, which used to impress the Berliners in general, could cause any visible change. The people hung their heads. During the last 24 hours before Munich, an atmosphere prevailed like after a disaster. Yet after the first message arrived about Munich, the faces lit up, and cheerfulness seized the city. Who was thinking about the Sudeten Land? Probably only a few. I must confess that I was shaken as well. On the morning of September 29, when the last Palestinian visitors left my office to go to Basel after I had given them some more instructions, at noon, when one more phone call came in

\footnote{Which shows once more that and why the resistance was interested in a war.}
from London, in the afternoon, when I was in the west of the city, I had

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the feeling of departing from life. Within a few hours our fate would be decided. (In the first night after the outbreak of war, rumors had it then, personalities considered subversive, including all Jewish functionaries, were to be shot.)\(^{60}\) – When the first phone calls came from London the next morning, the sober voices of my partners sounded like greetings from a new world – the world of peace and freedom. When I passed the Reich Chancellery again on my way back, I was aware of the burden of the secret that I knew and would never betray. Hitler did not suspect that, at the moment of decision on war and peace, just a few steps outside his door was waiting his doom, was rising his nemesis. Had the war erupted in September 1938, we German Jews, the hundreds of thousands who emigrated due to the November events, would have been the likely victims. But perhaps liberation would have taken place earlier, and Europe would have been spared some of the terrible years of the war of 1939.

The Western powers’ retreat changed the path. Hitler’s prestige rose unmeasurably.

VII. (The description of the November events belonging here is contained in a special contribution by Ernst Marcus) –

VIII. The consequence of the November events was especially that chaos reigned instead of a certain order in the handling of Jewish emigration from Germany, and the insight that the Jews [waiting for] visas and certificates

\(^{60}\) Obviously a false rumor, since nobody was arrested or even shot after the 1st of September 1939.
needed to be allowed a meager base to enable them to eke out a living until the emigration date. Vienna had become an example. The perfect organization of robbery with lightning speed which Eichmann had created in Vienna, the panicked flight of those who had received an unfeasibly short deadline to emigrate, even across closely guarded borders, this “success” of this Gestapo emigration policy became popular which began to move thousands to Shanghai or to small South American countries, whereas they would otherwise have waited for their visa to the USA or for their Palestine certificate. Didn’t this prove that the “strong hand,” which now took over the reins, was able to quickly and thoroughly solve the Jewish question in spite of all the difficulties, while the prudent measures of the departments couldn’t boast of such a complete success? One city after another announced proudly to be free of Jews! Homes of expelled Jews became available for Aryans. Furniture and other furnishings came onto the market for cheap. Valuable real estate was sold below value. The incessant pressure by the Gestapo which increased beginning in the summer of 1938, and aimed at bringing the emigration under the management of the State Police, led to the top authorities slowly giving way. But despite all that, it took until the end of the year before a Central Office for Jewish Emigration following the Viennese example and led by the Gestapo could be established in Berlin, and even then the transfer of assets remained unaffected. After the November events and the imposition of the levy of a billion Reichsmark, in association with the lock-down and the handing over of Jewish effects, real estate, home furnishings and equipment, desperation broke out in the respon-
sible offices of the government departments that had nothing to do with any of this. The regulations had been conceived and designed by the Police Department. – All affected markets were derailed; there was nothing left of a normal formation of prices and stock market values. Buyers were no longer available despite low prices. A thin class which bought goods enriched itself. The Reich Treasury was the ultimate beneficiary. Finally the banks, industry, and all other relevant economic groups protested in the same way. This initiative led to the Reich Department of Commerce trying to eliminate the worst effects, and to create certain reliefs in negotiations with us, which enabled the continuation of the emigration to Palestine and the transfer. Proposals were renewed on how the Jewish emigration could be facilitated on the condition that the German armament enterprises, esp. the Hermann Goering Werke,[61] would be financed with the help of Jewish bonds. It was difficult to determine who exactly was the first to come up with this idea. In any case, Schacht was working on such plans in conjunction with Max Warburg, and they were repeatedly brought up for discussion as major loan projects, like long-term mortgages to finance individual industrial projects, for instances refineries. The “Altreu”,[62] a transfer company that had been established in 1937 by Jewish representatives, representatives of the Reich, and the Zionist Asso-

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61 The Reichswerke Herman Göring was a steel-producing enterprise established in the course of Germany’s drive for autarky by exploiting hitherto-unprofitable iron-ore deposits near Salzgitter. Connection to rearmament arose only later.

62 “Allgemeine Treuhandstelle für die jüdische Auswanderung G. m. b. H.” (Altreu; General Fiduciary Agency for Jewish Emigration, Ltd.), established on May 24, 1937.
ciation for Germany, and which was to promote emigration to countries other than Palestine, dealt with projects of the described kind. – I did not have the opportunity to formulate a general rejection in such a strident way as the subject seemed to required. During

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unofficial meetings with officials of the Reich departments I nevertheless succeeded, by way of clarifying the difficulties and by asserting objections to certain aspects of economic nature, to impede the negotiations and to prevent them from ever reaching a conclusion.[63]

At this time, the atmosphere became more oppressive every day. However, it could not yet be determined when the outbreak of war would put a definitive end to our efforts to save the German Jews. But it could not be denied that the end was near. It was just a matter of preventing the collapse as long as possible and not burning the bridges, as long as survivors of the disaster could still use them. When Schacht visited the City of London exactly at this time in order to negotiate with Montague Norman, the head of the Bank of England, about loans connected to the liquidation of German Jews, while at about the same time the Commissioner for Jewish Emigration of the League of Nations, the American Professor MacDonald, who was visiting Berlin, was cut off from any contact with the Jewish organizations, the background of these events was hardly discernible even from behind the scenes. For example, Schacht’s visit to London could have been a covert maneuver, which in the intentions of the Germans was meant to prevent the City

[63] Here Marcus sabotages Jewish emigration!
from prematurely abandoning the policy of appeasement and to mitigate the impression left by the November pogrom, which was very strong in London. For the initiated, however, no doubt was possible. The ongoing efforts at work became more and more difficult, since not a single day passed which did not highlight the terrible situation of the German Jews in a dramatic way. Even in this dark hour, von Hentig’s brave helpfulness did not fail. The Wilhelmstrasse was within the area forbidden for Jews, and when Hentig offered to apply for a pass on my behalf, which would have made it possible for me to reach the Foreign Office, I rejected his offer. It seemed to me that the investigation by the security service, which would follow after the issuance of such a pass, was too dangerous for all concerned to risk getting such a pass. Thereupon Herr von Hentig moved our meetings with his typical decisiveness to his apartment in the Händelstrasse. At that time, Ernst Eisenlohr, the Reich’s last envoy in Prague, was liaison officer of the Foreign Office for Jewish Affairs, insofar as international organizations were involved. Through Hentig, an important channel to him existed. There were moreover reports on the conditions in the concentration camps, which I could convey to important German personalities through this channel, and effective steps for the release of Jewish functionaries who had been in custody since November 1938. Otto Hirsch was released back then in this way. – The old Tiergarten trees in the pale evening light of winter days – the dark doorway, which I studied very carefully before I entered the house, – then the typical, slightly formal interior of a Berlin Tiergarten home, and finally the vibrant activity of the
host who, supported by his spirited wife, did not lose his courage even in the worst days, and tried to alleviate our suffering with deep empathy – he felt the morbidity of the atmosphere, the demise of his – the other – Germany and his Europe, where his life was still worth living. It probably took intimate knowledge of the milieu in order to understand the tragedy of those people who could not leave Germany because they loved it, whereas Hitler's Germany instilled hatred and contempt in them.

When I left Berlin at end of March 1939 in order to immigrate to Palestine, I did not yet know that I would not return. On the morning of the day on which my plane took off at Tempelhof, Hitler had occupied Memel. The weapons rattled.\textsuperscript{64} The lights of the Amsterdam airport shone cheerfully through the evening mist. But worries were widespread in the city, and a few days later we saw Zurich in invasion panic.\textsuperscript{65}

The Orient seemed peaceful after such a departure from Europe. Although the repercussions of Germany’s “dynamic” foreign policy and of Italy’s neo-imperialism had long since set the Middle East on edge, and although the actions against the Jews in Germany and the immigration kept Jewish Palestine in constant commotion, those coming from Europe could feel that an ocean lay between them and the hot spots. At that time, German foreign policy no longer had the tendency to avoid, in deference to

\textsuperscript{64} The entirely German Memel area, which had been ceded to Lithuania after World War I against all international law, was peacefully and voluntarily given back to Germany in 1939 by Lithuania without any German pressure or initiative. Not a single shot was fired, and the Wehrmacht also never marched in to “occupy” it.

\textsuperscript{65} At no point in time did plans exist by any power to invade Switzerland. This remark merely proves Marcus’s war hysteria.
England, an open statement in favor of the Arab nationalist movements, even though an anti-British tone was usually still suppressed. The door between Germany and England had still not been slammed shut. But in addition to the activities of Italian agents, German actions could be sensed everywhere, although not initiated by the Foreign Office, but by the foreign organization of the NSDAP and other party sections. Supplies of arms and money were reaching all areas of the Middle East.

The German diplomats working in the Orient Department or the Orient organizations watched the new busyness with great apprehension. They had, after all, some experience with the Arabs from the World War of 1914, which were not the best. Dr. Grober in Baghdad and Hentig most certainly did not support an anti-British policy based on the Arabs, since the latter was generally inclined toward a western – Anglo-Saxon – orientation of German foreign policy. But their position was not strong enough to prevent foreign policy excesses by the Party in the East. In March 1939, the Foreign Office had delegated Herr von Hentig to do an inspection tour through the Middle East. He had to visit all German missions from Cairo to Ankara, a journey that led to the strangest observations by the British and British-oriented press about his person. This staunch opponent of Nazism, who was not in contact with any of its most important representatives, was called a friend and confidant of Göring, among other things. His surveillance was strikingly close. The role he had played in Central Asia during the war of 1914 had apparently not been forgotten in the Colonial Office.
In early May 1939 – immediately after he had officially arrived in Palestine and had been received by the High Commissioner – Hentig called me from the German consulate in Jaffa, and an hour later we met in the old garden of the consulate in the Jaffa-Tel Aviv Road. We left the consulate after a brief farewell to the old Consul Timotheus Wurst, who wore his spectacles on the tip of his nose as always. The types could hardly be more different than the stout, slow-moving Swabian Wurst and the stiff and tall Hentig, vibrant with energy. – Then suddenly the representative of the Party, the “Gauleiter of Palestine”, P[arty]C[omrade] Schwarz stood in front of us with medals and decorations, stretching his arm toward the sky. He had come to greet Hentig, and turned into a pillar of salt when he saw me leaving with Hentig, as he did with any other guest from Berlin. He did not notice the mocking welcome. His concern about Hentig, who said: “Oh, what a pity, I am just about to drive with Dr. Marcus to Tel Aviv”, darkened his face. That this hero – small, crooked, the archetype of a fairytale tailor – would embody the militant party members, increased the irony of the scene.

But even funnier was the face of my Tel Aviv taxi driver, who believed himself to have fallen among the Nazis and could be calmed down only with difficulty.

While I showed my guest the seaside of Tel Aviv, he told me about Cairo. There appeared during his stay no less a figure than Goebbels – surprisingly and without anyone knowing the motive for his visit. Hentig, whose feelings for the Reich Minister were clear, greeted him with the words: “It is a sign of great courage that you, Mr. Reich
Minister, will visit Palestine!” Goebbels, who had no intention of doing anything like that, but merely wanted to enjoy himself in Egypt, took that statement seriously and, feeling flattered, denied such a plan. The visit ended with a mishap. After his trip the world press announced that Dr. Goebbels, while in Cairo, had shopped almost exclusively in Jewish stores. Nobody knew who had instructed Goebbels’s tourist guides!

It was my last encounter with Hentig. His interest in the growing Jewish Palestine was great. The audacity of the Jewish endeavor, the experimental element, appealed to his nature. In all this he felt oppressed by the awareness of the German people’s responsibility for what Hitler was doing to the Jews. He felt a genuine friendship for us.

He used his mission, a component of German politics, to impede the wheel that was rolling downhill toward war. But he knew that the war was coming, and he hoped that it would liberate Germany from its bloody and ignominious regime.

My intention to show Hentig the Emek⁶⁶ – a journey which he would have made incognito, of course – had to be abandoned due to Arab raids along the roads. He left Palestine without having seen our settlements.

The farewell to him was also a farewell to “the other Germany” that fought a hopeless struggle against Hitler during the war, and which had its courageous representatives in Hentig and in other individuals of the Reich’s diplomatic corps.

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⁶⁶ Emek Yizra'el is a large fertile plain and inland valley south of the Lower Galilee region in today’s Israel.
Hentig is also quoted in the published diary of the executed ambassador Ulrich von Hasselt.

The End

Ernst Marcus
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HOLOCAUST HANDBOOKS

This ambitious, growing series addresses various aspects of the “Holocaust” of the WWII era. Most of them are based on decades of research from archives all over the world. They are heavily referenced. In contrast to most other works on this issue, the tomes of this series approach its topic with profound academic scrutiny and a critical attitude. Any Holocaust researcher ignoring this series will remain oblivious to some of the most important research in the field. These books are designed to both convince the common reader as well as academics. The following books have appeared so far, or are about to be released. Compare hardcopy and eBook prices at www.findbookprices.com.

SECTION ONE: General Overviews of the Holocaust

The First Holocaust. The Surprising Origin of the Six-Million Figure. By Don Heddesheimer. This compact but substantive study documents propaganda spread prior to, during and after the FIRST World War that claimed East European Jewry was on the brink of annihilation. The magic number of suffering and dying Jews was 6 million back then as well. The book details how these Jewish fundraising operations in America raised vast sums in the name of feeding suffering Polish and Russian Jews but actually funneled much of the money to Zionist and Communist groups. 5th ed., 198 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#6)

Lectures on the Holocaust. Controversial Issues Cross Examined. By Germar Rudolf. This book first explains why “the Holocaust” is an important topic, and that it is well to keep an open mind about it. It then tells how many mainstream scholars expressed doubts and subsequently fell from grace. Next, the physical traces and documents about the various claimed crime scenes and murder weapons are discussed. After that, the reliability of witness testimony is examined. Finally, the author lobbies for a free exchange of ideas about this topic. This book gives the most-comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the critical research into the Holocaust. With its dialog style, it is pleasant to read, and it can even be used as an encyclopedic compendium. 3rd ed., 596 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#15)

Breaking the Spell. The Holocaust, Myth & Reality. By Nicholas Kollerstrom. In 1941, British Intelligence analysts cracked the German “Enigma” code. Hence, in 1942 and 1943, encrypted radio communications between German concentration camps and the Berlin headquarters were decrypted. The intercepted data refutes the orthodox “Holocaust” narrative. It reveals that the Germans were desperate to reduce the death rate in their labor camps, which was caused by catastrophic typhus epidemics. Dr. Kollerstrom, a science historian, has taken these intercepts and a wide array of mostly unchallenged corroborating evidence to show that “witness statements” supporting the human gas chamber narrative clearly clash with the available scientific data. Kollerstrom concludes that the history of the Nazi “Holocaust” has been written by the victors with ulterior motives. It is distorted, exaggerated and largely wrong. With a foreword by Prof. Dr. James Fetzer. 4th ed., 261 pages, b&w ill., bibl., index. (#31)

Debating the Holocaust. A New Look at Both Sides. By Thomas Dalton. Mainstream historians insist that there cannot be, may not be a debate about the Holocaust. But ignoring it does not make this controversy go away. Traditional scholars admit that there was neither a budget, a plan, nor an order for the Holocaust; that the key camps have all but vanished, and so have any human remains; that material and unequivocal documentary evidence is absent; and that there are serious problems with survivor testimonies. Dalton juxtaposes the traditional Holocaust narrative with revisionist challenges and then analyzes the mainstream’s responses to them. He reveals the weak-
nesses of both sides, while declaring revisionism the winner of the current state of the debate. 2nd ed., 332 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#32)

The Hoax of the Twentieth Century: The Case against the Presumed Extermination of European Jewry. By Arthur R. Butz. The first writer to analyze the entire Holocaust complex in a precise scientific manner. This book exhibits the overwhelming force of arguments accumulated by the mid-1970s. Butz's two main arguments are: 1. All major entities hostile to Germany must have known what was happening to the Jews under German authority. They acted during the war as if no mass slaughter was occurring. 2. All the evidence adduced to prove any mass slaughter has a dual interpretation, while only the innocuous one can be proven to be correct. This book continues to be a major historical reference work, frequently cited by prominent personalities. This edition has numerous supplements with new information gathered over the last 35 years. 4th ed., 524 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#7)

Dissecting the Holocaust: The Growing Critique of "Truth" and "Memory." Edited by Germar Rudolf. Dissecting the Holocaust applies state-of-the-art scientific technique and classic methods of detection to investigate the alleged murder of millions of Jews by Germans during World War II. In 22 contributions—each of some 30 pages—the 17 authors dissect generally accepted paradigms of the "Holocaust." It reads as exciting as a crime novel: so many lies, forgeries and deceptions by politicians, historians and scientists are proven. This is the intellectual adventure of the 21st century. Be part of it! 2nd ed. 620 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#1)

The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry. By Walter N. Sanning. Six million Jews died in the Holocaust. Sanning did not take that number at face value, but thoroughly explored Eastern European population developments and shifts mainly caused by emigration as well as deportations and evacuations conducted by both Nazis and the Soviets, among other things. The book is based mainly on Jewish, Zionist and mainstream sources. It concludes that a sizeable share of the Jews found missing during local censuses after the Second World War, which were so far counted as "Holocaust victims," had either emigrated (mainly to Israel or the U.S.) or had been deported by Stalin to Siberian labor camps. 2nd ed., foreword by A.R. Butz, epilogue by Germar Rudolf containing important updates; 224 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography (#29).

Air Photo Evidence: World War Two Photos of Alleged Mass Murder Sites Analyzed. By Germar Rudolf (editor). During World War Two both German and Allied reconnaissance aircraft took countless air photos of places of tactical and strategic interest in Europe. These photos are prime evidence for the investigation of the Holocaust. Air photos of locations like Auschwitz, Majdanek, Treblinka, Babi Yar etc. permit an insight into what did or did not happen there. The author has unearthed many pertinent photos and has thoroughly analyzed them. This book is full of air photo reproductions and schematic drawings explaining them. According to the author, these images refute many of the atrocity claims made by witnesses in connection with events in the German sphere of influence. 5th edition; with a contribution by Carlo Mattogno. 168 pages, 8.5"x11", b&w illustrations, bibliography, index (#27).

The Leuchter Reports: Critical Edition. By Fred Leuchter, Robert Faurisson and Germar Rudolf. Between 1988 and 1991, U.S. expert on execution technologies Fred Leuchter wrote four detailed reports addressing whether the Third Reich operated homicidal gas chambers. The first report on Auschwitz and Majdanek became world famous. Based on chemical analyses and various technical arguments, Leuchter concluded that the locations investigated “could not have then, or now be, utilized or seriously considered to function as execution gas chambers.” The second report deals with gas-chamber claims for the camps Dachau, Mauthausen and Hartheim, while the third reviews design criteria and operation procedures of execution gas chambers in the U.S. The fourth report reviews Pressac’s 1989 tome Auschwitz. 4th ed., 252 pages, b&w illustrations. (#16)

The Giant with Feet of Clay: Raul Hilberg and His Standard Work on the “Holocaust.” By Jürgen Graf. Raul Hilberg’s major work The Destruction of European Jewry is an orthodox standard work on the Holocaust. But what evidence does Hilberg provide to back his thesis that there was a German plan to exterminate Jews, carried out mainly in gas chambers? Jürgen Graf applies the methods of critical analysis to Hilberg’s evidence and examines the results in light of modern historiography. The results of Graf’s critical
Jewish Emigration from the Third Reich. By Ingrid Weckert. Current historical writings about the Third Reich claim state it was difficult for Jews to flee from Nazi persecution. The truth is that Jewish emigration was welcomed by the German authorities. Emigration was not some kind of wild flight, but rather a lawfully determined and regulated matter. Weckert’s booklet elucidates the emigration process in law and policy. She shows that German and Jewish authorities worked closely together. Jews interested in emigrating received detailed advice and offers of help from both sides. 2nd ed., 130 pages, index. (#12)

Inside the Gas Chambers: The Extermination of Mainstream Holocaust Historiography. By Carlo Mattogno. Neither increased media propaganda or political pressure nor judicial persecution can stifle revisionism. Hence, in early 2011, the Holocaust Orthodoxy published a 400 pp. book (in German) claiming to refute “revisionist historiography,” trying again to prove “once and for all” that there were homicidal gas chambers at the camps of Dachau, Natzweiler, Sachsenhausen, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück, Neuengamme, Stutthof... you name them. Mattogno shows with his detailed analysis of this work of propaganda that mainstream Holocaust hagiography is beating around the bush rather than addressing revisionist research results. He exposes their myths, distortions and lies. 2nd ed., 280 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography. index. (#25)

SECTION TWO: Specific non-Auschwitz Studies

Treblinka: Extermination Camp or Transit Camp? By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. It is alleged that at Treblinka in East Poland between 700,000 and 3,000,000 persons were murdered in 1942 and 1943. The weapons used were said to have been stationary and/or mobile gas chambers, fast-acting or slow-acting poison gas, unslaked lime, superheated steam, electricity, diesel exhaust fumes etc. Holocaust historians alleged that bodies were piled as high as multi-storied buildings and burned without a trace, using little or no fuel at all. Graf and Mattogno have now analyzed the origins, logic and technical feasibility of the official version of Treblinka. On the basis of numerous documents they reveal Treblinka’s true identity as a mere transit camp. 2nd ed., 372 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography. index. (#8)

Belzec in Propaganda, Testimonies, Archeological Research and History. By Carlo Mattogno. Witnesses report that between 600,000 and 3 million Jews were murdered in the Belzec camp, located in Poland. Various murder weapons are claimed to have been used: diesel gas; unslaked lime in trains; high voltage; vacuum chambers; etc. The corpses were incinerated on huge pyres without leaving a trace. For those who know the stories about Treblinka this sounds familiar. Thus the author has restricted this study to the aspects which are new compared to Treblinka. In contrast to Treblinka, forensic drillings and excavations were performed at Belzec, the results of which are critically reviewed. 142 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography. index. (#9)

Sobibór: Holocaust Propaganda and Reality. By Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues and Carlo Mattogno. Between 25,000 and 2 million Jews are said to have been killed in gas chambers in the Sobibór camp in Poland. The corpses were allegedly buried in mass graves and later incinerated on pyres. This book investigates these claims and shows that they are based on the selective use of contradictory eyewitness testimony. Archeological surveys of the camp in 2000-2001 are analyzed, with fatal results for the extermination camp hypothesis. The book also documents the general National Socialist policy toward Jews, which never included a genocidal “final solution.” 442 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography. index. (#19)

The “Extermination Camps” of “Aktion Reinhardt”. By Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues and Carlo Mattogno. In late 2011, several members of the exterminationist Holocaust Controversies blog posted a study online which claims to refute three of our authors’ monographs on the camps Belzec, Sobibór and Treblinka (see previous three entries). This tome is their point-by-point response, which makes “mincemeat” out of the bloggers’ attempt at refutation. Caution: The two volumes of this work are an intellectual overkill for most people. They are recommended only for collectors, connoisseurs and professionals. These two books require familiarity with the above-mentioned books, of which they are a comprehensive update and expansion. 2nd ed., two volumes, total of 1396 pages, illustrations, bibliography. (#28)
Holocaust Handbook illustrated, bibliography. (#23)

ganda. 2nd ed., 188 pages, indexed, facts about Chelmno, not the propa-
no's scrutiny. Here are the uncensored reports, German documents, evacua-
matoria, building plans, official U.S. archaeological excavations, the cre-
forensics reports, coroners' reports, wagons as extermination weapons, evidence. Eyewitness statements, gas chambers operated as claimed? Where are the murder weapons? Could they have operated as claimed? Where are the corpses? In order to get to the truth of the matter, Alvarez has scrutinized all known wartime documents and photos about this topic; he has analyzed a huge amount of witness statements as published in the literature and as presented in more than 30 trials held over the decades in Germany, Poland and Israel; and he has examined the claims made in the pertinent mainstream literature. The result of his research is mind-boggling. Note: This book and Mattogno’s book on Chelmno were edited in parallel to make sure they are consistent and not repetitive. 398 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#23)

The Gas Vans: A Critical Investigation. (A perfect companion to the Chelmno book.) By Santiago Alvarez and Pierre Marais. It is alleged that the Nazis used mobile gas chambers to exterminate 700,000 people. Up until 2011, no thorough monograph had appeared on the topic. Santiago Alvarez has remedied the situation. Are witness statements reliable? Are documents genuine? Where are the murder weapons? Could they have operated as claimed? Where are the corpses? In order to get to the truth of the matter, Alvarez has scrutinized all known wartime documents and photos about this topic; he has analyzed a huge amount of witness statements as published in the literature and as presented in more than 30 trials held over the decades in Germany, Poland and Israel; and he has examined the claims made in the pertinent mainstream literature. The result of his research is mind-boggling. Note: This book and Mattogno’s book on Chelmno were edited in parallel to make sure they are consistent and not repetitive. 398 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#23)

The Einsatzgruppen in the Occupied Eastern Territories: Genesis, Responsibilities and Activities. By C. Mattogno. Before invading the Soviet Union, the German authorities set up special units meant to secure the area behind the German front. Orthodox historians claim that these units called Einsatzgruppen primarily engaged in rounding up and mass-murdering Jews. This study tries to shed a critical light into this topic by reviewing all the pertinent sources as well as material traces. Ca. 850 pp., b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (Scheduled for late 2018; #39)

Concentration Camp Majdanek: A Historical and Technical Study. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. At war’s end, the Soviets claimed that up to two million Jews were murdered at the Majdanek Camp in seven gas chambers. Over the decades, however, the Majdanek Museum reduced the death toll three times to currently 78,000, and admitted that there were “only” two gas chambers. By exhaustively researching primary sources, the authors expertly dissect and repudiate the myth of homicidal gas chambers at that camp. They also critically investigated the legend of mass executions of Jews in tank trenches and prove them groundless. Again they have produced a standard work of methodical investigation which authentic historiography cannot ignore. 3rd ed., 358 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#5)

Concentration Camp Stutthof and Its Function in National Socialist Jewish Policy. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. Orthodox historians claim that the Stutthof Camp served as a “make-shift” extermination camp in 1944. Based mainly on archival resources, this study thoroughly debunks this view and shows that Stutthof was in fact a center for the organization of German forced labor toward the end of World War II. 4th ed., 170 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#4)

SECTION THREE: Auschwitz Studies

The Making of the Auschwitz Myth: Auschwitz in British Intercepts. Polish Underground Reports and Postwar Testimonies (1941-1947). By Carlo Mattogno. Using messages sent by the Polish underground to London, SS radio messages sent to and from Auschwitz that were intercepted and decrypted by the British, and a plethora of witness statements made during the war and in the immediate postwar period, the author shows how exactly the myth of mass murder in Auschwitz gas chambers was created, and how it was turned subsequently into “history” by intellectually corrupt scholars who cherry-picked claims that fit into their agenda and ignored or actively covered up literally thousands of lies of “witnesses” to make their narrative look credible. Ca. 300
Holocaust Handbook

How did these gas chambers look like? How does it kill? And what effect has it on masonry? Does it leave traces that can be found still today? By thoroughly examining these issues, the horror of Auschwitz is meticulously dissected, and thus, for the first time, it really becomes comprehensible. 3rd ed., 442 pages, more than 120 color and almost 100 b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#2)

Auschwitz Lies: Legends, Lies and Prejudices on the Holocaust, By C. Mattogno and G. Rudolf. The fallacious research and alleged “refutation” of Revisionist scholars by French biochemist G. Wellers (attacking Leuchter’s famous report), Polish chemist Dr. J. Markiewicz and U.S. chemist Dr. Richard Green (taking on Rudolf’s chemical research), Dr. John Zimmerman (tackling Mattogno on cremation issues), Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman (trying to prove it all), as well as researchers Keren, McCarthy and Mazal (how turned cracks into architectural features), are exposed for what they are: blatant and easily exposed political lies created to ostracize dissident historians. 3rd ed., 398 pages, b&w illustrations, index. (#18)

Auschwitz: Plain Facts: A Response to Jean-Claude Pressac, Edited by Germar Rudolf, with contributions by Serge Thion, Robert Faurisson and Carlo Mattogno. French pharmacist Jean-Claude Pressac tried to refute revisionist findings with the “technical” method. For this he was praised by the mainstream, and they proclaimed victory over the “revisionists.” In his book, Pressac’s works and claims are shown to be unscientific in nature, as he never substantiate what he claims, and historically false, because he systematically misrepresents, misinterprets and misunderstands German wartime documents. 2nd ed., 226 pages, b&w illustrations, glossary, bibliography, index. (#22)

Auschwitz: The Chemistry of Auschwitz: The Technology and Toxicology of Zyklon B and the Gas Chambers – A Crime Scene Investigation, By Germar Rudolf. While respecting the victims, whether of foul play or of circumstance, this study nonetheless tries to conduct Auschwitz research on the basis of the forensic sciences, where material traces of the crime and their interpretation reign supreme. Although it is generally agreed that no autopsy of any victim has ever been performed, most of the claimed crime scenes – the chemical slaughterhouses called gas chambers – are still accessible to forensic examination to a greater or lesser degree. This book addresses questions such as: How did these gas chambers of Auschwitz look like? How did they operate? What were they used for? In addition, the infamous Zyklon B can also be examined. What exactly hides behind this ominous name? How does it kill? And what effect has it on masonry? Does it leave traces that can be found still today? By thoroughly examining these issues, the horror of Auschwitz is meticuosly dissected, and thus, for the first time, it really becomes comprehensible. 3rd ed., 442 pages, more than 120 color and almost 100 b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#14)
Special Treatment in Auschwitz: Origin and Meaning of a Term. By C. Mattogno. When appearing in German wartime documents, terms like “special treatment,” “special action,” and others have been interpreted as code words for mass murder. But that is not always true. This study focuses on documents about Auschwitz, showing that, while “special” had many different meanings, not a single one meant “execution.” Hence the practice of deciphering an alleged “code language” by assigning homicidal meaning to harmless documents – a key component of mainstream historiography – is untenable. 2nd ed., 166 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#10)

Healthcare at Auschwitz. By C. Mattogno. In extension of the above study on Special Treatment in Auschwitz, this study proves the extent to which the German authorities at Auschwitz tried to provide appropriate health care for the inmates. In the first part of this book, the author analyzes the inmates’ living conditions as well as the various sanitary and medical measures implemented to maintain or restore the inmates’ health. The second part explores what happened in particular to those inmates registered at Auschwitz who were “selected” or subject to “special treatment” while disabled or sick. The comprehensive documentation presented shows clearly that everything was tried to cure these inmates, especially under the aegis of Garrison Physician Dr. Wirths. The last part of this book is dedicated to the remarkable personality of Dr. Wirths, the Auschwitz garrison physician since 1942. His reality refutes the current stereotype of SS officers. 398 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#11)

Auschwitz: The First Gassing, Rumor and Reality. By C. Mattogno. The first gassing in Auschwitz is claimed to have occurred on Sept. 3, 1941, in a basement room. The accounts reporting it are the archetypes for all later gassing accounts. This study analyzes all available sources about this alleged event. It shows that these sources contradict each other in location, date, victims etc, rendering it impossible to extract a consistent story. Original wartime documents inflict a final blow to this legend and prove without a shadow of a doubt that this legendary event never happened. 3rd ed., 190 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#20)

Auschwitz: Crematorium I and the Alleged Homicidal Gassings. By C. Mattogno. The morgue of Crematorium I in Auschwitz is said to be the first homicidal gas chamber there. This study investigates all statements by witnesses and analyzes hundreds of wartime documents to accurately write a history of that building. Where witnesses speak of gassings, they are either very vague or, if specific, contradict one another and are refuted by documented and material facts. The author also exposes the fraudulent attempts of mainstream historians to convert the witnesses’ black propaganda into “truth” by means of selective quotes, omissions, and distortions. Mattogno proves that this building’s morgue was never a homicidal gas chamber, nor could it have worked as such. 2nd ed., 152 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#21)

Auschwitz: Open Air Incinerations. By C. Mattogno. In spring and summer of 1944, 400,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz and allegedly murdered there in gas chambers. The Auschwitz crematoria are said to have been unable to cope with so many corpses. Therefore, every single day thousands of corpses are claimed to have been incinerated on huge pyres lit in deep trenches. The sky over Auschwitz was covered in thick smoke. This is what some witnesses want us to believe. This book examines the many testimonies regarding these incinerations and establishes whether these claims were even possible. Using air photos, physical evidence and wartime documents, the author shows that these claims are fiction. A new Appendix contains 3 papers on groundwater levels and cattle mass burnings. 2nd ed., 202 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#17)
The Cremation Furnaces of Auschwitz. By Carlo Mattogno & Franco Deana. An exhaustive study of the history and technology of cremation in general and of the cremation furnaces of Auschwitz in particular. On a vast base of technical literature, extant wartime documents and material traces, the authors can establish the true nature and capacity of the Auschwitz cremation furnaces. They show that these devices were inferior make-shift versions of what was usually produced, and that their capacity to cremate corpses was lower than normal, too. 3 vols., 1198 pages, b&w and color illustrations (vols 2 & 3), bibliography, index, glossary. (#24)

Curated Lies: The Auschwitz Museum’s Misrepresentations, Distortions and Deceptions. By Carlo Mattogno. Revisionist research results have put the Polish Auschwitz Museum under pressure to answer this challenge. They’ve answered. This book analyz-es their answer and reveals the appallingly mendacious attitude of the Auschwitz Museum authorities when presenting documents from their archives. 248 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#38)

Deliveries of Coke, Wood and Zyklon B to Auschwitz: Neither Proof Nor Trace for the Holocaust. By Carlo Mattogno. Researchers from the Auschwitz Museum tried to prove the reality of mass extermination by pointing to documents about deliveries of wood and coke as well as Zyklon B to the Auschwitz Camp. If put into the actual historical and technical context, however, these documents prove the exact opposite of what these orthodox researchers claim. Ca. 250 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (Scheduled for early 2019; #40)

SECTION FOUR: Witness Critique

Holocaust High Priest: Elie Wiesel, Night, the Memory Cult, and the Rise of Revisionism. By Warren B. Routledge. The first unauthorized biography of Wiesel exposes both his personal deceits and the whole myth of “the six million.” It shows how Zionist control has allowed Wiesel and his fellow extremists to force leaders of many nations, the U.N. and even popes to genuflect before Wiesel as symbolic acts of subordination to World Jewry, while at the same time forcing school children to submit to Holocaust brainwashing. 468 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#30)

Auschwitz: Confessions and Testimonies. By Jürgen Graf. The traditional narrative of what transpired at the infamous Auschwitz Camp during WWII rests almost exclusively on witness testimony. This study critically scrutinizes the 40 most important of them by checking them for internal coherence, and by comparing them with one another as well as with other evidence such as wartime documents, air photos, forensic research results, and material traces. The result is devastating for the traditional narrative. (Scheduled for late-2018; #36)

Commandant of Auschwitz: Rudolf Höss, His Torture and His Forced Confessions. By Carlo Mattogno & Rudolf Höss. From 1940 to 1943, Rudolf Höss was the commandant of the infamous Auschwitz Camp. After the war, he was captured by the British. In the following 13 months until his execution, he made 85 depositions of various kinds in which he confessed his involvement in the “Holocaust.” This study first reveals how the British tortured him to extract various “confessions.” Next, all of Höss’s depositions are analyzed by checking his claims for internal consistency and comparing them with established historical facts. The results are eye-opening... 402 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#35)

An Auschwitz Doctor’s Eyewitness Account: The Tall Tales of Dr. Mengele’s Assistant Analyzed. By Miklos Nyiszli & Carlo Mattogno. Nyiszli, a Hungarian physician, ended up at Auschwitz in 1944 as Dr. Mengele’s assistant. After the war he wrote a book and several other writings describing what he claimed to have experienced. To this day some traditional historians take his accounts seriously, while others reject them as grotesque lies and exaggerations. This study presents and analyzes Nyiszli’s writings and skillfully separates truth from fabulous fabrication. 484 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#37)
Thomas Dalton, *The Holocaust: An Introduction*

The Holocaust was perhaps the greatest crime of the 20th century. Six million Jews, we are told, died by gassing, shooting, and deprivation. But: Where did the six million figure come from? How, exactly, did the gas chambers work? Why do we have so little physical evidence from major death camps? Why haven't we found even a fraction of the six million bodies, or their ashes? Why has there been so much media suppression and governmental censorship on this topic? In a sense, the Holocaust is the greatest murder mystery in history. It is a topic of greatest importance for the present day. Let's explore the evidence, and see where it leads. 128 pp. pb, 5”×8”, ill., bibl., index

Carlo Mattogno, *Auschwitz: A Three-Quarter Century of Propaganda: Origins, Development and Decline of the “Gas Chamber” Propaganda Lie*

During the war, wild rumors were circulating about Auschwitz: that the Germans were testing new war gases; that inmates were murdered in electrocution chambers, with gas showers or pneumatic hammer systems; that living people were sent on conveyor belts directly into cremation furnaces; that oils, grease and soap were made of the mass-murder victims. Nothing of it was true. When the Soviets captured Auschwitz in early 1945, they reported that 4 million inmates were killed on electrocution conveyor belts discharging their load directly into furnaces. That wasn't true either. After the war, “witnesses” and “experts” repeated these things and added more fantasies: mass murder with gas bombs, gas chambers made of canvas; carts driving living people into furnaces; that the crematoria of Auschwitz could have cremated 400 million victims… Again, none of it was true. This book gives an overview of the many rumors, myths and lies about Auschwitz which mainstream historians today reject as untrue. It then explains by which ridiculous methods some claims about Auschwitz were accepted as true and turned into “history,” although they are just as untrue. 125 pp. pb, 5”×8”, ill., bibl., index, b&w ill.

Wilhelm Stäglich, *Auschwitz: A Judge Looks at the Evidence*

Auschwitz is the epicenter of the Holocaust, where more people are said to have been murdered than anywhere else. At this detention camp the industrialized Nazi mass murder is said to have reached its demonic pinnacle. This narrative is based on a wide range of evidence, the most important of which was presented during two trials: the International Military Tribunal of 1945/46, and the German Auschwitz Trial of 1963-1965 in Frankfurt.

The late Wilhelm Stäglich, until the mid-1970s a German judge, has so far been the only legal expert to critically analyze this evidence. His research reveals the incredibly scandalous way in which the Allied victors and later the German judicial authorities bent and broke the law in order to come to politically foregone conclusions. Stäglich also exposes the shockingly superficial way in which historians are dealing with the many incongruities and discrepancies of the historical record. 3rd edition 2015, 422 pp., 6”×9”, pb, b&w ill.

Gerard Menuhin: *Tell the Truth & Shame the Devil*

A prominent Jew from a famous family says the “Holocaust” is a wartime propaganda myth which has turned into an extortion racket. Far from bearing the sole guilt for starting WWII as alleged at Nuremberg (for which many of the surviving German leaders were hanged) Germany is mostly innocent in this respect and made numerous attempts to avoid and later to end the confrontation. During the 1930s Germany was confronted by a powerful Jewish-dominated world plutocracy out to destroy it… Yes, a prominent Jew says all this. Accept it or reject it, but be sure to read it and judge for yourself! The author is the son of the great American-born violinist Yehudi Menuhin, who, though from a long line of rabbinical ancestors, fiercely criticized the foreign policy of the state of Israel and its repression of the Palestinians in the Holy Land. 4th edition 2017, 432 pp. pb, 6”×9”, b&w ill.

For prices and availability see www.shop.codoh.com or write to: CHP, PO Box 243, Uckfield, TN22 9AW, UK
Germar Rudolf, Bungled: “Denying the Holocaust” How Deborah Lipstadt Botched Her Attempt to Demonstrate the Growing Assault on Truth and Memory

With her book Denying the Holocaust, Deborah Lipstadt tried to show the flawed methods and extremist motives of “Holocaust deniers.” This book demonstrates that Dr. Lipstadt clearly has neither understood the principles of science and scholarship, nor has she any clue about the historical topics she is writing about. She misquotes, mistranslates, misrepresents, misinterprets, and makes a plethora of wild claims without backing them up with anything. Rather than dealing thoroughly with actual arguments, Lipstadt’s book is full of ad hominem attacks on her opponents. It is an exercise in anti-intellectual pseudo-scientific arguments, an exhibition of ideological radicalism which does nothing but undermine the claims it pretends to refute. F for FAIL

2nd ed., 224 pp., 5”×8”, pb, bibli., index, b&w ill.

Carolus Magnus, Bungled: “Denying History”. How Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman Botched Their Attempt to Refute Those Who Say the Holocaust Never Happened

Skeptic Magazine editor Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman from the Simon Wiesenthal Center wrote a book in 2000 which they claim is “a thorough and thoughtful answer to all the claims of Holocaust denial.” In 2009, a new “updated” edition appeared with the same ambitious goal. In the meantime, revisionists had published some 10,000 pages of archival and forensic research results. Would their updated edition indeed answer all the revisionist claims? In fact, Shermer and Grobman completely ignored the vast amount of recent scholarly studies and piled up a heap of falsifications, contortions, omissions, and fallacious interpretations of the evidence. Finally, what the authors claim to have demolished is not revisionism but a ridiculous parody of it. They ignored the known unreliability of their cherry-picked selection of evidence, utilizing unverified and incestuous sources, and obscuring the massive body of research and all the evidence that dooms their project to failure. F for FAIL

162 pp., 5”×8”, pb, bibli., index, b&w ill.

Gerhard Rudolf, Bungled: "Debunking Holocaust Denial Theories: How James and Lance Morcan Botched Their Attempt to Affirm the Historicity of the Nazi Genocide"

The novelists and movie-makers James and Lance Morcan have produced a book “to end [Holocaust] denial once and for all.” To do this, “no stone was left unturned” to argue against all the claims of Holocaust deniers.” In 2009, a new “updated” edition appeared with the same ambitious goal. In the meantime, revisionists had published some 10,000 pages of archival and forensic research results. Would their updated edition indeed answer all the revisionist claims? In fact, Shermer and Grobman completely ignored the vast amount of recent scholarly studies and piled up a heap of falsifications, contortions, omissions, and fallacious interpretations of the evidence. Finally, what the authors claim to have demolished is not revisionism but a ridiculous parody of it. They ignored the known unreliability of their cherry-picked selection of evidence, utilizing unverified and incestuous sources, and obscuring the massive body of research and all the evidence that dooms their project to failure. F for FAIL

144 pp., 5”×8”, pb, bibli., index, b&w ill.

Joachim Hoffmann, Stalin’s War of Extermination 1941-1945

A German government historian documents Stalin’s murderous war against the German army and the German people. Based on the author’s lifelong study of German and Russian military records, this book reveals the Red Army’s grisly record of atrocities against soldiers and civilians, as ordered by Stalin. Since the 1920s, Stalin planned to invade Western Europe to initiate the “World Revolution.” He prepared an attack which was unparalleled in history. The Germans noticed Stalin’s aggressive intentions, but they underestimated the strength of the Red Army. What unfolded was the most-cruel war in history. This book shows how Stalin and his Bolshevik henchman used unimaginable violence and atrocities to break any resistance in the Red Army and to force their unwilling soldiers to fight against the Germans. The book explains how Soviet propagandists incited their soldiers to unlimited hatred against everything German, and he gives the reader a short but extremely unpleasant glimpse into what happened when these Soviet soldiers finally reached German soil in 1945. A gigantic wave of looting, arson, rape, torture, and mass murder…

428 pp., pb, 6”×9”, bibli., index, b&w ill.

For prices and availability see www.shop.codoh.com or write to: CHP, PO Box 243, Uckfield, TN22 9AW, UK

Udo Walendy, Who Started World War II: Truth for a War-Torn World

For seven decades, mainstream historians have insisted that Germany was the main, if not the sole culprit for unleashing World War II in Europe. In the present book this myth is refuted. There is available to the public today a great number of documents on the foreign policies of the Great Powers before September 1939 as well as a wealth of literature in the form of memoirs of the persons directly involved in the decisions that led to the outbreak of World War II. Today, together, they made possible the mosaic-like reconstruction of the events before the outbreak of the war in 1939. This book has been published only after an intensive study of sources, taking the greatest care to minimize speculation and inference. The present edition has been translated completely anew from the German original and has been slightly revised.

500 pp, pb, 6”×9”, index, bibli., b&w ill.

Gerhard Rudolf: Resistance is Obligatory!

In 2005 Rudolf, a peaceful dissident and publisher of revisionist literature, was kidnapped by the U.S. government and deported to Germany. There he wrote his 62nd book and continued his writing. Rudolf was not permitted to defend his historical opinions, as the German penal law prohibits this. Yet he defended himself anyway: 7 days long Rudolf held a speech in the court room, during which he proved systematically that only the revisionists are scholarly in their attitude, whereas the Holocaust orthodoxy is merely pseudo-scientific. He then explained in detail why it is everyone’s obligation to resist, without violence, a government which throws peaceful dissident into dungeons. When Rudolf tried to publish his public defense speech as a book from his prison cell, the public prosecutor initiated a new criminal investigation against him. After his probation time ended in 2011, he dared publish this speech anyway...

304 pp., 6”×9”, pb, bibli., index, b&w ill.

Gerhard Rudolf, Hunting Germar Rudolf: Essays on a Modern-Day Witch Hunt

German-born revisionist activist, author and publisher Germar Rudolf describes which events made him convert from a Holocaust believer to a Holocaust skeptic, quickly rising to a leading personality within the revisionist movement. This in turn unleashed a tsunami of persecution against him: loss of his job, denied PhD exam, destruction of family photos, driven into exile, slandered by the mass media, literally hunted, caught, put on a show trial where filing motions to introduce evidence is illegal under the threat of further prosecution, and finally locked up in prison for years for nothing else than his peaceful yet controversial scholarly writings. In several essays, Rudolf takes the reader on a journey through an absurd world of government and societal persecution which most of us could never even fathom actually exists...

144 pp., 6”×9”, pb, bibli., index, b&w ill.

Gerhard Rudolf, The Day Amazon Murdered History

Amazon is the world’s biggest book retailer. They dominate the U.S. and several foreign markets. Pursuant to the 1998 declaration of Amazon’s founder Jeff Bezos to offer “the good, the bad and the ugly,” customers once could buy every book that was in print and was legal to sell. However, in early 2017, a series of anonymous bomb threats against Jewish community centers occurred in the U.S., fueling a campaign by Jewish groups to coax Amazon into banning revisionist writings, false portraying them as anti-Semitic. On March 6, 2017, Amazon caved in and banned more than 100 books with dissenting viewpoints on the Holocaust. In April 2017, an Israeli Jew was arrested for having placed the fake bomb threats, a paid “service” he had offered for years. But that did not change Amazon’s mind. Its stores remain closed for history books Jewish lobby groups disagree to. This book accompanies the documentary of the same title. Both reveal how revisionist publications had become so powerful convincing that the powers that be resorted to what looks like a dirty false-flag operation in order to get these books banned from Amazon...

128 pp., pb, 5”×8”, bibli., b&w ill.

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